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FOREWORD 
This project began over ten years ago when it was arranged by Juta's 
that Adv Gauntlett and I were to work together to update the 
'Principles' in Corbett & Buchanan 'The Quantum of Damages in 
Bodily & Fatal Injury Cases'. Due to certain logistical difficulties the 
arrangement fell through. I had by that stage already done a good deal 
of reading and had assembled the material which formed the basis for 
the publication by Juta's in 1984 of 'Damages for Lost Income'. Mr 
Justice Corbett very supportively provided a glowing foreword. This 
thesis is an amplification of that earlier publication. Few words 
capture better the essence of damages for future loss than the following 
extract with which I prefaced 'Damages for Lost Income': 
I am a pan of all that I have met,-
Yet all experience is an arch wherethro' 
Gleams that untravelled world, whose margin fades 
For ever and for ever when I move. 
from 'Ulysses ' by Alfred Lord Tennyson 
I come to this subject having qualified in 1974 both as an actuary 
through the Faculty in Scotland, and as an LLB with UNISA. Prior 
to this I had completed an honours degree in theoretical physics. A 
further formative period was three years spent lecturing statistics and 
computer management at the Business School of the University of 
Stellenbosch. I have for the last 15 years, the last 8 fulltime, earned 
a living doing damages calculations. The practice now handles in 
excess of 1500 claims per year. 
I owe thanks to many people, but particularly to my children who have 
often expressed the wish that they had a normal father who stopped 
working at weekends. .To those many others that I do not mention 
they are not forgotten. My special thanks goes to my business clients 
who have loyally supported me over the years and provided the raw 
material, ideas and opportunities which have so greatly helped to 
enlarge my perspective. 
Cape Town 
July 1993 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABBREVIATIONS ...................•.•.• •. ...•...... . ....... • .. xvii 
LIST OF TABLES . ..• . • .......................... • ........•..• . . xix 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi 
OLD AUTHORITIES • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii 
STATUTES AND RULES OF COURT ........•..•.•••..•....•.......••. xxv 
CASES • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • xxvii 
ABSTRACT .•••••............... .••• ••........................ 355 
OPSOMMING .•........•.•...........................••.••.•.. 359 
SUBJECT INDEX ..............•.••.•••••....•••................ 363 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
(1.1] THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
(1.2) BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
(1.3) STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
(1.3.1) Part I - Theory of damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
[1.3.2) Part II - Financial and technical matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
[1.3.3) Part ill - Damages for personal injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
[1.3.4) Part IV - Damages for loss of support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
[1.4] REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
[1.5] STYLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
CHAPTER 2 
UTILITY 
[2.1) DEFINITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
[2.1.1) Human wants rational & irrational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
[2.1.2] Disutility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
[2.1.3) Summation of utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
[2.1.4] Changing utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
[2.1.5) Hedonism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
[2.2) UTILITY OF A LIFE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
[2.2.1) Ideal compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
[2.2.2) The limitations of money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
(2.2.3) Irreversible damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
[2.3) UTILITY OF MONEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
[2.3.1) Price elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
[2.3.2) Money as the measure of utility .......... '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
[2.3.3) Social mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
[2.3.4] Rich man - poor man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
ii DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[2.4] UTILITY OF RISK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
[2.4.1] Risk aversives and risk seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
[2.4.2] Insurance and lotteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
[2.4.3] Market pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 9 
[2.4.4] Attraction of large sums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
[2.4.5] General contingencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
[2.5] THE MEASUREMENT OF UTILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
[2.5.1] Qualitative measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fl 
[2.5.2] Quantitative measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
[2.5.3] Damages assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
[2.5.4] Act of measurement affects result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
[2.5.5] Value amongst fellow men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
[2.6] SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS OF CHANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
(2.6.1] Intuitive notions of chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
[2.6.2] Diverse manifestations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
[2. 7] EXPECTED VALUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
[2.7.1] Averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
[2. 7 .2] Overlapping scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
[2. 7.3] Mental processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
[2. 7 .4] Expectation of life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
[2. 7 .5] Personalized averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
[2.7.6] The relevance of averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
[2. 7. 7] Average earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
[2.7.8] Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
[2.8] EXPECTED NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
[2.8.1] Adequate causation ................... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
[2.8.2] Expected normal course of events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
[2.8.3] Supervening events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
(2.8.4] Effect of appeal-court ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
[2.8.5] Causation by facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
[2.9] MARKET VALUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
[2.9.1] Communal utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
(2.9.2] Imperfect information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
(2.9.3] Expected prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
(2.9.4] Hypothetical value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
[2.9.5] Immediate replacement of damaged goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
(2.9.6] Disutility of effecting replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
[2.10] SUBSTITUTES FOR MARKET VALUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
(2.10.1] Hypothetical objective values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
[2.10.2] The forensic exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
(2.10.3] Rebuttable presumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
[2.10.4] The market value of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
(2.10.5] Discounting to present value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
(2.10.6] Quot homines tot sententiae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
(2.10.7] A general norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
[2.10.8] Insights from expropriation ... . .................... ·. . . . . . 29 
(2.10.9] Expected advantages and disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
[2.10.10] The morality of logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
(2.10.11] Four elements of assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
[2.11] 'ABSTRACT' AND 'CONCRETE' DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
(2.11.1] Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
(2.11.2] Sentimental value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
(2.11.3] Judicial ambivalence ................. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
[2.11.4) Abstraction of future loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
(2.11.5] Formalisms of assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 








TABLE OF CONTENTS lll 
(2.11.6] A right to concretize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
(2.11.7] The high cost of concretization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
(2.11.8] The burden of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
(2.11.9] Privileged claimants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
[2.12] FORENSIC DYNAMICS ...... . . . ..... ... ..................... 36 
(2.12.1] The most obvious juristic fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
(2.12.2] Judicial discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
[2.12.3] Adapting the law to changing conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
(2.12.4] Juries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
(2.12.S] Sources of normative rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
(2.12.6] Relevance of reported judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
[2.13] CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
CHAPTER 3 
DAMAGE AND DAMAGES 
(3.1] FORM OF PAYMENT OF DAMAGES ...... ... ..... . ............... 41 
(3.1.1] Rule of procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
(3.1.2] Advantages of a lump sum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
[3.1.3] Instalment compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
(3.2] THE AQUILIAN ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
(3.2.1] Multiple causes of action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
(3.2.2] Group actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
(3.2.3] Multiple measures of damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
(3.2.4] Punitive damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
(3.2.S] The dependants' action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
(3.2.6] Consequential loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
(3.2. 7] Lucrum cessans and damnum emergens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
(3.3) DAMAGE - WHAT IS IT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
(3.3.1] 'Damage' ................... ... .......... .. .. .. .... · 47 
(3.3.2) Interacting concepts of justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
(3.3.3] 'Damages' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
(3.3.4) Damage as a legal concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
(3.3.4.1) IJamnum corpore corpori datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
(3.3.4.2] Infringement of a right . . . . . . . . .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
[3.3.4.3) Reduced economic resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
(3.3.S] Roman law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
(3.3.6] Comprehensive compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
(3.3.7] The 'eggshell skull' rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
(3.3.8) Modern juristic perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
(3.3.9] Reinecke's formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
(3.3.10) Van der Walt's formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
(3.3.11) Loss and damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
(3.3.12] Actionable damage ......................... · . . . . . . . . . . 56 
(3.4) DIFFERENCING METHODOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
[3.4.1) Intuitive notions of differencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
(3.4.2] 'Differenztheorie' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
(3.4.2.1) Loss of use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
(3.4.2.2] Wasted expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
(3.4.2.3) Past loss of earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 
(3.4.2.4) Single universal action for damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
(3.4.2.S] Considerations of equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
(3.4.2.6) Utility of damages award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
(3.4.3] Classical differencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
lV DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[3.4.4] Utilitarian differencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
[3.4.4.1) Saved finance charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
[3.4.4.2) Business opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
[3.4.4.3) Psychological advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
[3.4.4.4) Remarriage prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
[3.4.4.5) Loss of insurability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
[3.4.4.6) Loss of support during the 'lost years' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
[3.4.4. 7) Disability grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
[3.4.5) Causation implies differencing .. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
[3.5) PATRIMONIUM - WHAT IS IT? . . .. . ... . .......... . ........ ..... 62 
[3.5.1) Patrimonial and non-patrimonial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
[3.5.1.1) Earning capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
[3.5. 1.2) Organ transplants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
[3.5. 1.3) Services of wife and mother . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
[3.5.1.4) Overlapping heads of damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
[3.5.2) Assets less liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
[3.5.3) Inappropriate analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
[3.5.3.1) Value of a chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
[3.5.3.2) Injury to a child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
[3.5.4) Patrimoniwn in the broadest sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
[3.5.5) Capitali:zation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
[3.5.6) Ever changing life plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
[3.5. 7) Present and future patrimonies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
[3.5.8) Past and future loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
[3.6] UTILITARIAN NATURE OF DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
[3.6.1) The shadow of future events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
[3.6.2) General damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
[3.6.3) Capital and income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
[3.6.4) The meaning of 'value' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
[3.6.5) The pricing formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
[3. 7) CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
CHAPTER 4 
VALUE OF A CHANCE 
[4.1) DEFINITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
[4.1.1] Value of a chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
[4.1.2) Intuitive downward adjustment .. . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
[4.1.3) Past loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
[4.1.4) Future loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
[4.1.5) Desirable technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
[4.1.6) Probabilities and possibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 
_[4.1.7) Balance of probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 
[4.1.8) Certa spes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
[4.2) APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES . ...... . . . . .... .. . ..... . . . .. .' . . 76 
[4.3) ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES ... . ................ . . . .... . . . . . ... 77 
[4.3.1) A finding of fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
[4.3.2) A choice of alternatives .. . .. · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
[4.4) CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
TABLE OF CONTENTS v 
CHAYfER 5 
THE CHANCES OF LIFE AND DEATH 
[5.1] DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
[5.1.1] Period of survival ... · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
[5.1.2] Chance of survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
(5.1.3] Chance of death ....... .............. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
(5.1.4] The expectation of life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
(5.1.5] Reduced expectation of life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
(5.1.6] Anecdotes and averages .. ... .......... · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
[5.2] HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
[5.2.1] Ulpian's table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
(5.2.2] Modem life tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
(5.3] RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
(5.3.1] 'End-of-the-rainbow' phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
(5.3.2] Expectation of working life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
[5.3.3] Contingency of early death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
(5.3.4] To put in the position he would have been in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
[5.4] THE ACTUARIAL YEAR-BY-YEAR METHOD ....................... 87 
[5.4.1] Sliding-scale survival chances ... .................. · ........ . 87 
(5.4.2] Yearly slices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
(5.4.3] An exrunple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
[5.4.4] Restitution of income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
(5.4.5] Contingency funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
(5.4.6] Present utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
(5.4. 7] Retirement benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
(5.4.8] Joint survivorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
(5.5] CHANCE OF INHERITANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
(5.5.l] Gross multiplier method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
(5.5.2] Actuarial year-by-year method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
(5.5.3] Retirement lump sums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
(5.5.4] Awards of drunages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
(5.6] LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
[5.6.1) Frequency predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
(5.6.2) Consuming interest and capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
[5.6.3] Cross subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
(5.6.4) Individuals and utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
(5.6.5] Classical statisticians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
(5. 7) CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
CHAYfER 6 
CONSUMING INTEREST AND CAPITAL 
[6.1) DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
[6.1.1) Multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
(6.1.2) The actuarial year-by-year method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 
(6.1.3) Approximations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 
[6.1.4) Interest and inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 
[6.1.5] Sinking funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 
(6.1.6] Discussion of model A .... . ...... . . . .......... ... ....... 101 
[6.1.7] Discussion of model B .. . . .... ..... .. ............. . ..... 101 
[6.1.8) Discussion of model C .... ......... . .................... 101 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Vl DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[6.2] CONSUMABLE INVESTMENT INCOME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 
(6.2.1] Preservation of capital ... ........ ....... ... ....... ..... . 102 
[6.2.2] Retirement funding .................................... 102 
[6.3] TAXATION ................................................ 103 
[6.3.1] Taxable and tax-free investments ........................... 103 
[6.3.2] Estimating future tax rates ............................... 103 
[6.3.4] Net capitalization rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 
[6.4] CONTINGENCY FUNDS .................................. . . ... 106 
[6.4.1] Definition .......................................... 106 
(6.4.2] Provision for taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
[6.4.3] Reserves of a life office ............. . ...... ......... .... 107 
(6.4.4] Support from a deceased estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 
[6.S] FUNDING CRITERIA ............ .... .... ......... . .. ......... 108 
[6.S.1] 50% risk of ruin . ....... . .. . .... ............. ......... 108 
[6.S.2] Deciles & quartiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
[6.S.3] Even-handed justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 
[6.S.4] Unfettered use of compensation money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 
[6.S.S] Optimal expenditure criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 
[6.S.6] No general solution ...... .. ............................ 110 
[6.S. 7] 'Another bite at the cherry' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 
[6.5.8] Add-on for risk ...................................... 110 
[6.6] CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
CHAPTER 7 
ANNUITIES 
[7.1] DEFINITIONS .............................................. 113 
(7.1.1] Life annuity ....................... . . ..... ... ...... . 113 
[7 .1.2] Joint-life annuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
[7.1.3] Joint-life and survivor annuity ............................ 113 
[7.1.4] Deferred life annuity ............... . ................... 113 
[7.1.S] Immediate annuity ....... . ..... . ........ . .... .... ..... 114 
[7.1.6] Annuity certain ........ .. ... .. . .. .. -... . ... ... . . ...... 114 
[7.1.7] Increasing annuity . .......... . . . . . ... .. .. ............. 114 
[7.1.8] Settlement annuity ... .. .. ... .... .. . ... . ............... 114 
(7 .1.9] The right to an annuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 
(7.1.10] Taxation of annuity payments . .. . ........ ... ............. 115 
(7.2] FORENSIC APPLICATIONS .................................... 115 
[7.2.1) Price of a life annuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 
(7 .2.2] Changing perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 
[7.2.3] Modern life annuities .................................. 116 
(7 .2.4] Discount rates of return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
[7 .2.5] Immunisation theory ........ ....... ........... , . . . . . . . . 117 
[7.3] THE ROMAN-DUTCH PRACTICE ................................ 118 
(7.3.1] Market values ....................... .. . ......... . ... 118 
[7.3.2] Meaning of 'lijfrente' ... . .... . ......... .. . ........... .. . 118 
[7.3.3] Johan de Witt ....... ... ...... ... ... . . . ....... .. .. . . . 120 
(7.3.4] Voet's silence .... . ..... . . . . .. .............. .. ...... .. 120 
[7 .3.5) The rise of life offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
[7.4] CONCLUSIONS ............................................. 121 




TABLE OF CONTENTS Vil 
CHAPTER 8 
THE T™E VALUE OF MONEY 
[8.1] BASIC CONCEPTS .... ...... ......... . . . .................... 125 
[8.1.1] Disutility of delayed payment ............. .......... ..... . 125 
[8.1.2] Estimated market value ............. . ......... . ......... 125 
[8.1.3] Duty to mitigate ....................... . ..... . . . ...... 126 
[8.1.4] Objective investment standard . ............................ 127 
[8.1.5] Internal rate of return .................... . .. . . .. ....... 127 
[8.1.6] Historical returns ....................... ..... . . ....... 128 
[8.1. 7] The nominal rate and its components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 
[8.1.8] Risk of mortality ........................... .... ...... 129 
[8.1.9] Residual earning capacity ....................... . ........ 130 
[8.2] THEORY OF REAL RATE OF RETURN ........ .. .................. 130 
[8.2.1] Net capitalization rate ......................... . ........ 130 
[8.2.2] Consistency between awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
[8.2.3] Good times and bad times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
[8.3] INVESTMENT INDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
[8.3.1] The consumer price index . . . .......... ... ............... 133 
[8.3.2] The dividend yield .................................... 133 
[8.3.3] The yield index ...................................... 133 
[8.3.4] Consumption of capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 
[8.3.5] Expectations and outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 
[8.3.6] 'Barometer' of prevailing investment conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
[8.3. 7] Dispute resolution amongst actuaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
[8.3.8] Surrogate markets .................................... 137 
[8.3.9] Compensating errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 
[8.3.10] Importance of nominal rate of return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 
[8.3.11] Reliability of long-term fixed-interest yield index ................ 139 
[8.3.12] Mixed investment portfolio .............................. 139 
[8.3.13] Fixed-interest investment involves high risks ................... 140 
[8.4] QUANTIFYING THE REAL RATE OF RETURN ............ . ......... 141 
[8.4.1] Estimates ... . ...................................... 141 
[8.4.2] Anomalous investor preferences ............................ 141 
[8.4.3] Measurement of liquidity premium ............. .............. 142 
[8.4.4] Results of studies ........ ... ..... ......... . . .......... 142 
[8.4.5] 2,5% per year real return ............................... 143 
[8.4.6] Prescribed real rate of return . . ...... . · ............. . ...... 144 
[8.5] NET CAPITALIZATION RATES .............. .. .... .. . .. ........ 145 
[8.5.1] Real increases in earnings . . ............................. 145 
[8.5.2] Medical inflation ........................... . ........ . 146 
[8.5.3] Reducing rates of inflation ............. . ................. 147 
[8.6] CONCLUSIONS ............................................. 148 
CHAPTER 9 
GENERAL CONTINGENCIES 
[9.1] INTRODUCTION .......... .... .............................. 149 
[9.1.1] Early judgments ... ................................... 149 
[9.1.2] All embracing adjustment .... ........................... 149 
[9.1.3) Implicit adjustments ................................... 150 
[9.1.4] Deductions used in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
[9.1.5] More than just days unemployed ........................... 151 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Vlll DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
(9.2] RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS ............ ..... ... . ...... ..... . 151 
(9.2. l] Insurance reduces the risks of life ......... . .. .. ......... . .. 151 
(9.2.2] The unemployed victim ............ .... .. . .......... ... . 151 
[9.2.3] Costs of travelling to and from work .... . . ...... .. ... .... . .. 152 
(9.2.4] Early retirement .. ..... ....... . .... ......... ..... . . ... 153 
(9.2.5] Divorce ... . ..................... .. .... ........ .... 153 
(9.2.6] Early death ...... ... ... .. ............... .... ........ 154 
[9.2.7] Medical and related expenses ....................... . ..... 154 
(9.2.8] Layers of earnings ..... ; ... ... . ........... . ..... . ... . . 154 
(9.2.9] Risk attaching to pensions .................. .. .. . . . .. .... 155 
[9.2.10] Subjective impression ..... ....... ............... ...... . 156 
(9.2.11] Consistency between awards ................... ... ....... 157 
(9.3] THEORETICAL ASPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 
(9.3.1] Always a deduction ... . .. ..... .. .... . ... ... .. . ......... 157 
(9.3.2] Utility of capital . .... ........ . ........ ... .. .. ...... .. . 158 
[9.3.3] Widening funnel of doubt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 
(9.3.4] Increase to the discount rate ..... .. ....................... 159 
[9.3.5] Illustrative calculations ................................. 160 
(9.3.6] Different approaches - same result ................... . ...... 160 
(9.3. 7] Share-market risk profiles .............. . .... . .......... . 160 
[9.3.8] Low share prices indicate high risks ........... .... . .... ..... 161 
(9.4] CONCLUSION ... . . ......... . . . . . ... . ............... . .... . . 162 
CHAPTER 10 
LOSS OF USE 
[10.1] INTRODUCTION .................................... . ...... 163 
[10.1.1] Money and goods . .. .... ... ............ . . ......... ... 163 
(10.1.2] Inadequacies in the law ........................... . .... 163 
(10.1.3] Exceptions ..... . ........ .. ... ..... . ...... .. .. ... ... 164 
[10.1.4] Loss of utility .... . .................................. 164 
(10.2] ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 
(10.2.1] Cost of hiring a substitute . . .. .. . .. . . .. . ....... . .. .. .. ... 164 
(10.2.2] Unused goods . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . ... . .... . . . . ....... 165 
[10.2.3] Tradeable goods ........ ... .............. .. .......... 165 
[10.2.4] Non-tradeable goods ...... . ....... .. .................. 166 
(10.2.5] Invesbnent rates of return ................. .. . . ......... 166 
[10.2.6] Running costs . .............................. . ....... 166 
[10.3] THEORETICAL ANALYSIS .................................... 167 
[10.3.1) Anomalous legal principles .............................. 167 
(10.3.2) Date-of-delict rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 
(10.3.3) Trading costs ......... ... .... ................ . . .... . 168 
(10.3.4) Value encapsulates all use options ................ ... ... . . .. 169 
(10.4) INTEREST AND DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 
(10.4.1) Single undivided debt ... ....... . ... . . . . .. . ........... . ~ 169 
(10.4.2) A series of separate pseudo-debts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 
[10.4.3] Liquidated damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 
[10.4.4) Different standards of justice . ..... . . . ... ... .............. 171 
[10.4.5) Loss of buying power .. ................................ 171 
[10.4.6] Use of collateral benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
(10.4. 7) Fault in conduct of proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
[10.4.8] Interest or inflation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
(10.4.9] Notional borrowings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 
(10.4.10) Penalty interest ........................ ... .......... 173 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
TABLE OF CONTENTS lX 
[10.4.11) Prescribed rate of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 
[10.4.12) Date from which interest runs ..... . .... . .... . .......... . 175 
[10.4.13) Indexation . ...... ..... . ... . . . ..... . ..... . ..... . ... 175 
[10.5) FOREIGN CURRENCIES ................ ... .. .... . . . ......... 176 
[10.5.1) Judgment in a foreign currency ...... . . . ...... . .. . ...... . . 176 
[10.5.2) Mora interest . .. ......... ... . .. ... ... . ... . . . ........ 176 
[10.6] CONCLUSION ...... . .. . ...... .. ...... .... . ... . ..... . . .. ... 177 
CHAPTER 11 
COLLATERAL BENEFITS 
[11.1) INTRODUCTION ................. . ...... .. ............. . ... 179 
[11.1.1) Grounds for deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 
[11.1.2) Justifiable non-deduction ............. . ... .. ........... . 180 
[11.1.3) Micro- and macro-economics ... .. ..... .. .... . . ..... .. . .. . 180 
[11.1.4) The role of large institutions .......... . . . .. . .. . .... . . . . . . 181 
[11.1.5) Abdication of judicial responsibility? . . . .. .. ... . . ... .... .. . .. 182 
[11.2) INSURANCE AND PENSION BENEFITS . ..... . .. ... .. . .. ... . ...... 183 
[11.2.1) Deduction of pension benefits .. . .... . ... .. . ... .. ....... . . 183 
[11.2.2) Exceptions to the 'Dippenaar' rule .. .. . .. ... .. . .. . .. ... . . . . 185 
[11.2.3) Insurance as savings .......... ... . . . ... .... . .. . ....... 185 
[11.2.4] Privately negotiated insurances .... . . ... .. ... . .. .. . .... . .. 186 
[11.2.5) The insurance principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 
[11.2.6] Right of subrogation ..... . . . . .. .... ... . ... .. . . ... ... .. 187 
[11.2.7] Casual frolic . . ... .. . . .............. . ............ . .. 188 
[11.2.8) Durable and ephemeral 'investments' . ... ... .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . . 188 
[11.2.9] Take your victim as you find him .... .. ........... . ...... .. 190 
[11.2.10) Premiums paid by the claimant ...... . .... .. .... . ..... .. . 190 
[11.3) GRATUITOUS BENEFITS .... . .. . . . . . .......... . . . ......... ... 190 
[11.3.1) General . . .. . . ....... . .. . ............ . . .. ........ . . 190 
[11 .3.2) Directive by the court .. ... ... . . ................ . ... . . . 191 
(11.3.3] A general rule? . . ............... ... .......... . ... . ... 192 
[11.3.4) Inadequate compensation .......... ... . ..... . ... .... .... 192 
(11.4) OVERLAPPING RIGHTS OF ACTION ........ .... . . . .... .. . .. .... 193 
[11.4.1) 'Group action' defined ... . ... . ...... ...... . . ... . . . . .... 193 
(11.4.2) Single group action is preferable .. ............. . . . ..... . .. 194 
[11.4.3] Circumstances where separate actions preferable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 
[11.4.4) Collateral support after death ......... .. .. ... . . .......... 195 
[11.4.5) Expenses of an injured child ... .... .. ... .. . . . . . ..... ... . . 195 
[11.5) THE 'CONTRACT' OF EMPLOYMENT .. . . . .. . ..... . . . . ... ....... 195 
[11.5.1) Employers as loss bearers ........ .. . . ........... . . . .. . .. 195 
[11.5.2) Employment benefits . .... . . ....... ............. . .... . . 196 
[11.5.3) Reasonable expectations ... .. . .............. . . . .. . ... . .. 197 
(11.5.4) Sick pay and leave pay .. ... . . . . ....... . . . ... . . . . ... .... 198 
[11.5.5) 'Gratuitous' benefits . .... ... . . ..... . ... .. ... . ... . . . ... 198 
[11.5.6) Contractual discretion ... . . .... . .. ....... . . . . . ....... . . 198 
(11.6) BENEFITS PAYABLE BY THE STATE . ........ . . ... .. . .. . .. .. .... 199 
(11. 7) PUBLIC SUBSCRIPTIONS .. . . ... .......... .... .. . . .... .. .... .. 200 
[11.8) PIGEONHOLING . . ... .... · .. ..... . ...... . .... . ........ . .. .. . 200 
[11.8.1) Pigeonholing ..... ... .. . ............... . . . .......... 200 
[11.8.1.1) Past gains .. . . ..... ; ...... ... . . ......... . .... 200 
[11.8.1.2) Loss of support by reason of personal injury . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 
[11.8.1.3] Support in old age ..... .... .. . . .. ............... 201 
[11 .8.1.4) Like deducted from like . . .. . . . . ...... . .... .. . .. .. 201 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
x DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[11.8.2) Overlapping heads ..... . . ....... . . .. .... ... . ......... 201 
[11.8.3) 'Pigeonholing' general damages .................... .... ... 203 
[11.8.4) Effect of supervening death . ...... .. . ............ ........ 203 
[11.8.5) Overlap between patrimonial and non-patrimonial . .............. 204 
[11.8.6) Statutory 'pigeonholing' of general damages ... ... . . ..... .. .. .. 205 
[11.8. 7) Military pensions .... . . .. ...... . ...... . ... . .... ... . .. 206 
[11.8.8) Contradicted principles ... ... . . ............. . .......... 206 
[11.9) CAUSATION BY FACILITATION .. ...... .. ... . .... .. ............ 207 
[11.9.1) Narrow causal reasoning ................ .... . .. ........ 207 
[11.10) SUBLIMINAL WRATH .. ...... . . .............. .. ............ 209 
[11.10.1) Damages are not punislunent ...................... . ... . . 209 
[11.10.2] Indications of irrationality . . ... .. . .. .. .. . . .............. 209 
[11.10.3) Judicial discretion . ...... .. .. . .... .... . ..... ........ . 210 
[11.10.4] Policy decisions ...... . . . ........ ... ................. 211 
[11.10.5) The morality of logic .... . ............. . ......... .. . . . 211 
[11.11) CONCLUSIONS .............. .... .... .. ...... .. ........ . .. 212 
CHAPTER 12 
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
[12.1) 'LOSS OF EARNINGS' ..... ... .. . .. . . .. ......... . .. . .... .. ... 213 
[12.1.1] All-embracing ...................................... 213 
[12.1.2) 'Pigeonholing' .................... . ..... . ......... . . 213 
[12.1.3] The three elements ... ..... .......... .. ..... .. ...... . . 214 
[12.1.3.1) Work capacity ..................................... 214 
[12.1.3.2) Earnings ......................................... 214 
[12.1.3.3) Present value ....... . ... . . , ... . . .. .. . .............. 215 
[12.1.4] Capital and income ................................... 215 
[12.2] DIFFERENCING METHODOLOGY ...... . ....................... 217 
[12.2.1) Capitalize first ............... . ............... . ...... 217 
[12.2.2) Difference first ............................. -..... . ... 217 
[12.2.3) Damages as a series of debts . .. . .. ..... .. ... ............. 217 
[12.2.4) Eclectic methodology ... ... ... .. . .. .. . . . .. .. . .. . ....... 218 
[12.2.5) Superficial distinctions ... . .... .. ... .. . .. . . . .... . ...... . 218 
[12.2.6) Differential contingencies ..... .. ... . .. . . ... ............. 218 
[12.2. 7) Earning capacity as an asset .. ........................... 219 
[12.3) PAST LOSS OF EARNINGS . ..... .. ............ . .. . ............ 219 
[12.3.1) Complicating factors .................................. 219 
[12.3.2) Foregone utility ..... . ....... ... ................ .. ... 221 
[12.3.3) Claims by deceased estates ................... . ........ .. 221 
[12.4) HOME-MAKING CAPACITY ....................... . ........... 222 
[12.4.1) Who claims what? ..... . ....... .. ... . ..... . .... . ..... . 222 
[12.4.2) Compensation for notional expenditure ...................... 222 
[12.4.3) Loss of ma·rriage prospects ..... .. ....................... 223 
[12.4.4) Quantifying the loss .... .... . ... . ..................... . 223 
[12.5) LIVING EXPENSES .. . ...... . . .. .... ........ . .... .... .... .. . 225 
[12.5.1) Savings deducted ... . .. . ... .... . . . ... . . . ...... . . .. ... 225 
[12.5.2) Saved travel costs ... .. . .... .. . .. .. .... . . .... .. .. . .... 226 
[12.5.3) Savings in the 'lost years' .............. .. ...... . .... . .. . 227 
[12.5.4) Yearly packets of loss . . ............................... 227 
[12.5.5] General damages for the 'lost years' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 
[12.5.6] Institutionalization .............. . . ...... ......... -.... 228 
[12.5. 7) Expensive hobbies .......................... . ... . ..... 229 
[12.5.8] Loss of marriage prospects .............................. 229 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
TABLE OF CONTENTS Xl 
[12.5.9] Divergent opinions ................................... 230 
[12.6] INCOME TAX ............................. . .. . ..... . . . .... 231 
[12.6.1] Tax status of award ................................... 231 
[12.6.2] Tax on investment income ........... . ... ... . .. ... .. . .. .. 231 
[12.6.3] Tax on notional earnings ............................... 231 
[12.6.4] Estimation of future taxation ............... . ............. 232 
[12.6.5] 'Pigeonholing' ...................................... 232 
[12.7] THE BALANCE SHEET OF LIFE ................................ 233 
[12.7.1] Male victim ........................................ 233 
[12. 7 .2] Female victim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 
[12.8] LIKELY EARNINGS ......................................... 235 
[12.8.1] Expected earnings ..... : .......... . .... . ..... . ........ 235 
[12.8.2] Retirement age ...................................... 237 
[12.8.3] Lo~ of capacity to work ................................ 237 
[12.8.4] Percentage disablements ......... . ...................... 237 
[12.8.5] Onus of proof ...................... . ................ 238 
[12.8.6] Partially gratuitous earnings ............................. 239 
[12.8. 7] Mitigation of damages ..................... .. .... . ..... 239 
[12.9] ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES ................... . ........... 240 
[12.9.1] Likely expenditure . . ... ....... ............ .. ......... 240 
[12.9.2] Likely medical costs .................. . ................ 241 
[12.9.3] Comparable social standing .......... . ............. . ..... 242 
[12.9.4] Notional expenditure .................................. 243 
[12.9.5] Victim's stated intentions ............................... 244 
[12.9.6] Taxation ... . ...................................... 245 
[12.9. 7] Freedom of action ...... . . . ........................... 245 
[12.10] INSURANCE COSTS . . . . . . ....... · .......... . .... . ........... 246 
[12.10.1] Life insurance ............................... . ...... 246 
[12.10.2] Disability insurance .................................. 247 
[12.10.3] Accident insurance ........... . . . . . ................... 247 
[12.10.4] Short-term insurance ................................. 247 
[12.11] MOTOR-CAR EXPENSES .............. . ..................... 248 
[12.11.1] Luxury or nec~ity? ............ . .................... 248 
[12.11.2] Unlikely expenditure ................................. 249 
[12.12] MODIFICATIONS TO THE HOME .............................. 249 
[12.12.1] Leased premises ..... ... ............................ 249 
[12.12.2] Investment of award in a home .......................... 250 
[12.12.3] Compensating advantages .. . ........................... 250 
[12.13] ATTENDANTS ....... . .................................... 251 
[12.13.1] Remuneration ...................................... 251 
[12.13.2] Regional and social diversity . ... . . ...................... 251 
[12.13.3] Accommodation and travel . ... ......................... 252 
[12.13.4] General contingencies ... . . . ........................... 252 
[12.13.5] Cars and wheelchairs ................................. 252 
[12.13.6] Curator bonis ...................................... 253 
[12.14] EXPENSES FOR A CHILD .................................... 254 
[12.14.1] Future costs awarded to parent .......................... 254 
[12.14.2] Unjustifiable practice ................................. 254 
[12.14.3] Apportionment of damages . . ........................... 255 
[12.15] GENERAL DAMAGES ....................................... 255 
[12.15.1] Balancing item ..................................... 255 
[12.15.2] Core element ...................................... 256 
[12.15.3] Functional approach ................................. 256 
[12.15.4] Freedom from the need to work ........................ . . 256 
[12.15.5] Retributive awards ... .. ..... . ....................... 258 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XU DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[12.15.6] Financially relevant awards ........ ... .. . .... .... . .... .. 259 
[12.15. 7] Objectively observed subjectivity .... ..... ...... ...... ..... 260 
[12.15.8] Enrichment of the life plan ........ ... ...... . .. . ....... . 260 
[12.15.9] Eclectic assessment criteria .. . . . ....... ... ..... . .. .... . . 261 
[12.16] FLUCTUATING EARNINGS ........... .. . . .. . ................. 261 
[12.17] BUSINESS CAPITAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 
[12.17.1] Earning capacity of capital .. .. ........... . ............. 261 
[12.17 .2] Declining real values (table 18) ... . .. . ...... . ........... .. 262 
[12.17.3] Real values maintained (table 19) ....... . .. . . . .......... . . 262 
[12.17.4] Increasing real capital (table 20) .......... . ...... . .. . ..... 264 
[12.17.5] Wealth reduces need to work ............... . .......... . . 264 
[12.17.6] The entrepreneur ............. .. .... . .......... .. ... 264 
[12.17. 7] Investment capacity of victim .. .. .... . ...... . .. . ...... . .. 265 
[12.18] SERVICES OF WIFE IN A FAMILY BUSINESS . ....... .. .......... . 265 
[12.18.1] Cost of substitute services .. . . ............. . .. ... . . ..... 265 
[12.18.2] Who claims for what? ............... . ... . .... . ..... . . 265 
[12.18.3] Adjustment for income tax . ..... . ............. . .... .. .. 266 
[12.18.4] Injury to the husband ......... . ..... . .............. .. . 266 
[12.19] ILLEGAL EARNINGS ..... . ..... . .. . . . ......... . .. .... .. ... . 267 
[12.19.1] Compensation denied .. .. . . ... . ... . ............... . . . . 267 
[12.19.2) Inadmissible evidence . . · .... . .. .... ... . .. . ...... . ...... 267 
[12.19.3) Tenuous earnings . .. . .. .. .. .. ... . ...... .. ...... .. ... 267 
[12.19.4] Punishment to match the crime ....... .. .... . ... .. ..... . . 268 
[12.19.5] Versari in re illicita . .............. . ...... . .. . ...... .. 268 
[12.19.6] Hypothetical legality .. . .... . ...... . ... . .......... . .... 269 
[12.19.7] Tax evasion ........... . . . .... . .. . ... . . .. ....... . .. 269 
[12.19.8] Enforceability of illegal contracts ..... . .... .... . . ......... 270 
[12.19.9] Post-injury illegality . ... ...... .. ............... ... .... 270 
[12.19.10) Immorality ...... .. . . .... . .................. . . . ... 270 
[12.20) CONCLUSIONS .................. .. .. . .... .. ............ . . 271 
CHAPTER 13 
THE DEPENDANTS' ACTION 
[13.1] THE RIGHT OF ACTION .... ... ........ . . ... . . .. . .. .... . , .. . . 273 
[13.1.1] Confined to loss of support .. ... ......... . ....... .. ...... 273 
[13.1.2] Damages for shock ........ . .......................... 274 
[13.1.3] Damages to the deceased's estate ...................... . ... 274 
[13.1.4) Historical origins ........... .... .... .. ............ . .. 274 
[13.1.5] The injured breadwinner . . .................... . ........ 275 
[13.1.6] Quantum ................ . ....... . ... . ............. 275 
[13.1.7] Past loss ............ . ......... . ................... 276 
[13.1.8) Curator bonis .......... . ............................ 276 
[13.2) REQUIREMENTS FOR A CLAIM ................................ 277 
[13.2.1] Financial value ........... ... ....... .. . ...... . ... . ... 277 
[13.2.2] Enforceable duty of support . .. . . . . ... ....... .... . ... . . . . 278 
[13.2.3] Spes of support . .. . . .... . . ... . . .. .. .. . . . ............. 278 
[13.2.4] Value of prospective support by a child ....... . .............. 279 
[13.2.5] Changing circumstances .................. . .. . ... . ...... 279 
[13.2.6] The posthumous child ........ . ............. . ..... . .... 279 
[13.2. 7] Death before a wedding .... .. .......................... 279 
[13.2.8] Support by parents .................. .. .... . .......... 280 
[13.2.9) Support by children ................................... 281 
[13.2.10] The obligation to seek work . ...... ......... . ............ 282 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
TABLE OF CONTENTS Xlll 
[13.2.11) Temporary unemployment ............... ... .... . ....... 282 
(13.2.12) Support by siblings ............. ........ .......... . .. 283 
(13.2.13) Support for stepchildren ............................... 283 
(13.2.14] In-laws ............................ .. ............ 284 
(13.2.15) Support between grandparents and grandchildren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 
[13.2.16) Uncles nephews and nieces ................ . ............ 285 
(13.2.17) Support by breadwinner's estate .. . ....................... 285 
[13.2.18) Contractual right to support .................. . ......... 286 
(13.2.19) Diverse uncompensated obligations to maintain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 
(13.2.20) Black Laws Amendment Act ................ . ........... 287 
(13.3) PERIOD OF DEPENDENCY .... ................................ 288 
[13.3.l] Between husband and wife .................. . .. .. ....... 288 
(13.3.2) Divorce ..... .......... .. ... .. ..... . : ....... . .... .. 289 
(13.3.3) Children ............................ . ............. 289 
(13.3.4] Economic depression ..................... ........... .. 289 
(13.3.5) Military service ...... .... ............. .............. 290 
(13.3.6) Dependent parents .... ........ .. .. ....... . . .. ........ 290 
(13.3. 7) Siblings ................................. . ......... 290 
(13.3.8) Dependency but for the death .................. . ......... 290 
(13.4] FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF DEPENDENCY ............ ..... ........ 291 
[13.4.1) Likely support .................... . ..... ....... . .... 291 
(13.4.2) Benefits in kind ............. ......................... 291 
(13.4.3) 'Social advantages' ....................... . ........... 291 
(13.4.4) 'Comforts, conveniences and advantages' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 
(13.5] USE OF ASSETS ...... .... .................. .. ..... . ....... 293 
(13.5.1) Real rate of return . ..... ...... ... .... ..... .. . .... .... 293 
(13.5.2) Use value of a home .................................. 293 
(13.5.3) Wife's assets ...................................... . 294 
(13.5.4) Donations between spouses .................. . .... ....... 294 
[13.5.5) Communal assets .............. ...... ... . . ........... 294 
(13.5.6] Going concerns ...................................... 295 
(13.5. 7) Rapidly depreciating assets ......... ... ....... . .......... 295 
(13.5.8) Retirement assets ....................... . ............ 295 
(13.5.9) Adjustment to accelerated benefits .................. .. ..... 296 
(13.6) SERVICES IN THE HOME ................... ...... .... .. ..... 296 
(13.6.1) Separate claims ........ ... ............. .. .... ... .... 296 
(13.6.2) Utilitarian approach .................................. 297 
(13.6.3) Substitute services .................. ........... ....... 298 
(13.6.4) Services of grandparents ..... ... ... ..................... 298 
(13.6.5) Period of loss . ...................................... 298 
[13.6.6) Deduction for remarriage . . . · ....... .. ................... 298 
(13.6. 7) Anomalous aspects ................................... 298 
(13. 7) DEDUCTIONS FROM THE DECEASED'S INCOME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 
(13.7.1) Taxation and travel costs ............................... 299 
(13.7.2) Deceased's own living expenses ........................... 299 
(13.7.3) Maintenance provided in absence of duty to do so ............... 300 
(13. 7 .4) More than one wife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 
(13. 7 .5) Hindu and Moslem marriages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 
(13. 7.6) Further children and further wives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 
(13.7.7) 'Common-law wife' ............. ... .... ..... .......... 301 
[13.7.8) Gratuitous support .................... . ...... . ....... 301 
[13. 7.9) Charity ......... ................ .. .... . . .......... 302 
(13.7.10] Pension deductions and insurance premiums .................. 302 
(13.7.11) Savings ......... .. ....... . .. ..................... 302 
(13.7.12) Wife's income ...................................... 303 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XIV DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[13. 7 .13) Expensive hobbies ...... ........ ......... . ..... . · .. ... 303 
[13.7.14) Insolvent breadwin.ner ........ ...... ...... . . .... ...... 303 
[13.8) APPORTIONMENT OF FAMILY INCOME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 
[13.8.1) Family income defined ................................. 304 
[13.8.2) Two-parts-one-part method ....... .. ..... . . .. ........... .. 304 
[13.8.3) A convenient approximation .. .... .......... ..... ........ 305 
[13.8.4) Nwnerical example 1 . ..... . . ..... ......... . . .... ... .- . . 305 
[13.8.5) Preswnption of common household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 
[13.8.6) Single-parent families .................................. 305 
[13.8. 7) Dependent grandparents ............ ... .. . ...... ... . ..... 306 
[13.8.8) Lower-income household finances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 
[13.8.9) Employment benefits not shared with family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 
[13.8.10) Lobola money .............................. .. .... . . 307 
[13.8.11) Support for illegitimate children ............. . ... .. ....... 307 
[13.8.12) Direct evidence of maintenance payments ... . .... ..... . . . . . .. 307 
[13.8.13) Services in the home ................................. 308 
[13.9) THE WORKING WIFE ....................................... 308 
[13.9.1) Self-supporting to extent of her own income ..... .. .... . ....... 308 
[13.9.2) Nwnerical example 2 .................................. 309 
[13.9.3) The support of children ................................ 309 
[13.9.4) Statutory and common-law rights of recourse .. . .. . .. . ......... 310 
[13.9.5) Joint and several liability of parents . . . ....... . . .. . . . .... . .. 310 
[13.9.6) In accordance with his or her 'means' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 
[13.9. 7) Pro-rata contributions by spouses . ............ ...... ....... 312 
[13.9.8) Unfair treatment of mothers ......... .. .... ...... . . ...... 312 
[13.9.9] Nwnerical example 3 (method A) .. .... .................... 313 
[13.9.10) Nwnerical example 4 (method B) ..... . . . ...... . . .. .... . .. 314 
[13.9.11] Method A is to be preferred ........... . ....... . ........ 315 
[13.9.12) Form of contributions by spouses ......................... 315 
[13.9.13) Equity between parents ............................... . 316 
[13.9.14) Spurious 'losses' indicated by method B ....... .... . ... ...... 316 
[13.9.15) Nwnerical example 5 (method A) . ............ . ........... 317 
[13.9.16) Sources of legal authority ....... .. . ........ . ........... 318 
[13.9.17) Redistribution of burden of support . . .. .. ... .... . . ... . .... 318 
[13.9.18) Foreign jurisdictions .. .. . .. . ... .. . ..... . .. . .... ..... . 318 
[13.9.19) Chances of death, divorce or unemployment . . .. ... .. . .. .. .... 319 
[13.9.20) Further children ....................... .. ........... 319 
[13.9.21) Services in the home ......... . ...................... . 320 
[13.9.22) Wife's personal obligations ........................... .. 320 
[13.10) WIDOW'S EARNING CAPACITY HAVING REGARD TO THE DEATH ..... 320 
[13.10.1) Widow's earnings are ignored .......... . ................ 320 
[13.10.2) Widow's changed tax position ................. . ......... 321 
[13.10.3) Widows who cease working ...... . . . ..... . .............. 321 
[13.10.4) Child's loss of earning capacity .......................... 322 
[13.11) EMPLOYMENT IN THE FAMILY BUSINESS ....................... 322 
[13.11.1) The duty of support .................................. 322 
[13.11.2) Earnings after the death are ignored .. . ... . .. . .. ...... ..... 323 
[13.11.3) What model now? .. . . . . .. .. . .. . .. ... . . . ... .... .. .. . . 323 
[13.11.4) Savings in expenditure .. ..... . ... . .. . . ... . ...... . .... . 323 
[13.11.5) Taxation ..... .. ............. .. .. . . ............... 324 
[13.11.6) Assessment of damages .. .. . ... ...... .. .............. . . 324 
[13.12) REMARRIAGE .. ... . ...... .. ... ... . ....................... 324 
[13.12.1) Financial value .... . ..... .. . ..... .............. . .... 324 
(13.12.2) The remarried widow ......... . . . ........ .... ......... 325 
[13.12.3) Period until remarriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
TABLE OF CONTENTS xv 
[13.12.4) Increased remarriage rates ... .. .. ... .. ... . ............ . 326 
[13.12.5) Death occasions remarriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 
[13.12.6) Divorce rates ...................................... 326 
[13.12.7) Remarriage by blacks ........................... . ..... 327 
[13.12.8) Remarriage statistics ......................... . ...... . 327 
[13.12.9] Effect of children .......... .... ... ... .. . .. . . . . ...... 328 
[13.12.10) Case study .. . ......... ......... . ... . .. . ..... . .... 328 
[13.12.11) Remarriage by a widower ............................. 329 
[13.12.12) Adoption of a child ..... ..... ...... .. .......... . .. .. . 329 
[13.12.13) Criticism of the remarriage deduction ..................... 329 
[13.13) LOSS OF INHERITANCE PROSPECTS ........................... 330 
[13.13.1) Interference with testator's free will ... .. .................. 330 
[13.13.2) Negligence as to procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 
[13.13.3) Caused by early death ................................ 330 
[13.13.4) Ongoing support from inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 
[13.13.5) Incongruous ruling ................. ............ ... . . 332 
[13.13.6) Loss of life cover .................... .. .. ... . ... ..... 332 
[13.14] ACCELERATED BENEFITS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 
[13.14.1] Inheritances . ...................................... 333 
[13.14.2] Use of assets . . ... .................................. 333 
[13.14.3] Changing values .................................... 334 
[13.14.4] Discussion of table 21 ................................. 334 
[13.14.5] Past loss of inheritance prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 
[13.14.6) Date for discounting .................................. 336 
[13.14. 7] Projection of future value of inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 
[13.14.8] Complex contingencies ........... .. ................ .. . 337 
[13.14.9] Inheritance of family business ....... ........ . .. ......... 337 
[13.14.10] The 'Maasberi;' approach .. .......... .......... . ...... 337 
[13.14.11] Family home out of community ..................... . .... 338 
[13.14.12] Family home-in community ..... ............. . .... .. ... 339 
[13.14.13] Deprived children . ................... . ........... .. 339 
[13.14.14] Right of recourse .... .................. .. . . ... . ..... 339 
[13.15] ACCELERATED BENEFITS - SELECTED PROBLEMS ... ... . ......... 339 
(13.15.1] Funeral expenses .................................... 339 
[13.15.2] Testamentary support .... .. ................. . ......... 340 
[13.15.3) Gratuitous transfer of inheritance .... ........... ... .. . .... 340 
[13.15.4] Loss of benefits of divorce .............................. 340 
[13.15.5] Support claimed from estate ........ ... ... . .. .. .... . .... 341 
(13.15.6) Usufruct ............ . ............................ -341 
[13.15. 7) Fideicommissum . . .......... .... ..................... 342 
[13.15.8) Massing . _ ..... ... .. .... .... .. ..................... 342 
[13.15.9) Inheritances by children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 
[13.16] APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES . ...... ... .... ... .. . .......... 342 
(13.16.1] Contributory negligence of deceased ....................... 342 
(13.16.2) Assets protected against recourse ......................... 343 
[13.16.3) Recourse against life insurance payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 
[13.16.4] Assets used by the family are protected ..................... 344 
[13.16.5) Two schools of thought ......... .. . . ................... 344 
[13.17) INSURANCE AND PENSION BENEFITS .......................... 345 
[13.17.1] Unfair legislation . .............. ... ... .. .. ........ ... 345 
[13.17.2} Benefits deemed non-existent .... .... .................... 346 
[13.17.3) Not all benefits are payable as a result of the death . ........ . ... 346 
(13.17.4] Deductible life insurances ....................... ... .... 346 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XVI DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[13.18] THE 'LOST YEARS' ........................................ 347 
(13.18.1) Dependants' right or action ...... .. ..................... 347 
(13.18.2) Difficulties with evidence ............................... 347 
[13.18.3) Refonn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 
(13.18.4) Prescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 
[13.19) CONCLUSIONS ................................ .... ...... . 350 
(13.19.1) Registration or marriages .......................... . ... 350 
(13.19.2) Fonnalisms ....................................... 351 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS .•.••••••••••••••••.••••••...••••••••••• 353 






























American Journal of Comparative Law 
Businessman's Law 
Corbett & Buchanan 'The Quantum of Damages in Bodily and Fatal Injury Cases' Classified 
Reports (looseleaf Juta 1992) 
Canadian Bar Review 
Far East and Southern Pacific Spinal Injuries Congress 
Human Sciences Research Council 
Journal of the Institute of Actuaries 
Journal of the Institute of Actuaries of Australia 
Journal of the Institute of Actuaries Students' Society 
The Journal of Political Economy 
The Law of South Africa (Butterworths 1979) 
Law Quarterly Review 
The Manitoba Law Journal 
The Modem Law Review 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 
Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society 
South Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
South African Law Journal 
South African Life Tables 
Transactions of the Actuarial Society of South Africa 
Transactions of the Faculty of Actuaries 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
Transactions of the Institute of Actuaries in Australia 
Quarterly report of the Bureau for Economic Research at the 
University of Stellenbosch 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xviii DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za























LIST OF TABLES 
CALCULATION OF EXPECTED OVERTIME HOURS ... .. .... . ..... . . 15 
THE BALANCE SHEET OF A LIFE PLAN .. . . ... .. .. .... . . . ... . .. . 66 
ULPIAN'S LIFE TABLE ..... .. .... .. ..... ...... . . . .. ....... . 83 
EXPECTED AGE AT DEATH . .... ... .. ... ...... . . .. . .. ....... 84 
GROSS MULTIPLIER & YEAR-BY-YEAR METHODS ....... . ... . . . ... 88 
20-YEAR SINKING FUND MODELS ... . . .. .. ... .. ....... . .. . .. 100 
TAXED SINKING FUNDS . . . . .. ... .. ...... . ...... . . . .. .. ... 105 
CONTINGENCY FUNDING CRITERIA .. . .. .... . . ....... . .. . . .. . 109 
EUROPEAN LIFE ANNUITY & BOND RATES .... ... .. . .. . .... .. .. 119 
YIELDS ON STOCK EXCHANGE EQUITIES: 1960 - 1992 .. . · .. . . . .. . .. . 122 
YIELDS ON FIXED INTEREST INVESTMENTS: 1960 - 1992 .. . ........ 123 
GENERAL CONTINGENCIES and THE DISCOUNT RATE OF INTEREST ... 161 
IN-OUT PENSION SAVINGS ............. .. ....... .. ... . . . ... 185 
DIFFERENTIAL CONTINGENCIES ... .. ..... . . . .. . ............ 219 
HISTORY OF TAX RATES FOR CONSTANT REAL INCOME ... .. . . .. .. 233 
MALE VICTIM NOTIONALLY UNINJURED . .... .. .. ..... . .. .. . . . 234 
FEMALE VICTIM NOTIONALLY UNINJURED ..... . .. .... . ....... 235 
FLUCTUATING EARNINGS ...... . ...... .................... 262 
BUSINESS CAPITAL DECLINES AT 4 % PER YEAR .. . .. .. ....... . . . 263 
BUSINESS CAPITAL MAINTAINED IN REAL TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 
BUSINESS CAPITAL INCREASING IN REAL TERMS .. . ....... . ... .. 263 
YEAR-BY-YEAR CALCULATION OF SPES OF INHERITANCE . . .... .. . . 219 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xx DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 






Actuarial Evide11ce (Carswell 1983) ................... 41, 141, 142, 144, 145 
Accidents, Compe11Satioll a11d the Law 3ed (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1980) 20, 41, 42, 74, 
145, 180-182, 188, 190, 195, 210, 240, 256, 268 
No Black a11d White Solutions (1990) 37 Optima 112 .................... 290 
Benjamin & Haycocks The Analysis of Mortality (Cambridge 1970) ..................... 84 
Benjamin Franklin Speech made in 1792 . .................................. 232 
Bentham J An l11troduction to the Principles of Morals & Legislatio11 
1823 (from Page Utility Theory cited below) ........................... 64 
















(1986) 20 3 The Actuary 1 (Newsletter of the Society of Actuaries in America) .... 114 
Schadevergoeding bij Ollrechtmatige Daad (Doctoral Thesis - Kluwer-Deventer 1965) . 8, 
15, 17, 18, 25, 29 , 30, 32-36, 47, 48, 50-52, 55, 64, 164, 167, 169, 172, 174, 183, 
190-192, 194, 199, 202, 216, 220, 221, 223, 235, 237, 242, 243, 255, 265, 266, 279, 345 
Booysen v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 3 SA 1211 (SOK) 1981 TSAR 176-80 .... 269 
The Law of Persons and the Family (Juta 1977) . . . . 106, 107, 254, 277-283, 285, 286, 
308-310, 312, 318, 331 
The Law of Delict (Juta 1984) ........ 21, 33, 35, 41, 42, 46, 52, 56, 57, 59, 73, 74, 
103, 111, 166-168, 181, 184, 186, 187, 191, 201, 204, 205, 209, 214, 216, 219, 224, 
231, 232, 239, 255, 258, 259, 266, 268, 269 
Shortened Expectatioll of Life as an Elemelll ill the Assessment of Damages for Loss of 
Eamillgs (1960) SAIJ 438 ................................. 225, 350 
Dependant's Claim for Loss of Support (1961) SAIJ 214 . . . . . . . . . . . 286, 288, 292 
Fact and Fa111asy in the Assessmelll of Damages for Death (1963) SAIJ 538 . . . 85, 219 
Damages for Prospective Loss of Support (1964) SAIJ 147 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56, 279 
Deductiolls from Gross Damages ill Actions for Wrollgful Death I111roduction (1964) SAIJ 
194-225 ..... . ..... 10, 21, 74, 86, 87, 89, 97, 156, 157, 218, 289, 326, 328, 329 
lnsurallce Belle.fits (1964) SAIJ 346-370 ......................... 345, 346 
The Relevance of Other Sources of Support for Depellda111s (1966) SAIJ 402 . . . 73, 325 
The Apportiollment of Damages Amendment Act (1971) SAIJ 423 . . . . . . 339, 342, 344 
Damages and Income Tax (1981) 11 BML 25 . . ................. 37, 211, 231 
The Assessment of Damages for Death (1972) SAIJ 147 .................. 157 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xxn DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Boberg Damages for Another's Injury or Death 1976 BML 113 ...... .. ........... 328 
Boberg Judge or Soothsayer I 1988BML 11 ... . ................. ... 111, 116, 334 
Boberg Judge or Soothsayer II 1988 BML 55 ... . . . ........... . .... ... 19, 73, 325 
Bouwer Die Beredderingsproses van Bestorwe Boede/s (Van der Walt 1967) ........... 108 
Bouwstoffen Geschiedenis van de Levensvenekeringen en Lijfrenten in Nederland 
(Damrak Amsterdam 1897) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89, 120 
Brackenridge Medical Selection of Life Risks 2ed (Nature Press 1985) ............... . .... 82 
Brigham Financial Management Theory & Practice 3ed (Dryden 1982) ...... 99, 100, 110, 128 
Brown 1986 Presidential Address 1985/6 TASSA 604 ......................... 136 
Buchanan Damages for Future Loss of Earnings or Earning Capacity - Deductions 
( 1965) SAU 457 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 
Buchanan Prospective Damages and Postponemeflt of Action (1960) SAU 143 56, 74 
Buchanan Prospective Damages in Actions for Damages for Bodily Injury 
(1960) SAU 187 ....................................... 56, 72, 76 
Bud lender A Critique of Poverty Datum Lines (1985) Saldru Working Paper 63 ........... 278 
Burchell (1978) Annual Survey 278 .... . ...... . ...... .. ... . .......... . .. 190 
Burchell Book review re: Prospective loss of support (1976) SAU 365 ............... 349 
Burchell No-fault Compensation for Motor-accideflt Victims - I (1981) 11 BML 74 .. .. . .... 41 
Burchell No-fault Compensation for Motor-accidem Victims-II (1982) 11 BML 107 ......... 41 
Burchell The Policy Limits for Recovery of Pure Economic Loss (1981) SAU 1 .. ....... . 181 
Burman Illegitimacy and the African family (from African Customary Law 36 
(Juta 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .•. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154, 307, 328 
Business Day .......... .. .............. . .......... . .... ·. . . . 133, 152, 282, 290 
Cambridge Economic History The Cambridge Economic History of Europe 2ed (Cambridge 1966) 120 
Celliers On the drawing of wills 1980 De Rebus 388-9 ....... .. .............. .. 330 
Central Statistical Services News Release P0102 Survey of Flats - May 1990 10.4.90 .. ... . .. 140, 293 
Churchill A History of the English-Speaking Peoples (Cassell 1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 
Claasen & Oelofse Berekening van Skadevergoedi11g by verlies van verdienvennoe 
(1979) De Rebus 588 .................... . ........ . ..... 184 
Clarkson & Plymen Improving the Perfonna11ce of Equity Portfolios 115 (1988) JIA 631 . . . . . . 134 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY xxiii 
Clerk & Lindsell Torts 12e<l (Sweet & Maxwell 1964) ................ . ..... . ... 76 
Collings A Life Office Actuary Looks at Pension Fund Valuations (1982/83) TASSA 119 .... 136 
Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders Personal Injury Damages in Canada (Carswell 1981) .. 10, 17, 22, 41, 
72, 73, 77, 139, 145, 156, 157, 171, 183, 191, 202, 210, 214, 225, 232, 286, 297, 
299, 303, 318, 320, 344, 347 
Corbett Buchanan & Gauntlett The Quantum of Damages in Bodily & Fatal Injury Cases - General 
Principles 3ed (looseleaf Juta 1985) ... 9, 21, 35, 39, 56, 74, 99, 133, 
153, 181, 210, 226, 228, 255, 260, 277, 343 
Corbett Hahlo Hofmeyr & Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (Juta 1980) ........... 330 
Courant Some Aspects of and Recellt Developments in Disability Insurance 1977 TASSA 108 . 237 
Cox Demography (Cambridge 1970) . . .. ........... . .. ................. 84 
Crocker The Actuary in the Courtroom (1980) TIM 517 ........ . .. . .. .. . 85, 87, 90, 91 
Davel Die Aksie van Ajhanklikes en die Onregmatig Verkree bzkomste van die Broodwinner 
1992 De Jure 83-95 ......................................... 269 
Davel Die Dood van 'n Broodwim1er as Skadevergoedingsoorsaak (Doctoral Thesis Pretoria 1984) 
21, 45, 46, 76, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 92, 119, 190, 258, 267, 273-275, 286, 302, 
337' 344, 349 
Davel Skadevergoedi11g aan Ajhanklikes (Digrna 1987) .. 36, 41, 45, 85, 90, 92, 116, 209, 227, 
258, 266, 274, 279, 285, 286, 288, 292, 297, 299, 301-304, 324-326, 328, 329, 331, 334, 338, 
342-344 
De Finetti La Prevision: ses lo is logiques, ses sources subjectives 1937 Anna/es de L 'Institut Henri 
Poincare VII,I .............. -..................... 11, 12, 15, 19, 31 
Demographic Trends Report of the Science Committee of the President's Council on Demographic Trends 
in South Africa (Government Printer 1983) ..................... 301 
Dendy Claims for Damages for Loss of Support (1990) SAJJ 155 ........ 44, 193, 281, 347 
Dendy Damages for Loss of Support out of Illegally Earned Income: visiting the sins of the fathers 
1987 (104) SAJJ 243 ........................................ 269 
Department of Transport Statistics ........................................... 182 
Dlamini The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs from African Customary Law 71 -
(Juta 1991) ................................ .. .. . ......... 288 
Donald Compound Interest and Annuities Certain (Cambridge 1963) ................. 99 
Dublin & Lotka Length of Life - A Study of the Life Table (Ronald Press, New York 1936) ... 84 
Erasmus & Gauntlett The Law of South Africa Vol 7 39 LAWSA (Butterworths 1979) .. 56, 209, 239 
Erasmus Aspects of the History of the South African Law of Damages (1975) THRHR 104-18 . 28, 
29, 32, 43, 46, 48, 50, 51, 55 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XXIV DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Erasmus Aspects of the History of the South Afrir:an Law of Damages 
(1975) THRHR 268-83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 45, 76, 150 
Erasmus Aspects of the History of the South African Law of Damages 
(1975) THRHR 362-69 ......... ...... ....... ... .. .. . . . . ...... 209 
Erasmus Wills: the Price of Negligence 1980 De Rebus 389-92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64, 330 
Faculty of Actuaries Members' Handbook ...... . ........... . . . ............ . . .. . 137 
Fama Foundations of Finance (Blackwell Oxford 1976) ........ . . ..... . .. . 100, 127 





Over de Oorsprong van Twee Omstrede11 Paragrafen uit de Inleidinge van Hugo de Groot 
(3.33.2 en 3.34.2) (1958) Al 27 ........................ . ... . .... 119 
The Historical Developmellt of Delictual Liability for Killing and for the Infliction of Bodily 
Harm (1972) Al 227 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45, 275 
The Feldman Way (Farnsworth 1974) .. .. .... .... .. .. . .... ..... . .. . 189 
Essays in Memory of Oliver Deneys Schreiner (Juta 1983) ........... .... ... 38 
Finance Week . ............................ ..... ... ..... .. . .... 63, 144, 298 
Financial Mail .. .... . ................... . . . ... . . . .... . .. . .... .. ....... 38 
Fisher & Young Actuarial Practice of Life Assurance (Cambridge 1971) .................... 81 
Fleming Probabilistic Causation in Tort Law (1989) 68 CBR 661 ................ 76, 77 
Fleming The Impact of Inflation 011 Tort Compensation (1977) 26 A/CL 51 ... .. . 41, 131, 133 
Forsyth In Danger for Their Talents (Juta 1985) .. .... ... .... . ............. . .. 38 
Francis & Freemantle Dependallt's Claim for Loss of Support (1961) SAU 103 . . . . . 286, 288, 292 
Francis & Freemantle 
French Dictionary 
Friedman & Savage 
Friedmann 
Santam v Fondo revisited (1992) 109 SALi 197-203 ............. 287, 288 
Gasc's Concise French Dictionary (Bell 1939) ...... .. ............ 19 
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk 1948 JPE 279 . 8-10, 17, 37, 110, 
131, 141, 158, 188, 189, 242, 257 
Legal Theory 5ed (Stevens 1967) ........................ 211 
Funk & Wagnall Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary (New York 1963) . ... ........ . 65 
Geisler et al .survival in Traumatic Spinal C?rd Injury (1983) Paraplegia 21 346 . . . . . . . . 82, 348 
Gibson Repairing the Law of Damages 1978 (8) Manitoba Law Journal 637 142 
Gough Paymellfs from a Collateral Source (1983) THRHR 474 .. ................. 197 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY xxv 
Government Actuary (England 1984) . . . ... 106 
Gratton Immediate Annuity Business in Australia (1985) TIAA .. . .. ... .. . . .... . 114, 138 
Grayson Decisio11S under uncertainty: drilling decisiollS by oil & gas operators 
(Harvard Business School 1960) ...... . ........ . .. .. . . ............ 11 
Grosskopf Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of Compulsory Motor Vehicle 
Insurance (Government Printer 1981) ....... . ......... . .. . ... . .. 206, 345 
Grove Renteberekening, regshervorming en die Woekerwet 73 van I968 (1990) THRHR 28 . 128 
Grueber The Roman Law of Damage to Property (Oxford 1886) . .... .. .......... 58, 64 
Hahlo & Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background 
(Juta 1968) ........... . ................. . 38 , 157, 210, 258 , 275, 327 
Hahlo & Kahn The Union of South Africa - the Developmen.t of its Laws and Constitution 
(Juta 1960) .. .. .. . . . . ... . .. ................. . . .. .. .. . .. .. . 39 
Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife 5ed (Juta 1985) . . 257, 276, 279-282, 292, 
308, 310-312, 314, 318 
Hall Career Developmellt ill Organizatio11s (Jossey-Bass 1987) . .. ............ 237, 257 
Hansard Assessmellt of Damages Bill 17.02.69 841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182, 190, 199 
Hart & Honore Causation in the Law 2ed (Clarendon 1985) . . . . . . . 20, 22, 44, 51, 61, 62, 77, 327 
Hoffman & Zeffert Evidence 4ed (Butterworths 1988) ......... .. .... . . . ..... . ... 236 
Hofmeyer Labour Market Participation 1985 HSRC RDS!.. .............. . ......... . IO 
Honore Legal reaso11ing in Roma a11d today from Select South African legal problems 
edited by Kahn & Zefferl (Juta 1974) 84-94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Hooker & Longley-Cook Life a11d Other Co11tinge11cies vols I & II (Cambridge 1957) . . .......... 93 
Houtzager H0Ua11ds Liff- en Losrentele11ingen voor I672 (Rotterdam 1950) .... . .. . .... . 118 
Howroyd Damages for Pecuniary Loss Occasio11ed by Shortened Expectation of Life 
(1960) SAU 448 ........ .. . ... ....... . ... . ..... . . .. ........ 350 
Howroyd The Assessmellt of Compe11Sationfor Loss of Support (1958) SAU 65 .......... 337 





Marriage a11d Family Life in South Africa: Research Priorities (HSRC 1987) .. . 223-225, 
230, 306, 308, 326, 327 
Register of Graduates (HSRC communication 21; November 1986) . . . . . . . . . 18, 308 
The Income of Male Graduates in I990 (HSRC MN-136 1990) 146 
The Wage Structure of Male Graduates (HSRC MN-126 1987) 146 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XXVl DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Hutchison Accident Compensation: New Zealand Shows the Way (1985) THRHR 24 . ....... . 41 
Johnson A History of the Modem World (Weidenfield & Nicolson 1984) .... .. . ........ 41 
Jonker Property Valuatio11 in South Africa (Juta 1984) ... ....... .. .. . .. . .... 29, 30 
Joubert Oorsaaklikheid: Feit of norm (1965) 6 Codicillus 6 ....................... 20 
Kantor & Rees South African Eco11omic Issues (Juta 1982) ........ .. ...... .. ...... 146, 159 
Kaser Roman Private Law (translation by Dannenbring Butterworth 1965) ...... 43, 49, 207 
Kemp Damages for Personal Injury & Death 3ed (Longman 1986) ........ 7, 90, 223, 228 
Kerr Date for Determini11g Loss through Breach of Contract (1986) SAU 339 ........ 167 
Kerr Improvements by Lesees (1991) SAU 9 .................... .... ..... 250 
Keynes The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(Macmillan 1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133, 134, 136, 158 
Koch & Melville The Quantum Yewbook 1993 .. . . . ... ... ... .... 122, 123, 325, 334, 337, 338 
Koch Aquilian Damages for Personal Injury and Death (1989) THRHR 203 .......... 345 
Koch Damages for Lost Income (Juta 1984) 30, 41, 42, 74, 87, 89, 90, 92, 99, 101, 104, 110, 
114, 128, 130, 134, 141, 142, 150, 151, 156, 157, 171, 218, 260, 261, 293, 336, 344 
Koch Statistical Tables for Lawyers (1986) De Rebus 551 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84, 325 
Koch The Deduction of Workmen 's Compensation Benefits 
(1987) THRHR 475 ................................ 51, 139, 183, 201 
Koch The Incidence of the Pare11tal Duty of Support (1992) THRHR 128 .... .. ...... 315 
Koch The Remarriage Deduction in Claims for Damages ( 1988) De Rebus 631 . . . . . . . . 326 
Koch Workmen's Compensatio11 Benefits ( 1990) De Rebus 343 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51, 183 
Kopf The Early History of the A1111uity (1927) 13 PCAS 225 .............. 83, 118, 120 
Kwon Statistical Decision Theory with Business & Economic Applicatio11s 
(Petrocelli/Charter 1978) ........................... . ...... 9, 11, 15 
Labuschagne Regspluralisme e11 huweliksduplikasie i11 Suid-Afrika 1993 De Jure 171-5 . . . . . . . . 288 
Land reform Land Reform and the Future of La11downership in South Africa 
(Juta 1991 edited by Van der Walt A J) ... . .... . . .. . .. . . . ...... ..... 306 
_Leage Leage's Roman Private Law 3ed (Macmillan 1967) (revision by Prichard) . . . . . 49, 207 
Lee & Honore South African Law of Obligations 2ed (Newman 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 
Lee The Elements of Roman Law 4ed (Sweet & Maxwell 1956) . .. .... .. ... .. 49, 207 
















Statistics for Ma11agement 2ed (Prentice-Hall 1981) ....... . 9, 15, 17, 21, 30, 261 
Rights at Work (Juta 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196, 197, 257 
Wrongful Birth a11d Wrongful Life Actions (1992) 109 SAU 428-46 ...... . .. . .. 279 
Structured Settlemellls - The Way Forward? (9.8 .91) .......... .. . . ....... 114 
ls a Right of Rescission subject to Extinctive Prescription (1990) THRHR" 43 191 
Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death 2ed (Butterworths 1983) . . 10, 17, 
22, 42, 57, 72, 73, 78, 86, 90, 139, 155, 156, 171, 183, 187, 190, 200, 202, 210, 
225,257, 286, 296-299, 301, 309, 319, 320, 322, 344, 347 
Damages in Cases of Brain /11jury (1965) SAU 6 . . . .. .......... .. . .. .. . 225 
Causing the Death of a Breadwinner - the customary marriage widow's problem 
(1986) De Rebus 555-8 ... . . ... .. . ........ .. ..... . .. . ......... 288 
Do we have a new type of voidable marriage? 1992 (55) THRHR 628 ... . ... . .. 288 
Widows of Civil and Customary Marriages in Bophuthatswana - Competing Heirs 
(1990) De Jure 326 ..... . .......... . ..... .. . .. .............. 288 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific . . ................... . .. . .... . . ... 15 
On Interest, Compound /merest a11d Damages (1985) LQR 30 .. .. . .......... 171 
Die Middeletoets by Staatsouderdomspensioene 1980/81 TASSA 83 .. . ....... . . 289 
MVA Basis Analysis (unpublished UCT paper presented to Actuarial Society of South Africa 
November 1987) .. .. ....... .. ........ . .... .. .. . ............ 138 






Compensation versus Punishmellt (1965) MLR vol 28 629 . . . . . . . . . . 151, 188, 211 
McGregor on Damages 14ed (Sweet & Maxwell 1980) .. . 7, 24, 33, 35, 39, 63, 72-74, 
140, 163, 165, 166, 199, 286 , 290, 297-299, 301 , 303, 318,_ 320, 337, 347 
The Law of Delict 7ed (Juta 1971) .. . .. . .................... . ... . . 254 
Van Heerden's case discussed (1951) SAU 373 . ....................... 210 
Principles of Economics Translated by Dingwall (NY University Press 1976) . . . . . . 6 
Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde The Actuarial Aspects of Compe11satio11 for Loss of Support 
(1974) TASSA 292 ................. 73 , 90, 103, 318, 335-337 
Milburn-Pyle Damages and Compe11sation: An /11teresti11g Developmellt in the South African Context 
(1980/81) TASSA 136 ................. . ... . ..... . .......... 41, 42 
Milton 011 his bli11d11ess (poem) .. . .. . . .. .. . .. . ........... . .. . .... . ... 165 
Mishan Elemems of Cost-Benefit A11alysis led (Allen & Unwin 1972) ............ 128, 129 







DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Beitrage zum Obligationenrecht (Braunsweig 1853) Vol 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58, 164 
Technique in Litigation 2ed (Juta 1975) .................. ....... .... 39 
Fact finding, juries and unlawfulness 1993 De Rebus 721 ......... .. . .. .... 211 
Causation in Delict: do the mea11S justify the ends (1987) THRHR 379 .... ... 209, 210 
Damages for Personal Injuries & Death 4ed (1980) . 27, 29, 33, 35, 39, 40, 45, 47, 48, 
74, 195, 211 
Nathan Barnett and Brink Uniform Rules of Court 2ed (Juta 1977) ........ ..... . 43, 68, 245, 252 
Neethling & Potgieter Aquiliese Aksie van 'n Kind vir Mediese Koste weens Persoo11like Beserings 
( 1992) 55 THRHR 480-84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193, 254 
Neethling & Potgieter Aspekre van die Delikselemente Nalatigheid, Feitlike en Juridiese Kousaliteit 
(i11sluitend die sogenaamde eierskedelgevalle) (1993) 56 THRHR 157 . 51, 54, 77 
Neethling Potgieter & Visser Delikrereg 2ed (Butterworths 1992) .. 16, 20, 22, 23, 33, 35, 38, 41-44, 
46-49 , 51-54, 56 , 57, 59, 68 , 69, 77, 163, 176, 206, 217, 218 , 228, 274, 350 . 
Neethling Die Reg op die Verdienvermoe 1990 THRHR 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 214, 215 
Neethling Persoonlike Immaterieel Goedereregte: 'n nuwe kategorie subjekriewe regte? 
1987 THRHR 316 . ........ ......... . ... .. .. ... .... .. .. . .. . .. 63 
Neill Life Contingencies (Heinemann 1977) . . . . . .. ...... . . . .. ... .. 79, 80, 89, 93 
Newall The Demand for a Living Wage 2ed (Zebra) ......... ..... ... ... ... 278, 281 
Newdigate & Honey The MVA Handbook (Clevro 1987) 81, 87, 90, 110, 141, 146, 154, 157, 206, 
259, 302, 337 , 343, 344 
Otto Die Gemee11regtelike Verbod teen die Oploop van Rente (1992) 55 THRHR 472-80 .. 174 
Owen & Shier The Actuary in Damages Cases - Expert Witness or Court Astrologer (unpublished paper 
presented to the Institute of Actuaries Students' Society in 1985) . . .. . .......... 98 
Oxford English Dictionary, The Shorter (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 47, 48, 70 
Page Utility Theory: A Book of Readings (Wiley 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8, 19, 31, 37, 260 
Patel Structured settlemellts 1993 The Actuary 16-17 ... . .......................... 114 




(1992) SALJ 18 . . . .. .... . . . .. ... .... ... . ........ . . ........ . 287 
Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1979 2 SA 904 (A) (1979) TSAR 256 . . . 184, 187 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 2ed (Macmillan 1973) . . . . . . . 26, 111, 125, 129, 137, 138, 157 
Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Cmnd 7054 1978) 
(Chairman: Lord Pearson) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 42, 78, 106, 111, 158 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
~ 
























The Long-Term Future of Interest Rates both Real and Nominal (1984) TFA 145 . . 110, 
136, 138, 141, 142, 159 
Feitelike en Juridiese Kousaliteit (1990) THRHR 267 188 
Actuarial Assessment of Damages from Damages for Personal Injury & Death 
(Edited by Kemp - Longman 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80, 118 
Damages for Breach of Contract Paid In Foreign Currency (1987) THRHR 233 .... 176 
Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 
(Rontledge & Kegan 1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12, 31, 211 
Review of the Principles of Life-Office Valuations (1952) JIA 286 . . . . . . 117, 150, 158 
Die Elemente van die Begrip Skade (1976) TSAR 26 .... 26, 32, 44-47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 
56-58, 64, 65, 67, 72, 76, 77, 189, 217, 240, 241, 256, 285, 302, 331, 333, 339, 340, 347 
Nabetragtinge oor die Skadeleer en Voordeeltoerekening (1988) De Jure 221 32, 39, 53, 
163, 184, 188, 209, 267 
Quantum of Damages for Personal Injuries (1961) SAU 102 ................. 42 
SA Life Tables: 1979-81 (1985/86) TASSA 498 ............. 73, 80, 84, 89, 91-93 
Severe Accidental Head Injury (MacMillan 1979) .... . .............. . .... 81 
lnjlasie en die verhoging van 'n onderhoudsbevel (1992) 55 THRHR 489-92 ...... 308 
Reintroduction of the Jury System (1990) De Rebus 749 .................... 39 
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations published in Studies in Bayesian 
Econometrics and Statistics Edited by Fienberg & Zellner (North Holland 1975) . 11-13, 
15, 26, 31, 74, 76, 78, 85 
Die Geskiedenis van die Oorer:flikheid van Aksies op Grond van Onregmatige Daad in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (Thesis Leiden 1976) ............................ 21 
Balltu Law in South Africa 3ed (Juta 1970) . . ........... .. ............ 327 
Customary Law in Southern Africa 5ed (Juta 1989) . . . . . . . . . 301, 302, 307, 327, 342 
Damages for Breach of Contract (1987) SAU 229 ....................... 24 
Criminal Law 2ed (Butterworths 1989) .............................. 20 
Tshabalala v Tshabalala 1980 1 SA 134 (0) en Philip v The Master 1980 2 SA 934 (D) 
1981 TSAR 172-6 ..... ... .................................. 330 
Inflation and the Law (1975) SAU 31 ..................... 48, 133, 134, 175 
Law of Parent and Child 3ed (Juta 1971) . . . . . . . . . 254, 283-285, 310-312, 318, 320 
On the Rights of Parellts against their Children (1968) THRHR 118 . . ......... 279 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xxx DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Squire South African Property and the Valuer (Juta 1975) ... . . ....... .. . ... .. . . 140 
Stoll & Visser Some thoughts on Delictual Damages for the Loss of the use of Property 
1990 De Jure 347 ................... .. . . .. . . ... .. . . . .. .. 163-165 
Street Principles of the Law of Damages 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 39, 86, 90, 156, 191, 226 
Supple The Royal Exchange Assurance - A History of British Insurance 1972-1970 
(Cambridge 1970) ...... . ... . ........ .. .. .. . ..... .. . . . . .. . . . 121 
The Economist .. .. ... ...... . ... . . . . . ..... .. .. .. . . . ... .... .. ... ....... 107 
Thomson The Determination of the Deduction for Remarriage (1988) De Rebus 67 35, 73, 325-327 
Time Magazine . .. . .... .. . . . .. .. .. ... . .. .. . .. ... . .... .. .. . . . . .. 63, 154, 207 
TRENDS .... .. .. .. .... . ... .. .. .. . .. .... .. . .. . . . .. .. . . .... . .. ..... . 293 
Van Aswegen Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict 1993 THRHR 171 ..... . ... .... .. 211 
Van der Merwe & Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad 4ed (Van der Walt 1980) .. ...... ....... . . 52 
Van der Merwe /Jisake: Nkabinde v SA Motor & General /Jisurance Co Ltd 1961 1 SA 302 (N) 
1961 THRHR 133-6 ............. ... . .. . . . . .... . . ............ 286 
Van der Spuy Taxability of Awards of Damages for Loss of Earnings (1991) Consultus 40 ...... 231 
Van der Vyver Artikel 31 van die wysigingswet op Bamoewetgewing, 1963 (1964) THRHR 94 .. 288 , 327 
Van der Walt Deliktereg 1990 THRHR 140 ... .. . . .... ..... .. . . ...... . .... . 214, 237 
Van der Walt Die Sommeskadeleer en die 'Once-and-for-all ' - Reel (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of South Africa 1977) . . 5-8, 13, 16-18, 22, 24, 26, 29, 32, 33 , 36 , 37, 42, 43 , 45-48 , 
50, 52, 53 , 55 , 57, 59, 61 -65, 67, 73 , 76, 110, 157, 164, 165, 180, 181 , 183, 
199, 202, 203, 206, 214, 217, 221 , 255 , 259 , 279, 345 
Van der Walt Die Voordeeltoerekeningsreel - knooppum van uiteenlopende teoriee oor die oogmerk met 
skadevergoeding 1980 THRHR 1 . . . . 58, 157, 180, 183, 187, 198, 202, 209, 210, 345 
Van Heerden Skadevergoeding en Belastingpligtigheid published in JC Noster 'n Feesbundel 
edited by Gauntlett (Butterworth 1979) .. . . ..... .... .. ... ... . .... 214, 231 
Van Niekerk Werkgewers Aanspreeklikheidsversekering en Subrogasie (1976) 17 Codicil/us 20 180, 183 
Van Rensburg 'n Kritiese Beskouing van die Conditio Sine Qua Non-Oorsaaklikheidsteorie soos Uiteengesit 
deur ons SA Skrywers published in Huldigingsbundel Daniel Pom 
(Balkema 1970) . . .. . . .. . . .. ... . . ... . . . .. . . . . ... .. .. .... 19, 20, 95 
Van Zyl The significance of the concepts 'Justice' and 'Equity' in Law and Legal Thought 
(1988) SALJ 272 ....... . ..... . .... .. ........... . . . ....... . . 211 
Visser Kompensasie vir Nie-vermoenskade (1983) THRHR 43 . ... 221, 244, 255 , 256, 259-261 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
BIBLIOGRAPHY XXXl 
Visser De Gebruik van Vorige Beslissings in Kwantum (1986) De Jure 207 
Visser Genoegdoening in die Deliktereg (1988) THRHR 468 
31, 181, 204, 255, 
256, 258, 260, 261 
27' 204, 207' 256 
Visser Die Vergoedingsbedrag vir Pyn en Leed by Liggaamlike Beserings (1) 
(1981) De Rebus 438 . . ...................................... 259 
Visser Die Verhouding Tussen Onregmatigheid en Skade (1991) THRHR 782 . . 47, 53, 267 , 269 
Visser Die Grondslag van die Condictio bulebiti (1988) THRHR 492 ............ 341, 343 
Walsh & Yeo Morality of Paraplegic & Tetraplegic Casualties 1985 FESPIC 142 ............ 82 
Wassenaar Squa1ulered Assets (Tafelberg 1989) . ............. .... ..... . .... 155, 182 
Weston & Brigham Weston & Brigham's Managerial Finance (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1979) 110, 
128, 129, 159 
Withey Withey on Annuities ( 1800) 118 
Wunsh Aspects of the Contractual and Delictual Liability of Attorneys 1988 TSAR 1-28 . . . . 330 
Zellner Basic Issues in Econometrics (University of Chicago 1984) .. . . , .. . . .... 13, 20, 61 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XXXll DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
STATUTES AND RULES OF COURT xx xv 
STATUTES AND ·RULES OF COURT 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 
s 18(3) ... ...... .............. .......................... 342 
s 103 .................... ~ .......... .. .... . . .. . . ....... 253 
Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42, 51, 76, 275 
s 2(1B) .... . ... . ....... ......................... . .. .. 339, 342 
s 2(6)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339, 342, 343 
Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 . 126, 182, 184, 187, 190, 199, 208, 246, 258, 302, 321, 332-334, 
343' 345' 346 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983 
s 12 ... .. ....... ....... ... ........ .... ... .... ......... . 197 
s 13 ............ .... ..................... . ... ....... 196, 197 
s 14 ................................................... 197 
s 17(a) .......... . ................. ..... . .... ..... . ..... 289 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 
s 22 ............ . ................ .. ..... . .............. 288 
Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 
s 31 .. ..... ..... . .... ............ .... ........... 286, 288, 300 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
s 56 ................... . . . .. .. ..................... . ... 199 
Children's Act 33 of 1960 
s 89 .................... .... .................. . ........ 199 
Children's Act 33 of 1960 
s 90 ... .. .............. ... ........ .. .......... ........ . 199 
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 56 of 1972 ................... ... ..... .. .. 283 
s 28 ................................................... 187 
s 35 ................................................ 267, 270 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
s 300 ................................................... 45 
Customary Law Amendment Decree 1991' (Ciskei) 
SS 2 & 6 ................................................ 288 
Defence Act 44 of 1957 
s 113 .................................................. 182 
s 149te 
Disability Grants Act 27 of 1968 
s 3 ....... ... ...................... ............ . ...... 199 
s 7 ................................................... 199 
s 10 .................... . . ... ........... ..... .......... 199 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
XXXVl DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
s 7 ............ . ....... . .. ..... . . .. .... . ... . .. . . .. ... . 340 
Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 
s 13(2) . .. .. ............ ... . . . . . .. . . . .. ... . .. . . ... .. .. .. 346 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
s l(a) ...... ..... .. . .. . . ..... .. .. ............. . ... .... . . 115 
s lO(l)(gB) ............. . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. ... ... . . . . . .. . . . 115 
s lO(l)(i)(xv) and (xvi) .. . .... . . .. .. . . .... . ...... . .... .. .. . 104, 140 
s lO(l)(k 
s lOA .. .. .. . . .... . . ..... . .... ........ . .. . ... . . .. . ... 115, 144 
s18 ... . ........ . .. .... .... .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. .. .. . ..... . 231 
s 86 ...... . .. . .. .. .. . . . .. ......... . . ... ......... . ... . .. 232 
s 86A . . .. . . . . ... .. ... .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. .. .. . ... .. . . .. . . . 232 
Insurance Act 27 of 1943 
s 1 . ... .. .. .. ... . . .... . ... . . .. .... . .... . ...... .... . ... 121 
s 10 .. . ........ . .. ... . .. . ... . ..... .. .. .. .. . .. . ... .. .. ... 90 
s 39 .. ... . .. ....... .. . ..... . ... . ... . . ... . . . .. . ... . . .... 343 
s 40 . ........ . ... .. . ... .. . . . ...... ... ..... . . .. ... .. . ... 343 
s 45 .. ............. . . . . . . . ....... .. ....... . . . ... .. . . . . . 343 
Liquor Act 87 of 1977 
s 190 .. ... .... . . . ....... ... ...... .. .... . . . ..... . ... ... . 267 
Maintenance Act 23 of 1963 
s 5(6) .. ..... .... . ...... .. . . . ... . . . .... . .. .... .. .. . . . ... 287 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 . . ...... . ... . . .. ........ .. .. . . 285, 340 
Marriage & Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 
s 1 .. . .. . ... .. ... . ... ... . .. . . .... ..... ... .. .. .. ... ... . 288 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961 
s 3(1) . . .. . . . . . .. ...... . .. . . .. . . .... ... .... ... . . . .. . . .. . 286 
Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 
s 3 . .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . ... . .. ... . .. .. .. . .. . ...... 312 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 ... .. .. . . ... . .... . .. .. . ... . ........ .. . . . . 288 
s 4 . . .. . .... . .. .... . .. ........ ..... . .... . .. . . . . .... . . . 175 
s 15(30) . . .............. . ........... . ........... . . .. .. .. 283 
s 17(l)(b) . . ... ... ....... . . ... ..... . ....... .. ............ 205 
s 17(5) .. . ..... . . . .... ... ...... .. . -. .. . .. . .... . . . . .. .. 284, 320 
s 22 ... . .......... . . . ...... .. ...... . .... .. . .. ...... . ... 294 
s 23 ... ..... ......... .. . ... . .... . ......... . ... . . 303, 310, 312 
Military Pensions Act 84 of 1976 . .. . . . . .... . . .. . . . ... .. .. .. ... . ... . . .. . . 206, 207 
s 7(6)(e) ... . .. ... . . . .. .. . ... . ... ... ... .. : . .. .. .. . .. ... .. 206 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
STATUTES AND RULES OF COURT xxxvn 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989 
(Agreement in terms of the Act and scheduled therewith) . . . . . . . . . . . . 59, 268, 283 
Article 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
Article 43 . . . ..... .. . ... ..... ......... ...... ..... 42, 78, 114, 115 
Article 45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 
Article 46 ........ . .................................. . 195, 283 
Article 47 ........ . ...................................... 187 
Article 47(a) ...... .. . ... .......................... .. ..... 205 
Article 47 A ....... . ...................................... 206 
Article 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 
Police Act 7 of 1958 
s 32 ............ ..... ... .. . . ........... . .. ....... ...... 182 
Prescribed Rate oflnterest Act 55 of 1975 ... ... .. . . ............................ 174 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 .............. ... . . ... .... .... .. . ..... .... ... .. 191 
Social Aid Act 37 of 1989 
s 5 ........ . . .. ....................................... 199 
Social Pensions Act 37 of 1973 
s 3 ...................................... ..... ...... .. 199 
South Africa and Homelands Act 50 of 1956 
s 1(1) ........... . ...................................... 163 
Transkei Marriage Act 1978 
s 37 .................. .. .................. . ............ 288 
s 38 .. ................. . ....................... ......... 288 
UNIFORM RULES OF COURT ... . . .. ..................................... 145 
Rule 18(10) ................ ... .. ...... .................... 68 
Rule 34A ................................................ 43 
Rule 57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245, 252 
War Pensions Act 82 of 1967 .......... . . . ................................. 207 
Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941 ... ................ 51, 155, 183, 199, 203, 206, 237 
s 8(1) ........................................... . ...... 183 
s 39(1)(c) . . .. . . ............. ... . .. ................... ... 115 
s 39(l)(d) ............. .. .................... . ........ .. . 115 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xxxvm DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Administration of Justice Act 1969 
s 22 ................................................... 164 
s 3(1) ............................................... 274, 333 
s 4(2) .................................................. 228 
s 73(3) . .... ............................................ 228 
s 73(4) ... .......................... . ...... .. ........... 228 
Bubble Companies etc Act 1825 (6 Geo 4c91) ............................ . ....... 120 
Financial Services Act 1986 ............................................... 144 
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 
s 2(4) .................. ..... ........................ 228, 244 
Law Reform Act (Miscellaneous Provisions) 1934 
s 3(1) ...................................... .. ....... 163, 164 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za







4.4.11 .......... . ....................................... 83 
9.1.3 ...... ..... . ...................................... 275 
9.2.33 ....... .... .......................... .. ........... 32 
9.3.7 ........... . ...................................... 275 
35.2.68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83, 349 
50.17 .125 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
lnleidi11g tot de Holla11dsche Rechtsgeleertheyd ......................... 72 
2.17.13 ................................................ 119 
2.17.14 .................................. . ............. 278 
3.14.19 ............................................. 119, 129 
3.14.20 ................................................ 129 
3.32. 16 .......................................... 31, 125, 215 
3.33.2 ........................................ 83, 119, 275, 286 
3.34.2 ................................................. 209 
De Crimi11ibus 
47.4.3 ................................ . ................. 45 
47.4.5 ............. ... .................................. 83 
48.7.11 ................................................. 83 
Van Bynkershoek Observationes Tumultuariae .................................. 169 
Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 
2.15.14 ................................................ 276 
9.2.11 ................. . .............................. . 209 
25.3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, 286 
45. l . 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169' 172 
45.l.9 .................................... 22, 28, 37, 55, 76, 165 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xxxiv DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CASES xxxix 
CASES 
Al Electric Jee Cream Factory (Pty) Ltd, Pretoria North Town Council v 1953 3 SA 1 (A) . . . . . . loc cit 
AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Maqula 1978 1 SA 805 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127, 150, 151 
AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Van Jaarsveld (1) 1974 2 C&B 360 (A) ............... 21 
AA Onderlinge Assuransie Assosiase Bpk v Sodoms 1980 3 SA 134 (A) ....... .. . ....... 205, 211 
Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 ................................ .... ...... 193, 222 
Ackerman v Loubser 1918 OPD 31 ....................................... 180, 187 
Administrator-General, South West Africa, and Others v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A) .. 17, 62, 63, 154, 183, 
202, 213, 214, 235, 237, 244, 249 
African Oxygen Ltd, Commissioner for /11land Revenue v 1963 1 SA 681 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Alcock and others v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1991] 4 All ER 907 (HL) ...... 274 
Andrews et al v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd et al (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 452 (SCC) ............... 139 
Anthony and Another v Cape Tow11 Municipality 1967 4 SA 445 (A) ................... 282, 283 
Arendse v Maher 1936 TPD 162 ....................................... 24, 35, 310 
Arnold et al v Teno et al (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 609 (SCC) .... . .. . ..... ....... . ... 127, 252 
Asamera Oil Corp Ltd v Sea Oil & Ge11eral Corp et al (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 1 (SCC) ...... 25, 36, 167 
Assur NO v Protea Assura11ce Co Ltd 1981 3 C&B 196 (C) .. ...... ..... . ...... 63, 203, 207 
Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers (1978) 52 AUR 707 (HC); (1978) 21 ALR 129 (HC) ......... 29, 30, 215 
August v Guardian Natio11al Jnsura11ce 1990 4 C&B E2-13 (C) .......................... 81 
Bailey NO v Southern Insurance Association Ltd 1981 3 C&B 178 (C); 1984 1 SA 98 (A) ..... 130, 150 
Bailey NO, General Accidellt Versekeringsmpy SA Bpk v 1988 4 SA 353 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Bailey NO, Southern Jnsura11ce Association Ltd v 1984 1 SA 98 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Baker and Another v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 147 (QBD) .................. 346 
Barnard v Union and South-West Africa /11surance Co Ltd 1971 1 SA 537 (EC) ............... 199 
Barnes v Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 502 (E) ... 278, 283, 285, 287, 298 
Bay Passenger Transport Ltd v Franzen 1975 1 SA 269 (A) . ........... .. ........ 150, 180 
Beach v Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd [1956] 2 All ER 652; l WLR 807 .................... 140 
Bekker v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1983 1 PH 113 (E) .......................... 22, 77 
Bellairs v Hodnett and A11other 1978 1 SA 1109 (A) ............................ 164, 170 
Benham v Gambling [1941] 1 All ER 7 (HL) ................ ... ................. 228 
Bennett v Sun Insurance Office Ltd 1952 1 C&B 391 (E) .......................... 193, 240 
Bennie v Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd 1989 4 C&B A3-34 (W) ................. 226, 249 
Beresford v Royal Jnsura11ce Co Ltd [1938) 2 All ER 602 (HL) ......................... 189 
Bester v Commercial Union Versekeri11gsmaatskappy van SA Bpk 1973 l SA 769 (A) 46, 51, 265, 273, 322 
Bester v Silva Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1952 1 SA 589 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86, 87 
Beverley v Mutual & Federal /nsura11ce Co Ltd 1988 2 SA 267 (D) ..... . ... . ............ 260 
Bezuidenhout, Senator Versekeri11gsmaatskappy Bpk v 1987 2 SA 361 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Bird Precision Bellows Ltd, Re [1984] 3 All ER 444 (ChD) ........................... 129 
Birkett v Hayes [1982] 2 All ER 710 (CA) . . ... ..... .... ....................... 173 
Birmingham City Corporation v West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association (/11corporated) 
[1969] 3 All ER 172 (HL) .... .. .................................... 168 
Blower v Va11 Noorden 1909 TS 890 ............ ..................... ......... 38 
Blyth v Van de11 Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) . . . . . . . . . . 14, 26, 71, 72, 74, 181, 217, 232, 251, 280 
Bobape v President lnsura11ce Co Ltd 1990 4 C&B A4-43 (W) ............... 229, 230, 236, 245 
Boonzaier v Provincial /11sura11ce Co Ltd 1954 l C&B 87 (C) ...................... 127, 277 
Booysen, Shield Insurance Co Ltd v 1979 3 SA 953 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Bordihn v Bordihn 1956 2 PH B32 (A) ....................... . ......... . ...... 312 
Bosch v Mutual & Federal /11sura11ce Co Ltd 1993 (T) (unreported 25.3.93 case no 2090/92) ...... 315 
Bosch v Parity lnsura11ce Co Ltd 1964 2 SA 449 (W) .............................. 198 
Boshoff v Motor /11surers' Associatio1111 of Southern Africa 1969 2 C&B 105 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 
Boswell v Mi11ister of Police a11d A11other 1978 3 SA 268 (E) ................ . ...... 273, 274 
Botes v SAR&H 1937 2 PH J 18 (C) .... ...................... . ............... 339 
Botes v Van Deve11ter l 966 3 SA 182 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44, 51 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xl DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Bores, Legal Insurance Co Ltd v 1963 1 SA 608 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Botha (now Griessel) and Another v Finanscredit (Pry) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A) ... ... ....... . . 191 
Botha v Minister of Transport 1956 4 SA 375 (W) .. ... ............ .. . .. ............ 18 
Bourhill (or Hay) v Young [1942] 2 All ER 396 (HL) ........ ..... ......... . . ... .... 273 
Bradburn v Great Western Railways Co [1874-80] All ER 195 (Exch D) .......... . .... 188, 208 
Brijlall v Naidoo & Naidoo 1961 1 C&B 266 (D) .............. ... ...... . ......... 218 
Brink v Motor Vehicle Assurance Fund 1991 (C) (unreported 2.8.91 case 6038/89) 131, 132, 136, 151, 156 
Bristol Laboratories Inc v Ciba Ltd 1960 1 SA 864 (A) .. .......... . ............ . .... 76 
British Transport Commission v Gourley [1955] 3 All ER 796 (HL) .................. 103, 231 
Britz, Randalia Assurance Corporation of SA Ltd v 1976 3 SA 243 (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Broderick Properties (Pry) Ltd v Rood 1964 2 SA 310 (T) ............... 33, 37, 51, 163, 170 
Browning v War Office and Another [1962] 3 All ER 1089 (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180, 181, 191 
Brummond v Brummond's Estate 1993 2 SA 494 (Nm) .......... .. ........ . ...... . .. 284 
Brunt v AA Mutual Insurance 1990 (W) (unreported 26.2.90 case 19198/87) .. .. .... . .. ... 130, 146 
Buch v Buch 1967 3 SA 83 (T) ........... ... .............. ... .. . ........... 281 
Buckingham v Francis and others [1986] 2 All ER 738 (QBD) ....... . ................. 129 
Burger v Union National South British Insurance Co Ltd 1975 4 SA 72 (W) ........ . .... 71, 73, 74 
Burns v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 
1988 3 SA 355 (C) ................. . . .. .... . .. 60, 280, 291, 301, 315, 326, 332 
Buthelezi, President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v 1977 1 PH J26 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Butler v Durban Corporation 1936 NPD 139 .................................... 116 
Byleveldt, Sanlam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v 1973 2 SA 146 (A) ... .. ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Capital Insurance v Richter 1963 4 SA 901 (A) .................................. 205 
Carstens NO v Southern Insurance Association Ltd 1985 3 SA 1010 (C); 1987 3 SA 577 (A) . 18, 30, 34, 
76, 81, 87, 90, 98, 127, 154, 165, 170, 191, 224, 225, 230, 236, 252, 253, 264, 269 
Casely NO v Minister of Defence 1973 1 SA 630 (A) .... . ............ . ... ... . 59, 203, 207 
Castle and Castle NO v Pritchard 1975 2 SA 392 (R) ............................ 164, 167 
Celliers v South African Railways and Harbours 1961 1 C&B 160 (T) .................... 63 
Chaplin v Hicks [1911-13] All ER Rep 224· (CA) ................. 57, 62, 64, 67, 72-74, 217 
Chawanda v Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd 1990 1 SA 1019 (ZH); 1991 2 SA 825 (ZS) .......... 286, 288 
Chisholm v East Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd 1909 TH 297 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116, 156, 279, 301 
Ciba Ltd, Bristol Laboratories Inc v 1960 1 SA 864 (A) ....... -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Cilliers, SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v 1987 3 C&B 716 (A) . .. ................ ... ... loc cit 
Clair v Port Elizabeth Harbour Board; Kennedy v The Same (1886) 5 EDC 311 .. 91 , 115, 116, 129, 156 
Clay, Union Government v 1913 AD 385 . . . .... ... .. . . .. . . ... . ... . .. .. . .. .. . loc cit 
Cl(!rk & Co v Lynch 1963 1 SA 183 (N) ..... ... .. . .... . ...... ...... .... .... . .. 310 
Cloverbay Ltd (joint administrators) v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1991] 1 All ER 894 
38 
Coetzee v SA Railways & Harbours 1933 CPD 565 ........................... 56, 57, 218 
Coetzee v SA Railways & Harbours 1934 CPD 221 .... . ... . .................. 56, 57, 218 
Coetzee, Union and National Insurance Co Ltd v 1970 1 SA 295 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd and Another v Stanley 1973 1 SA 699 (A) 201, 213, 223, 224, 
266, 280, 345 
Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd v Mirkin and Another NNO 1989 2 SA 584 (C) ....... 339 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v African Oxygen Ltd 1963 1 SA 681 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69, 231 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Nolan's Estate 1962 1 SA 785 (A) ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Shell SA Pension Fund 1984 l SA 672 (A) . . . . . .. . . . ..... 208 
Cannan, Sekretaris van Binnelandse lnkomste v 1974 3 SA 111 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A) .. 194, 195, 268, 283, 284, 287, 297, 337, 349 
Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Victor NO 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 207, 208, 223, 225, 254, 318, 
324, 329, 331, 342 
Cooke and Cooke NO v Maxweli 1942 SR 133 ........................... 298, 319, 329 
Cookson v Knowles [1977] 2 All ER 820 (CA); [1978] 2 All ER 604 (HL) · ......... 38, 40, 157, 171 
Couper v Flynn l975 1 SA 778 (R) .......... . . ..... . .. ... .. ................. 107 
Cowley v Hahn 1987 1 SA 440 (E) ............. .......... . ................... 24 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CASES xli 
Cross v Cross 1922 EDL 224 ....... . .......................... . .. . . . ...... 108 
Dale v Hamilton 1924 WLD 184 ............. ... ........................ . ... 116 
Davehill (Pry) Ltd a11d Others v Commu11iry Developmellt Board 1988 l SA 290 (A) . . . . . 164, 172, 174 
Davies v Crossli11g 1935 WLD 107 ........ . ... ... ........................... 116 
Davies v Taylor [1974) AC 207 (HL); [1972) 3 All ER 836 (HL) ........................ 72 
De Harde v Protea Assura11ce Co Ltd 1974 2 SA 109 (E) ............... .. . . . . .... 239, 240 
De Jager v Grunder 1964 l SA 446 (A) ............................. . . . ...... . . 39 
De Jongh v Gu11ther a11d A11other 1975 4 SA 78 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151, 289, 340 
De Vaal NO v Messi11g 1938 TPD 34 ... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193, 221, 266, 275, 283, 297, 347 
De Villiers NO v Maursen Properties (Pry) Ltd 1983 4 SA 670 (T) ........................ 21 
De Vos v Suid-Afrikaa11se Eagle Versekeri11gsmaatskappy Bpk 1985 3 SA 447 (A) . . . . . . . . . . 54, 332 
De Wet v Odendaal 1936 CPD 103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 
Dexter v Courtau/ds Ltd [1984) 1 All ER 70 (CA) ................................. 175 
Dhlamini en 'n Ander v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1974 4 SA 906 (A) . . . . . . . . . 23, 26, 266, 268, 270 
Dhlami11i v Govemmellt of the Republic of South Africa 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) .. 213, 240-245, 248, 249, 
259 
Dhlamini v Multilaterale Motorvoertuigongelukkefonds 1992 1 SA 802 <n ............... 267, 270 
Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1979 2 SA 904 (A) . . 21, 27, 30, 32, 36, 39, 40, 47, 59, 65, 126, 
181, 184, 186, 197-199, 201, 202, 216, 276, 302 
Dladla v Minister of Defence 1988 3 SA 743 (W) . . ................................ 42 
Donnelly v Joyce [1973) 3 All ER 475 (CA) ... . ................................ 193 
Doifling v Bazeley 1961 l C&B 128 (E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103, 199, 231 
Du Bois v Motor Vehicle Accident Fu11d 1992 4 SA 368 (T) ........................... 256 
Du Preez v AA Mutual Insura11ce Association Ltd 1980 3 C&B 206 (E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 
Du Toit v General Accident Assurance Co of South Africa Ltd 1988 3 SA 75 (D) . 208, 302, 332, 345, 346 
Duke of Portland v Wood's Trustee 1926 SC 640 .... . ..... .. ...................... 54 
Dusterwald v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) ... 16, 74, 130-132, 143, 146, 147, 150, 
153, 154, 181, 197, 213, 230, 234, 245, 248, 249, 293 
Dyssel NO v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1982 3 SA 1084 (C) ... 63, 127, 180-182, 199, 203, 207, 229, 230, 
245, 255 
Edouard v Administrator Natal 1989 2 SA 368 (D); 1990 3 SA 581 (A) ................... 279 
Edwards v Hyde 1903 TS 381 ............................................. 165 
Elgin Brown and Hamer (Pry) Ltd v Dampskibsselskabet Torm Ltd 1988 4 SA 671 (N) .......... 176 
Engelbrecht, Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd v 1989 4 SA 908 (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Erasmus v Booyse 1963 1 PH B4 (C) ...................................... 308, 311 
Erasmus v Davis 1969 2 SA 1 (A) ........... . ....... . . . ........... 24, 36, 39, 54, 167 
Erdmann v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1985 3 SA 402 (C) . . 146, 154, 193, 194, 213, 214, 222, 265, 271, 
299, 320, 323, 324 
Everson v Allianz Insurance Ltd 1989 2 SA 173 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67, 260 
Evins v Shield Insura11ce Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) ..... 44, 59, 214, 273, 275, 299, 321-323, 347, 349 
Fantiso, U11ion and South-West Africa Insurance Co Ltd v 1981 3 SA 293 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Farrell v Ha11key 1921 TPD 590 ........... . ............................. 276, 310 
Ferguson v Sanlam Insura11ce Ltd 1985 1 SA 207 (C); 1985 4 SA 843 (A) .................. 269 
Ferguson, Santam Insura11ce Ltd v 1985 4 SA 843 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Fick, Sanlam Insurance Co Ltd v 1982 (A) (unreported 24.5.82 case 282179/AV) ............ Joe cit 
Fletcher v Autocar & Transporters Ltd [1968) 1 All ER 726 (CA) ....................... 229 
Fondo, Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransie Maatskappy Bpk v 1960 2 SA 467 (A) . . . . Joe cit 
Ford v Allen and Others 1925 TPD 5 ...................................... 284, 320 
Fortuin v Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd 1983 2 SA 444 (C) ............ 76, 267, 268 
Franzen, Bay Passenger Transport Ltd v 1975 1 SA 269 (A) ......................... Joe cit 
Fredericks v Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd 1972 2 C&B 335 (E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 
Gallie NO v Natio11al Employers Ge11eral I11sura11ce Co Ltd 1992 2 SA 731 (C) ............ 131, 293 
Gammell v Wilso11 a11d Others [1980) 2 All ER 557 (CA); [1981] 1 All ER 578 (HL) ........ 228, 258 
Gehring en A11dere v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 2 SA 266 (C) ... 198 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xlii DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
G(!neral Accident /11Surance Co SA Ltd v Summers; Southern Versekeringsassosiasie Bpk v Carstens NO; 
General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd v Nhlumayo 1987 3 SA 577 (A) ... 21, 33, 36, 52, 69, 70, 75, 90, 
126, 163, 167, 170, 171, 192, 214, 217, 221, 230, 278, 336, 345 
General Accident Versekeringsmpy SA Bpk v Bailey NO 1988 4 SA 353 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 175 
General Accident Versekeringsmpy SA Bpk v Uijs 1993 4 SA 228 (A) ..................... 229 
Gerke NO v Parity Insurance Co Ltd 1966 3 SA 484 (W) .... .. 79, 202, 204, 209, 230, 255, 256, 258 
Gibbins v Williams Muller Wright & Mostert Jngelyf en Andere 1987 2 SA 82 (T) ............. 196 
Gildenhuys v Transvaal Hindu Educational Council 1938 WLD 260 ................... 277, 279 
Gillbanks v Sigournay 1959 2 SA 11 (N); 1960 2 SA 552 (A) ......... 70, 85, 97, 102, 116, 129, 159 
Glass v Sanlam Insurance Ltd and Another 1992 1 SA 901 (W) .......... ... ............ 325 
Glazer v Glazer NO 1963 4 SA 694 (A) .................................... 254, 285 
Gliksman v Talekinsky 1955 4 SA 468 (W) ..................................... 285 
Goedhals v Graaff-Reinet Municipality 1955 3 SA 482 (C) ............... .. ............ 71 
Gold v Gold 1975 4 SA 237 (D) ......................................... 281, 290 
Goldie v City Council of Johannesburg 1948 2 SA 913 (W) ........................... 227 
Goliath, Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd v 1968 4 SA 329 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Gonya, Ro11dalia Assurance Corporatio11 of SA Ltd v 1973 2 SA 550 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Goodall v President Insurance Co Ltd 1978 1 SA 389 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150, 151, 156 
Gourley, British Transport Commission v [1955] 3 All ER 796 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Midkon (Pry) Ltd and Another 1984 3 SA 552 (T) .... 175 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Ngubane 1972 2 SA 601 (A) ............ 59, 203-205 
Greathead v Greathead 1946 TPD 404 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
Green v Coetzer 1958 2 SA 697 (W) . ...... . ............. . ................. 43, 59 
Green v Green 1976 3 SA 316 (RAD) ........................................ 308 
Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) . . 73, 180, 195, 285, 288, 298, 302, 318, 329, 331, 333, 336, 
339-341, 343, 345 
Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd v Engelbrecht 1989 4 SA 908 (T) .................... 152 
Hall, Shield Insurance Co Ltd v 1976 4 SA 43 J (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Harbutt's 'Plasticine' Ltd v Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd [1970) l All ER 225 (CA) .. ........ 172 
Harris v Brights Asphalt Contractors Ltd [1953] 1 All ER 395 (QB) ............... .. ..... 244 
Hartley, SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v 1990 4 SA 833 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Hartman v Krogscheepers 1950 4 SA 421 (W) ............. .. .................... 284 
Hartnick v SA Eagle Insurance 1982 1 PH JlO (C) ................................. 42 
Harwood v Harwood 1976 4 SA 586 (C) . . . ... ... ... .... . .... ... ...... .. .... ... 312 
Hayward v Protea Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1985 3 C&B 588 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52, 330 
Hearne, Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v 1986 3 SA 60 (A) ....... . .. . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Heath v Le Grange 1974 2 SA 262 (C) ........ .. .............................. 167 
He11dricks v President Insurance Co Ltd 1993 3 SA 158 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 297 
Hesse/son v SAR 1921 (T) (unreported 2.9.21.) .............. .. ................... 292 
Hevican v Ruane [1991) 3 All ER 65 (QBD) .... . .... . ... . ...................... 274 
Heyns v SA Eagle Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1988 (T) (unreported 6.7.88 case 13468/86) ... 286, 289, 
341, 346 
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909 (HL) ................... 76 
Hughes v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1988 (W) (unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86) . 41, 78, 241, 243, 245, 
248, 250 
Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 .......................... 39, 91, 120, 156, 157, 209, 210, 273 
Hutchings v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd 1986 3 C&B 737 (C) .. 151, 154, 218, 219, 222, 249 
Jndrani and Another v African Guarantee and Indemnity Co Ltd 1968 4 SA 606 (D) . . . . ..... 191, 199 
/nfolsdottir v Mutual and Federal /11Surance Company 1988 (SWAZI) (unreported 27.5.88 case 1054/86) 
176 
Ingle, Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York v 1910 TS 540 ........................ Joe cit 
Ismail v General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd 1989 2 SA 468 (D) . . . . . . . . . . . . 191, 283, 284, 297 
Ismail v Ismail 1983 l SA 1006 (A) ....................................... 286, 300 
Jackson and Others, Union Government v J956 2 SA 398 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Jackson, Minister of Defence and Another v 1991 4 SA 23 (ZSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CASES xliii 
Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474 ..... . ..... . . . 57, 277, 278, 280, 281, 283, 284 
Jacobs, a pane 1950 2 PH M26 (0) .. . . . ... . . . . . . ....... . .... . ....... . .. . .. . 342 
Jacobs, Modern Engineering Works v 1949 3 SA 191 (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 .. . ... . .. . . .. . . ........ . ...... . . ......... . .. 270 
Jameson's Minors v Ce11tral South African Railways 1908 TS 575 . .... . . . .. 227 , 273, 274, 291, 349 
Jefford and Another v Gee [1970] 1 All ER 1202 (CA) . . ...... . ........... 164, 169, 171, 175 
Jodaiken v Jodaiken 1978 1 SA 784 (W) . .. ....... . .... . . . ........... . .. . ...... 314 
Joffe and Co Ltd v Hoskins 1941 AD 431 ... . .. .. .. . . . .... .. ... . ... . . . .. . .. . .. .. 76 
Jones v Fletcher NO 1948 1 C&B 234 (SR) ... .. . .. .. . .. . ............ ... ........ 238 
Jones v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1976 2 C&B 602 (E) . ......... .. .. . ... .. . . .. .. . . .. 193 
Kandalla v British Airways Board (formerly British European Airways Corporation) 
[1980] 1 All ER 341 (QB) ... .. ...... . . . ....... . .. . . . ............... 181 
Karpakis v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1991 3 SA 489 (0) .... .. ... . ......... . ... 43 
Karrim v Karrim 1962 1 PH B4 (D) ............... ... ............... . .. . .. .. 280 
Katz NO, Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd v 1979 4 SA 961 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Ke1iston Pharmacy (Pty) Ltd, Monumelltal Art Co v 1976 2 SA 111 (C) . .. ..... .. ...... _. . loc cit 
Kewana v Santam bisurance Co Ltd 1993 (Tk) (unreported 28.02.93 case 112/88) . ... . . . 48, 287, 302 
Khan and Another v Padayachy 1971 3 SA 877 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 
Khoza v The Minister of Law and Order 1983 (W) (unreported 19.10.83 case 16967/82) .... . . . .. 240 
Khuduge v Sanlam Insurance Limited 1991 (W) (unreported 23.5.91 case 4637/90) . ......... 152, 245 
King v Geldenhuys 1983 3 C&B 379 (C) .... . . . . . .. ... . .. . . .... . .. . . . ....... 150, 151 
Klaas v Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd 1981 4 SA 562 (A) . .. . . .... . .... 193, 201 
Kleinhans v African Guarantee and Indemnity Co Ltd 1959 2 SA 619 (E) .. . . . . . ......... .. . 42 
Klingman v Lowell 1913 WLD 186 ................... . . .. ...... . .. . ...... 33, 194 
Kloppers v Ro1ufalia Assurance Corp of SA Ltd 1972 2 C&B 289 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103, 254, 260 
Knoop, In re (1893) 10 SC 198 . . ... . . . ..... .... . .... . . ... . . .. .... . .. . .. 280, 281 
Kommissaris van Binnelandse lnkomste en Multilaterale Motorvoertuigongeluksfonds v Hogan 1993 (A) 
(unreported 28.5.93 cases 663/91 & 683/91) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113, 115, 231 
Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Steyn NO 1992 1 SA 110 (A) .......... . . . ..... . . 308 
Kontos v General Accidellt bisurance Co Ltd 1989 4 C&B A2-l (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153, 229, 230 
Kotwane v Unie Nasionaal Suid-Britse Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 458 (0) . . . 10, 117, 127, 
130, 138, 145 
Kriel v Administrator-General for South West Africa 1986 3 C&B 539 (SW A); 1988 3 SA 275 (A) . 17, 76, 
. 110, 202, 205 
Kriel, Administrator-General, South West Africa, and Others v 1988 3 SA 275 (A) . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Krugell v Shield Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1982 4 SA 95 (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 , 75, 185, 197, 238 
Kwele v Rondalia Assurance Corp of SA Ltd 1976 4 SA 149 (W) .. . .... .. ... .. .. . . . ... 71, 74 
Lamb v Sack 1974 2 SA 670 (T) .... ... . .. . . .......... . .......... . 280, 282, 284, 311 
Lamb, Prqtea Assurance Co Ltd v 1971 1 SA 530 (A); 1971 2 C&B 117 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Laney v Wal/em 1931 CPD 360 . . . .. ....... . .. . . . ... . .. . ......... 129, 157, 291, 338 
Lawrence v K01ufotel Inns (Pty) Ltd 1989 1 SA 44 (D) ....... . ..... . .............. 44, 61 
Lebona v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1991 3 SA 395 (W) . 269, 282, 287, 304, 309, 311, 318, 
320 
Lee, Union Government (Minister of Railways) v 1927 AD 202 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Legal Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) . . 12, 18, 21, 35, 37, 39, 44, 73, 151 , 164, 170, 210, 
214, 225, 273, 274, 291 , 293, 295, 299, 324, 325, 327, 328, 331, 334, 338, 339 
Levin v Levin 1984 2 SA 298 (C) .. .. ..... . .... ... . . . . . . ..... .. .. .. . . .... 287, 308 
Light v Conroy NO 1948 1 C&B 444 (T) .... . .. . . ... . .. .............. . . 17, 63, 244, 259 
Lillicrap Wassenaar atuf Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) .. ....... 44 
Lim Poh Choo v Camden atuf Islington Area Health Authority 
(1979] 1 All ER 332 (CA), [1979] 2 All ER 910 17, (BJ49, 40, 43, 98, 229, 242, 244, 245 
Linton v Corser 1952 3 SA 685 (A) . . .. ... ...... .. .... . . . .... . ..... ... ...... . 164 
Lockhat's Estate v North British & Merca11tile Insurance Co Ltd 1959 3 SA 295 (A) . . 40, 204, 221, 227, 
228, 230, 255, 259 , 266, 275, 285, 331 , 340, 347 
LTA Construction Bpk v Administrateur, Transvaal 1992 1 SA 473 (A) ................ . 172, 174 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xliv DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Ludick v Samca 1iles (Pty) Ltd 1993 2 SA 197 (B) ................................ 197 
Maasberg v Hunt, Leuchars & Hepburn Ltd 1944 WLD 2 . . . . . 120, 153, 157, 226, 293, 299, 337, 344 
MacDonald and Another v Parity Insurance Co Ltd (In Liquidation) and Another 1967 1 C&B 748 (D) . 63 
Mafesa v Parity Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk (In Likwidasie) 1968 2 SA 603 (0) .... .. .... .... . 77 
Mago/av SA Eagle Insurance Company Ltd 1987 (T) (unreported 10.4.87 case 8584/85) ......... 242 
Mair v General Accidelll Fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd 1970 3 SA 25 (RAD) ............... 22 
Maja v SA Eagle Insurance Ltd 1987 4 C&B B2-l (W) ..... . ......... _. . . . . . . . . . . . 78, 241 
Makwindi Oil Procureme11t (Pvt) Ltd v Natio11al Oil Co of Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd 1989 3 SA 191 (Z) ... 176 
Ma/gas v Guardia11 Assura11ce Co Ltd 1960 1 C&B 158 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109, 242, 245 
Mallett v McMonagle [1969] 2 All ER 178 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48, 101, 144, 145, 160, 173 
Maluleka, Standard Ge11eral Insurance Co Ltd v 1976 2 C&B 579 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Ma/yon v Plummer [1962] 3 All ER 884 (QBD); [1963] 2 All ER 344 (CA) ................. 346 
Mankebe NO v AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd 1986 2 SA 196 (D) ................ 268, 269 
Manuel v African Guaralllee a11d llldemnity Co Ltd and Another 1967 2 SA 417 (R) . . . . . 277, 278, 280 
Maqula, AA Mutual lllsurance Association Ltd v 1978 l SA 805 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Mariamah v Marine and Trade Insura11ce Co Ltd a11d Another 1977 2 PH 130 (D); 1978 3 SA 480 (A) 323 
Marine and Trade lllsurance Co Ltd v Goliath 1968 4 SA 329 (A) ....................... 205 
Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Katz NO 1979 4 SA 961 (A) ... 42, 114, 127, 222, 224, 229, 252 
Marine a11d Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Mariamah and Another 1978 3 SA 480 (A) ... 227, 266, 292, 294, 
295, 303, 323, 330, 336, 345 
Maroso v SA Eagle bisurance Co Ltd 1987 3 C&B 638 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181, 186, 197 
Mashao v President Insurance Co Ltd 1993 (T) (unreported 1.6.93 case 8370/92) . . . . . . . . . . 63, 203 
Mashini v Senator Insurance Co Ltd 1979 3 C&B 82 (W) ... ...... .. . ....... 63, 203, 207, 254 
Masiba and Another v Constamia Insurance Co Ltd a11d Another 1982 4 SA 333 (C) ........ 274, 328 
Mathews, President Insurance Co Ltd v 1992 1 SA 1 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Matillise, Protea Assura11ce Co Ltd v 1978 1 SA 963 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Matthews and Others v You_ng 1922 AD 492 ..................................... 43 
MBA v Southern lnsura11ce Association Ltd 1981 1 SA 122 (Tk) .................. . .. 268, 269 
McKenzie v SA Taxi-Cab Co 1910 WLD 232 ..................................... 33 
Mentz v Simpson 1990 4 SA 455 (A) .. · ....................................... 280 
Meredith, Santam Insurance Ltd v 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 1986 3 SA 181 (A) ............................ 270 
Mhlawuli v SA Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd 1976 2 C&B 597 (E) .............. 194 
Midkon (Pty) Ltd and Another, Governmellt of the Republic of South Africa v 1984 3 SA 552 (T) . . loc cit 
Millward v Glaser 1949 4 SA 931 (A) . . . . . . . ...... . .... . . . . .. . .. .. . ... . ... 330, 331 
Miltis v Protea Assura11ce Co Ltd 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) ...... . 261, 278, 280, 291 , 301, 303, 309, 321 
Minister of Communications a11d Public Works v Re11ow11 Food Products 1988 4 SA 151 (C) ..... 22, 77 
Minister ofDefe11ce and Another vJackson 1991 4 SA 23 (ZSC) ........................ 231 
Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A) .. . ............ . .................... 61 
Mirkin and Another NNO, Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd v 1989 2 SA 584 (C) . . . . . loc cit 
Mitchell v Mulholla11d and A11other (2) [1971] 2 All ER 1205 (CA) ...... . ............... 242 
Mlombo v Fourie 1964 3 SA 350 (T) .......................................... 45 
Modern Engineering Works v Jacobs 1949 3 SA 191 (T) .............................. 76 
Modimogale v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 (B); 1993 2 SA 192 (BA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 36, 164, 167, 168 
Moekoena v President ltisurance Co Ltd 1990 2 SA 112 (W) .......................... 182 
Mokoena v Administrator Transvaal 1988 4 SA 912 (W) ............................. 197 
Monumental An Co v Kenston Pharmacy (Pty) Ltd 1976 2 SA 111 (C) . . ... 58, 69, 164, 165, 167, 168 
Moores v CWS Ltd (The Times 5.9.55) . .... .. .. .. .... ....... . .. .. .... .. .. .... .. 47 
Moste11 v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1978 2 C&B 751 (E) ....... .. ..... . ....... . .. .... 252 
Motor Vehicle Accidems Fu11d v Andreano 1993 3 SA 227 (T) ........... . .............. 42 
Mrwarwaza v Rondalia Assurance Corp of SA Ltd 1978 2 C&B 760 (E) .. .................. 18 
Muller v Mutual and Federal ltisura11ce Co Ltd 1993 4 C&B 12-56 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171, 172, 232 
Muller v The Master 1992 4 SA 277 (T) .................................... 341, 343 
Mu11arin v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1965 1 SA 545 (W); 1965 3 SA 367 (A) . . . . . 285, 292, 301 
Munro v National Employers' Ge11eral Insura11ce Co Ltd 1988 4 C&B F2-1 (D) . . . . . . . . . . . 78, 241 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CASES xlv 
Murata Mac{li11ery Ltd v Cape/on Yams (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 671 (C) . ........... .. ....... 176 
Mutual & Federal /nsura11ce Co Ltd v Swanepoel 1988 2 SA 1 (A) . . . . . . . . . . 33, 62, 186, 206, 259 
Mutual Life lnsura11ce Co of New York v Ingle 1910 TS 540 ........... .. ..... . . . .. . ... 191 
Naidoo, New India Assurance Co Ltd v 1950 (A) (unreported 19.5.50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Na11ile v Minister of Posts & Telecommu11ications 1990 4 C&B A4-30 (E) ......... .... . .. .. 244 
Ncubu v National Employers Ge11eral Insurance Co ltd 1988 2 SA 190 (N) . . . . . . . . 76, 86, 110, 154, 
241, 254, 280, 311 
Ndlovu v Swazila11d Royal /nsura11ce Co 1989 4 C&B E2-1 (Swazi) ........ . 241, 248, 249, 251, 252 
Nel v Federated Versekeri11gsmaatskappy Bpk 1991 2 SA 422 (T) ............. ... ........ 43 
New llldia Assurance Co Ltd v Naidoo 1950 (A) (unreported 19.5.50) .. ... .. .. ....... 33, 35, 143 
Ngubane v South African Transport Services 1991 I SA 756 (A) . 127, 131, 132, 146, 235, 242, 243, 248, 
249 
Ngubane, Government of the Republic of South Africa v 1972 2 SA 601 (A) ............. ; . Joe cit 
Nhlumayo v General Accident lllsurance Co of SA Ltd 
1986 3 SA 859 (D); 1987 3 SA 577 (A) ................................... 87 
Niblock-Stuart, Protea Assurance Co Ltd v 1973 2 C&B 323 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Joe cit 
Nkambula v Linda 1951 1 SA 377 (A) ... . .. . . . ...................... . ... .. ... 288 
Nkomo v Presidem lllsura11ce Co Ltd 1992 4 C&B A4-82 (W) ...................... 252, 253 
Nkwenteni v Allia11z Insurance Co Ltd 1992 2 SA 713 (Ck) ........................... 267 
Nochomowitz v Salltam /11surance Co Ltd 1972 1 SA 718 (T) . . 18, 34, 82, 150, 227, 266, 291, 295, 323, 
336, 337 
Nochomowitz v Samam Insurance Co Ltd 1972 3 SA 640 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150, 261, 299, 338 
Nolan's Estate, Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 1962 1 SA 785 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joe cit 
Novick v Benjamin 1972 2 SA 842 (A) ........ . .................... : .......... 167 
Oberholzer v National Employers General Insura11ce Co Ltd 1988 4 C&B A3-1 (C) ...... 10, 131, 293 
Oberholzer v Oberholzer 1947 3 SA 294 (0) .... . ............................ 276, 279 
Oberholzer v Santam Insurance Co Ltd a11d A11other 1970 1 SA 337 (N) . . . . . . . . . 103, 185, 199, 231 
Ocean Accident a11d Guaralltee Corporatio11 Ltd, Union Governme11t v 1956 1 SA 577 (A) . . . . . . Joe cit 
Oelofsen NO v Cigna Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1991 1 SA 74 (T) ......................... 22 
Oliphant, Ex parte 1940 CPD 537 ..................... ... ...... .. ........... 347 
Oliver and Others v Ashman a11d A11other [1961] 3 All ER 323 (CA) ..................... 228 
Omega Africa Plastics (Pty) Ltd v Swisstool Ma11ufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 3 SA 465 (A) .. ..... 231 
Oosthuizen v Homegas (Pty) Ltd 1989 (0) (unreported 13.7.89 case 539/86) .... .. .......... . 231 
Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 .......................... 193, 195, 280-284, 297, 320 
Osman v Reis 1976 3 SA 710 (C) ........................................... 270 
Page and Another v Ro11dalia Assura11ce Corporatio11 of South Africa Ltd and Another 1974 2 C&B 524 (E) 
240, 252 
Pallas v Lesotho Natio11al Insurance Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 3 C&B 705 (ECD) ......... 76, 109, 181, 241 
Parity Insurance Company Ltd (in liquidatio11) v Va11 der Merwe 1967 1 PH J 17 (A) ............. 24 
Parry v Cleaver [1967J.2 All ER 1168 (CA); [1969] l All ER 555 (HL) ... 75, 180, 182, 189, 190, 199, 
201, 210, 211 
Paterson v South Africa11 Railways and Harbours 1931 CPD 289 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Paton v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1965 1 C&B 637 (E) ........................ .. .... 18 
Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munari11 1965 3 SA 367 (A) . . 40, 130, 266, 278, 300, 320, 324, 329, 
331 
Petersen v South British Insurance Co Ltd 1964 2 SA 236 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277, 278, 280 
Philip Robinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v NM Dada (Pty) Ltd 1975 2 SA 420 (A) ........... 33, 167, 168 
Phillips v London and South Western Rail Co [ 1874-80] All ER Rep 1176 (CA) ........... 129, 149 
Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd v De Wet 1963 1 C&B 196 (A) ............................. 18 
Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 774 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173, 228, 349 
Pienllar, Ex parte 1964 1 SA 600 (T) ...................... . ............... 289, 290 
Pietennaritzburg Corporation v SA Breweries 1911 AD 501 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
Pinchin and A11other NO v Salltam Insura11ce Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 254 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 
Pitman v Scrimgeour 1947 2 SA 22 (W) ........................................ 18 
Pitt v Economic Insurance Co Ltd 1957 3 SA 284 (D) ............ .. 103, 195, 199 , 231, 238, 346 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xlvi DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Plotkin v Western Assurance Co Ltd and Another 1955 2 SA 385 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . 222, 265 , 310, 324 
Poo v President Insurance Co Ltd 1992 4 C&B A3-96 (T) ........ ... ..... . . . . .. ... 199, 244 
Porobic, Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v 1957 l C&B 90 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Potgieter v Rolldalia Assurance Corporation of SA Ltd 1970 l SA 705 (N) . . . . . . . . . . . 204, 256, 274 
Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204, 256, 274 
President Insurance Co Ltd v Mathews 1992 l SA l (A) ........ . .. . ..... ... .... . . 238, 251 
President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Buthelezi 1977 l PH 126 (A) .... .. ... . . .... .. 285, 301 
Pretoria Nonh Town Council v Al Electric Ice Cream Factory (Pty) Ltd 1953 3 SA l (A) . ....... 202 
Probert v Baker 1983 3 SA 229 (D) .. . . ... . .. .. .. ... . .. ...... ....... ... . . . . .. 170 
Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb 1971 l SA 530 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157, 205, 322 
Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb 1971 2 C&B 117 (A) ..... . ...................... .. 322 
Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Matinise 1978 l SA 963 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 127 
Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Niblock-Stuart 1973 2 C&B 323 (C) ... .. . . .. .. ........... 17, 63 
Pym v Great Northern Railway Co (1863) 4 B&S 396 (Ex Ch); 122 ER 508 (Ex Ch). . ..... .. .. . 332 
Quntana v Union and South West Africa Insurance Co Ltd 1976 2 C&B 680 (E) .. ... . ... .... . . 91 
R v Glasser 1944 EDL 227 ..... . . . .. ... .. . . .. ................. . ... . . . . . . . 311 
R v Sibiya 1955 4 SA 247 (A) . . .. . ............ ... ... . . . . . . . .. . . . ... . ... . .. 163 
Radebe v Hough 1949 l SA 380 (A) ... . .... ... .. . ........ . . . . . . . 9, 127, 210, 228, 260 
Regan v Williamson [1976] 2 All ER 241 (QB); [1976] l WLR 305 ......... . ......... . ... 63 
Reid v South African Railways alld Harbours 1965 2 SA 181 (D) .... . ..... . . . .. . 74, 91, 224, 230 
Reyneke Nov Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1992 2 SA 417 (T) .... .. .... . . . .... 42, 252 
Reyneke v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1991 3 SA 412 (W) . . . . . . . . 204, 228, 254-256 , 260 
Richter, Capital Insurance v 1963 4 SA 901 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Roberts NO v Nonhern Assurance Co Ltd 1964 4 SA 531 (D) . .. ... ... . .. . 199, 229, 230, 255, 259 
Robens v Lolldon Assurance Co Ltd (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 227, 291 , 292, 324, 326 
Rolldalia Assurance Corporation of SA Ltd v Britz 1976 3 SA 243 (T) . .. ... ... . .. . ..... . . 339 
Rolldalia Assurance Corporation of SA Ltd v Go11ya 1973 2 SA 550 (A) .. . . .. ..... . .. .. 217, 254 
Rood, Broderick Properties (Pty) Ltd v 1964 2 SA 310 (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Ross v Caunters [1979] 3 All ER 580 (ChD) . .. .. ......... . .. . ... .... ......... . . 330 
Roux, Santam Versekeri11gsmaatskappy Bpk v 1978 2 SA 856 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Rowley v Lolldon alld North Western Railway Co 
[1872-73] LR 8 Exch 221 , [1861-73] All ER Rep 823 (Exch) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129, 149, 181 
Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 3 SA 761 (A) ... . ... . .. ... .... . . . . .. ... ......... 24, 35, 62, 63 
Ruby v Marsh (1975) 49 AUR 320 (HC); (1975) 6 ALR 385 (HC) .... . ... .. ... . .... . 67, 171 
S v Campbell en 'n Ander 1985 2 SA 612 (SW A) . ... . ... ... ..... .. .. .. . ... . ... 267 , 270 
S v Daniels 1983 3 SA 275 (A) . . .. .. . .. ..... .. ...... . . . . . ... .. . . . . .. . .... .. 20 
S v Dlova 1986 3 SA 248 (NC) .. . . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . . . . ... .. .. ............. .. 267 
S v MacDonald 1963 2 SA 431 (C} . . .. ..... . .... . .. . ... . . ~ . . . . ... .. .. . . . . 284, 320 
S v Marais 1982 3 SA 988 (A) . ................... . .................... . .. . 270 
S v Mbambo 1965 2 SA 845 (A) .. . ...... . . . .. . . . .. .. .. . .................. . .. 20 
S v Mokgethi en 'n A11der 1990 1 SA 32 (A) .... . .............. . ... . .. . .. .. .. 188, 348 
S v Mudau 1980 3 SA 1079 (V) . . ............... . ........ . .. . ... . .. .. ...... 270 
S v Pitsi 1964 4 SA 583 (T) . . ... . .. .... . ... . .... ... . . .. ... . .. .. ..... . ..... 280 
S v Robinson alld Others 1968 1 SA 666 (A) . . ... . ........... . ...... . ...... . .. . . 189 
S v 11ame 1982 4 SA 319 (B) .. ... .... . .. . . . ..... . .... . .. .. .......... . ... . .. 45 
S v Tsoai 1981 1 SA 348 (0) ................... .. ..... . ...... . ..... . ... 267, 270 
S v Vennaas (T) sub iudice September 1991 .. . . .. . ... . .. ... . ... ... .. .. . . . . .. . . . 144 
S v Vulesangweni alld Another 1980 3 SA 527 (Tk) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Cilliers 1987 3 C&B 716 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 239 
SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Hanley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) . 27 , 33 , 48 , 67 , 69, 70, 85, 126, 163, 167-172, 
174, 176, 204, 211, 216-218, 255, 259 , 260, 334 
Saridler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd 1941 AD 194 . . .. . . .. . . . .. . .. ... 24, 35, 62, 217, 232 
Santam /nsura11ce Co Ltd v Fick 1982 (A) (unreported 24.5.82 case 282179/AV) .. . ... . .... 216, 269 
Santam Insurance Ltd v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 181, 266-268 
Santam /nsura11ce Ltd v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276, 292, 294, 334 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CASES xlvii 
Salltam Versekerillgsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 27, 30, 33, 45, 48, 69, 126, 180, 
181, 184, 188, 190-192, 195-198, 209-211, 215, 235, 237, 239 
Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Roux 1978 2 SA 856 (A) ..................... 204, 205 
Schierhout v Union Govemmelll 1926 AD 286 ...................... . .. . ....... . . 108 
Schnellen v Rondalia Assurance Corporation of SA Ltd 1969 l SA 31 (W) .. 180, 193 , 194, 254, 266, 350 
Searle v Protea Assurance Company Ltd 1983 (C) (unreported 6.5.83 case 1.77/81) . ..... . ... .. 283 
Sebatjane v Federated Employers' Insurance Co Ltd 1989 4 C&B H2-l (T) ... . ............. 274 
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Watenneyer 1965 4 SA 431 (A) ...................... 113, 115 
Sekretaris van Bi1111elandse lnkomste v Co1111a11 1974 3 SA 111 (A) ............ . ........... 30 
Senator Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Bezuidenhout 1987 2 SA 361 (A) ................ 201, 203 
Senior NO v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd 1989 2 SA 136 \'N) .... 277, 278, 298, 310 
Serumela v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 1981 1 SA 391 (T) .............. . ...... 75, 197, 198 
Shasha v President Insurance Company Ltd 1990 4 C&B A2-8 (W) ......... 226, 241, 243, 249, 250 
Shearman v Folland [1950] 1 All ER 976 (CA) ...................... .. ........... 229 
Shell SA Pension Fund, Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 1984 1 SA 672 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Shephard v Zimnat Insurance Co Ltd 1984 3 C&B 532 (Z) ........ , .................. 255 
Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) .................. 14, 127, 156, 267, 268 
Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Hall 1976 4 SA 431 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127, 156, 218 
Shrog v Valellline 1949 3 SA 1228 (T) ..................................... 164, 167 
Sigoumay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) . . 10, 14, 21, 47, 74, 103, 104, 131, 138, 139, 141, 156, 219, 
220, 231, 232, 251, 252 
Singh v Santam Insurance Co 1974 4 SA 196 (D) ........................... 277, 278, 281 
Skosana, Minister of Police v 1977 1 SA 31 (A) ............ .... .. . ............. loc cit 
Smart and Others v South African Railways and Harbours 1928 NPD 361 . . . . . . . . . . . 129, 150, 227 
Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) .............. 20, 51, 54, 164, 167, 172, 190, 208, 209, 274 
Smit, South British Insurance Co Ltd v 1962 3 SA 826 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Smith v President Insurance 1990 (C) (unreported 31.10.90 case 15283/89) ................. 283 
Smith v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 1986 2 SA 314 (C) .... ... . . ..................... 132 
Smith-Wright v Van der Linde 1954 1 C&B 454 (SR) ................................ 22 
Smoker v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority; Wood v British Coal Corp [1991] 2 All ER 449 (HL) 
189, 190 
Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C); 1966 3 SA 237 (A) ................ 90, 150, 305, 337 
Sodoms, AA Onderlinge Assuransie Assosiasie Bpk v 1980 3 SA 134 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice 1967 1 SA 263 .(A) ........ 203 
South British Insurance Co Ltd v Smit 1962 3 SA 826 (A) ............................ 255 
Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 17-19, 21, 30, 37, 53, 56, 57, 69, 99, 
101, 130, 131, 143, 152, 157, 158, 165, 181, 183, 197, 202-204, 207, 209, 211, 215, 216, 218, 220, 
225, 228, 235-237, 256, 259, 327 
Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Pty) Ltd 1979 2 SA 383 (C) ................ 194 
. Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka 1976 2 C&B 579 (A) ..................... 130 
Stanley, Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd and Another v 1973 1 SA 699 (A) . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Steyn NO, Kommissaris van Binnelandse lnkomste v 1992 1 SA 110 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit . 
Stockenstrom v Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd 1974 2 C&B 435 (C) .............. 146 
Strauss v Strauss 1974 3 SA 79 (A) .......................................... 287 
Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust en Assuransie Maatskappy Bpk v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A) 36, 274, 286, 
289 
Sumesur v Dominion Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1960 1 C&B 228 (D) ................... 153, 226 
Summers v General Accidellt Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1985 3 SA 418 (C); 1987 3 SA 577 (A) ....... 34 
Swanepoel, Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd v 1988 2 SA 1 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Swisstool Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd, Omega Africa Plastics (Pty) Ltd v 1978 3 SA 465 (A) . . . . loc cit 
Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 3 SA 649 (A) . . . . . . . . . . 69, 231 
Thomas v Bunn; Wilson v Graham; Lea v British Aerospace pie [1991] 1 All ER 193 (HL) ....... 175 
Todd v Administrator, Transvaal 1972 2 SA 874 (A) .......................... 26, 29, 137 
Todorovic and A1io1her v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC) .... 32, 34, 39, 131, 139, 142, 144, 145, 231 
Trichardt v Van der Linde 1916 TPD 148 ..................... .. .. .. . . .. 57, 58, 72, 74 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
xlviii DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) . . ... . . .. ... . . ... . .. . ... ....... .. . ... 326, 328 
Trumpelmann v Barclays Ba11k 1988 (C) (Sunday Times 4 . 10.81 page 7) . .... . .. ... . .. ..... 330 
Uijs v General Accide11t Versekeri11gsmaatskappy Bpk 1991 4 C&B A4-88 (C) ..... ... ... ..... 229 
Uijs, General Accidellt Versekeringsmpy SA Bpk v 1993 4 SA 228 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Union and National Insura11ce Co Ltd v Coetzee 1970 1 SA 295 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62, 238 
Union and South-West Africa Insurance Co Ltd v Fantiso 1981 3 SA 293 (A) ... . ... ....... .. 283 
Union Government (Mi11ister of Railways) v Lee 1927 AD 202 . .... . . .... . ...... . ... 274, 342 
Union Government v Clay 1913 AD 385 .. . . . .. ..... ... .. ..... ... ... . ... . .... . . 156 
Union Government v Jackson and Others 1956 2 SA 398 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168, 172, 174 
Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporatio11 Ltd 1956 1 SA 577 (A) . 191, 195, 196 
Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 32, 39, 58, 64, 164, 209, 273, 274, 276 , 280, 296-298, 320 
Van Aardt NO v Southern Versekerings-Assosiasie Beperk 1986 (0) (unreported 27.2.86 case 523/82) . 305 
Van Almelo v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 411 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 , 238, 239 
Van Aswegen v General Accident Insurance Co of SA Ltd 1989 (YV) (unreported 16.10.89 case 8420/89) 43 
Van Aswegen, Minister van Polisie en Binnelandse Sake v 1974 2 SA 101 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Van Blerck v Van Blerck 1972 2 SA 799 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198, 281, 285, 287 
Van der Merwe v Pearl Assurance Co Ltd 1967 2 PH J3 l (A) .. ... ........... .. ... . .. .. 309 
Van der Merwe, Parity Insurance Company Ltd (in liquidation) v 1967 1 PH 117 (A) . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Van der Plaats v South African Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd 1980 3 SA 105 (A) . 154, 169, 
217 
Van Dyk v Mutual & Federal Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1981 3 C&B 226 (T) .. .. . . . . .. . . .. . 18 
Van Goo/ No v Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd 1992 1 SA 191 (W) . .. . .... .. ... . ... . 254 
Van Heerden v Bethlehem Town Council 1936 OPD 115 ..... . . . ......... . . . ..... . .. . 304 
Van Jaarsveld, AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v (I) 1974 2 C&B 360 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Van Oudtshoorn v Northern Assurance Co Ltd 1963 2 SA 642 (A) .... ... .. . ........ . 71, 72, 74 
Van Rensburg v AA Mutual Insurance Co Ltd 1969 2 C&B 40 (E) ... . . . . . ... . ...... . 251 , 252 
Van Rensburg v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1968 2 C&B 62 (YV) . .. ...... . ...... • 18 
Van Staden v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk l 990 4 C&B L2-1 (W) ..... . .. . .... 262, 304 
Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) ... . ........ .. . . . . . . .. . .. . .. 57 , 277-279, 281, 282 
Van Zyl v Serfontein 1992 2 SA 450 (C) ... .. ..... . . . . .... .. .......... '. .. . .. 341, 343 
Vaughan NO v SA National Trust and Assurance Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 667 (C) . . . . . . . . . . 278, 284, 285 
Venter v Federated Employers' Assuransie Maatskappy Bpk 1978 2 C&B 756 (T) . .. . .. .... 228, 259 
Venter v Mutual en Federale Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1988 3 C&B 749 (T) ... ...... . . 151 , 218 
Victor NO v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1985 1 SA 118 (C); 1986 1 SA 601 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 
Victor NO, Constantia Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v 198_6 1 SA 601 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 167, 169, 231 
Visser, In re estate 1948 3 SA 1129 (C) .... . ... . .. . ... . . . ... .. .. . .. ...... .. 106, 109 
Yoest Alpine lntertrading Gesellschaft MBH v Burwill and Co SA (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 149 (W) . . 33, 168, 
176 
Volkenborn v Volkenborn 1946 NPD 76 . ...... .... .................. . ...... .. . 280 
Wade JR v Sanlam Insurance Co Ltd and Another 1985 1 PH J3 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42, 181 
Waring & Gillow Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103, 116, 156 
Warneke, Union Government v 1911 AD 657 . ............ . ...... .. .. . ......... loc cit 
Watenneyer, Secretary for Inla11d Revenue v 1965 4 SA 431 (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . loc cit 
Wege v Elphick (1947) 49 WALR 83 ... . ........................ . ..... . ... .. . 236 
Wessels v AA 011derlinge Assura11Sie Assosiasie 1989 4 C&B A3-19 (T) . . . . . . . . . . . . 241, 247 , 249 
Whitfield v Phillips a11d Another 1957 3 SA 318 (A) . .. ....... . . . . ......... .. .. . . 231 , 232 
Wieser et al v Pearson et al (1980) 109 DLR 3d 63 (Brit. Col. SC) . ... ... .... . .. . ........ 56 
Wigham v British Traders Insurance Company Ltd 1963 3 SA 151 (W) . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 21, 85 , 281 
Wikner v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1992 (T) (unreported 4.6.92 case no 17826/91) . . . 25 , 168 
Wilkie-Page v Wilkie-Page 1979 2 SA 258 (R) . . . . ... .. ....... . . . ................ 284 
Williams & Another v British America Assurance Co 1962 2 PH 118 (SR) .... . ... .. ... . . 265, 323 
Williams v Oosthuizen 1981 4 SA 182 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199, 241, 243 
Williams v Shub i 976 4 SA 567 (C) .................. . .............. . ...... . . 276 
Wilson v Birt 1963 2 SA 508 (D) ... . . . ........ ... .. . ....... .. .. . ...... . .. . .. 71 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CASES xlix 
Wood, John Arthur v Sa11tam 111sura11ce Compa11y Limited 1976 2 PH J52 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 297 
Woodhead v Woodhead 1955 3 SA 138 (SR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279, 280, 310 
Wright v British Railways Board [1983] 2 All ER 698 (HL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 40, 129, 173, 205 
Xatula v Minister of Police, Tra11Skei 1993 4 SA 344 (Tk) ............................ 267 
Yorkshire !11Surance Co Ltd v Porobic 1957 1 C&B 90 (A) ........... 227, 297, 298, 303, 315, 324 
Young v Hutton 1918 WLD 90 ...................................... 277, 278, 280 
Zimelka v Zimelka 1990 4 SA 303 (W) .............................. 280, 311, 313, 315 




Summary: This thesis is concerned with damages for continuing loss, 
such as most commonly arise with personal injury, or with the death 
of a breadwinner. 1he approach is multidisciplinary rather than 
multinational. 1he thesis comprises 4 sections: General theory; 
Technical issues; Technique and law governing personal injury 
claims; Technique and law governing claims for loss of support. 1he 
thesis does not seek to be a compilation of all relevant legal sources. 
[1.1] THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
1 
This is a thesis about damages, the compensation that is awarded by a court for damage 
suffered in consequence of wrongful conduct. The emphasis is directed at damages for 
personal injury and death, events which give rise to a continuing loss over an extended 
period of time. Some would use the plural 'losses'. The distinction goes to the heart of one 
of the major ambiguities of damages assessment and forms a central topic of this thesis. 
Continuing loss arises with breach of contract, damage to physical property, and with pure 
economic loss. It follows that the issues addressed in this thesis are not confined solely to 
loss flowing from personal injury and death. 
As a general rule damage for continuing loss is compensated by a single once-and-for-all 
lump sum. 1 For purposes of this thesis the lump-sum once-and-for-all rule is accepted as 
axiomatic and desirable. There will be some discussion of compensation by instalments. 
It will be argued in this thesis that damage is a reduction in the overall utility of a person's 
life plan and that damages by way of monetary payment provide a substitute for what has 
been lost. The single once-and-for-all payment made by way of damages has the nature of 
a price, in a manner of speaking. The nature of this price is most obvious when using the 
technique of value of a chance,2 the present utility of an uncertain past or future loss or 
gain. The damages awarded for uncertain past or future loss have much in common with a 
market value, another manifestatio11 of utility, and it is instructive to examine the assessment 
of damages against the background of such a paradigm. Market value is important to the 
assessment of damages because it is, in theory, the price at which a victim may purchase 
substitute goods and thereby convert a loss of goods into a loss of money. The right to a 
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[1.2] BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH 
The assessment of damages is largely a question of fact with a sprinkling of legal rules 
governing the manner in which the facts are to be interpreted. These legal rules are 
supplemented by a large body of conventions drawn from various sciences, notably 
economics, sociology, statistics, and actuarial science. The major focus of this thesis is a 
critical overview of the conventional wisdom of the courts as regards these peripheral 
disciplines and an examination of the related logical and rational structures. Legal research 
traditionally has regard to foreign law. This has been done in this thesis, where appropriate, 
but, m.ore importantly, the approach is multidisciplinary rather than multinational. In 
adopting this approach I have sought to move from the open arguments suggested by 
consideration of other disciplines towards structured reasoning suitable for legal analysis in 
the sense described by Honore: 4 
(There are two categories of presentation)' : open arguments and appeals to rules of 
law. But in many ways the most important feature of Roman and modern legal 
argumentation has been omitted from the catalogue so far discussed: it is this feature 
that constitutes the essence of the Roman gift to modern Western civilization. I am 
referring to the existence of a canon of unacceptable arguments. If we compare 
Greek and Roman civilization and ask wherein the inferiority of the Greeks lies from 
the point of view of legal culture we may be inclined to answer on the following 
lines: The Greeks had laws and constitutions and conducted arguments before juries 
and the like, but their mode of argument was determined by rhetorical and not 
specifically legal considerations. To them any argument was grist to the mill: in 
particular arguments in hominem, that one's opponent was a scoundrel or that one had 
oneself performed notable services to the city; and arguments which appeal directly 
to philosophical or religious principles or to political considerations. The Greeks had 
in fact a notion of rhetoric, of the art of persuasion, and a theory or catalogue of 
types of arguments, in other words a notion of 'topic'. But what they lacked either 
in theory or in practice was the discipline to set up a canon of acceptable arguments 
proper to legal discourse. This involves a narrowing of the scope of the discussion 
with a view to strengthening within certain limits their persuasive power and so the 
stability of the conclusions reached . The appeal to rules of law is of course the first 
type of argument to be listed as acceptable . . . . 
'Secondly, there are conventions concerning the range of acceptable open arguments. 
The creation of these conventions depends on a certain professionalization of the 
law .... 
'Given, then, intellectual professionalism, it is possible for . certain issues to be 
considered not in isolation from the moral, social, political and religious issues 
affecting society at large but in such a way that these are allowed to be taken into 
account only on certain terms and within certain limits. The terms are, I think, really 
twofold . The first is that open arguments resting on social values must ultimately 
give way to rules: in the last resort the argument that the decision proposed is 
inconsistent with a rule compelling the contrary decision must be accepted ... The 
second is that the positive values which are the basis of open arguments are system-
4Honore Legal reasoning in Rome and today from Select South African legal problems edited by Kahn & Zeffert (Juta 
1974) 84 91-3. 
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neutral and person-neutral, that is to say that they are indifferent to the idiosyncratic 
features of religious, moral , philosophical or political thought systems and are not 
conceived ad hominem .. . The open arguments are the windows through which the law 
looks at society and by which the values of society filter through to the law. By them 
the law absorbs the values of the people: utility, equity, nature and the like. But they 
enter in that very general form in which they would be likely to be endorsed by the 
mass of people, rather than as specific programmes, and they are filtered through a 
professional mesh which reduces them to technically manageable principles and 
maxims . . . This impartiality between as between persons and systems is crucial to 
Western legal culture; it is the specific legacy of Roman law to our civilization and 
it is alien to Greek culture .. . . 
'The Romans therefore bequeathed to us a form of legal culture in which the closed 
and the open are combined. Law is a separate sphere of discourse: it is closed in the 
sense that all arguments adduced must be person- and system- neutral. On the other 
hand it is open in that open arguments, if they conform to the above criteria, are 
acceptable subject to the ultimate test of consistency with binding rules'. 
3 
There is a large divide between legal science and actuarial science. This gives rise to an 
intellectual no-man's land considered unduly actuarial by the lawyers and unduly legal by the 
actuaries. This thesis seeks to fill that gap. The actuarial issues discussed in this thesis are, 
with few exceptions, fairly trite by actuarial standards, but fairly advanced by legal 
standards. Suffice it to say that this thesis is not intended for actuaries but for lawyers who 
are concerned with the analysis of the relationship between damage and damages. 
[1.3] STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
[1.3.1] Part 1- Theory of damages: Chapters 2 and 3 seek to define a theory of damage and 
damages. Chapter 2 deals primarily with general utility theory whereas chapter 3 goes on 
to deal with differencing and 'pigeonholing'. 
[1.3.2] Part 11 - Financial and technical matters: Chapters 4 to 11 discuss and define a 
number of concepts and issues, largely technical in nature: Chapter 4 defines the all-
pervasive technique of value of a chance; Chapter 5 examines this technique further using 
the risks of life and death as the paradigm; Chapter 6 deals with diverse funding techniques, 
including the fiction of consuming interest and capital as the means by which to reproduce 
the lost cash flow; Chapter 7 defines and discusses various forms of annuity; Chapter 8 
examines the discount for delayed payment, that is to say the discount for the prospect of 
investment returns; Chapter 9 deals with the deduction for general contingencies; Chapter 10 
deals with compensation for loss of use of goods, but, more importantly, the loss of use of 
money; Chapter 11 deals with the vexed issue of collateral benefits and examines these from 
an economic and administrative, rather then legal, point of view. 
[1.3.3] Part 111- Damages/or personal injury: Chapter 12 examines in detail the techniques 
and legal aspects governing the assessment of damages for personal injury. 
[1.3.4] Part IV - Damages for loss of support: Chapter 13 examines in detail the techniques 
and legal aspects governing the assessment of damages for loss of support arising from the 
death of a breadwinner. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the problem of the 'lost 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
years' which involves an overlap between the claim for loss of support and the claim for 
personal injury. 
[1.4] REFERENCES 
I do not attempt to provide a compilation of all available judgments and articles on the 
various topics. My focus is on ideas and methodologies. For this reason I will often cite 
a single judgment to illustrate an approach which has been used in a number of judgments. 
As a rule the most recent judgment on a topic includes a comprehensive survey of the 
relevant authorities up to that point in time. When this is not so I have provided guidance 
to a wider range of authorities. 
[1.S] STYLE 
In order to render the text more readable I have made extensive use of the first person 'I' 
rather than a more formal impersonal -phraseology. For the same reason I use · popular 
damages phraseology despite having pointed to the potential misconceptions that are 
contained therein. My approach to punctuation and capitals is a blend between Juta's house 
style and that preferred by the editors of THRHR. 




Summary: This chapter examines utility theory and the related 
concept of value. In its most general . form utility is merely 
descriptive of a vital life force. Its application to the assessment of 
damages requires objectivization. Money and risk are both subject 
to utilitarian considerations. Techniques can be developed for the 
measurement of personal utilities. The statistical concept of an 
expectation describes the utility of uncenain, usually future events. 
In suitable circumstances market value provides an objective guide to 
utility. Abstraction promotes forensic efficiency. Concretization, 
attention to personal details, ensures for each claimant and defendant 
a proper hearing. Justice involves a blend of these conflicting goals. 
[2.1] DEFINITION 
5 
[2.1.1] Human wants rational & irrational: Utility, or 'nuttigheid' as Van der Walt 
describes it, 1 reflects the capacity of goods or actions or even dreams to satisfy human 
wants. 2 The notion is as wide and varied as human want in all its diverse manifestations. 
This means that utility may be attributed to the most irrational and incomprehensible 
considerations such as witchcraft. Evaluations of utility will commonly be based upon 
incomplete information and misunderstood circumstances. 3 In its most general form utility 
provides no guidance as to generally accepted value, no rules for normative behaviour. It 
is purely descriptive of a vital force fundamental to human nature and the variable 
relationship of individuals with the environment of people, things and ideas.4 
The objects of utility are not just tangible goods but also intangibles such as the services of 
other persons, ideas, hopes, dreams, and, of course, the buying power with which to obtain 
such of these things as may be acquired with money. 
[2.1.2] Disutility: ·utility has a positive and a negative aspect. 5 Bentham refers to the 
'disutility' of work. 6 Pain is undesirable, it has disutility. A person will act to remove pain 
by, for instance, acquiring pain suppressing pills. For some persons work may have a high 
1Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 281 284. At 215 he uses the word 'utiliteit'. This is, it seems, merely a synonym 
for 'nuttigheid'. 
2Page 'Utility Theory' 3-48 55-61 311. 
3Page 'Utility Theory' 41-2 127. 
4Page 'Utility Theory' 47. 
'Page 'Utility Theory' 3 14-17. 
6Page 'Utility Theory ' 41. 
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utility early in the day.7 This utility may decline with the passage of time until later in the 
day it has acquired a negative utility. Many persons aspire to wealth and freedom from the 
need to work. For them to work for a living has substantial disutility. 8 
[2.1.3] Summation of utilities: A person's total utility is not obtained by adding up 
individual utilities. 9 Thus a certain combination of goods may have a greater utility than the 
sum total of the combined individual utilities. Van der Walt refers to a matched team of 
horses. 10 One may also point to sets of stamps, china or chairs. In such circumstances the 
relative utility of the last item needed to complete the collection may be very high indeed. 
Alternatively an excessive quantity of bricks, wheat, or puppies has lesser utility to the 
possessor than the more modest quantity which he needs for his own use. If the surplus is 
unmarketable, for example puppies, it may acquire a negative utility, a disutility. 
[2.1.4] Changi.ng utilities: Utility is not constant in time. Things which have a high utility 
at one point in time may have a low utility at another point in time. Menger describes how 
the toys of boyhood are abandoned in favour of the books and sports of the student. 11 How 
these in tum are abandoned in favour of the tools of the trade with which we earn a living 
and how with old age the tools of our trade lose their utility. As the utility declines the point 
is reached where the price at which such goods can re-enter the market and be sold comes 
to have a higher utility than the goods themselves and we sell them to others. Menger here 
echoes the interaction between utility, the life plan of the individual, and value in exchange 
which, Van der Walt12 has emphasised, is the basis for compensation. 
[2.1.ST Hedonism: Bentham proposed a principle of hedonism: 13 Every person ·may be 
assumed ~o seek to maximize the utility of his life plan within the limitations of his available 
resources. Money is a major resource for achieving this purpose, but health, personality, 
education, family and associates, are other relevant factors. Economists have developed a 
theory of marginal utility based on maximizing overall utility within a limited income. 14 
The weakness in this theory is its focus upon income and what can be purchased with it. 15 
The theory has not so far succeeded in dealing with utility substitution without commercial 
value. Thus a man may optimize the utility of his life plan by ceasing to work or by 
working for less than his maximum capacity. The principle of hedonism proposed by 
7Page 'Utility Theory' 66. 
'See paragraph 12.15.4. 
9Page 'Utility Theory' 35 39 59. Realization as to the non-additivity of utilities led to the mathematical 
representation of total utility changing from a summation of separate individual utility functions to a single function 
dependent on individual commodities (see Page 77). 
10Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 171 
11Menger 'Principles of Economics' 232. 
12Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 281 284 'planmatig' . 
13Page 'Utility Theory' 39-44. 
14Page 'Utility Theory' 66-7 71-91. 
uPage 'Utility Theory' 127-8. 
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· Bentham may remain valid but not for economists. 16 
[2.2] UTILITY OF A LIFE PLAN 
{2.2.1] Ideal compensation: Utility is a very personal thing. The same goods or ideas or 
sensations or money will have different utility values for different persons. Damage may be 
defined as the disruption of the utility of a person's life plan. The ideal system of 
compensation would restore the overall utility of the plaintiffs life plan to what it would 
have been had there been no injury or death . There are two major factors which prevent a 
court from achieving this goal in practice: 
{2.2.2] The limitations of money: A court is confined to awarding compensation in terms of 
money. Compensation is thus restricted to those aspects of personal utility which can be 
measured in monetary terms. The measurement of personal utility presents considerable 
problems which I shall deal with in the next section. Suffice it to note for the moment that 
Van der Walt restricts compensation for loss of personal utility to those aspects given 
recognition by our fellow men and to which can be ascribed a monetary value, albeit not a 
market value. 17 The monetary equivalent serves as a common denominator, 'algemene 
maatstaf . 
{2.2.3] I"eversible damage: The disruption of the utility of a life plan by way of catastrophic 
injury or death is usually, like the birth of a child, an irreversible process. No amount of 
money can ever remove the disruption and restore to the victim the life plan and its 
associated utility. The event of the injury or death gives birth to a completely different set 
of circumstances, a new life plan with its own different utility. The award of compensation , 
be it by lump sum or by instalments, is the stepping stone into a new life with a new set of 
oppo.rtunities and adversities. Van der Walt points out in this regard that compensation is 
but a monetary equivalent for what has been lost: 18 
'Deur middel van die toekenning van geld as skadevergoeding word dus 'n ekwivalent 
vir die verlore of verminderde nuttigheidswaarde van die eiser se vermoensgoed · vir 
die bevrediging van sy erkende behoeftes gegee' . 
Van der Walt confines the notion of equivalence to past loss, 'afgeslote skade'. He then 
proposes a system of compensation which reduces compensation for future losses to a series 
of past losses19• It follows that the notion of equivalence applies equally to past and 
future loss.20 Only in the most exceptional circumstances will money serve as the means 
16Page 'Utility Theory' 43 refers to 'Bentham's slow discovery that men do not all spontaneously desire "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number" ' ; see too 93-5. 
17Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 280-1. 
18Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 280 285 286. 
19Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 294 'afgeslote toekomstige gevolge'. 
~cGregor 'Damages' 14ed 306 notes that there is no fundamental difference between past and future capitalized 
values; see too Kemp 'Damages' Jed 63-4. See too paragraph 3.3.3. 
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to effect restitution.21 Bloembergen22 records the important concept of equivalent value 
in relation to a damaged res. 
[2.3] UTILITY OF MONEY 
[2.3.1] Price elasticity: There is no simple measure for utility. Some idea of the utilities of 
individuals may be obtained by raising the price of goods. The point at which persons stop 
buying gives a fair indication in monetary terms as to the upper limit to the utility of the 
goods. The consumer demand for many classes of goods is what the economists call 
'elastic', that is the higher the price the fewer the purchasers. The same goods then have 
a wide variety of different utilities to different persons, but only one market price. As the 
market price rises an ever increasing number of potential purchasers cease to become buyers. 
If the price is raised to very high levels, as with diamonds and gold, the goods may acquire 
enhanced utility by reason of being expensive, an indicator of social status and a storage 
medium for wealth. Subsequent price increases may lead to increased purchasers. 
[2.3.2] Money as the measure of utility: The price a person is prepared to pay for goods 
merely indicates that the utility of the money paid is less than or equal to the utility of the 
goods for that individual. Bentham saw in money a common standard of value by which 
utility could be measured. 23 He was frustrated in the further development of money as a 
common denominator by the realization that the utility of money is not the same for all 
persons. 
[2.3.3] Social mobility: If I aspire to a modest style of living and have adequate funds to 
cover the cost thereof then the utility to me of further money may be fairly low. If I have 
difficulty maintaining my chosen style of living then the utility of further funds will be very 
high. One might say in general that money has greater utility to a poor man than to a rich 
man. This is however, an oversimplification. Friedman & Savage24 have demonstrated that 
money has the highest utility when it enables a person to move up on the social scale, 
labourer to middle class, middle class to upper class. In practice there may be numerous 
grades. Some persons may have no desire to move up the social scale even if the money is 
available. Additional money in this context has low utility for them. The phenomenon of 
the rich person who watches every cent is not unknown. For such persons additional money 
has a high utility notwithstanding their wealth. 25 · 
[2.3.4] Rich man· - poor man: Prima facie money has less utility to a rich man than to a 
21Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 285-6. 
22Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 47-8 'De benadeelde had in de toekomst nog van al/es met de zaak kunnen doen 
- gebruiken, verkopen, enz. - maar al die toekomstige mogelijkheden vinden in de maatschappelijke werkelijkheid 
hun uitdrukking in de waarde ... De benadeelde zich bijna altijd met hem aid us toegekende vergoeding in onze op 
ruilverkeer gebaseerde maatschappij zo niet een soortgelijke zaak, dan toch wel iets gelijkwaardigs kan verschajfen ... 
Die gelijkwaardige zaak zal hem dan ook weer gelijkwaardige mogelijkheden verschajfen.' 
23Page 'Utility Theory' 37-8. 
24Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279. 
25Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 282-3 note that the fact that a rich man will spend more money to avoid pain 
than a poor man does not necessarily imply that money has a lower utility to the rich man. 
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poor man because the rich man has so much more of it. -This consideration suggests that 
awards for general damages for pain and suffering should be larger for rich men than for 
poor men. The appellate division in South Africa has ruled that the money value to be 
placed on the loss of an amenity of life is to be the same regardless of the financial 
circumstances of the plaintiff. 26 Corbett & Buchanan27 note that the courts have not been 
astute to abide by this ruling. 
[2.4] UTILITY OF RISK 
[2.4.1] Risk aversives and risk seekers: A major concern of this text is the utility of risk. 
As with so many utilities the utility of risk varies widely. Economists have distinguished two 
important types of person in this regard, the 'risk seeker' and the 'risk aversive'. 28 In 
general the risk averse person will be as heavily insured as his finances permit. He will 
eliminate all possible sources of risk from his life plan. The risk seeker, on the other hand, 
will probably carry little insurance and apply all available funds to speculative entrepreneurial 
ventures which offer the prospect of large gains at long odds. 29 
[2.4.2] Insurance and lotteries: In general the cost of acquiring insurance exceeds the 
'actuarial' value30 of the risk. This is so because the premium includes the administrative 
costs of the insurer. 31 It follows that if people buy insurance it must be because their 
personal perceptions · of the risks have a present utility which exceeds the utility of the 
premiums to be paid. Lotteries generally yield profit to the organizer. It follows that the 
value of the chance of a prize is less then the cost of a lottery ticket. Nonetheless lotteries 
are popular. The utility of th5! prospect of the gain of a large sum of money on small odds 
thus outweighs the utility of the more certain loss of the cost of a lottery ticket.32 
[2.4.3] Market pricing: Perhaps the most important point to be gleaned from a consideration 
of personal utilities under conditions of risk is the distinction between the objective actuarial 
present value of the risk and the individual's subjective assessment thereof. The actuarial 
value of the risk would be obtained by using statistical averages, taken from observation, in 
conjunction with the value of the chance. For the purpose of the argument one needs to 
assume that there is sufficient reliable information available. The individual's subjective 
assessment is likely to be far more intuitive, probably based on emotion and less-than-full 
information. He will compare the present outgo, the insurance premium or price of a lottery 
ticket, with the imagined consequences and likelihood of the gain or loss. The only way one 
can determine the level of utility is to raise the price progressively until it reaches the point 
26Radebe v Hough 1949 1 SA 380 (A). 
27Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 8n64. 
281.evin 'Statistics for Management' 2ed 712-13; Kwon 'Statistical Decision Theory' 245-9. 
29Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 280 'Young men of an adventurous disposition are more attracted by the 
prospects of a great success than they are deterred by the fear of failure'. · 
. 
30Friedman & Savage 1948 J PE 279 use the adjective 'actuarial' (see 284 287) to denote 'the statistical average' (see 
285-6) which an individual can expect to receive. 
31 Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 285. 
32Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 284nl3. 
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where the individual being tested loses interest in taking out insurance or buying a lottery 
ticket. There will also be some risk-averse persons for whom the usual cost of insurance or 
lotteries is already too high. To measure their personal utility values one would need to 
decrease the price progressively until these people became buyers. The testing process will 
produce a variety of personal values, both larger and smaller than the objective actuarial 
value. 
[2.4.4] Attraction of large sums: Friedman & Savage have concluded that the prospect of 
substantial gain at long odds has great attraction for lower income and some middle income 
groups. 33 The wealthy, it seems, are not generally attracted by the prospect of large gains 
at long odds. 34 After all ex hypothesi the wealthy already have substantial sums and their 
interest in life is more that of conservation of their capital by sound investment and insurance 
against risks. 
Life offices offer immediate life annuities whereby a single lump sum premium acquires the 
right to a series of future payments contingent on the survival of the life assured. On death 
the capital is forfeited to the life office. Such plans, once fairly popular, are little sought 
after today. Conversely, endowment insurance policies which pay out a capital sum after a 
specified number of years, or on earlier death, are extremely popular and are taken out in 
large numbers. This observation suggests that the prospect of a series of future payments 
contingent on human life has less utility for the average person than an actuarially equivalent 
large lump sum. 35 
[2.4.5] General contingencies: The deductions made by judges for general contingencies is 
almost without exception larger than is suggested by unemployment statistics. 36 One also 
finds an exaggeration of the risk of death for a child. 37 This is the behaviour one would 
expect from a judge who is risk averse, that is say a person whose personal present utility 
for the prospect of future risk attaching to the series of uncertain payments exceeds the 
actuarial value. One finds similar risk-aversive behaviour in the judicial choice of discount 
rates of interest below the level indicated by prevailing market conditions.38 This scaling 
33Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 287 301 
34Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 301 
3
'This conclusion is supported from other sources: see quotation in paragraph 3.1.2; see too Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 
26. 
36Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 255-9; Street 'Damages' 120-5; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 
295-306; Boberg 1964 SAL/ 194 212. In general unemployment statistics should be received with caution: they do 
not reflect all persons seeking employment (Hofmeyer 'Labour Market Participation' 1985 HSRC RDSl) . 
Unemployment is not the only risk leading to reduced earnings, there may be years of increases below the rate of 
inflation, and tax rates may rise inordinately as they have done in recent years in South Africa. 
376 
• •• the possibility of the minor's death before age 16. The actuary from an insurance point of view treats that 
possibility as negligible. It is a factor .that from a practical point of view must be taken into consideration' Paterson 
v SAR&H 1931 CPD 289 300-301. 
31Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 587F-G (43 per year adopted in face of market rates of 5,753 per 
year); Kotwane v UNSBIC 1982 4 SA 458 (0) 466inf (53 per year adopted in face of market rates of some 123 
per year); Oberholzer v NEG Insurance 1988 4 C&B A3-l (C) (13 per year net capitalization rate in face of a usual 
level of 2 3 to J 3 per year). 
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down of the discount rate because of investment uncertainty is contrary to the normal 
behaviour of investors in a market who generally expect an increase to the rate of investment 
return as compensation for the prospect of risk. That is to say that such investors expect to 
pay a lower price because of the risks involved.39 The seemingly anomalous judicial 
behaviour is to be explained by a perception that the claimant is able to use the award by 
consuming interest and capital to reproduce the lost income.40 
[2.5] THE MEASUREMENT OF UTILITY 
[2.5.1] Qualitative measures: A qualitative or nominal guide41 to a person's utility in 
respect of something can be gleaned from statements such as 'highly valued', 'of little use', 
'good'. 
[2.5.2] Quantitative measures: An ordinal guide to personal utility42 is obtained by ranking 
a variety of choices with numbers such as choice 1, choice 2, etc. The higher the number 
the lower the utility. One finds such measurements forming part of consumer surveys for 
marketing purposes. For our purposes an important type of ordinal measure concerns the 
utility of risk. We may ask the subject of our inquiry to rate his perception of the risk 
attaching to a future event on a scale of 0 % to 100 % . Zero rating means that the event is 
considered to be impossible, that is to say total indifference, a non-event. A rating of 100% 
implies absolute certainty that the event will occur, that is to say considerable concern with 
the outcome. A percentage between 0% and 100% implies a degree of confidence in the 
outcome of the event which lies somewhere between certainty and impossibility. Ramsey43 
described these ordinal values as 'degrees of belief' and demonstrated that they obey the 
same mathematical rules as the theory of chances, the theory of 'probability' as it is known 
to the modern statistician. It is a valid mode of thought to consider such degrees of belief 
to be chances.44 Valuable information has been obtained in many fields by observing the 
degrees of belief attached by experts to uncertain events with which they are familiar.45 
These beliefs are often remarkably similar. This deserves note in a world where subjective 
evaluations usually differ widely between individuals.46 
[2.5.3] Damages assessment: When a medical expert tells a court that the chance of a future 
39The higher the discount rate of return the lower the present value. 
40See 84, 97. 
41Kwon 'Statistical Decision Theory' 245. 
42Kwon 'Statistical Decision Theory' 245 . 
43Ramsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 166-84; see too De Finetti 1937 Al Henri Poincare II 6-16; Savage 
'Bayesian Econometrics' 112-15. 
44De Finetti 1937 Al Henri Poincare 1 16 'La notion de probabilite, tel/e que nous /'avons decrite , est sans doute 
la plus voisine de cel/e de •1'110mme de la rue•; mieux encore, c 'est exactement cel/e qu 'ii applique tous le jours 
dans ses jugements pratiques'. 
"Kwon 'Statistical Decision Theory' 250-4; Grayson 'Drilling Decisions'; Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 155-6 
lists numerous publications relating, among other things, to weather forecasts . 
46De Finetti 1937 Al Henri Poincare II 16 'Cette conception, qui laisse tout afait fibre chaque individu d 'evaluer 
/es probabilites comme ii le croit' . 
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operation, damnum emergens, is 33% he is giving expression to his degree of belief based 
on his own experience and, possibly, available statistics. As regards lucrum cessans one 
commonly finds a plaintiff alleging that he would have been promoted had he not been 
injured. It can be most revealing to ask the employer to state his personal degree of belief 
that promotion would have occurred. 'Was it a 50% chance?' 'No, less than that' might be 
the reply. 'Was it a 25% chance?' 'No, more than that.' 'How much more?' 'About 33% 
I think' might be the conclusive reply. Inquiries of this nature can eliminate endless 
haggling. The plaintiff is awarded 33 % of the value of the promotion as a certainty. 47 A 
critic might complain that these are but opinions with no scientific basis. The reply is that 
no better basis is available to the court. These opinions as to likelihood are the best available 
evidence from the lips of experts who can be expected to know better than anyone else. 
Such opinions often relate to a hypothetical state of affairs which can never be tested by 
actual experience, by waiting, and must often be based on relatively limited overall 
information. In certain situations it is possible to objectivize the subjective opinions by 
reference to logic of the situation or statistical data. 48 
The plaintiff in the matter may on similar inquiry reveal his personal assessment of his 
chances of promotion to be 95 % . By reason of the injury he has been deprived of the utility 
of a 95 % expectation of promotion. If compensation is based upon the personal utility of the 
plaintiff a chance of 95 % should be used to assess the loss, the chance of 33 % expressed by 
the employer should be irrelevant. As a general rule a court will accept the assessment of 
the employer and reject the assessment of the employee.49 It is in this sense that awards 
for damages are objectivized. 
[2.5.4] Act of measurement effects result: The measurement of personal utilities is beset 
with many problems, not the least being that the very circumstances of the inquiry may affect 
the answer that will be given. This is particularly so of a plaintiff who has a financial 
interest in the answers given. An employer may paint a rosy picture of the lost opportunities 
of his injured employee in the knowledge that he will not be called upon to 'put his money 
where his mouth is' . This is not to suggest that such persons are dishonest, they probably 
have sincere belief in the correctness of what they say. Savage50 mentions in addition to 
bias: 
'all subjects report, or otherwise reveal, that they do not know their own preferences; 
they experience wavering and indecision that cannot be identified with mere 
indifference'. 51 
48De Finetti 1937 Al Henri Poincare ll 16 'Dew: sont Les procedes d'ou l'on a cru pouvoir deduire une signification 
objective de la probabilite: d 'une part le schema des cas egalement probables, et d'autre part la consideration des 
frequences' . See 15 below. 
49Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617F the widows personal views of her remarriage prospects were · 
accorded little weight: 'Her attitude is that she will not remarry unless it is necessary to do so to support her child. 
I think little weight should be attached to her attitude'. 
'°Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 115-16. See too Ramsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 172. 
~'Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 115. 




'is that once an experimenter satisfies one preference of a subject he may quite 
drastically change the subject's pattern of preferences'. 52 
13 
This consideration is of particular significance if one seeks to elicit information from a 
widow or injured plaintiff concerning preferences had the injury or death not occurred. 
Savage notes as well that: 
'actual subjects are of course sometimes blind to their own clear advantage, failing 
to understand that they can only deprive themselves ... Such facts do underline the 
need for education and training prior to, and even during, the application of 
elicitation devices•. 53 
This last consideration confirms the well-established principle of justice that a plaintiff should 
have legal representation if he is to present his case properly. 
[2.5.5] Value amongst fellow men: The difficulties attaching to the measurement of personal 
utilities are probably the single most important reason why the courts seek out independent 
evidence concerning the utility of what has been lost. Account will thus be taken of loss of 
utility only to the extent that this can be corroborated by the opinions of others, that is to say 
objectivized. 54 Van der Walt55 states in this regard that: 
'Die skadevergoedingsregtelike vermoensbegrip altyd moet gaan om die bevrediging 
van erkende behoeftes ... Die nuttigheid van die betrokke goed vir die bevrediging van 
die vermoensubjek se behoeftes, en daardie behoeftes as sodanig, 'n verkeerswaarde 
moet M.' 
Van der Walt has in mind here not market value but rather consensus as to value amongst 
our fellow men. 
[2.6] SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS OF CHANCE 
[2.6.1] Intuitive notions of chance: The first formal record of a subjective interpretation of 
chance was by Ramsey.56 Ramsey died shortly after preparing his paper. His line of 
thinking was then developed by a number of econometricians, notably Savage57 and De 
Finetti. 58 The theory of subjective chances has its major application in the realm of utility 
52Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 115. 
53Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 115. 
54See too 22. 
55Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' page 280. 
56Ramsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 1931 158-98. 
57Savage 'Foundations of Statistics'; Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 111-56. 
58De Finetti 1937 A I (Anna/es de L '/nstitut) Henri Poincare l. 
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analysis, 59 a topic which has already been discussed. Statisticians are heatedly divided 
between Bayesians and classicists. 60 Jurists are essentially Bayesian in their approach to 
facts: Pre-established notions, such as 'not guilty', are modified in the light of the evidence. 
The recorded difficulties with communication between statisticians and the courts61 most 
likely reflect, apart from disagreement on the meaning of the word 'probability', a 
classical-statistics bias on the part of many statisticians, particularly actuaries. From the 
court's point of view classical statistics is non-intuitive and therefore of questionable 
relevance to matters of the soul, such as justice and fairness. 62 
{2.6.2] Diverse manifestations: The more intuitive perceptions of chance, or 'probability' 
as the statisticians call it, may be viewed in a variety of different ways and for this reason 
the concept has a chameleon-like quality. Ramsey writes of degree of belief.63 Savage in 
his last paper says that a subjective chance is 'a price, in a manner of speaking'. 64 Dreze 
writes that it 'may be interpreted as an insurance premium. Given such a price system ... ~ .65 
The deduction for general contingencies66 and the value of a possibility67 are both 
commonly determined by a process of subjective impression rather than arithmetic 
calculation. This similarity with the subje~tive chances described by Ramsey provides a 
fundamental link to utility theory. Formal statistics and monetary amounts are then merely 
ways for objectivizing the subjective impression. 
Ramsey's concept of degree of belief is not seen in terms of price because we can hold 
degrees of belief in relation to events without for one moment considering their monetary 
value. The identification of degree of belief with 'price' arises when we come to deal with 
value in exchange, the price at which an individual will now exchange the prospect of an 
uncertain future gain or loss. 68 Under conditions of a frequent exchange of money for 
'9Zellner has produced a collection of the important papers on utility under the title 'Basic Issues in Econometrics' . 
Kurihara 'Post Keynesian Economics' 388-436 includes a paper analysing the propensity of households to save rather 
than spend. The mathematical model used, hardly surprisingly, closely resembles the actuarial year-by-year method. 
60Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 39-67. 
61 Downton 1982 JRSSA 395. 
62Van Rensburg Huldigingsbundel Daniel Pont 384 405. 
63Ramsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 163-84. 
64Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 112inf. 
65Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 22inf. 
66Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 965G 'The determination ... for such contingencies involves, by 
its very nature, a process of subjective impression or estimation rather than objective calculation'; Sigournay v 
Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 569A. 
67
'1n the present case I do not propose to express the possibility ... in terms of a precise percentage. I intend merely 
to award an amount in respect of the total cost ... which will take account of the extent of the possibility and the 
various imponderables .. .' Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 226C. 
61Cost-benefit analysis of social projects and legislation has been closely analyzed using calculations very similar to 
those used for damages assessments (see, for instance, Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed; Mishan 'Cost-Benefit 
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goods the subjective values held by different individuals become objectivized as market 
values. Bloembergen makes the important observation that the value, the price in exchange, 
of a tangible res such as a motor car, encapsulates in one figure all possible uses and 
disadvantages attaching to that res. 69 It is of course possible to find examples of a barter 
economy with a highly developed pricing structure but with no money and no statisticians.70 
(2. 7] EXPECTED VALVES 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the relationship between utility and value in exchange 
we need first to explore further the manner in which personal evaluations of uncertainty are 
expressed in the minds of individuals, and accordingly in common parlance: 
TABLE 1 - CALCULATION OF EXPECTED OVERTIME HOURS 
A B c D 
Range Midpoint Chance Value 
hrs hrs BxC 
0 0 0,1 0,0 
0-4 2 0,4 0,8 
4-8 6 0,3 1,8 
8+12 9 0,2 1,8 
Total (the weighted average) 4,4 hours 
[2.7.1] Averages: A cardinal measure of utility71 is the 'expected value', or 'point 
estimate' .72 This is expressed in a form that is familiar to most people as an average. For 
instance one might ask the employer in our example how many hours overtime the employee 
would have worked. The reply might be '4 to 5 hours per week at time plus one third'. 
Closer inquiry might reveal that in the past little overtime was worked but now it is usual 
for employees to work overtime. The figure of '4 to 5 hours' reflects a degree of belief on 
Analysis'). 
~loembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 47-8 'De benadeelde had in de toekomst nog van alles met de zaak kunnen doen 
- gebruiken, verkopen, enz. - maar al die toekomstige mogelijkheden vinden in de maatschappelijke werkelijkheid 
hun uitdrukking in de waarde ... De benadeelde zich bijna a/tijd met hem aid us toegekende vergoeding in onze op 
ruilverkeer gebaseerde maatschappij Zo niet een soortgelijke zaak, dan toch we/ iets gelijkwaardigs kan verschajfen .. . 
Die ge/ijkwaardige zaak za/ hem dan ook weer ge/ijkwaardige mogelijkheden verschaffen' . 
70eg the use of cattle amongst the Nguni tribes of southern Africa; see too Malinowski 'Argonauts of the Western 
Pacific' and the use of shell necklaces. 
71 Kwon 'Statistical Decision Theory' 245 . 
72Levin 'Statistics for Management' 2ed (expected value) 188-9 192-4 711-12 (point estimate) 287-92; De Finetti 
1937 Al Henri Poincare 1 19 (l'esperance mathematique de lafrequence); Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 126-9. 
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the part of the employer, perhaps based on some rough mental arithmetic. It would be 
useless to try to statistically analyze overtime worked in previous years, there was previously 
no overtime and conditions have changed. Further questioning might reveal a perceived 
chance of 10% that no overtime would be worked, balanced by a chance of 20% that 
overtime of 9 hours per week would be worked, with chances of 40% for overtime between 
0 and 4 hours per week, and 30% for between 4 and 8 hours per week. The weighted 
average of these different views is 4,4 hours per week: 
When dealing with subjective chances it is preferable to describe such a weighted average 
as an 'expected value'. This sort of average needs to be distinguished from an average over 
time which, although very similar, is not quite the same thing. The middle value for each 
range of hours worked has been multiplied by the associated chance and the resulting values 
summed to give the expected value. One may recognise here the technique of valuation of 
a chance73 applied to each separate element. The figure of 4,4 hours multiplied by the rate 
of pay and discounted for mortality and interest gives the present value of the chance of 
earning overtime in one particular week. 
Care should be taken that a single point estimate in the form of an average or an expected 
value does not obscure the extent to which the point estimate balances the relevant risks and 
alternative values: 74 
'What is necessitated is an exercise involving the various future possibilities being 
expressed as percentage chances, or averages, and subject to contingency 
allowances ... The court makes the best assessment it can on all the evidence. That 
assessment is not a calculation. It may involve calculation but when calculation has 
been done the assessment exercise necessitates taking into account and employing 
devices such as averages, contingency allowances and percentage chances in order 
that the eventual award does justice by being fair to both sides' . 15 
The assessment of general damages for pain and suffering and loss of the amenities of life 
involves an averaging process. 76 
[2. 7.2] Overlapping scenarios: The overtime calculation is an example of the general 
principle that the value of the chance of a composite event, the so-called, 'e~pected value', 
may be computed by adding the values of the chances for the separate components. This rule 
of additivity only applies to chances which do not overlap with one another, the chance of 
earning no overtime does not overlap with the chance of earning between 0 and 4 hours of 
overtime. The value of a chance is a measure of utility and utilities may be expected to obey 
similar rules of addition provided they do not interact. Where, however, they do interact 
then the utility of the group of goods is not equal to the sum of the utilities of the 
components. Thus the utility of a team of four horses trained to operate together is greater 
74See 97. 
15Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 61 64. 
76Neethling Potgieter & Visser ' Deliktereg' 2ed 245. 








then the sum of the utilities of each horse individually .77 That the total utility should exceed 
the sum of the separate utilities is very much the exception. In the majority of cases the 
overlap of utilities has the effect that the utility of the total is less than the sum of the utilities 
of the components. 78 Thus a trader will often give a discount for bulk purchases. It is for 
this reason that the courts warn against overlapping heads of damage giving rise to double 
compensation. 79 
[2. 7.3] Mental processes: The 'expected value' based on the weighted average of a variety 
of scenarios is a common measure of utility. In practice the person whose utility is being 
measured will not go through a conscious process of adding up the separate values for 
different scenarios as we did in table 1 above. The assessment of utility will be done more 
intuitively with perhaps brief reference to higher and lower values. Thus an employer might 
express the opinion that a fair average level of earnings is Rl8000 per year with a possible 
low of R12000 per year and a possible high of R21000 per year. An expert on family 
planning might express the opinion that a young widow would have had 3 children had her 
husband not been killed. In forming this opinion the expert might consider that families from 
that socio-economic group generally have between 2 and 5 children but that 3 is the most 
common. The widow might say that she and her husband planned to have two children.80 
Quite which expectation the court will accept will depend on circumstances. 
[2. 7.4] Expectation of life: The expectation of life is obtained by adding up the chances of 
survival to each individual future year. 81 It thus constitutes a point estimate of the age at 
which death is likely to occur. ' 
[2. 7.5] Personalized averages: Uncertainty in the form of pure risk and inadequate 
information, that is to say less than ideal evidence, is an integral and unavoidable component 
of many forms of damage. Van der Walt notes82 in regard to loss of income arising from 
an injury: 
'Alhoewel hiervoor 'n konkrete skadebegrip moet geld is dit bykans onmoontlik om 
77Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 171n91. The same may said of a set of stamps or chairs. Once the set has been 
completed, however, the acquisition of a further horse or stamp or chair has extremely low utility. 
711This follows from the observation that subjective chances obey the doctrine of chances which states that the chance 
of the occurrence of two overlapping sets of events A and B either individually or together is C(A) +C(B)-C(A)xC(B) 
where C(A) and C(B) represent the chances of the respective events (see Levin 'Statistics for Management' 2ed 
139-40). It follows that for overlapping sets of events C(AorB) is less than C(A) +C(B) . This highly simplified 
reasoning is only valid in a very general sense. Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 295 have pointed to the multiple 
S-shape of the utility curve of money and risk. · 
19Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) l 13F. See too Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 243; Cooper-Stephenson & 
Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 275-91; Lim Poli Oioo v C&IHA [1979) 2 All ER 910 (HL) 92lg-h; Light v Conroy 
1948 1 C&B 444 (T) 445; Niblock-Stuart v Protea Assurance 1973 2 C&B 323 (C); Kriel v Administrator-General 
for SWA 1986 3 C&B 539 (SWA) 548; 1988 3 SA 275 (A). 
~e statistical average in this case might be 2, 75 children. The 0, 75 of a child reflects the value of the chance of 
a third child. 
81 See paragraph 5.1.4. 
112Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer ' 200nl 1. 
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vas te stel of die eiser hoegenaamd sy persoonlike potensiaal om inkomste te verdien 
sou gebruik bet - of hoe suksesvol by daarin sou gewees bet - as by nie onregmatig 
beseer is nie. Daarom moet generaliserend (dws met gemiddelde syfers) gewerk 
word. 83 Hierdie "ruwere" konkrete skadebepaling kan mi ewe goed die toepassing 
van 'n minder subjektiewe konkrete skadebegrip genoem word.' 
One might paraphrase these words by saying that every inquiry as to damages begins with 
all the known past and present circumstances of the claimant. Where information is lacking, 
particularly as regards the future, the gaps are filled by means of averages and expectations 
which are moulded as closely as possible to the known personal circumstances of the 
plaintiff. S4 An expectation in this sense is appropriately described as a 'personalized 
average'. 
[2.7.6] The relevance of averages: The cynic would point out that if one has one's head in 
the fridge and one's feet in the fire then one is on average comfortable. This type of 
information nihilism destroys the tenuous validity that averages provide for facilitating 
agreement between men in the face of uncertainty. 85 Without using averages we cannot deal 
efficiently with uncertainty. Some information, albeit incomplete, is better than none at all. 
The cynic destroys but does not propose a better substitute. 
[2. 7. 7] Average earnings: One finds numerous references to 'average earnings' in the 
decided cases. 86 The word 'average' as used by the courts generally designates 'an average 
over the years'. An average over different possibilities at one point in time is indicated by 
the words 'probable', 'likely' and 'expectation'. Average earnings statistics for a 
population87 give guidance in one figure both as to probable expectations and an average 
in time, 88 that is to say the sample on which the statistic is based includes persons in 
83See too Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 106. 
14Standard mortality tables will always be adjusted up or down in the light of the particular circumstances of the 
plaintiff: Noclromowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (f) 721-2 'the person concerned will live longer than the 
average'; Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1027 'an allowance of 50 per cent extra mortality'. 
Remarriage statistics are received with caution: Legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617 'The census 
statistics . . . should not be regarded as a starting point, but merely as one of the facts'. 
15Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 200nll; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 106. 
86In Pitman v Scrimgeour 1947 2 SA 22 (yV) 35 it was 'established that he could probably have expected an income 
averaging £2500 over the years'; Southern Insurance Assn Ltd v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 115C 'If an average 
expectancy or projection would be postulated'; Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (yV) 848 'a high 
average figure'; Botha v Minister of Transport 1956 4 SA 375 (yV) 379C/D 'at an average salary'; Phoenix 
Assurance v De Wet 1963 l C&B 196 (A) 200 'his average annual earnings'; Paton v Santam Insurance 1965 l C&B 
637 (E) 645sup 'at an average over the years'; Mrwarwaza v Rondalia Assurance 1978 2 C&B 760 (E) 765 'This 
judgment must therefore assess Nozive's prospects of employment not entirely as an individual's but as a statistical 
probability' ; Van Rensburg v President Versekeringsmpy 1968 2 C&B 62 (yV) 64 (Inland Revenue statistics for 
doctors); Van Dyk v Mutual & Federal Versekeringsmpy 1981 3 C&B 226 (T) 228 (average earnings for blind 
persons). 
. 
17There are numerous salary surveys which provide earnings data subdivided by type of work and length of 
experience (for instance the Peromnes surveys prepared by FSA and the HSRC surveys of graduate earnings). Such 
surveys generally provide median and quartile earnings rather than average earnings. It seems highly unlikely that 
a court would go So far as to distinguish between median and average earnings. 
88Valid provided earnings scales do not alter in real terms in time. 
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numerous possible occupations and at different stages in their careers. 
[2. 7.8] Predictions: Expected values are sometimes erroneously described as 'predictions'. 89 
The dictionary meaning of the word 'predict' is 'foretell', 'prophecy', 'announce 
beforehand'. 90 The word 'expectation '91 implies a degree of uncertainty which is absent 
from the word 'prediction'. Expected values are present utilities in relation to uncertain 
future events. A prophecy may give rise to an expectation, but an expectation is not a 
prophecy. 92 The present utility of an uncertain future event determines the manner in which 
I act now,93 not how I will act at the time when the event is due to take place in, say, 20 
years' time. Present expectations determine present decisions, including a decision as to 
the amount to award now by way of damages. Subsequent events may alter my 
expectations and thus lead to different decisions. It is for this reason that a court will have 
regard to subsequent events and make a different award at the time of trial from that which 
would have been made at the time of the injury or death. 94 Predictions in the mechanistic 
sense of 'prophecy' are only possible if the entire future has already been mapped out in one 
vast clockwork of cause and effect. 95 Such predestination is, however, a denial of the 
power of man to choose between right and wrong, it precludes a finding of fault:96 and the 
legal basis for an award of damages. The notion of prediction, or prophecy, is in conflict 
with the fundamentals of our legal heritage. I have emphasised the distinction between a 
prophecy and an expectation because the word 'prophecy' is sometimes misleadingly used 
by the courts in relation to the process of assessing damages for future loss.97 
19For example Boberg 'Judge or soothsayer' 1988 BML 11 ' ... our judges in a role essentially no different from that 
of a prophet or fortune teller'; Boberg 1988 BML 55 'The judge must do the best he can to predict the future: hence 
his need to don the fortune teller's mantle' ; Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) l 13G 'It involves a 
prediction as to the future'; Auty v National Coal Board 'The Times' 3 April 1984 '. .. as a method of providing a 
reliable guide to individual behaviour patterns or to future economic and political events, the predictions of an 
actuary could be only a little more likely to be accurate (and would almost certainly be less entertaining) than those 
of an astrologer'. 
900xford English Dictionary. 
91 For instance in Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) l llD one finds the expression 'verwagte 
verdienste'. De Finetti used the word 'prevision' in the title to his paper on the subject of the utility of uncertainty. 
Gase 's French Dictionary defines 'prevision' as ' forecast', 'anticipation', 'expectation', 'estimate'. The Oxford 
English dictionary definition of the word 'expectation' is 'awaiting', 'ariticipation'. 
92De Finetti 1937 Al Henri Poincare 1 23 '11 faut remarquer toutefois que cette wprevision de la frequence w n 'est 
autre chose qu 'une evaluation des (chances): elle n 'est nu//ement une prophetie'. 
93The primary manifestation of utility is choice between alternatives, ie utility implies a choice, action here and now 
(Page 'Utility Theory' 3). Do I buy at the present market price or not? Do I abandon my right to compensation 
for the amount offered or not? In this sense damages are no more than what the judge perceives to be a fair price 
between plaintiff and defendant. The present utilities of plaintiff and defendant, as perceived by the judge, determine 
what action, what decision, he will take . 
94See, for instance, Wigham v British Traders Insurance 1963 3 SA 151 (W). 
95Such as one finds in Greek thought. 
96Van Rensburg 1970 Huldigingsbundel Daniel Pont 384 393 'Slegs die mens kan ... verantwoordelik gehou word 
vir sy dade'. 
97See, for instance, Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 .(A) 113G 'Any inquiry into damages for loss of 
earning capacity is of its nature speculative, because it involves a prediction as to the future, without the benefit of 
crystal balls, soothsayers, augurs or oracles. All that the court can do is make an estimate, which is often a very 
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[2.8] EXPECTED NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS 
[2.8.1] Adequate causation: Modern scientific thinking on causation has embraced the 
concept of prediction, in a contingent sense, according to a probabilistic set of laws.98 
German legal analysis has gone so far as to define a 'cause' to be an event which increases 
the risk, that is to say the chance of the result, by a significant amount.99 An approach to 
causation based on the theory of chances, that is to say 'adequate causation', has received 
judicial recognition in South Africa, 100 although one must hasten to add that this has been 
done without consideration of the rigorous analysis that has characterised the German 
approach. The adherence to a test based on a fixed percentage chance (50%) has been 
harshly and correctly criticised: 101 The major objection to defining causation by reference 
to a fixed percentage chance of harm is that different percentages will apply in different 
cases, quite apart from the fact that the percentage chances will in most instances have to be 
determined by intuitive considerations. 102 When assessing damages for personal injury or 
death a gain or loss would generally be viewed as 'caused' by the injury or death if the 
chance thereof has been increased to a material extent. The compensation to be awarded is 
the increase in the value of the chance103 for damnum emergens, and the decrease in the 
value of the chance for lucrum cessans, eg the chance of earnings. 
[2.8.2] Expected nonnal course of events: Once an injury or death has been caused then 
there comes into being the expected normal course of events having regard to the death, 
or the full known extent of the injuries. This is compared with the expected normal course 
of events had there been no injury or death. Adverse economic events and notional early 
death are generally viewed as part of the normal course of events, that is to say causes of 
loss which will be presumed. Hart & Honore describe such sequences as 'ongoing 
states' .104 
We cannot know the precise course of the future, but we can have intimate and immediate 
knowledge of what we currently expect to be the normal course of events. A court may 
validly receive evidence as what a witness expects in the future as the normal course of 
rough estimate, of the present value of the loss'. 
98Zellner 'Econometrics' 38-9. Scientific concepts of causation include a prediction of the frequency for occurrence 
of the result (see Van Rensburg Huldigingsbundel Daniel Pont 384 390-1). 
99J'he 'adequate cause' theory of Von Kries described in Hart & Honore 'Causation' 2ed 469 states that in assessing 
the chances regard should be had to what the wrongdoer knew or should have known. This was considered by the 
German high court to be too narrow a view (see Joubert 1965 Codicillus 6 10). Atiyah 'Accidents compensation 
& the law' 3ed 594-5 describes a quantitative approach to negligence based on financial considerations alone. 
100In Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) the court uses the expression 'reasonable possibility' (ie a chance of less 
than 50%) for the 'real risk, one which would occur to the mind of a reasonable man in the defendant's position and 
which he would not brush aside as far-fetched' (at 165F - see too S v Mbambo 1965 2 SA 845 (A) 857E-F; S v 
Daniels 1983 3 SA 275 (A) 332-3). At 178C the court notes an instance where 'the test of foreseeability applied 
was more stringent'. See too Joubert 1965 Codidllus 6; Snyman 'Criminal Law' 2ed 60-1 66-9. 
101 Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 173-4. 
102ie relevant formal statistics will not be available. 
103See 71. 
104Hart & Honore 'Causation' 2ed xliv 2 11 59-61 194-204 374-6. 
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events. The state of mind of the witness is a question of fact. 105 
[2.8.3] Supervening events: For purposes of assessing damages for future loss that which is 
foreseeable will normally be determined in the light of all information available at the time 
of the assessment. It is usual that several years elapse before a matter comes to trial. 
During that time a number of factors influencing the assessment of the damages will change. 
Inflation is likely to have persisted and prices and salaries increased. The plaintiff may have 
died or his employer gone out of business or a widow may have remarried. It is not judicial 
policy to ignore such events. When the matter comes to trial the court will avail itself of all 
the latest information: 106 
'Where there has been a change in the situation between the date of the delict and the 
date of the judgment this change may affect the amount of damages to be 
awarded' .107 
'By die verhoor gekyk moet word na al die gebeure wat dit voorafgegaan het en om 
ska9evergoeding in die lig van al die bekende feite en die werklikhede te bepaal'. 108 
The supervening information may alter the court's perception of what is foreseeable, the 
expected normal course of events in relation to the relevant life plan. This in tum will give 
rise to a changed assessment for the damages. The terminology of statistical science 
describes this as a Bayesian revision, 109 that is to say a prior estimate of an unknown 
quantity revised, made more accurate, in the light of additional information. 
[2.8.4] Effect of appeal-court ruling: Once the trial court has given judgment then the 
court's award becomes frozen in time. If an appeal court alters the award made by a trial 
court then 'The order of the trial Court is set aside and there is substituted therefore the 
following ... ' .110 The date on which the trial court hands down judgment determines a 
cut-off date after which no further evidence may be brought to bear upon the determination 
of quantum. 111 By way of contrast English law is quite unambiguous about admitting 
10
'See 19. 
106Wigham v British Traders Insurance 1963 3 SA 151 (W) 156C 'The Court is entitled in the case of prospective 
damages to inform itself of subsequent facts which are known at the date of trial and which if taken into account 
would enable the Court to determine with a greater degree of certainty or accuracy the actual loss of a plaintiff. By 
so doing the amount of speculation involved in such an assessment is reduced'. See too Boberg 1964 SAL! 194 
199-200; Boberg 'Delict' 487; Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 10-11; Davel 'Broodwinner' 194-7 509-10. Scott 
'Oorerflikheid van Aksies' 212 suggests that the cut-off date should be litis contestatio. 
'
01Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 5570. 
101General Accident Insurance v Sununers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 615C. 
109Levin 'Statistics for Management' 2ed 156-62. 
110Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 12lsup. General Accident Versekeringsmpy v Bailey 1988 4 SA 
353 (A) 360. 
111Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 915A 'It appears that the plaintiff died before the hearing of this 
appeal'; in Legal l{ISurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) the appeal court was not notified of the plaintiffs prior death 
and experienced some degree of embarrassment from subsequent press reports; De Villiers v Maursen Properties 
(Pty) Ltd 1983 4 SA 670 (T) 678A 'Evidence not before the Court a quo and subsequent to the granting of the order 
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before an appeal court evidence of events supervening since date of judgment. 112 
[2.8.5] Causation by facilitation: A supervening event may be a delictual act by a third 
party. In general the damage suffered by the plaintiff will then be apportioned between the 
first and the second wrongdoers. 113 Sometimes, however, the original injuries of the victim 
may be viewed as the cause of the subsequent incident and the associated financial loss 
becomes an addition to the primary loss. 114 In this latter instance one would say that the 
original injury has facilitated, that is to say increased the risk, of the subsequent incident. 
In other words the subsequent event was foreseeable in the normal course of events, having 
regard to the injury or death. 115 
[2.9] MARKET VALUE 
[2.9.1] Communal utility: Personal utility in its most subjective form is generally not 
measurable with sufficient reliability to satisfy the needs of a court of law. For purposes of 
justice between man and man, and man, the public nature of the law courts requires a 
publicly demonstrable standard of value. Voet states in this regard: 116 
'It is beyond doubt that, when ascertaining the loss suffered, account is taken of the 
communal value for the patrimonium, not the claimant's personal evaluation.' 
Van der Walt117 has expressed this principle in more modern, if perhaps roundabout 
language: 
'Aangesien dit in verband met die skadevergoedingsregtelike vermoensbegrip altyd 
moet gaan om die bevrediging van erkende behoeftes, moet die betrokke goed se 
nuttigheid vir die bevrediging van die vermoensubjek se behoeftes sodanig wees dat 
daardie goed deur van sy regsgenote aangesien sal word as nuttig vir daardie doe!, 
welke doe! ook vir hulle bevredigingswaardig voorkom. Dit kan derhalwe gese word 
dat die nuttigheid van die betrokke goed vir bevrediging van die vermoensubjek se 
behoeftes, en daardie behoeftes as sodanig, 'n verkeerswaarde moet he. S6 beskou 
is die vermoenswaarde van iets gelyk aan die verkeerswaarde van die nuttigheid van 
cannot be introduced'. Contra AA Mutual Insurance v Van Jaarsve/d (1) 1974 2 C&B 360 (A) 'Since the trial a 
strong possibility has emerged .. .'. 
112Lim Poli 0100 v C&IAHA [1979) 2 All ER 910 (HL) 914f-h. 
113Bekker v Constantia Insurance 1983 1PH113 (E); Minister of Conununications & Public Works v Renown Food 
Products 1988 4 SA 151 (C); Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 626-635; Hart & Honore 
'Causation' 247n3&4. 
114Smitli-Wright v Van der Linde 1954 1C&B454 (SR); Mair v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance 1970 3 SA 
25 (RAD) 27A-B; Oe/ofsen v Cigna Insurance 1991 1 SA 74 (f). Medical negligence is commonly occasion for 
such an inquiry (see Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 127-8 132-4; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 
626-35). See Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 187-9 concerning novus actus interveniens. 
1
.,See too section 11.9. 
116Voet Ad Pandectas 45 .1. 9 '11/ud extra dubium est, in de.ft niendo eo quod interest, neutiquam affectionem pecu/iaris 
rationem habendam esse, sed conununem, ut ita dicam, affectionem oportere spectari'. 
117Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 280-1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
UTILITY 
daardie goed vir bevrediging van die vermoensubjek se erkende behoeftes in 
ooreenstemming met die wyse waarop hy sy vermoe vir daardie doel planmatig 
struktureer. Die vermoensubjek is dienooreenkomstig in die posisie dat hy die 
vermoensgoed ter bevrediging van sy besondere behoeftes planmatig s6 kan inspan 
dat aan sy vermoe 'n subjektief - funksioneel gestruktureerde eenheidsgestalte gegee 
word. ' 118 
23 
We may here discern the basic elements of a utility value ('nuttigheidswaarde') which must 
not only be recognized by our fellow men in the legal sense ('regsgenote') but which must 
also have a communal value ('verkeerswaarde'). Both conditions must be satisfied. Thus 
prostitution may have a value in exchange ('verkeerswaarde') but this value will not be 
recognized for compensation purposes. 119 Van der Walt seems rather to overstate his point 
when he says that the utility of the goods, and the need for them, must have a value in 
exchange. 120 Needs ('behoeftes') give rise to utility ('nuttigheidswaarde') but do not 
themselves have value independent of their associated utility .121 The notion of a life plan 
('planmatigheid') lends cohesion to the patrimonium in the sense of a 'co-ordinated going 
concern' rather than a haphazard agglomeration of assets and liabilities, hopes and fears. I 
will for the moment defer further discussion of just what is a 'patrimonium'. For the 
moment let us focus upon value in exchange ('verkeerswaarde'), the outward and discernible 
manifestation of numerous diverse private utility values held by various members of the 
community. 
The most common manifestation of communal utility is the market value of the goods. In 
an active commercial environment one finds a communal concept of value for exchange of 
ownership and exchange of use. Transfer of ownership for value is generally effected by 
means of sale or barter. Exchange of use is effected by means of lease. The use of money 
is generally exchanged by lending it at interest. The concept of 'market value' requires 
closer examination: 
[2.9.2] Imperfect infonnation: Where goods are actively traded in a market there comes into 
being a certain degree of consensus as to a fair monetary value for the goods, the 'market 
value'. I say 'a certain degree of consensus' because it is rare that there is absolute clarity 
as to the precise market value of any trade goods at any one point in time. 122 When prices 
are fixed by monopoly or official decree then one may identify a fixed price. However, 
where market forces are allowed to operate there tends to be a range of prices at which 
trading takes place during any one day. One has only to consider stock exchange prices 
118Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 208n76 criticise this statement by Van der Walt on the grounds that 
'Dit is noodwendig 'n kenmerk van vermoenskade dat die betrokke bate en die nadeel direk in geld waardeerbaar 
moet wees'. This is, of course, what Van der Walt is saying but in a very much more generalised utilitarian way. 
119The principle applies to damages for personal injury (Dhlamini v Protea Assurance 1974 4 SA 906 (A)) and to 
damages for loss of support (Santam Insurance v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A)). 
120
'die nuttigheid van die goed, en daardie behoeftes, 'n verkeerswaarde moet he'. 
121 Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 208n76 remark upon Van der Walt's abstract concept of 
functionality independent of money value. 
122Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 230n223 note the difficulty that can be experienced with the 
determination of market value. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
which have the unusual feature that price information is immediately and publicly available. 
This is not always so. 
[2.9.3] Expected prices: If price information is difficult to come by the range of prices at 
which trading takes place will generally widen. Even in an erratic market, such as 
residential property, the house brokers, property salesmen, will have fairly clear ideas as to 
the value of most properties. This concept of value amongst the 'experts' will tend to 
determine the prices at which trading takes place. It is likely, however, that no two property 
brokers will fully agree as to the market value of any particular property, but they will 
probably arrive at values which are broadly similar. Market value in this sense is the price 
at which a sale is expected to take place if the property in question was traded at that point 
in time. If the property has been recently traded, that price may be a true reflection of 
market value. It is common, however, for an actual price to be described as 'a bargain' or 
'excessive'. Such comments reflect a concept of value different from that at which actual 
sales take place. There is a form of mental averaging in the concept of 'fair market price'. 
[2.9.4] Hypothetical value: The main point I make here is that market value reflects the 
expected price at which trading would take place. Market value is for most situations itself 
hypothetical. This is particularly so in actions for damages where the goods have been used 
or have aged or have been damaged. The market for such goods will generally be one where 
price information is difficult to come by. Even when the claimant has sold the goods the 
price obtained is not necessarily conclusive of market value. 123 I emphasise this point 
because commentators, such as Van der Walt, 124 have developed theories of compensation 
based on the notion that certainty is possible, if only we can wait to allow unfolding reality 
to resolve our doubts. In practice, day-to-day commercial life is fraught with inadequate 
information and hypotheses as regards prices. 125 In this sense the trader making a business 
decision is in very much the same position as a court called upon to assess damages on the 
basis of inadequate information.126 
[2.9.5] Immediate replacement of damaged goods: Market value, the price at which goods 
will be traded, provides a measure of communal utility. If goods have a higher utility to a 
person than the price at which they can be purchased in the market then he becomes a 
potential buyer. Conversely if the goods have lower utility than the money for which they 
can be exchanged then the owner becomes a potential seller. If too many persons seek to 
sell then, in a free market, the price should decline until buyers and sellers are once again 
balanced. Actions for damage to goods have the important characteristic that the claimant 
123See, for instance, Cowley v Hahn 1987 1 SA 440 (E) and discussion thereof by Sharrock 1987 SAJJ 229; see too 
Erasmus v Davis 1969 2 SA 1 (A) 6H 8. 
124Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer ' 291 et seq. 
125See, for instance, comments in Erasmus v Davies 1969 2 SA 1 (A) 7G-H; Sharrock 1987 SAJJ 229-32; McGregor 
'Damages' 14ed 193. 
126 A court cannot decline to make an assessment by reason of paucity of evidence (Arendse v Maher 1936 TPD 162 
165; Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers 1941 AD 194 198; Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 3 SA 761 (A) 769-70; Parity 
Insurance v Van der Merwe 1967 1 PH J17 (A)). However, a claimant who fails to lead available evidence may 
be non-suited (SA Eagle Insurance v Cilliers 1987 3 C&B 716 (A) 728; Hendricks v President Insurance 1993 3 SA 
158 (C)). 
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at the time of the wrongful act preferred to own goods rather than their equivalent in 
money. 127 From this we may conclude that, as a general rule, the utility of the goods to 
the claimant was more than the utility of the money for which those goods could have been 
exchanged. If market value is taken as the basis for compensation then we can conclude that 
the claimant gets less utility by way of compensation than he enjoyed when he possessed the 
goods. This use of market value may be justified if the claimant is provided with sufficient 
compensation money to buy substitute goods. 128 If such substitute goods are purchased 
immediately after the damaging of the original goods then the claimant's loss becomes a loss 
of money and not a loss of the utility of the goods. 129 In general a plaintiff is expected to 
mitigate his damages by purchasing substitute goods as soon as is reasonably possible. 130 
Many claimants do not have the financial resources to acquire substitute goods until after 
compensation has been paid. Those claimants who do have the financial resources will 
commonly find that immediate replacement is just not possible at a cost which approximates 
to the 'market value' of the goods which have been damaged. Replacement cost is not 
necessarily equal to the price which the claimant could have got for the goods had they been 
sold immediately prior to the event causing damage. The market for motor vehicles provides 
a good example of wide differences between acquisition costs and the price obtainable on 
disposal, the 'trade-in' value. In Wikner v TPA 131 the court refused to add general sales 
tax to the damages suffered despite the fact that if the claimant had actually purchased 
substitute goods he would have incurred this cost. 
[2.9. 6] Di.sutility of effecting replacement: Quite apart from the question of the price payable 
the acquisition of substitute goods132 requires effort on the part of the claimant. It may 
take days, weeks and even years of diligent effort to acquire substitute goods. Such effort 
is of the same nature as work. To the extent that such work has disutility the claimant's 
overall utility has been reduced. Even if the claimant does succeed in replacing the goods 
shortly after the delict he will suffer a loss of the use of the money spent. With breach of 
contract the claimant will often have the use of the purchase price that he would otherwise 
have paid. Such persons suffer little or no loss of use of money. It is otherwise when goods 
have been so badly damaged as to be unusable. The question of damages for loss of use, 
particularly of_ money, is a topic with which I will deal in due course. 133 
127The effort of selling goods may have substantial disutility. It is possible that the utility of goods to a person is 
less than the utility of the monetary value of the goods but more than the combined utility of market value Jess the 
disutility of selling. 
12
'Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 53. But see discussion at 163 below. 
129Bioembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 55 mentions the notion that the loss of the goods is replaced as at the date of 
delict or breach with the sum of money which may be claimed by way of compensation. Such a rule can only be 
justified on grounds of mitigation. A claimant can only be expected to mitigate his damages in this manner if 
replacement was reasonably possible. See further discussion at 163 below. 
1
»rhe market-value rule and the associated duty of mitigation are comprehensively discussed in Asamera Oil Corp 
Ltd v Sea Oil & General Corp (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 1 (SCC). See too Modimoga/e v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 (B). 
131 1992 (f) (unreported 4.6.92 case no 17826/91). See 168 below for further discussion. 
132And damages in· court. 
133See 163. 
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[2.10] SUBSTITUTES FOR MARKET VALUE 
{2.10.1] Hypothetical objective values: So far I have emphasised market value as a measure 
of utility. In damages theory, market value is the cost of replacing the goods damaged. In 
practice the imperfections of the market compel the court to adopt a notional market value, 
that is to say the expected, or perhaps 'deemed' cost of replacement. We shall now tum to 
the problem of establishing a value in exchange for utilities for which there is no direct 
evidence of market value in the sense of a present lump-sum value. Major classes of 
present utility with which we are here concerned include earning capacity, future expenses 
(medical and other), entitlement to support, and the spes of inheritance. 
Reinecke134 proposes the use of a realistic, albeit subjective, value and would seem to have 
in mind the intuitive assessment of vcilue of a chance. 135 Van der Walt136 paraphrases 
this as a value recognised by our fellow men, 137 and adds the requirement of legality .138 
Savage139 gives a different perspective when he states that: 
'A probability is a price, in a manner of speaking'. 
Such prices, as I have observed, 140 can be elicited by a general interrogation, typically by 
cross examination of experts in court. Alternatively use can be made of surrogate 
markets, 141 such as the prices for life annuities. Van der Walt's primary objection seems 
to be his perception of insurmountable difficulty of assessment. It is well established, 
however, that difficulty of assessment does not mean that the court may adopt a non 
possumus attitude and decline to award damages. 142 The fact that the courts have 
frequently assessed damages in the face of limited information suggests that the problems are 
not insurmountable. Van der Walt has here clearly overlooked the distinction between 
restitution and compensation. Restitution implies a perfect reconstruction of what would have 
been. Compensation requires merely a fair equivalent. 143 
Earning capacity is the ability of a person to exchange his services and skills for money or 
monetary equivalent. The standard commercial measure of value is earnings, a salary or 
mReinecke 1976 TSAR 26 31 'realistiese indien subjektiewe waarde'. 
13541n th~ present case I do not propose to express the possibility ... in terms of a precise percentage. I intend merely 
to award an amount in respect of the total cost ... which will take account of the extent of the possibility and the 
various imponderables .. .' Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 226C. 
136Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 272-3. 
m•regsgenote'. 
138Damages will not be awarded if the earnings were derived from an illegal activity (Dhamini v Protea Assurance 
1974 4 SA 906 (A) 915B 917E); see 267 below. 
139Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 111 112. 
140See 11. 
141 Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 10-11; Todd v Administrator, Transvaal 1972 2 SA 874 (A) 8850 (comparable 
prices for similar lands). 
142See footnOie 126. 
143See paragraph 3 .3 .3. 
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wage. Earning capacity is only very rarely exchanged for a lump sum. 144 Some persons, 
such as entrepreneurs or inventors or prospectors, may work for many years to achieve a 
single substantial capital gain. Such events are too scarce in the marketplace to provide 
much assistance as to a lump-sum standard of value for earning capacity. Loss of support 
claims are concerned with the share of the deceased's earnings expected by the dependant. 
[2.10.2] The forensic exchange: The courts, with their lump-sum awards for loss of earning 
capacity, provide the most active commercial exchange where lump sum values are explicitly 
quoted. 145 The. legal procedures by which the lump sums are determined tend to emphasise 
that evidence of commercial value is drawn from sources extraneous to the courts, 
particularly of wage levels. This ensures consistency between judicial awards and the 
commercial environment. A similar reliance on the opinions of experts enables the courts 
to remain in touch with social and scientific developments. Notwithstanding all this evidence 
the 'forensic exchange' creates its own standard of value. That is the nature of a specialist 
market. 146 The most obvious area where the courts create their own standard of value is 
with conventional damages, general damages for pain and suffering and loss of the amenities 
of life. These are determined by and large by reference to previous awards. 147 Just as, 
if I wanted to sell my home, I would seek out information as to the prices paid in recent 
sales and pitch my asking price accordingly. 
[2.10.3] Rebuttable presumptions: The conventions of the ' forensic exchange' extend well 
beyond the customary pricing of damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities. Some 
of the conventions are entrenched as rules of law .148 Most are less rigid in application and 
serve to fill gaps created by inadequate evidence. 149 This latter class has the quality of 
rebuttable presumptions which give way to explicit evidence, if plaintiff or defendant chooses 
to make such available. 150 The rebuttable conventions thus reflect an abstract approach to 
assessment which may be concretized by more detailed evidence. 
[2.10.4] The market value of work: As I have noted the standard communal measure of a 
man's earning capacity is the wage which he can command. That, of course, is a measure 
of the utility of a man's earning capacity to the person paying the wage. T~e utility of the 
1~e closest that commercial practice comes to a lump-sum payment in exchange for earning capacity is the price 
of a restraint of trade agreement.. One might also cite the 'purchase• of a football player by a football club. Even 
if such transactions did reflect fair value for a lifetime's earnings they are sufficiently rare that one cannot say that 
a lump-sum market value for earnings is thereby established. 
14sStrictly speaking it is not earning capacity which is exchanged but the right to bring further claims against the 
defendant. 
146eg war medals, stamps, vintage cars, etc. 
147Visser 1988 THRHR 468 485inf 'Daar het dus onteenseglik 'n kommersialisering van sekere hoogspersoonlike 
belange plaasgevind'; Munkman 'Damages' 4ed 18-19; SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 841E. 
141Vide the rules governing collateral benefits: Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A); Dippenaar 
v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A). 
149For example: SA population life tables are used as the basis for mortality and general contingencies are deducted. 
1
»rhe convention under the dependants ' action to apportion family income with two parts to each adult and one part 
to each child provides a fine example. 
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wage to the workman is determined by the extent to which that wage can be used to fulfil 
needs. As will be discussed later151 this requires that tax be deducted from earnings. One 
is left with a net income which may then be projected over many years into the future. The 
projected income provides a measure of the utility of the man's earning capacity, but only 
in the form of yearly or monthly packets of utility. The problem facing a court subject to 
the once-and-for-all lump-sum rule is the conversion of a time-dependent series of packets 
of utility into a single lump sum payable immediately which has substantially equivalent 
present utility. 
[2.10.5] Discounting to present value: In performing this capitalization the court needs to 
bear in mind a number of factors influencing utility. Foremost is the consideration that an 
amount payable at some future date, say 20 years' time, has substantially less utility than the 
same amount payable immediately. The difference is measured by the discount for 
interest. 152 As an offset against this discount for interest is the consideration that wages 
and prices will increase over the years due to the effects of inflation. The prospect of wage 
and price increases, inflation, enhances the utility of net earnings 20 years from now. The 
prospect of death intervening during the 20 years reduces the utility, as too does the prospect 
of unemployment. Considerations of possible promotions or successful establishment of 
one's own business may well increase the utility of net earnings 20 years ahead. Each of 
these different elements needs to be weighed, one against another, in arriving at a fair 
present value. 
[2.10.6] Quot homines tot sententiae: One thing is certain, the present utility of a 
prospective gain or loss 20 years from now will be assessed very differently by different 
persons. Some will emphasise the risk of intervening death, some will overstate the discount 
for delay (interest), some will overstate the effects of future inflation. There will be others 
who will underrate these considerations. Typically the chance of early death will be largely 
ignored by many persons. If agreement is to be reached as to present value in face of these 
different perceptions then it is necessary that practical communicable procedures be adopted 
for the objectivization of present utility. In the absence of rules of assessment all is 
confusion. 
[2.10.7] A general nonn: I have already quoted Voet's statement153 that for purposes of 
assessing compensation regard must be had to the 'ajfectio communem' and not the 'ajfectio 
peculians'. The ajfectio peculiaris is the personal subjective assessment of value, the present 
utility of the claimant. For V oet the ajfectio communem means not the market value of the 
res in the commercial sense but rather that 'the plaintiffs loss is to be assessed by a general 
norm' .154 The first norm which comes to mind is the principle of restitution, to put the 
plaintiff in the position he -would have been in. In general, however, restitution is not 
possible and the award of damages is no more than compensation, a monetary substitute for 
•'2see 125. 
1'3Voet 'Ad Pandectas' 45.1.9. See 22. 
•scErasmus 1975 THRHR 104 115 269nlll. 
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the utility which has been lost. 155 This phenomenon is most obvious with general damages 
for pain and suffering and loss of the amenities of life. The phenomenon arises equally, 
albeit less obviously, with uncertain financial loss. 156 I discuss at some length below that 
once a deduction has been made for risk it matters not how diligently the plaintiff invests his 
money, when the time comes, if it can ever come at all, 157 the award will be either too 
much or too little. 158 
[2.10.8] Insights from expropriation: Bloembergen159 observes that although the problems 
of compensation for expropriation of immovable property differ in many ways from the 
problems of assessing damages, nonetheless a comparative study can be enlightening. 
Barwick CJ in Australia160 has likened the assessment of earning capacity to the valuation 
of rental property. As regards expropriation it has been said that: 
'The word "value", as pointed out by writers on Political Economy, has two 
meanings. It sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object (which is 
called value in use) and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods, which is its 
value in exchange'. 161 
It is important to draw a distinction between the activities of 'valuation', the estimation of 
value in exchange, and 'investment analysis', the determination of value in use by the 
prospective purchaser. 162 The latter value determines whether or not the market value is 
attractive to a potential purchaser. In order to objectivize the 'investment analysis' it is 
necessary to introduce the concept of multiple potential purchasers to determine a notional 
value in exchange. 163 With objectivization the activity becomes a 'valuation'. Van der 
Walt164 points to the relevance of a group norm. 'Investment analysis' will usually take 
the form of discounting expected future rentals and expenditure to present value. 165 
155Munkman 'Damages' 4ed 1-2; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 48 114; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 65 157 
280 285; Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 106 'Historically, the sum of money of the judgment is probably to be 
explained as the price of redemption from liability' that is, the monetary composition offered to the victim in order 
to save the wrongdoer from the harshness of personal execution'. 
156Van der Walt ··sommeskadeleer' 270 notes that uncertainty is the major obstacle to the assessment of hypothetical 
events. 
IS7Some contingencies such as the longevity of a breadwinner had he died or the future promotions of an injured man 
can never be resolved by waiting. 
151
'There is really only one certainty: the future will prove the award to be either too high or too low' Lim Poh Choo 
v C&:IAHA [19791 2 All ER 910 (HL) 914 c-d. 
159Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 6. 
160Atlas Tiles v Briers (1978) 21 ALR 129 (HC) 136 quoted at 215. 
161Pietermaritzburg Corporation v SA Breweries 1911 AD 501 522. 
162Jonker 'Property Valuation' 5-6. 
163Todd v Administrator, Transvaal 1972 2 SA 874 (A) 882A. 
164Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 280 • ... dat daardie goed deur van sy regsgenote aangesien sal word as nuttig 
vir daardie doe!, welke doe! ook vir hulle bevredigingswaardig voorkom' . 
165Jonker 'Property Valuation' 88-96 99. 
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The concept of 'potential value' contemplates the highest and best use of the property. A 
large block of offices might, for instance, be let at below-market rentals thus affording a 
potential of higher profitability at the expiry of the existing leases. The highest and best use 
must be probable, not merely possible, as judged by an informed developer. 166 In like 
manner 'earning capacity' is determined by reference to 'probable' 167 or 'expected' 168 
earnings. 'Potential value' includes the value of the chance of enhanced value. 169 
[2.10.9] Expected advantages and disadvantages: The decision to purchase a house implies 
the foreseeability of the utility of the house to the purchaser including the possibility of a 
subsequent sale. Foresight as to the lettability of an office block and the expenses of 
maintenance will influence the price which a purchaser is prepared to pay. In both cases 
foresight, that is to say prediction in a contingent sense, is required as to the expected future 
income and expenses to be generated by the asset. Value in general is determined by 
foreseeability and the associated perceptions of the buyers and sellers regarding the course 
of future events. 170 
The foresight that a businessman has of the future course of rentals and expenses is the same 
foresight that is required of a court when assessing compensation for future loss of earnings 
or support. It has been said that the determination of a lump-sum value for earning capacity 
is very similar to the determination of the price to pay for lettable property .171 The value 
of lost earning capacity is usually determined by reference to what the victim 'would 
probably have earned', as distinct from what he 'could have earned' if earning capacity had 
been optimally utilised. 172 The expression 'verwagte verdienste', 173 expected 
earnings, 174 describes the concept more accurately than does 'probable earnings'. The 
statistical concept of an expectation implies an average of different possible earning scenarios 
each weighted with the separate chance of its realization. 175 Foreseeability and the 
166Jonker 'Property Valuation' 49n12 56. 
161Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1020G. 
168Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 11 lD. 
169SBI v Connan 1974 3 SA 111 (A) 117F (mineral rights). 
1
'°Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 73 'De mogelijkheden, die de zaak voor de toekomst nog bood, hadden zich in 
die waarde geconcretiseerd'. 
111Atlas Tiles v Briers (1978) 21ALR129 (HC) 136; Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917B 'The 
capacity to earn money is considered to be part of a person's estate'. The significance of this statement is apparent 
if one appreciates that earning capacity is a right of personality but that the present capitalized value of expected 
future earnings is an asset in the extended patrimonium. The perception of earning capacity as a lump-sum asset 
is also evident in Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 150C 'Die verlies van geskiktheid om 
inkomste te verdien, hoewel gewoonlik gemeet aan die standaard van verwagte inkomste, is 'n verlies van 
geskiktheid en nie 'n verlies van inkomste nie' (cited with approval in Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 
(A) lllD). 
172Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1020G. 
113Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 150C. 
114Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) ll5C 'If an average expectancy or projection would be 
postulated ... '. 
mLevin 'Statistics for Management' 2ed 192-4; for a calculated example see Koch 'Damages' 53 . 
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statistical concept of an expectation have much in common. A statistical expectation is 
defined in terms of frequency ratios, hypothetical or historically observed. That which is 
expected in the sense of 'foreseeable by the reasonable man' incorporates subjective 
perceptions of the relevant chances. 176 Both involve a weighing up of the various future 
possibilities and the choice of a suitable middle path as a basis for decision making. 
[2.10.10] The morality of logic: Market value, or the cost of repairs, are the most obvious 
bases for assessing the utility of what has been lost. Less obvious norms of assessment are 
the rules by which capitalization is effected. Such norms include for example the use of life 
tables, the apportionment of family income between dependants with one part to each child 
and two parts to each parent, and the addition of inflation when estimating future amounts. 
Finetti m has pointed out that because of the diversity of personal perceptions of utility 
agreement between men dictates that use be made of averages and logic, if agreement is to 
be reached at all. Our perceptions of the future are substantially influenced by our personal 
experiences of the past and are in a constant state of revision. 178 Ramsey179 points out 
that 'logic is concerned not with what men actually believe, but what they ought to believe, 
or what it would be reasonable to believe'. Logic ensures that our beliefs are consistent. 
In this sense logic has moral overtones. 180 
[2.10.11] Four elements of assessment: For the measurement of utility Bentham, the first 
major exponent of utility theory, identified four key elements: intensity, duration, certainty 
or uncertainty, and remoteness. 181 These echo the key elements of the standard actuarial 
calculation: Intensity can be identified with the level of earnings or support. Duration 
corresponds with the period of the loss if uncertainties such as mortality are ignored, that is 
duration contemplates a period to age 99, the limit of life. 182 Uncertainty is accounted for 
in the deduction for contingencies and the technique of valuation of a chance. Remoteness 
finds expression in the discount for interest, the adjustment for the time value of money. It 
is appropriate to r~call in this regard Grotius' statement183 that losses which are uncertain 
and remote in time are worth less than those that are certain and immediate. 
[2.11] 'ABSTRACT' AND 'CONCRETE' DAMAGES 
[2.11.1] Definition: The use of market value at date of delict, or even date of trial, will 
usually be materially different from the utility that has been lost by reason of the delict or 
176Such as are described ·by Ramsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 166-84; Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 111. 
177De Finetti 1937 Anna/es de L '/nstitut Henri Poincare 1 16-24. 
178De Finetti 1937 Anna/es de L '/nstitut Henri Poincare 23-4. Supervening events and the associated Bayesian 
revisions have been dealt with under causation (see 20 above). 
179Ramsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 193. 
11KJRamsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 184-98. 
111 Page 'Utility Theory' 17 33. 
112See paragraph 5.1.1. Visser 1986 De Jure 207 217-18 records the per diem approach to assessing general 
damages. 
113Grotius /nleiding 3.32.16. 
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breach. For this reason damages based upon market value are described by Bloembergen184 
as 'abstract', as distinct from 'concrete damages' 185 when full account is taken of the 
detailed circumstances of the claimant. 
[2.11.2] Sentimental value: Bloembergen's terminology is to be preferred to the more 
confusing terminology of 'objective' damages and 'subjective' damages. Subjectivity is a 
relative concept. As a general rule damages preclude the subjectivity of the claimant, his 
personal utilities, but are strongly influenced by the subjeetivity of the presiding judicial 
officer. The subjective condition of the claimant is only recognised to the extent that it is 
outwardly discernible and verifiable by others. The Roman jurists cited the example of the 
slave who was the natural son of the owner. If the slave were injured or killed the damages 
were assessed according to the market value for such slaves in general without regard for the 
higher price which the father/owner would have been prepared to pay for that slave in the 
open market. 186 This focus upon market value, to the exclusion of the true utility of the 
goods to the plaintiff, has ostensibly persisted into the modern South African law: 'Any 
element of attachment or affection for the thing damaged was rigorously excluded' .187 The 
question of sentimental loss affects, if anything, the assessment of general damages for pain 
and suffering and loss of the amenities of life. Patrimonial loss is essentially concerned with 
financial loss. The associated emphasis upon provable rand values tends to preclude 
consideration of personal utilities, sentimental and similar forms of added value, except 
where such sentimentality is generally recognised as affecting value. One may cite the 
examples of a vintage car, or a pop singer's personal possessions, as examples of a 
communal sentimentality creating economic value. The sources of economic value are deeply 
seated in the human psyche and its effect on human need, with all attendant irrationality and 
unpredictability. · 
[2.11.3] Judicial ambivalence: It has been said that 'abstract' -damages do not satisfy a 
refined sense of justice. 188 Concretization, however, requires time-consuming interpretation 
of complex and subtle facts. 189 An abstract measure of damages fulfils the needs of 
practice better than a concrete measure. That is to say that an abstract approach permits 
greater efficiency of claims handling than does a concrete approach. 190 It has also been 
1114Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 10 36 45-6 48-52 54 58-9 69 75-7 79 83 86 105 108 113; Van der Walt 
'Sommeskadeleer' 188 198 202 205 214 216. 
185Reinecke (1976 TSAR 26-56; 1988 De Jure 221-38) uses the expression 'konkrete skade' in a very different sense 
from that used by Bloembergen. Bloembergen's concept of 'abstract damage', reduction in market value, would 
seem to come closest to what Reinecke has in mind with 'konkrete skade', an ideal measure free of considerations 
of causation. 
11609.2.33. 
munion Government v Warneke 1911AD657 665; Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917. Most 
writers would exclude an addition for sentimental value: Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 60 74 132. 
18~rasmus 1975 THRHR 104 107; Bloembergen 'Sclradevergoeding' 38. 
189J3loembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 39. 
190ln Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC) the high court of Australia laid down a 3 % net capitalization rate 
for all future compensation matters and prohibited the leading of evidence concerning interest, inflation and taxation. 
This resort to an abstract measure was clearly motivated by considerations of forensic efficiency. 
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said that practitioners prefer to work with rough well-defined measures rather than 
sophisticated rules which are difficult to apply .191 The date-of-delict rule192 and the 
collateral benefit rules 193 provide examples of this preference. When a court insists on a 
concrete approach to damages this can have the effect of denying reasonable compensation: 
By way of example one may observe the general reluctance of the courts to award 
compensation for the temporary loss of the use of money .194 In such circumstances 
excessive zeal for a concrete measure has the effect of increasing the burden of proof, 
sometimes insurmountably. An emphasis upon concretization stands in sharp contrast to the 
general principle that compensation will not be denied for lack of evidence if it may 
reasonably be inferred that damage has been suffered. 195 In general the burden of proof 
required for damages for personal injury and death will be less stringent than for purely 
commercial claims such as breach of contract and damage to motor vehicles. 196 
[2.11.4] Abstraction of future loss: When Bloembergen writes of abstract damages197 he 
has in mind the market value of damage to the res as at date of delict or breach, to the 
exclusion of consequential loss. A concrete approach to damages implies an award for 
consequential loss and the assessment of value as at the date of the trial. Bloembergen's text 
is concerned with the simplest situations where uncertainty is largely excluded and full 
evidence is available, if required. When dealing with future loss, and, for that matter, 
uncertain past loss, it is convenient to extend the concepts of abstract and concrete. The use 
of a statistical average, such as a life table, is essentially an abstract approach to damages 
necessitated by the lack of knowledge as to the precise date that the claimant will die. If one 
knows the actual date of death then one is able to concretize the damages for future loss with 
considerably more accuracy. This is but one example of the compromise in the assessment 
of damages between concretization and abstraction, dictated by the availability of suitable 
evidence. Abstraction is avoided as far as possible by 'personalizing' the averages into 
191Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 48. 
1<nPhilip Robinson Motors (Pty) Ltd v N M Dada (Pty) Ltd 1975 2 SA 420 (A) 429F 428G-H; Voest Alpine 
lntertrading Gesel/schaft MBH v Bunvill & Co 1985 2 SA 149 (W); General Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 
3 SA 577 (A) 613B-D. Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 55 62 motivates the date-of-delict rule on the grounds that 
from that date the claimant has a claim for damages in lieu of what has been lost. 
193Klingman v Lowell 1913 WLD 186 (gratuitous board and lodging provided by parents); McKenzie v SA Taxi-Cab 
Co 1910 WLD 232 (insurance benefits ignored); Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) (gratuitous 
benefits); Mutual & Federal Insurance v Swanepoel 1988 2 SA 1 (A) (military pensions); see 179 below. An 
abstract measure of damages dictates that collateral benefits be ignored (Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 52). 
194See, for instance, Broderick Properties (Pty) Ltd v Rood 1964 2 SA 310 (T) 316A-F (evidence oflikely application 
of funds not led); SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) (interest on damages prohibited). A discount 
for interest will, however, be applied to future losses without the need to lead evidence (see, for instance, New India 
Assurance v Naidoo 1950 (A) (unreported 19.5.50); Protea Assurance v Matinise 1978 1 SA 963 (A) 975E-F). 
195See footnote 126. 
196Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 39. Similar considerations lead tp a relaxation of the foreseeability test and the 
award of compensation to the man with the so-called 'egg-shell skull' (Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 
189-91. Boberg 'Delict' 278-9 283 303-8 445 459 464; McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 105-115; Munkman 'Damages' 
4ed 38-9). 
197Bloembergen 'Sclradevergoeding' 10 36 45-6 48-52 54 58-9 69 75-7 79 83 86 105 108 113; Van der Walt 
'Sommeskadeleer' 188 198 202 205 214 216. 
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'expectations' .198 
[2.11.5] Fonnalisms of assessment: The practical administration of justice requires 
recognition of an abstract measure of damages. For Bloembergen this means adopting the 
market value as at date of delict. 199 For personal injury and death this means partial 
abstraction through the use of life tables, salary averages, expected investment returns, 
remarriage statistics and division of family income between dependants with two parts to each 
adult and one part to each child. All these measures are but abstractions, formalistic 
substitutes for the true facts. Unlike the South African courts the English courts give explicit 
recognition to abstract guidelines of this nature:200 
'A guideline as to quantum of conventional damages or conventional interest thereon 
is not a rule of law nor is it a rule of practice. It sets no binding precedent; it can 
be varied as circumstances change or experience shows that it does not assist in the 
achievement of even-handed justice or makes trials more lengthy or expensive or 
settlements more difficult to reach. But though guidelines should be altered if 
circumstances relevant to the particular guideline change, too frequent alteration 
deprives them of their usefulness in providing a reasonable degree of predictability 
in the litigious process and so facilitating settlement of claims without going to trial'. 
The purpose of guidelines is thus to create predictability, to facilitate settlements, to shorten 
trials and reduce costs. 201 These are the practical justifications for an abstract approach to 
damages. 202 · 
[2.11.6] A right to concretize: On the other hand it is equally clear that every plaintiff should 
have the right to a proper hearing, that is to damages based on a concrete measure. 
Conversely it seems to follow that every defendant should also be entitled to a full hearing 
should he feel dissatisfied with a purely abstract approach to assessment. Under the ideal 
system of justice the abstract measure would provide prima facie evidence of loss. Both 
plaintiff and defendant would then entitled, should they so wish, to challenge the abstract 
measure and introduce a greater or lesser degree of concretization by way of explicit 
evidence. A failure to invoke this right would constitute a tacit acceptance of the abstract 
19
'1nus, for example statistics from the standard life table may be adjusted in the light of special circumstances 
(Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 1i1-2 - evidence of unusual longevity; Carstens v Southern 
Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1024-7 - evidence of increased risk of early death). 
199'fbe rationale being that at date of delict the plaintiff loses the goods but obtains a right of action for the value of 
those goods at the moment of destruction; see Summers v General Accident Insurance 1985 3 SA 418 (C) 420B-D 
for an indication that a similar abstract measure prevails in South African law. 
200Wright v British Railways Board (1983) 2 All ER 698 (HL) 705j. 
201 ln Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC) the high court of Australia for reasons of forensic efficiency laid 
down that 3 % per year was to be used as the net capitalization rate in all future compensation matters. With this 
ruling the courts were prohibited from receiving evidence as to interest, inflation and taxation. 
202J3loembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 48. 
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measure. The abstract measure provides a starting point for negotiations. 203 
[2.11.7] The high cost of concretiwtion: The once-and-for-all lump-sum rule prevents a 
court from waiting for unfolding reality to reveal the future. For this reason courts are 
compelled to adopt an abstract approach to matters such as mortality, inflation and future 
salaries. Fuller concretization can be achieved if compensation is paid by instalments. The 
price of such concretization is the perpetuation of litigation and the expenses of collecting and 
processing the latest evidence. Notwithstanding access to unfolding reality many issues, such 
as promotions and the longevity of a deceased breadwinner, remain abstract hypotheses. The 
passage of time will also increasingly blur the causal relationship between the original injury, 
or death, and subsequent events. 
[2.11.8] The burden of proof:204 Once liability has been established, the so-called 'merits' 
of the case, then a plaintiff who seeks to claim damages carries the onus of proving that he 
has suffered loss. 205 It would, however, produce great injustice if the burden of proof were 
unduly exacting, after all it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who is responsible for the 
wrongful act giving rise to the cause of action and the need to go to court. Conversely 
innocent defendants need to be protected against unfounded and perhaps malicious actions. 
The burden of proof that falls on the plaintiff should be such as to justify the invocation by 
the court of at least an abstract measure of damages. 206 To demand full concretization may 
well produce injustice. The defendant is then entitled to demand concretization, greater 
attention to detail, but the burden of proof for such concretization should then fall on his 
shoulders to demonstrate that the abstract measure is unreasonable. It does arise that it is 
just not feasible within the constraints of tirrie and money to concretize the damages. The 
court itself is then justified in adopting an abstract measure rather than refusing to award 
damages. w7 When collateral benefits are treated as res inter alios acta the court is driven 
by a rule of law to adopt an abstract measure, that is to ignore the realities. Justice would 
be best served if the defendant were then permitted to prove that the plaintiff will beneficially 
retain the proceeds of insurance or donation, that is to demand concretization and deduction. 
203In Legal Insurance v Bot es 196J 1 SA 608 (A) 617inf it is said that 'the census statistics ... should not be regarded 
as a starting point, but merely as one of the facts to be considered along with the other facts' . This high-minded 
appeal to a concretization ignores the realities of settlement mechanics and undermines the credibility of the one and 
only piece of solid evidence that is generally available concerning remarriage prospects. Remarriage statistics are 
today very much more refined than when this dictum was handed down (see 1988 De Rebus 67 70 6Jl-2). 
~his procedural topic is conveniently discussed at this point because of its relevance to abstract damages. 
20~See Corbett & Buchanan Jed lJ. 
206By this I mean that sufficient evidence should be led to permit a provisional, albeit crude, quantification of the 
damages (Krugell v Shield Versekeringsmpy 1982 4 SA 95 (T) 98-9). The ruling in Van Almelo v Shield Insurance 
1980 2 SA 411 (C) 41JD has proved contentious (Corbett & Buchanan Jed lJ). Greater leniency is appropriate to 
actions for damages for personal injury and death than to other actions (Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' J9; see 
too the 'egg-shell skull' claimant Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 189-91; Boberg 'Deli ct' 278-9 28J 
JOJ-8 445 459 464; McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 105-115; Munkman 'Damages' 4ed J8-9). 
m Arendse v Maher 19J6 TPD 162 165; Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers 1941 AD 194 198; Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 
J SA 761 (A) 769-70. In general a court will, in defendant's favour, make a discount for interest in respect of future 
loss without any evidence being led (New India Assurance v Naidoo 1950 (A) (unreported case 19.5.50) 'no 
foundation had been laid in evidence ... in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that rate [4% py] is a 
reasonable rate'). 
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[2.11.9] Privileged claimants: Bloembergen208 states that a plaintiff may elect whether to 
bring his action on an abstract basis or a concrete basis. He here has in mind claims brought 
on the basis of cost of repairs, 209 or reduction in value at date of delict, 210 or with 
allowance for consequential loss.211 One would think that the availability of such an 
election is orily justified if the defendant has the right to decline to agree to an abstract basis 
and to invoke a concrete basis, to bring the matter to court and to lead relevant evidence. 212 
Damages in excess of the market value of the damaged res at date of delict will arise when 
there is no duty to mitigate by immediate replacement. 213 On the other hand it is 
conceivable that the damage suffered is less than the abstract measure. Thus 
Bloembergen214 gives the example of the person for whom minor damage to the motor 
vehicle has no disutility notwithstanding that the market value has been reduced. Such a 
person will clearly be awarded damages for the reduced market value. I have already 
observed215 that the collateral-benefit rules create a class of actions where the defendant is 
by law prevented from proving lesser damage. 216 
[2.12] FORENSIC DYNAMICS 
[2.12.1] The most obvious juristic fact: Van der Walt notes the tendency of the Roman 
jurists to focus upon the most obvious aspect of a situation before the court,217 that is to 
say on the external or physical manifestation rather than the abstract idea. Similar juristic 
psychology prevails today. Thus, for instance, the right to compensation for loss of support 
is made to hang on the existence of a right to support as distinct from the factual receipt of 
support. 218 The earnings of an injured man are given undue prominence219 when his true 
208Bloembergen 'Sclzadevergoeding' 50-1 71 76 91. 
209See, for instance, Erasmus v Davis 1969 2 SA 1 (A). 
210General Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613B-D. 
211See, for instance, Modimogale v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 (B). 
212Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 196nl. 
213Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 99 'Waar die betrokke goedere egter geen markprys het nie, is per definisie geen 
dekkingskoop moontlik nie, sodat die lucrum cessans as sommeskade bepaal moet word'. The criterion of existence 
of a market price is a poor guide. It is preferable to base the duty to mitigate on what a prudent businessman would 
have done (Asamera Oil Corp Ltd v Sea Oil & General Corp (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 1 (SCC) 20; see too 10-11 'A 
plaintiff need not take all possible steps to reduce his loss'. 
214Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 66-7. 
215See 35. 
216If collateral benefits were generally deductible this would greatly increase the litigation risk for a plaintiff that the 
assessed damages are reduced to a negligible amount or nil. 
217Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 172-3 'Die neiging van die Romeinse juris om aan die uiterlik waarneembare 
aspekte van 'n regsfeit vas te hou, verklaar ook waarom hulle gewoonlik na die regsobjek verwys het in plaas van 
na die eiendomsreg wat daarop betrekking het' . 
211Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 44 66-7 notes that Voet 25.3.4 allowed a right of action for a right to support derived 
from contract. The South African courts would seem to have strayed from the Roman-Dutch principle when they 
refuse compensation for loss of support provided under a customary union or order of divorce (Santam v Fondo 1960 
2 SA 467 (A)). 
219See, for instance, Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) and the emphasis upon a 'contract of 
employment' . 
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loss is the utility of his life plan in terms of living expenses. 220 One may speculate that the 
reason for such juristic distortion is the need for agreement between man and man and a 
focus upon that aspect of the situation that is most readily communicated to other persons. 
[2.12.2] Judicial discretion: I have noted that the utility perceptions of an individual are, as 
a rule, too elusive, too personalized and too varied to serve on their own as a basis for 
compensation. Abstraction in the form of rules of assessment is a necessary adjunct to an 
efficient system of compensation. 221 Such abstraction will always be subject to the 
consideration that concretization will prevail if this can be achieved efficiently and 
conclusively. 222 I add the caveat that excessive adherence to concretization may lead to 
as great an injustice223 as does excessive abstraction. 224 The middle way is always the 
most difficult to follow as is evident from the following quotations: 
'In assessing the compensation the trial Judge has a large discretion to award what 
under the circumstances he considers right. He may be guided but is certainly not 
tied down by inexorable actuarial calculations'. 225 
Boberg226 interprets these words to mean that the courts 'are entitled to prefer equity and 
convenience to the dictates of logic' . On the other hand it has been said that: 
'While the result of an actuarial computation may be no more than an "informed 
guess", it has the advantage of an attempt to ascertain the value of what was lost on 
a logical basis; whereas the trial Judge's "gut feeling" ... as to what is fair and 
reasonable is nothing more than a blind guess'.227 
'"Billikheid" is natuurlik 'n baie vae begrip sonder 'n konstante betekenis maar daar 
kan in hierdie verband gese word dat dit 'n versamelbegrip vir die volgende beginsels 
is: Die hof moet alle relevante omstandighede in ag neem wat op die skadeomvang 
dui en irrelevante oorwegings, soos besondere simpatie met die eiser, ignoreer; die 
basiese kompensasie gedagte moet voorop gestel word; die hof moet sy diskresie 
versigtig en konserwatief uitoefen en eerder te min as te veel toeken; die bedrag wat 
toegeken moet word, moet nie die verweerder onnodig beswaar ten gunste van die 
eiser nie. Indien hierdie beginsels toegepas word, kan met 'n groot mate van 
=-ntis is a complex topic which is discussed more fully under Joss of earning c~pacity (see 225). Suffice it to note 
for the moment that income and living expenses are closely correlated (see Page 'Utility Theory' 75; Friedman & 
Savage 1948 JPE 279 298-9). See too balance sheet of a life plan at 234. 
221 See paragraph 2.11.3. 
222Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 278. 
223Concretization will produce injustice when an appeal thereto increases the burden of proof to the point of denying 
compensation for a Joss genuinely suffered (see, for instance, Broderick Properties (Pry) Ltd v Rood 1964 2 SA 310 
(T) 316A-F). 
224Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 94 'vir die eiser begunstigende objektiewe skadebegrip'. 
225Legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) at 614F. See too Voet Ad Pandectas 45.1.9. 
226 1981 BML 25 27. 
msouthern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) l 14D; see too l 13A-F. 
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sekerheid verklaar word dat 'n "billike" benadering gevolg is' .228 
We may note as well that a court vested with a wide discretion is not thereby relieved of 
paying consideration to principles and previous decisions: 
'Like all discretions vested in judges by statute or at common law, it must be 
exercised judicially, or in a selective ... and discriminating manner, not arbitrarily or 
idiosyncratically, for otherwise the rights of parties to litigation would become 
dependent on judicial whim' .229 
'Cardozo said, "the labour of judges would be increased almost to breaking point if 
every past decision could be reopened in every case". Certainty, predictability, 
reliability, equality, uniformity, convenience: these are the principle advantages to be 
gained by a legal system from the principle of stare decisis' .230 
However, the process of formulating guidelines is subject to the caveat that: 
'There is a danger that the unfettered discretion will be superseded by the rule of 
thumb'. 231 
[2.12.3} Adapting the law to changing conditions: Emphasis upon a need for rules or 
guidelines does not mean that there is not a continuing need for the courts, acting in concert 
with the legislature, to adapt the law to changing social and economic conditions.232 As 
a general rule judicial adaptation will be achieved interstitially ,233 that is by filling in 
lacunae in the law rather than by substituting new rules for old.234 
228Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 252. 
229Cookson v Knowles [1978) 2 All ER 604 (HL) 606H. See 210. Financial Mail 28 September 1992 31. 
230Hahlo & Kahn 'The South African Legal System' 215. See too Financial Mail 2 October 1992 31 concerning a 
South African judgment that ruled a surety agreement invalid on grounds of public policy: 'The situation now 
amounts to legal chaos. The casualty is commercial certainty. (Other) judges have managed to find a fair and 
pragmatic answer by distinguishing the facts before them from those in the case which created the precedent. While 
this can work well in a particular case, it is not a panacea. Each case will have to be decided on its own set of facts 
and no generally applicable rule can be formulated'. 
231 Qoverbay v Bank of Credit & Commerce International [1991) 1 All ER 894 902. 
232Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890 905 'There comes a time in the growth of every living system of law when 
old practice and ancient formulae must be modified in order to keep in touch with the expansion of legal ideas, and 
to keep pace with the requirements of changing conditions. And it is for the courts to decide when the modifications, 
which time has proved to be desirable , are of a nature to be effected by judicial decision, and when they are so 
important or so radical that they should be left to the legislature'. 
233Hahlo & Kahn 'The South African Legal System' 306 quoting Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See further 
Hahlo & Kahn 304-6, 311-12; Forsyth 'In Danger for Their Talents' 197-207. 
234 
'Fiat /ustitia' 290 'The need for judicial enterprise and wisdom to accommodate developments in the social, 
economic and financial order, where the existing law does not provide for such, is not to be confused with judicial 
'legislation' whereby the existing law is discarded or changed in the face of binding precedent or statutory provisions. 
If the judge is to be free to reform the law as he thinks fit, the overall result might well be worse than the ills they 
are intended to cure'. 
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[2.12.4] Juries: When damages are determined by a jury they are 'a question of fact' because 
the jury and not the judge decides what the damages are to be.235 The judge decides 
questions of law: 
'So long as the award of damages remained the function of the jury precise rules of 
quantification could not be evolved' .236 
The jury system was unknown to the classical Roman-Dutch law and was introduced into 
South Africa by the English. It never found acceptance and was abolished some 60 years 
ago, 'unwept, unhonoured and unsung' .237 South African law now has a substantial 
number of reported judgments concerned with the assessment of quantum by a judge. One 
might thus expect that fairly sophisticated and ~etailed rules of assessment had by now 
evolved and become established. This has not proved to be the case either locally or over-
seas. 238 
[2.12.5] Sources of nonnative rules: The major obstacle to the development of detailed rules 
within the South African sphere has been the repeated emphasis by the judiciary upon 
retaining a large discretion to award what the court considers right239 coupled with a 
philosophy that every problem can be resolved by bringing sufficient evidence. In other 
words each case is decided on its own facts. 240 There is a view that there are few regular 
patterns or general principles to be extracted. 241 This 'hands-off approach of the South 
African courts, although by no means ideal, has, for various reasons, proved workable: 242 
* An emphasis upon fact generally indicates the application of a differencing 
methodology.243 That is to say that the need for, and effect of, differencing is 
apparent from the evidence before the courL 
235McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 1029-30. 
236Erasmus 1975 THRHR 268 274; Munk.man 'D~mages' 4ed 54. 
237Hahlo & Kahn (Union of SA) 257; Rood 1990 De Rebus 749. 
238Street 'Damages' (v of preface) 'Hitherto the law of damages has been quite remarkable for the lack of interest 
shown by jurists in its fundamental rules'; Erasmus 1975 THRHR 268 'The Roman-Dutch jurists of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries displayed a considerable lack of interest'; Reinecke 1988 De Jure 221 'Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
skadeleer verkeer nog in sy kinderskoene'. 
239Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 244; Legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614F 'In assessing the compensation 
the trial judge has a large discretion to award what under the circumstances he considers right. He may be guided 
but is certainly not tied down by inexorable actuarial calculations'. See 37. 
240See footnote 230 for difficulties created by a reliance upon the facts of each case to the exclusion of general rules. 
241 De Jager v Grunder 1964 1 SA 446 (A) 451C; Morris 'Technique in Litigation' 2ed 90 'It is a complex concept; 
it is a fundamental issue of fact'; Corbett & Buchanan (C&B) vol I xxv 'Because of the basis on which damages are 
computed in fatal injury cases little guidance is given by the quantum of previous awards. For this reason no fatal 
injury cases are included'. 
242Such as happened in Australia before th·e ruling Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC) that a net 
capitalization rate of 3 % per year was to be used in all cases. A little more practical guidance from the courts in 
South Africa for practitioners responsible for settling damages claims would not be misplaced. 
243 Erasmus v Davi~ 1969 2 SA 1 (A) 5F-G 17D-F; Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 665; Dippenaar v 
Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917. See section 3.4. 




DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Amongst practitioners concerned with the day-to-day settlement of the vast majority of 
claims that never reach the courts there is a substantial body of generally accepted rules 
of assessment. 
There is a heavy reliance by the courts upon actuarial evidence. Actuarial methodology 
promotes adherence to sound rules of assessment in many areas where the courts have 
declined to provide guidance. 
In addition to these informal sources of judicial rules of assessment there are a number of 
rules which may truly be said to be rules of the common law. 244 They are not questions 
of fact. 
[2.12. 6) Relevance of reporled judgments: In general one looks to the decided cases on 
damages not for authority as to rules of law but for guidance as to the prevailing norms of 
practitioners and actuaries which are acceptable to the courts. The fact that a particular 
approach has been adopted by a court in the past does not establish a rule of law but it does 
establish that a litigant may adduce such a methodology in a subsequent matter without undue 
fear of rejection. The decided cases identify what methodologies have been accepted in the 
past, and can be safely used in the future. 245 The English courts speak of 'guidelines' 
which fill the gap created by inadequate evidence, 246 and have been active in monitoring 
these 'guidelines'. 
[2.13] CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has explored the concept of utility in general, and more particularly techniques 
for the objectivization thereof for purposes of agreement between man and man. Important 
objectivizing techniques include direct reference to market prices, reference to relevant 
surrogate markets, statistical averages and derived expected values, logic and mathematical 
formulae, and the rules of precedent suitably modified to maintain relevance in changing 
times. 
The assessment of damages for future losses, and past hypothetical losses, is determined by 
reference to that which is foreseeable by the reasonable man at the time of the assessment 
as being the normal consequences of the injury or death. Regard will be had to all 
information available at the time of assessment. Compensation is for the increased chance 
that an expense will be incurred, or the decreased chance that earnings will be received. 
244Inter alia Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) (loss of earnings must be 
calculated over reduced expectation of life despite fact that but for the injury the victim would have lived a normal 
lifespan - see 227, 347); Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) (widow who takes up 
employment after her husband' s death is not required to reduce her claim for loss of support by the earnings that 
she now receives - see 320); Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) (pension benefits paid in terms of 
contract of emplpyment are to be deducted when assessing damages for loss of earnings - see 183). 
245Munkman 'Damages' 4ed x 177. 'There is no doctrine of precedent in fixing the quantum of damages'. 
Munkman has in mind generaJ"damages. 
2~Wright v British Railways Board [1983) 2 All ER 698 (HL) 705j; Cookson v Knowles [1978) 2 All ER 604 (HL) 
606-7; Lim Poh 0100 v C&IAHA [1979] 2 All ER 910 (HL) 915a-c. 
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CHAPrER3 
DAMAGE AND DAMAGES 
Summary: Perfect restitution is only possible in extremely rare 
instances. In general the damages awarded by a court are 
compensation, a fair substitute for what has been lost. When 
differencing utility regard must be had for the effect of the award for 
damages on the overall utility after the wrongful act. The assessment 
of lump-sum damages is assisted by the concept of a patrimonium 
which includes as assets the present values of future uncertain 
incomes and outlays. The assessment of damages requires a 
comparison between the hypothetical state had there been no 
wrongful act and the actual state having regard to that act. 
[3.1) FORM OF PAYMENT OF DAMAGES 
41 
[3.1.1} Rule of procedure: Damages, including those for personal injury and death, are 
usually awarded by way of a single once-and-for-all lump sum. 1 This lump sum must take 
full account, not only of losses which antedate the trial or settlement, but also of every 
foreseeable loss that will occur in the future, however distant and speculative. Once the 
lump sum has been paid the claimant is precluded from recovering further losses which were 
not envisaged at the time of the assessment. Conversely the defendant may not recover 
surplus funds if the claimant dies early, or the losses prove to be less severe than was 
originally anticipated. 
[3.1.2} Advantages of a lump sum: It is not my intention to argue for the abolition of the 
lump-sum once-and-for-all rule. Many writers have dealt extensively with the subject.2 
Whilst instalment compensation has much to commend it, it certainly is not the juristic 
panacea that some protagonists would make out. 3 The major pitfall associated with 
instalment compensation is administrative cost and perpetuation of litigation.4 The closer 
we get to the juristic ideal the greater the human effort needed to fulfil the dream. In all 
1See, for instance, Boberg 'Delict' 475-94; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 215-19. 
2See, for instance, Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' 3ed; Hutchison 1985 THRHR 24; Pearson Cmnd 
7054 1978; Burchell 1981 BML 74, 1982 BML 107; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 128, 136-7. 
3Milburn-Pyle 1980/81 TASSA 136 145 notes that perfect knowledge of the rate of inflation does not ease the problem 
of projecting earnings which do not increase in line with inflation. In the Bray agreement (reproduced in Koch 
. 'Damages' 250-2) future instalments are calculated on the basis of 92,5 % of the inflation rate. In France use is made 
ofa wage index (Fleming 1977 (26) A/Cl 51 57). Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' 3ed 208 notes the 
effect on wages of increasing productivity; see too Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 157; 
Anderson 'Actuarial Evidence' 30; Johnson 'Modern World' 223-4. 
4Hughes v Santam Insurance 1988 <yV) (unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86) discusses some of the difficulties and 
ongoing litigation that can attach to an instalment agreement. 
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societies economic resources are limited to a greater or lesser extent. Lump-sum 
once-and-for-all compensation, for all its imperfections, persists because it is administratively 
efficient. 5 This, however, is not the only reason for the continuing use of lump-sum 
compensation: 
'The lump sum has advantages of immediacy, certainty and flexibility , and the 
evidence tends to show that people prefer it, and if so they should not be accused of 
imprudence. The importance of certainty becomes evident if one bears in mind the 
number and variety of misfortunes which can befall nations as well as individuals' .6 
An inordinately large proportion of academic energy has been directed at the replacement of 
the once-and-for-all lump-sum rule with a system of compensation by instalments. I have 
already stated' that this thesis takes it be axiomatic that the once-and-for-all lump-sum rule 
is a convenient, flexible and desirable system that deserves to be retained, albeit, perhaps, 
in conjunction with instalment procedures. 
[3.1.3] Instalment compensation: This is permitted under South African law under limited 
circumstances. 8 The terms governing the payments are set out by way of an agreement. 9 
It is doubtful that a court has the power to order variation of such an agreement should 
unforeseen circumstances arise. In this sense the once-and-for-all rule continues to apply .10 
In one instance a court has considered itself competent to order compensation by instalments 
outside the ambit of the statutory provision. 11 The defendant elected not to appeal against 
this ruling thereby consenting to pay by instalments. 12 
A court may order interim payments once the liability of the defendant has been 
-'See Milburn-Pyle 1980/81 TASSA 136 152-3; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 315, 448. 'The principle is that 
immediate certainty and finality are to be preferred above deferred precision' Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 
1992 2 SA 417 (T) 420F. 
6Pearson Report vol 1 155. See too Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 26; Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 189. 
7See paragraph 1.1. 
'Article 43 of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989 (s8(5) Motor Vehicle Accidents Act 84 of 1986) permits 
instalment compensation for motor vehicle accident victims but only at the instance of the third-party insurer (Marine 
& Trade Insurance v Katz. 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 971H). See too Boberg 'Delict' 486. Dladla v Minister of Defence 
1988 3 SA 743 (W) discusses the problems created by an apportionment of damages in terms of the Apportionment 
of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
9For examples of agreements see Koch 'Damages' 248-56; Hannick v SA Eagle Insurance 1982 1 PH 110 (C). 
10
'The effect of Mr Israel's argument is that the respondent should be ordered to compensate the appellant for 
damages which she did not claim in the present action. That argument is contrary to the above quoted common-law 
rule (once-and-for-all damages). Furthermore the wording of section 8(5)(a) makes it plain that the undertaking is 
given and can thus be ordered only in respect of such costs as are included in the claim for compensation' Poo v 
President Insurance 1992 4 C&B A3-96 A3-l l lsup. See too Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 
216n140; MVA Fund v Andreana 1993 3 SA 227 (T) . 
11 Wade v Santam Insurance 1985 1 PH J3 (C). Van der Walt maintains that the once-and-for-all rule did not apply 
in Roman-Dutch times ('Sommeskadeleer' 304ff). 
12See too Kleinhans v African Guarantee & Indemnity 1959 2 SA 619 (E); Rein 1961SAL.I102 103. 
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established. 13 Such a payment will be restricted to losses ~ccrued to that time. General 
damages and future losses are excluded. 14 There is no restriction on how many times 
interim payments may be claimed. 15 It is conceivable that for reasons of convenience a 
court orders that a regular monthly amount be paid over pending finalisation of the matter. 16 
In certain extremely simple situations something approaching perfect restitution may be 
achieved. Van der Walt17 points out that perfect restitution cannot be achieved for past 
loss. 18 He proposes an instalment system for compensating future loss based upon 
convenient stops ('ruspunte') where accrued past loss is compensated. 19 Bearing in mind 
the problems with achieving perfect restitution with past loss20 it is clear that any system 
for compensating future losses can never do better than an award for past loss alone. 
[3.2] IBE AQUILIAN ACTION 
Certain aspects of the Aquilian action deserve mention: 
[3.2.1] Multiple causes of action: The Roman law allowed compensation by way of 
numerous special actiones each with its own formula and directed at a particular type of 
damage. 21 Our modern law allows compensation on the basis of two general actions, the 
Aquilian action and the actio injuriarum. 22 In its idealised form the Aquilian action 
compensates in one once-and-for-all action all forms of financial loss flowing from the injury 
or death. 23 In practice the notion of a single all-embracing Aquilian action is something of 
an oversimplification. 24 The facta probanda for the dependants' action continues to be 
viewed as separate and distinct from those for the action for personal injury.25 For statutory 
13Rule 34A of the Uniform Rules of Court (GG4152 27.11.87 R2642); Nel v Federated Versekeringsmpy 1991 2 SA 
422 (T); Karpalds v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 489 (0). See too article 45 ofMMF agreement ito Act 
93 of 1989. 
14Van Aswegen v General Accident Insurance 1989 (W) (unreported 16.10.89 case 8420/89). 
15This gives effect to Van der Walt's concept of a series of actions, each directed at compensating past loss, 
'afgeslote skade', alone 'Sommeskadeleer' 291-485. 
16The Karpakis case states obiter (at 5010) that the court order may allow for losses in the immediately foreseeable 
future. 
17Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 286. 
1
"There is really only one certainty: the future will prove the award to be either too high or too low' Lim Poll Choo 
v C&IAHA [1979) 2 All ER 910 (HL) 914 c-d. Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 210n96 note that the 
courts do not have as much difficulty with assessing future Joss as Van der Walt would like to suggest. 
19Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 291-304. 
20See paragraph 2.2.3. 
21 Kaser 'Roman Private Law' 149-50; Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 105-6. 
22Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492. 
23Green v Coetzer 1958 2 SA 697 (W). 
24Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 151 185-6. 
"Evins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 (A). This decision has arrested the development of single right of action 
for all classes of damage. Loss of support occasioned by death cannot be recovered under the same right of action 
as damages flowing from a personal injury . 
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reasons damages for personal injury must be claimed separately from damages for a motor 
vehicle. 26 The pauperian action provided for liability without fault and still survives 
independently. 27 The expression 'Aquilian action' is thus best described as a generic term 
for a variety of separate 'actions' each with its own differentfacta probanda. The common 
thread is that these actions are all directed at the recovery of patrimonial loss. 
[3.2.2] Group actions: Germanic law, by way of contrast to the Roman law, emphasized the 
interests of the group rather than the individual. Instances of group actions are to be found 
in South African law, 28 although it is doubtful that these can be traced to any explicitly 
Germanic origins. Rather they have their origin in the nature of the compensation problem. 
The most prominent example is the action for damages by an injured breadwinner. When 
a breadwinner is catastrophically injured his dependants may suffer financial loss by reason 
of his loss of earnings. The dependants, however, are denied a right of action because they 
may still look to their breadwinner who himself has a right to claim compensation.29 The 
practice of ignoring gratuitous benefits is directed at enabling the victim to reimburse the 
welldoer and is thus a form of group action30 where the victim effectively acts on behalf of 
himself and those who have assisted him. Under the dependants' action the group action 
exists concurrently with a separate action by the individual.31 
[3.2.3] Multiple measures of damages: In practice the different actions give rise to different 
measures for the damages. Damages for breach of contract are subject to a different measure 
from that applying to delict. 32 Foreseeability is an important factor limiting the defendants' 
liability under breach of contract and damage to property. With claims for personal injury 
the 'egg-shell skull' rule applies, that is to say that unforeseeable consequences of the injury 
will be compensated. 33 With the dependant's action the damages are restricted to loss of 
support. 34 In general the measure of damages to be used is determined by the purpose of 
the inquiry. 35 Even when the purpose of the inquiry has been identified one may find that 
26 Article 40 of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989. 
nLawrence v Kondotel 1989 1 SA 44 (D); Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 356-9. 
28See section 11.4. 
29See De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34. 
30See paragraph 11.4.2. 
31 See Dendy 1990 SAL! 155. 
32Lillicrap Wassenaar v Pilkington Brothers 1985 1 SA 475 (A); Boberg 'Delict' 3-16. The law of contract refers 
to positive interesse and negative interesse. Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 40 notes that these apparently different 
measures of the damage reflect two different causes 'Positiewe en negatiewe interesse is egter in werklikheid nie twee 
verskillende berekeningsmetodes nie, maar dit het betrekking op twee verskillende gebeurtenisse'. 
33Hart & Honore 'Causation' 2ed 173 269 271-5; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 189-91. The 
prospect of injury to the victim in general must, however, have been foreseen if liability is to arise (Botes v Van 
Deventer 1966 3 SA 182 (A)). 
34Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614E 'as regards maintenance'. 
HReinecke 1976 TSAR 26 39-42; see 48 below. 
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more than one measure is used, the one checking the result of the other. 36 
[3.2.4] Punitive damages: There is evidence to suggest that in the classical Roman-Dutch law 
the measure of damages was different when liability was derived from dolus rather than 
negligence. 37 In modern law damages are no longer punitive. 38 It follows that, once 
liability is established, the measure of damages is not affected by whether the wrongdoer 
acted negligently or with dolus. 
Historically a clear distinction has not always been maintained between the criminru law and 
civil liability for damages. 39 Under conditions where there _was no effective central 
government to enforce criminal sanctions the old Germanic law bundled together punitive and 
compensatory-' considerations. In the modem South African law section 300 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act40 empowers a criminal court to order the payment of damages over and 
above the punishment for the crime. When making such an order the criminal court will take 
care that it does not prejudice the complainant's right to claim damages in a civil court.41 
[3.2.5] The dependants' action: The dependants' action for loss of support arising from the 
wrongful killing of the breadwinner was unknown to the Roman law which subscribed to the 
ethic that th~ body of a freeman has no value.42 The early Germanic customary law 
allowed a right of action to the sib of the deceased for wrongful killing.43 The modem 
dependants' action reflects an actio utilis, an extension of the Roman-law action for loss of 
earnings developed in response to the Germanic ethic that compensation should be awarded 
for wrongful killing.44 During its formative stages the action for financial loss consequent 
to the killing of another was allowed to the heirs of the deceased rather than the 
dependants. 45 
[3.2.6] Consequential loss: The dependants' action displays the enigmatic feature46 that a 
right of action is allowed to persons who have not been physically harmed by the wrongful 
36See 54. 
31M/ombo v Fourie 1964 3 SA 350 (T) 357-8. 
38Erasmus 1975 THRHR 268 271; Munkman 'Damages' 4ed 2; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 223, 226. Santam 
v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A). 
39See Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 6 14-25. Matthaeus De Criminibus 47.4.3-5, for instance, deals with awards for 
damages in a text dealing with the criminal law. 
4051of1977. cf Matthaeus De Criminibus 47.4.3-5. 
41S v name 1982 4 SA 319 (B); S v Vulesangweni 1980 3 SA 527 (fk). 
42The Roman law did not allow compensation to anyone for the death of a freeman; Davel 'Broodwinner' 11-17. 
43Davel 'Broodwinner' 55-6; see too paragraph 13.1.4. 
44Feenstra 1972 Al 227 229. 
45Feenstra 1972 Acta Juridica 227. Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 51-6 argues for a reversion to this approach. 
46Historically the Aquilian action has had the requirement of damnum corpore corpori datum. This requirement has 
been watered down in the course of time. In Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmpy 1973 1 SA 769 (A) 
78 lA-B it was said that even a personal apprehension of danger is not essential. 
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act. In this sense it is an action for pure economic loss. 47 However, if the killing of the 
breadwinner is viewed as the primary damage then the damage for which compensation is 
claimed under the dependants' action may be viewed as consequential loss. This is also true 
of damage flowing from personal injury if the physical injuries are viewed as the primary 
damage. These preliminary observations reflect the important principle that a clear 
distinction needs to be drawn between the .infringement of a right that gives rise to a cause 
of action and the factual economic loss that flows from the infringement of that right.48 
Confusion in this regard is aggravated by the use of the same word 'damage' in English to 
describe both infringement of a legal right ('regskrenking') and the consequential economic 
loss ('skade').49 
[3.2.7] Lucrum cessans and damnum emergens: These two expressions occur frequently in 
the literature on damages. Modern jurists are not entirely in agreement as to their meaning. 
Some writers maintain that the distinction has ceased to be of any significance. 50 Some 
perceive damnum emergens to be the loss of future accruals to the patrimony of the plaintiff 
while lucrum cessans is viewed as reductions to the patrimony that existed at the time of the . 
delict or breach of contract.51 Van der Walt identifies lucrum cessans with future loss.52- ·-
He does not expressly indicate his own meaning for damnum emergens but it may be inferred 
that he identifies it with past loss. 53 Other writers refer to this same distinction with rather 
greater clarity. 54 Boberg provides a further variation :55 
'Because a delict may diminish an estate not only by reducing its value but also by 
preventing its value from increasing, damage is not confined to actual losses or 
expenses (damnum emergens), but includes also the deprivation of a financial benefit 
that would otherwise have accrued (lucrum cessans). To the former category belong 
medical expenses and the depreciation of damaged property; to the latter a loss of 
earnings or profits'. 
An important point here is that the expression damnum emergens refers to both past and 
future loss, the same being true for lucrum cessans. I use these expressions in the same 
47Boberg 'Delict' 3-16 58-103. 
41See 47. 
49See 48 and 64. 
50Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 108; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 37 (Fischer) 42 (Werner); Reinecke 1976 TSAR 
26 32n49. 
51Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 58-9 (Moller) 75 (Neuner) . 
52Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 274-5 . In this respect he follows Larenz (87-9). His general rejection of the 
principle of valuation of a chance is evidenced by his refusal to accommodate uncertain future losses under the 
beading of lucrum cessans. 
53Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 293-4 'afgeslote skade'. 
54Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 209; Davel 'Broodwinner' 14 'Ten opsigte van die begrip skade 
(damnum) is 'n onderskeid gemaak tussen reeds gelede en toekomstige skade. Hierdie onderskeid tussen damnum 
emergens en lucrum cessans is sedert die Middeleeue bekend'. 
55Boberg 'Delict' 476. This is the same view taken by Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 29-30. 
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sense as Boberg. Damnum emergens then has the important quality that all uncertainty can 
be removed by waiting for the 'unfolding reality' whereas with lucrum cessans unfolding 
reality may reduce the degree of uncertainty but can never eliminate it.56 The difference 
between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans is then a distinction between two essentially 
different types of uncertainty. Just as one may refer to the loss of the prospect of an 
uncertain profit (lucrum cessans) so too one may discuss the prospect of incurring an 
uncertain expense (damnum emergens) .51 
[3.3] DAMAGE - WHAT IS IT? 
[3.3.1] 'Damage': The dictionary58 defines 'damage' to be 'loss or detriment caused by hurt 
or injury affecting estate, condition or circumstances'. There is general agreement that 
damage is a concept used extensively by lawyers. 59 Causation is an essential component 
of this concept.60 One may discuss causation independently of damage61 but one may not 
discuss damage independently of causation. 62 Although damage is a concept used 
extensively by lawyers this does not mean that one should make the mistake of looking to 
the substantive law to ascertain what. damage is. 63 Damage is an intuitive concept which 
is shared by lawyer and layman alike. 64 Damage is determined by economic and scientific 
considerations, not by the law. The law uses the scientific and economic concepts when 
assessing 'damages'. One should take care not to confuse the methods used to ascertain 
damage with the legal rules governing the assessment of the related damages.65 
[3.3.2] Interacting concepts of justice: The foregoing does not mean that the law does not 
place restraints on what economic and scientific issues may be taken into account when 
assessing 'damages'. The practice of ignoring collateral benefits such as insurances66 and 
non-repayable gratuitous benefits67 gives rise to damages in excess of the loss suffered in 
terms of a strictly economic measure. Conversely a policy of currency nominalism gives rise 
"'Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 557-8. Munkman ' Damages' 4ed 71 cites Moores v CWS Ltd (171e Times 
5.9.55) for the example of the disabled policeman who was at risk for early retirement long before the accident 
terminated his employment. 
57Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26. 
"Oxford English Dictionary. 
59Visser 1991 THRHR 782; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 11-13; Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 26-7. 
60Jlloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 14. 
61For instance 'What causes the moon to rise'? 
62See 61 below. Contra Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 41-2. Reinecke advocates a measure of damages which is 
independent of questions of causation. 
63Contra Visser 1991 THRHR 782; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 203-4. 
64Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 11 ' ... dat in het dagelijks /even gebruikt word'. Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 
125n 1 refers to a 'voorjuridiese skadebegrip'. See 56 below. 
65See paragraph 3.3.3 . 
66See, for example, Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 920-1. 
61Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) . 
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to material undercompensation during times of high inflation. 68 The intuitive concept of 
damage is best viewed as part of natural justice towards which the substantive law 
endeavours to develop. By reason of changing economic conditions and scientific knowledge 
the intuitive concept will change from time to time rendering old assessment principles 
redundant and introducing the need for new procedures. The advent of high rates of inflation 
has, for example, required a major rethink of attitudes to this phenomenon.69 
In Kewana's case70 the court ruled that the protection provided by MVA legislation was not 
restricted to losses compensated by the Roman-Dutch law. In this instance a child adopted 
according to customary law was granted a right of action for loss of support caused by the 
death of the adopting mother. The modem Roman-Dutch law would deny such a child a 
right of action for loss of support.71 
[3.3.3] 'Damages': The dictionary72 defines 'damages' to be 'the value estimated in money 
of something lost or withheld; the sum claimed or awarded in compensation for loss or injury 
sustained'. Damages is a strictly legal issue limited to what the law will allow. The fiction 
of restitutio in integrum makes out that there is a perfect correlation between damage in the 
economic sense, and the damages awarded . In practice the courts are no more able to effect 
perfect restitution than they are able to bring the dead back to life or restore a severed limb. 
This is so regardless of what procedural regime is adopted, be it compensation by instalments 
or by lump sum.73 It follows that damages are not restitution, they are compensation,74 
a monetary substitute for what has been lost determined according to a set of legally 
determined rules and conventions.75 Otherwise stated the damages awarded is the price for 
which society expects the victim to exchange what would have been for what now is. An 
inquiry into damages is really an inquiry into the loss of utility suffered by the plaintiff 
regarding his patrimony and his person. · 
[3.3.4] Damage as a legal concept: Damage is a legal concept in the sense that lawyers are 
commonly called upon to make decisions about it. The word 'damage' is, however, 
ambiguous and can, depending on usage, encompass a number of different aspects of the 
damage-creating event: · 
68SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
69See, for instance, Spandau 1975 SAU 31; Mallett v McMonagle [1969] 2 All ER 178 (HL) 190. 
70Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 (fk) (unreported 28.02.93 case 112/88). 
71See footnote 123. 
720xford English Dictionary. 
73See paragraph 2.2.3 . 
74See Munkman 'Damages' 4ed 1-2; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 48 114; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 65 
157 280 285; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 197; Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 106 'Historically, the 
sum of money of the judgment is probably to be explained as the price of redemption from liability, that is, the 
monetary composition offered to the victim in order to save the wrongdoer from the harshness of personal 
execution'. · 
"Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 197 'geld dien dus as ekwivalent vir die skade'; see too 227. 
• 
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[3.3.4.1] Damnum corpore corpori datum: First of all there is damage in the physical 
sense, the violent damaging of one tangible by another, the early Aquilian requirement 
of damnum corpore corpori datum. 
[3.3.4.2] Infringement of a right: Secondly there is damage in the abstract legal sense 
of infringement of a right, 'regskrenking' .76 This form of damage is essential if there 
is to be a right of action in law. If the physical damaging of a person's body or goods 
also constitutes the infringement of a legal right then it is said that it has been done 
wrongfully. Usually the legal right infringed is that of the person injured or the owner 
of the goods. The right of action granted to dependants for the wrongful killing of the 
breadwinner derives from an infringement of the right to support enjoyed by the 
dependants.n With pure economic loss there. is no physical damage, only the 
infringement of an intangible legal right. As a general rule for every right there is a 
corresponding duty. It follows that infringement of a legal right will may usually be 
restated as a failure to observe a duty. In this thesis I do not propose to explore the 
relationship between rights and duties. 
[3.3.4.3] Reduced economic resources: Thirdly there is damage in the economic sense. 
The infringement of the abstract legal right brings with it a diminution in the economic 
resources that the victim would in the normal course of events have been able to 
command in order to fulfil a life plan comprising not only the necessities of life but 
also the chosen quality of life. The infringement of a right does not necessarily give 
rise to damage in the economic sense. 
For an action for damages to succeed the claimant must not only prove damage in the sense 
of an infringement of a legal right, but he must also prove damage in the economic sense of 
a reduction in the utility of his life plan. 78 
[3.3.5] Roman law: The classical Roman law did not award compensation for consequential 
loss. The focus was on the physical object which had been damaged. Whatever perceptions 
of damage were harboured by the Romans the damages awarded were based on the market 
value of the object damaged. It is conceivable that even partial damage was visited with the 
same award as was total destruction.79 The Romans were more concerned with 
composition, buying off public humiliation or physical punishment for the wrongdoer, than 
76Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 204 observe the distinction between 'regskrenking' and damage in 
the economic sense. 
77See 344. 
71Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 34. See 56 below. 
79Kaser 'Roman Private Law' 214; Lee 'Roman Law'. 4ed 395-6; Leage 'Roman Private Law' 3ed 410-11. The last 
two sources conclude on grounds of common sense that the Roman law could not possibly have been so harsh as 
to award the full value of the res when a residual value remained. If one bears in mind that damages during this 
period were viewed as composition rather than compensation the conclusions drawn by Lee and Leage are by no 
means necessary. The modern practice to ignore insurance payments may well be viewed with equal disbelief by 
a commentator 1000 years from now. 
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restitution for the plaintiff. 80 The concept of differencing has greatly extended the range 
of damage that will be compensated. 81 
[3.3.6] Comprehensive compensation: The ideal measure of damages is that which leads to 
the most comprehensive possible compensation. 82 This means that when assessing damages 
regard should be had to all financial gains and losses flowing from the injury or death. The 
word 'comprehensive' implies universality. 
The concept of the most comprehensive possible compensation does not mean the making to 
the claimant of as large an award of damages as can be motivated within the evidential 
framework. In relation to collateral benefits it can mean quite the reverse due to the making 
of substantial deductions. With damage to property, and with breach of contract, where 
limitation of damages is common,83 the concept may, however, imply an extended range 
of liability due to the wider range of damage viewed as worthy of being compensated. 
Van der Walt84 states as regards the expression 'die volledigs moontlike vergoeding': 
'Onder hierdie uitdrukking verstaan ek die volgende: hoewel volledige 
skadevergoeding teoreties denkbaar is, kan dit prakties nooit deurgevoer word nie; 
dit kan toegeskryf word en aan die grense wat ingevolge die bewys- en prosesreg 
gestel is aan die praktiese doenlike, en aan die feit dat volledige skadevergoeding in 
gepaste gevalle op grond van juridiese waardeoordele onwenslik mag wees'. 
Van der Walt was particularly concerned in his thesis with the restraints placed on 
comprehensive compensation by the lump-sum once-and-for-all rule. Bloembergen85 is 
somewhat more sanguine as regards this principle and notably emphasises the monetary 
aspect: 
'Het is niet voor betwisting vatbaar, dat ten onzent als hoofdregel geldt, dat alle 
schade vergoed moet worden of zoals men doorgaans zegt, dat de schade volledig 
vergoed moet worden. Of nog weer iets anders gezegd: behoudens uitzonderingen is 
de - doorgaans in geld uitgedrukte - schade even groot als de - doorgaans in geld 
uitgedrukte - schadevergoeding '. 
Elsewhere in his thesis Bloembergen86 points out in relation to this concept that to ignore 
collateral benefits is to objectivize the damages and ignore the true state of affairs. That is 
111Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 105-9. 
11See section 3.4. Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 38 considers that the range has been extended too far. 
12
'Die volledigs moontlike vergoeding' Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 8 43 46 93 108 115 125-6 189-90 205 227 
229 242 250 279 301 304; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 117 120 121317337. 
13See paragraph 3.3.7. · 
"Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 8. · 
1~Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 117. 
86Bioembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 52. 
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to say the concept of the most comprehensive possible compensation requires the deduction 
of insurances not subject to subrogation, 87 and the deduction of gratuitous benefits not 
subject to reimbursement. 88 One might debate whether these benefits are part and parcel 
of damage suffered or whether they are to be viewed as part of the compensation along with 
the award for damages. In other words are they to be deducted when assessing the damage 
or later when calculating the damages? This point is not entirely academic. Thus, for 
instance, when there is to be an apportionment of damages89 is the deduction for insurance 
benefits to be made before or after apportionment?90 
Erasmus 91 states that 'A purely objective standard of assessment does not satisfy a 
sophisticated sense of justice'. By the words 'purely objective standard' he means disregard 
for the special circumstances of the case. However, excessive demand by the courts for 
particularity, that is wholesale concretization, can increase the burden of proof to the point 
that legitimate damages are denied. 92 
[3.3. 7] The 'eggshell skull' rule: Liability for damages for personal injury and death arises 
provided the bodily harm in a general sense was foreseeable immediately prior to the event 
causing the harm. 93 The foresight of bodily harm encompasses a wide variety of different 
types of injury, including thos~ leading to death and mental shock short of actual physical 
contact. 94 Events subsequent to the injury may reveal unexpected forms of loss outside 
what might be considered normal. With damages for breach of contract and damage to 
physical property liability is limited to foreseeable harm, that is to say to damage which is 
considered normal having regard to the nature of the wrongful act. 95 With damages for 
personal injury the so-called 'eggshell-skull' rule applies whereby the victim may recover for 
damage which, prior to the event causing the injury, would have been viewed by the 
reasonable man as unusual and unexpected.96 
"See 183. 
88See 190. 
19ln terms of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
90J'he treatment of benefits payable in terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941 provides an example 
of this problem (see Koch 1987 THRHR 475-80; 1990 De Rebus 343-6). 
91 Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 107. 
92See, for example Broderick Properties v Rood 1964 2 SA 310 (f) 316. 
9
'The prospect of inJury to the victim in general must, however, have been foreseen if liability is to arise (Botes v 
Van Deventer 1966 3 SA 182 (A)). See too Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 186; Smit v Abrahams 
1992 3 SA 158 (C) 163-4 and discussion thereof by Neethling & Potgieter 1993 THRHR 157. 
94Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmpy 1973 1 SA 769 (A). 
95Foresight in the sense of a reasonable possibility, or probability, will be based on the knowledge imputable 
immediately prior to the wrongful act to the reasonable man, coupled with the special knowledge of the wrongdoer 
(Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 186nl56). 
96Hart & Honore 'Causation' 2ed 173 269 271-5; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 189-91. Van der 
Merwe & Olivier 'Die onregmatige daad' 212 are against the 'eggshell skull' rule. See Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 
SA 158 (C). 
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Hayward v Protea Versekeringsmpy97 provides a lone example of foreseeability being 
invoked to limit damages for personal injury. Damages had been claimed for loss of 
inheritance prospects for the victim due to the reaction of his father to the injuries. The 
court declined to apply the 'eggshell-skull' reasoning. 98 Foreseeability was not the sole 
reason for denying compensation for this head of damage. 
The above considerations would suggest that foreseeability is not relevant to the assessment 
of damages for personal injury and death to the same extent that it limits the damages 
payable for breach of contract, or damage to goods. This is largely true of that which was 
foreseeable immediately prior to the act or omission which caused the harm. However, once 
the full extent and nature of the injuries, or death, are known then the question of the 
foreseeability by the court of subsequent financial losses having regard to the injury, or 
death, becomes an all-important consideration. 99 
[3.3.8] Modem juristic perceptions: The modern intuitive perception of damage is that of 
a reduction to the value of the physical object damaged. 100 The felt need for a damaged 
object to which to point is evident in the practice whereby personal injury claims are 
described as actions for 'loss of earning capacity' or 'loss of earnings' .101 When a 
breadwinner is killed the focus falls on the lost right to support. 102 Van der Walt has noted 
the Roman propensity to hark upon the most obvious aspect of the legal event, 103 that is 
to say the external manifestation or physical object, rather than the abstract idea or concept. 
In this regard jurists have not changed very much since Roman times. 104 Financial 
advantages which serve to re.duce the loss suffered are generally perceived not as part of the 
damage but rather as a separate class of 'compensating advantages', factors which serve to 
compensate the claimant for his damage. 105 Factors which aggravate the loss suffered will 
in certain cases be ignored on the grounds of 'causally unrelated', 'too remote', 
'unforeseeable'. 106 
Neethling Potgieter & Visser define 'damage' as follows: 
97 1985 3 C&B 588 (C) 601. 
91Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 191 suggest that one may allow an exception to the 'eggshell-skull' 
rule when the damage is wildly unforeseeable. 
99See 20. 
100Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 284; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 9-10; Neethling Potgieter Visser 
'Deliktereg' 2ed 210-11. This seems to be the essence of the causally independent measure of damage described 
by Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 as 'konkrete skade'. 
'°'See 218. 
•rnGeneral Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 6120. 
103See paragraph 2.12.1. 
104Boberg's unnecessary attempts to rationalize an award for loss of the financial benefits of marriage tn the 'earning 
capacity' mould rather emphasises this point (see Boberg 'Delict' 576-7). 
10
'Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 315. See too 179 below. 
106Neethling Potgieter Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 159-95. The perception of causation as a juristic discretion rather than 
a factual inquiry sometimes gives rise to questionable rulings (see the examples discussed at 207 below). 
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'Skade is die nadelige inwerking op enige vermoens- of persoonlikheidsbelang wat 
die reg as beskermingswaardig ag. Anders gestel, dui skade op die afname in die 
nuttigheid of kwaliteit van 'n aangetaste vermoens- of persoonlikheidsbelang wat dien 
tot bevrediging van die betrokke persoon se regserkende behoeftes' . 107 
53 
This definition does not confine damage to financial loss but includes harm to personality 
interests. This conforms with the observation that there is substantial overlap between 
patrimonial loss and general damages for pain and suffering and loss of the amenities of 
life. 108 Damage to earning capacity is a prime example of a loss displaying this 
duality. 109 Neethling has proposed that earning capacity be included under a fifth class of 
legal objects. 110 
The definition of damage quoted above does not expressly address the issue of whether 
damage can exist independently of the law. Reinecke111 and Visser112 have gone so far 
as to suggest that the rule against compensation for illegal earnings arises because the victim 
has suffered no damage. Van der Walt113 does not agree with this view. Nor, it seems, 
do Neethling Potgieter & Visser114 who cite a number of examples of extra-legal 
damage. m That having been said, the definition of damage quoted above conforms with 
the views expressed in this thesis. 
[3.3.9] Reinecke'sfonnulation: There is an ongoing conflict, a lack of congruence, between 
the economic measure of damage which requires the deduction of collateral benefits, and the 
legal measure of damages which often excludes collateral benefits from the calculation. 
Reinecke has endeavoured to resolve this conflict by abandoning an explicit process of 
differencing in favour of an intuitive measure of damages that he calls 'concrete 
damage' .116 His preference for a concrete approach to damages is also motivated by his 
perception that a measure of damages based on causal considerations would cast too wide the 
liability of the defendant. 117 Reinecke unfortunately provides no examples of what he 
understands by the expression 'concrete damage'. One may tentatively surmise that he has 
107Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 198. 
io•see 204 and 215. 
109Loss of earning capacity may be claimed either as part of the general damages or as a separate item (see Southern 
Assurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A). 
110Neethling 1990 THRHR 101 104-5. 
111 1976 TSAR 26 32-3. 
112Visser 1991 THRHR 782. 
113Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 15n24. 
114Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 198-9. 
11 ssee 56. 
116Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26-56; 1988 De Jure 221-38. 
117Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 38 'Die doe! en funksie van die vergelykingmaatstaf was bloot om die deure kousaal 
gesien wyd oop te gooi '. 
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in mind concretization in the sense of reliance on the evidence, 118 that is to say the damage 
that is prima facie self-evident from the evidence before the court, without the need for 
abstract analysis, especially regard for an abstract 'universum'. 
In De Vos v SA Eagle lnsurance119 the untimely killing of the deceased before he could pay 
the first premium on a life insurance policy prevented the payment of the death benefits the 
policy. The refusal by the appellate division to award compensation is clearly correct 
because the present value of the future premiums payable was at least equal to the actuarial 
value of the spes of a death benefit at a later date. 120 The appellate division based its 
finding on the simple observation that had there been no death there would have b~n no 
insurance payment. The perception by the claimant that damage had in this instance been 
suffered would seem to be the sort of concrete damage according to first impressions, the 
absence of abstract analysis that Reinecke has in mind. 
Another example of 'concrete damage' as perceived by Reinecke would, it seems, be the 
costs of repairing a damaged motor vehicle. The cost of repairs is, however, but one way 
of assessing the damages. The preferable view seems to be that one should have regard to 
more than one measure, the one being used as a check on the conclusions drawn from the 
other: 
'The measures employed to estimate the money value of anything (including the 
damage flowing from a breach of contract) are not to be confounded with the value 
which it is sought to estimate; and the true value may only be found after employing 
more measures than one - in themselves all legitimate, but none of them necessarily 
conclusive by itself - and checking one result with another'. 121 
In so far as Reinecke's fears as regards causation and the associated extended liability are 
concerned, one cannot regard this as a problem if one takes the view that ideal compensation 
is comprehensive compensation. 122 Where the damage extends over long periods of time 
the continuing incidence of supervening causal events will increasingly blur the causal 
connection .123 There would also be the discounts for interest and uncertainty. The 
'eggshell skull ' rule124 applies in matters concerning personal injury and death, and also, 
so it seems, to certain other categories. 125 This has not led to obviously excessive awards. 
111See paragraph 2.11. 7. 
1191985 3 SA 447 (A). See discussion of this case by Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg ' 2ed 199n10. 
120See paragraph 13.13.6. 
121From Duke of Portland v Wood's Trustee 1926 SC 640 651 cited with approval in Erasmus v Davis 1969 2 SA 
1 (A) SE. 
122See paragraph 3.3.6. 
123See, for example, 348. 
124See 51. 
1251993 THRHR 157 161 'Eerstens is van belang dat die ta/em qua/em-reel nie (meer) tot persoonlike beserings 
('eierskedels') beperk word nie maar ook tot ander gevalle (soos die finansiele onvermoendheid van die eiser in casu) 
uitgebrei kan word' (discussing Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C)). 
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Reinecke's fears as regards unlimited causal extension are, it seems, not a matter of major 
concern. One does, however, sympathise with Reinecke's groping for a fundamental concept 
of damage which would explain the substantive law, rather than contradict it. However, 
some doubt may be expressed that legal rules of assessment are founded on a single 
unambiguous concept of damages. 
[3.3.10] Van der Walt's fonnulation: Van der Walt summarizes his concept of damage as 
follows: 126 
'Na my mening moet daar vir doeleindes van die vergelyking aangeknoop word by 
die eiser se individuele vermoensbestanddele en hulle nuttigheid vir die bevrediging 
van sy erkende behoeftes volgens sy eie planmatige vermoensgestalting. Die 
vergelyking moet onderneem word deur die pasgenoemde nuttigheid van die te 
ondersoeke vermoensbestanddeel soos dit voor die plaasvind van die gewraakte 
gebeurtenis was ... Wat was and wat is word dus met mekaar vergelyk'. 
Van der Walt defines damage in terms of the utility ('nuttigheid') of a life plan ('planmatige 
vermoensgestalting') to which the plaintiffs fellow men in the legal sense ('regsgenote') 
assign a monetary value. 127 The concept of 'the utility of a life plan' is a wide one. In 
the absence of objectivization by reference to the values of our 'fellow men' in the sense of 
a general norm, 128 one strays into the realm of non-patrimonial loss. Even with non-
patrimonial loss a general norm exists. 129 
A point that deserves some attention is Van der Walt's statement that 'What was and what 
is are compared' 130 If this statement had regard to an ongoing series of events over a 
period of time it would have been phrased 'What would have been and what has happened 
are compared'. Van der Walt's statement displays no sense of the effect of the passage of 
time on the value of the loss. His phraseology probably reflects no more than a focus on 
past loss rather than continuing future loss. 
The once-and-for-all award of lump-sum damages serves to top up the victim's lump-sum 
utility to what it would have been. 131 Van der Walt proposes a system of topping up at 
intervals rather than once-and-for-all. Both procedures involve the reduction of very personal 
utilities to objectively determined money. 132 
126Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 284. 
127Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 281. 
121Voet 'Ad Pandectas' 45.1.9; Erasmus 1975 THRHR 104 115269nl11. This may be either legal or commercial 
(see 22 above). 
129See 204. 
130
'Wat was en wat is word dus met mekaar vergelyk' (see quotation). 
131Bloembergen 'Sclradevergoeding' 115 uses the concept of a bucket of patrimonial items. Van der Walt 
'Sommeskadeleer" 145n6 describes this as 'sy plastiese beeld van "een emmer vol vermogenbestanddelen"'. 
msee 22. 
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[3.3.11] Loss and damage: The measure of damage is affected by the cause of the damage 
and the purpose of the inquiry. 133 Consider the arsonist who sets fire to a house, but while 
the house is burning there is a massive earthquake that causes the house to collapse. 134 If 
the arsonist is to be sued for damages he has no liability because had there been no fire the 
house would in any event have been destroyed and had no value. However, the insurer of 
the house would be liable if the policy covered loss by fire or earthquake. From the point 
of view of the owner of the house a loss has been suffered. This loss is only described as 
'damage' if there is an implication that someone is culpably liable to make good the loss. 135 
In other words not all financial losses are damage. 136 It follows that when defining 
'damage' regard must be had to the allocation of responsibility for the loss. That suggests 
a legal rather than an economic measure of damage. On the other hand consideration of the 
financial losses suffered by the victim and caused by the wrongdoer may suggest that the 
legal measure of damage has been cast too narrowly. It is important for the ongoing growth 
of law and practice that 'damage' be defined independently of limitations placed on damages 
by the prevailing substantive law. 137 The very expression 'limitation of damages' implies 
a concept of damage that extends beyond what will be compensated by the substantive 
law. 138 The doctrine of restitutio in integrum can create the misleading impression that 
damage and damages are co-extensive. 139 
[3.3.12] Actionable damage: The existence of damage is an essential component of Aquilian 
liability. It has been said that the fact of physical injury or death alone does not found an 
Aquilian action. 140 However, an injured child who has suffered no past patrimonial loss 
will be granted a right of action. 141 What 'damage' is it then that gives rise to the right 
of action? Suffice it say that there is some confusion as to precisely what constitutes 
'damage' sufficient to found a right of action. Notwithstanding one clear ruling to the 
contrary, 142 the prevailing practice is to accept evidence of the value of the chance of 
133See footnote 32. 
134This is the example used by Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 39. 
135In some instances the victim will have been partly or wholly responsible for causing his own loss. 
136Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 36 "n duidelike onderskeid tussen skade en beskadiging gehandhaaf moet word' and at 
34 'Vermoensvermindering as gevolg van "gebeurtenisse" wat seker gaan plaasv~nd soos slytasie, dood, verbruik 
van lewensmiddele, ensovoorts, is dus terminologies nie skade nie'. The wor~s 'seker gaan plaasvind' are not 
entirely correct because some unavoidable loss-causing events such as illness cannot be said to be certain. Reinet:ke 
here would Seem to have in mind rather events which are considered normal in a contingent sense (see 20 above). 
137See footnote 64. 
131See too 4 7. 
139See paragraph 3.3.3. 
140Erasmus & GauntlettLAWSA vol 7 39. Contra Coetzee v SAR&H 1934 CPD 221 226; Wieser v Pearson 109 DLR 
3d 63 70. 
141Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A). 
·
142Coetzee v SAR&H 1933 CPD 565 576. This judgment has been the subject of much criticism and has caused 
serious confusion as regards pure prospective loss (see Corbett & Buchanan Jed 11; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 
'Deliktereg' 2ed 214nl25; Boberg 'Delict' 488; Buchanan 1960 SAU 187; Boberg 1964 SAU 147; Buchanan 1960 
SAU 143-4). It is notable that the first Coetzee decision was not followed in its sequel Coetzee v SAR&H 1934 CPD 
221 226 (Watermeyer J was a party to both hearings). 
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financial loss as proof of damage sufficient to found a right of action. 143 The fact that 
actual financial loss will not materialize for many years, if at all, is irrelevant providing such 
loss can be established as a certa spes. 144 Perhaps by reason of the action for general 
damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life, an action for pure future loss 
is granted by way of convenience? A preferable view is to accept as damage adequate to 
found the Aquilian action a certa spes of future patrimonial loss. 145 Undoubtedly the loss 
of a chance in the past founds the Aquilian action. 146 There is authority for the proposition 
that under the dependants' action a certa spes of future loss is sufficient. 147 The one 
possible objection to allowing a certa spes of loss to found the Aquilian action is the problem 
of prescription. With actions involving physical injury to property or person it is difficult 
to imagine problems. With pure financial loss it would seem a sufficient safeguard that 
prescription should not run until the victim becomes aware of his prospective loss. 148 
[3.4] DIFFERENCING METHODOLOGIES 
[3.4.1] Intuitive notions of differencing: 149 We all have an intuitive notion of damage as 
a deprivation or diminution occasioned by the wrongful act. Implicit to the notion of damage 
is a comparison between an existing state of affairs and a hypothetical state of affairs, that 
which would have been had there been no wrongful act. Because of the hypothetical nature 
of loss it is .always attended by a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty. Very minute 
degrees of uncertainty will for practical purposes be ignored. 
[3.4.2] 'Differenztheorie': For juristic purposes intuitive notions need to be reduced to 
communicable procedures. 150 The Dijferenztheorie of Mommsen reflects an early attempt 
at defining a generalised approach to damages assessments. Mommsen defined damage to 
143 An injured child suffers no immediate demonstrable financial loss in the sense of debt incurred or money paid out. 
It is the parents who suffer the immediate losses by reason of their duty of support. It is unthinkable that a child 
should be denied a right of action until the age when, but for the injury, the child would have entered employment 
(see, for instance, Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A); see too Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 
CPD 474 479 concerning the death of a child). Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 30 "n persoon inderdaad regtens skade ly 
sodra 'n bepaalde vermoensverwagting in sy geheel often dele verydel word. Andersins sou dit tog onmoontlik wees 
om te verklaar waarom die persoon onmiddelik skadevergoeding kan haal'. 
144See paragraph 4.1.8. 
1451°his seems to be the dominant view of writers on the subject: Boberg 'Delict' 488-9; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 
'Deliktereg' 2ed 208inf; Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 30. In Coetzee v SAR&H 1933 CPD 565 576 the court required 
a demonstrable past loss to found the Aquilian action. In Coetzee v SAR&H 1934 CPD 221 226 the physical injury 
to the plaintiff was taken to be the basis for the Aquilian action (Watermeyer J was a party to both decisions). 
146Chaplin v Hicks [1911-13] All ER 224 (CA); Trichardt v Van der Linde 1916 TPD 148. 
141Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474 479 'Patrimonial loss includes prospective gains'. Seemingly 
contra Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 635D-E 'Om in haar aksie te kon slaag, moes die appellante bewys 
dat die oorledene tot haar onderhoud bygedra het en dat hy dit gedoen bet en sou voortgegaan het om dit te doen 
omdat hy regtens daartoe verplig was' (this may have been said with the particular circumstances of the case in 
mind). English and Australian law is quite clear about allowing an action based on a certa spes of future loss (Luntz 
'Damages' 2ed 406). 
148Boberg 'Delict' 488-9. 
149See 217 for a farther discussion of this central issue. 
1
.50cf Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 213, 216. 
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be: 
DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
'The difference between the value of a person's patrimony at a given point in time 
and the value which this patrimony would, at the same point in time, have had in the 
absence of the intervention of the particular event causing damage ... Today there is 
a general acceptance of the rule that the time of trial, that is the time when the 
calculation of interesse is done, is the basis of the law'. 151 
This statement of principle, a product of German scholasticism, has found its way into South 
African law through Union Government v Warneke 152 • As a starting point to an inquiry 
into damages Mommsen's formulation can be useful provided one bears in mind its 
limitations which include: 
[3.4.2.1] Loss of use: Mommsen's formulation takes no account of losses occasioned 
by temporary loss of use. Suppose I am deprived of my sailing yacht for a period of 
one year. Differenztheorie leads to the conclusion that my patrirnonium is not reduced 
because at all relevant times I remain owner of an undamaged yacht. In practice I have 
been deprived of the utility of unfettered usage as and when I please, a utility to which 
one may reasonably ascribe a value for compensation purposes. Is such loss 
patrimonial or non-patrimonial? The problem of loss of use will be discussed in more 
detail at a later stage. 153 
[3.4.2.2] Wasted expenses: Serious injury to a bride shortly before her wedding may 
lead to substantial wasted expenses if the wedding is then called off. The victim is 
deprived of the utility of those expenses, the benefit for which they were incurred. If 
the injuries now ensure that the wedding will not take place at another date, 
Mommsen's formulation suggests a nil loss whereas considerations of lost utility 
suggest a substantial loss. Damages for wasted expenses have been awarded by South 
African courts. 154 
[3.4.2.3] Past loss of earnings: Mommsen's formulation fails to disclose a loss under 
circumstances where the courts would make an award for past loss. For example a 
breadwinner may be severely injured and reduced to supporting himself and his family 
on 30% of the income which he would have had in the uninjured condition. Assume 
that before the injury he was a man of limited means with a nil estate. By the time the 
matter goes to trial some 3 years later he still has a nil estate and the hypothetical estate 
151 Author's translation of 'Die Dijferenz zwischen dem Betrage des Verm0gens einer Person, wie derselbe in einem 
gegebenen Zeitpunkte ist, und dem Betrage, welchen dieses vennogen ohne die Daswischenkumst eines bestimmten 
beschlidigenden Ereignisses in dem zur Frage stehenden Zeitpunkte Jiaben warde .. . Heutzutage gilt jedoch allgemein 
die Regel, das die Zeit des Urtheils... die Zeit, zu welcher die Berechnung des lnteresse vorgenommen wird, zu 
Grunde zu legen ist' (Mommsen 'Beitrage zum Obligationenrecht' Vol 2 at 3). 
152Union Government v Warneke 1911AD657 665 where reference is made to Grueber 'The Roman Law of Damage 
to Property' (1886). See too Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 3-4; Reinecke i976 TSAR 26 27. 
153See 163. 
154Trichardt v Van der Linde 1916 TPD 148 (horse racing); Monumental Art Co v Kenston Phamzacy (Pry) Ltd 1976 
2 SA 111 (C) (rent). See too Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 37sup . 
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but for the injury is also assessed at nil. According to Mommsen he has suffered no 
loss. The courts, on the other hand, would recognize the past loss of earnings and 
award 70% of the full notional earnings during the pre-trial period. 
[3.4.2.4] Single universal action for damages: Mommsen' formulation assumes a 
single universal damages action for all losses of whatever nature flowing from the 
wrongful act. Despite what was said in Green v Coetzer155 modern proceduralism 
perpetuates separate actions for different heads of patrimonial loss. 156 
[3.4.2.5] Considerations of equity: Mommsen's formulation takes no account of 
equitable considerations excluding the deduction of collateral benefits. Differenztheorie 
dictates that all financial advantages flowing from the injury shou.ld be deducted when 
assessing damages, whereas utility theory is more finely balanced and provides a 
middle path between Differenztheorie and the prevailing forensic practices. 157 
[3.4.2.6] Utility of damages award: Mommsen's formulation fails to draw attention to 
the effect of the damages award itself on the plaintiffs overall utility158• 
[3.4.3] Classical differencing: The 'Differenztheorie' of Mommsen has had a major impact 
on the methodology used by the courts for assessing lump-sum damages: Damages are these 
days generally calculated by having regard to all that the plaintiff would have brought into 
his patrimony, and disbursed therefrom, in the absence of the injury; a like calculation is 
then performed having regard to the plaintiffs injured condition. 159 The cash flows are 
capitalized and the resulting difference awarded as compensation. One might write this as 
a formula: 
Formula A 
· damages = value before less value after 
[3.4.4] Utilitarian differencing: The classical formulation of the assessment process tends 
to create the impression that damages are the result of the difference between two numerical 
sums. This can lead to some incorrect conclusions and for this reason it is preferable to 
u'Green v Coetzer 1958 2 SA 697 (W). 
156Evins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 (A) ruled that the actions for loss of support and loss of earning capacity 
are separate and distinct by reason of differentfacta probanda; see Boberg 'Delict' 515-16. The action for bodily 
injury has become separated from the action for damage to physical goods by reason of the third party insurance 
legislation (article 40 of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989) which covers only personal injury and death (see too 
Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 374-5; Boberg 'Delict' 504-5). General damages for non-patrimonial loss arising 
from an injury are not Aquilian (Government of RSA v Ngubane 1972 2 SA 601 (A) 606) but are generally claimed 
in the same action as damages for financial loss (Casely v Minister of Defence 1973 1 SA 630 (A) 642). See 43 
above. 
157See 35 and 180. 
151See formula B at 59. 
1'
9See Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917E; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 210-11. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
recast the formula as follows: 
Formula B 
utility after combined with utility of award = utility before 
This formulation emphasises that the award of damages is an event that forms part of the 
plaintiffs reconstituted life plan. It is a disturbing event as was the original injury. Whereas 
formula A treats the award as something separate and distinct from the plaintiffs life plan, 
formula B reflects the reality, namely that the award becomes part and parcel of the 
plaintiffs new life plan. Formula B implies that the court apprised of the matter may have 
regard to the interaction of the award with plaintiffs life plan and the revised utility that 
results. Formula A, it deserves note, will generally provide the court with a first cut at the 
problem, some guidance as to the order of magnitude of the award to be made. In many 
instances this will be sufficient to finalize the award. 
Examples of the interaction of the award with the claimant's lifestyle include: 
[3.4.4.1] Saved finance charges: One of the more obvious effects of a substantial 
damages award to an injured victim is that he will be able to pay off the bond on his 
house and pay cash when he buys a car, thereby being spared finance charges. 
[3.4.4.2] Business opporlunities: For an otherwise impecunious labourer the 
compensation money may open up lucrative career opportunities such as the purchase 
of a taxi or a shop. On a labourer's wage it would never have been possible to raise 
sufficient funds. The injuries may make it necessary to hire a driver. 
[3.4.4.3] Psychological advantages: The award will bring with it the dignity that goes 
with being of independent means and free from the need to work. During the period 
preceding the payment of compensation the victim may well have suffered the 
humiliation of being cast upon the charity of others. The award will thus provide not 
only financial advantages but also psychological advantages. 160 
[3.4.4.4] Remarriage prospects: Formula A suggests that in an action for damages for 
loss of support the widow's remarriage prospects should be determined without regard 
for the fact of the award. Formula B suggests that remarriage prospects should be 
assessed having regard to the award. 161 -
[3.4.4.5] Loss of insurability: The contracts of many employees provide for substantial 
insurance cover against death and disability, at no cost to the employee. The premiums 
which the employer pays to provide this cover are a measure of the value of this fringe 
benefit. Formula A suggests that when calculating damages the loss of earnings should 
160See 60 for further discussion. 
161 Burns v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364H-I 'a substantial dowry will undoubtedly add to her charms'. 
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include the value of the premiums which had been a benefit of employment. Formula 
B highlights that if substantial lump-sum compensation has been paid the claimant will 
have substantial assets and his need for insurance cover for death or disability will 
largely fall away. 162 
[3.4.4.6] Loss of supporl during the 'lost years': When a breadwinner is injured and 
suffers a reduction to his expectation of life his dependants suffer a prospective loss of 
support in respect of the 'lost years'. The award of a substantial lump sum to the 
claimant gives rise to a prospect of a substantial inheritance for the dependants in years 
to come. 163 Except in the case of the most severe reduction to the breadwinner's life 
expectancy the enhanced spes of inheritance will partly or wholly offset the reduced 
spes of support. 164 
[3.4.4. 7] Disability grants: State disability and welfare grants are subject to a means 
test. The payment of compensation will usually disqualify the recipient from further 
payments. It follows that such benefits should be deducted from past loss only, and not 
from future loss. 165 
[3.4.5] Causation implies differencing: A finding as to causation involves an hypothesis of 
what would have happened had the causal act not occurred. Every causal event takes place 
against the background of numerous pre-existing conditions and an expected normal or 
usual sequence of events. 166 The causal event interferes with the normal course of events 
to produce a different sequence of events. 167 It follows that the concept of causation is 
inseparable from the notion of a hypothetical sequence but for the causal act and an actual 
sequence having regard to the causal act. Hypothesis in the sense of an expected normal, 
or usual, course of events168 is an essential component of causation. 169 This is 
162See section 12.10. 
163Reduction to the expectation of life means that the chance of early death is greatly increased (see 81). The prudent 
victim will not seek to consume all interest and capital over his reduced life expectancy (see 102). 
164Even without reduction to life expectancy there is a substantial value for the chance that the wife or children will 
inherit a part of the award for damages (see 92). 
16
'See 199. 
166Hart & Honore 'Causation' 2ed 29 'The notion that a cause is essentially something which interferes with or 
intervenes in the course of events which would normally take place, is central to the common-sense concept of 
cause'. See 20 above. 
167Hart & Honore 'Causation' 33-41 466 'A cause is a condition which departs from the ordinary or regular course 
of events'. 
161Under the actio de pauperie liability arises if the animal has acted contra naturam sui generis (Lawrence v 
Kondotel 1989 1 SA 44 (D) 50-2). In other words liability arises if the animal has acted contrary to what the 
reasonable man would foresee as the normal course of events in the presence of such an animal. 
169 A conditio sine qua non implies the hypothesis 'What if the condition were removed?'. In general a cause in law 
must be a conditio sine qua non (Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A) 35C-D; Hart & Honore 'Causation' 
2ed 466). Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 587 refers to 'hipotetiese kousaliteit', 'causation by omission' (see Hart 
& Honore 'Causation' 2ed 30n3&4). Prediction, in the contingent sense, ie according to a set of probabilistic laws, 
implies a theory, an hypothesis about the real world (Zellner 'Econometrics' 38-9). 
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particularly clear when one is dealing with 'hypothetical causation', 170 that is to say 
causation by omission. 171 
The assessment of damages, because it derives from consideration of what damage has been 
'caused' by the wrongful act, requires a similar comparison between what has happened, and 
will happen, having regard to the wrongful act and what would have happened had there 
been no wrongful act. 172 The notion of an expected normal, or usual, course of events 
is vital to the assessment of damages for future losses, and for past hypothetical losses. 
[3.S] PATRIMONIUM - WHAT IS IT? 
[3.5.1] Patrimonial and non-patrimonial: The courts distinguish between 'patrimonial' and 
'non-patrimonial' loss. Patrimonial losses are those which can be proved with direct 
evidence of the loss of money or the loss of goods upon which society places a monetary 
value. Non-patrimonial losses, such as pain and suffering and loss of the amenities of 
life, 173 are those to which society outside of the courtroom does not ascribe a demonstrable 
commercial value: 
'What is a reasonable sum for general damages for personal injuries cannot be 
measured and tested as reasonable price can be, by the experience of the 
market-place' . 174 
Notwithstanding the sterile validity of this observation there is a general practice by the 
courts to determine the reasonableness of an award for general damages by having regard to 
previous awards. 175 The assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity is not without 
difficulties and the courts will in this instance too often not have the benefit of the experience 
of the market place. 176 The distinction between a judicially determined 'market-place' and 
a commercially determined one is, however, fundamental to the distinction between 
patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss. Van der Walt177 notes that it is possible that money 
provides a full equivalent for patrimonial loss, but never so for non-patrimonial loss. The 
point made here is that although there are some instances of patrimonial loss where perfect 
restitution can be achieved by the payment of money, there are no such instances when 
compensating for pain and suffering and loss of the amenities of life. What is more 
important is that there are numerous instances of so-called patrimonial loss for which the 
r70See, for instance, Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 587 ('hipotetiese kousaliteit'). 
171Hart & Honore 'Causation' 2ed 30n3&4. 
rnsee 60. 
171Administrator-General SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A) 288. 
114Mutual & Federal Insurance v Swanepoel 1988 2 SA 1 (A) lOA. 
msee 204. 
176See, for instance, Union National Insurance v Coetzee 1970 1 SA 295 (A) 301-2; Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 3 SA 761 
(A) 769-70. Even past loss of earnings can be a matter of extreme subjectivity, eg Oiaplin v Hicks [1911-13) All 
ER 224 (CA); Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers 1941 AD 194 198. 
1774Geld as skadevergoeding kan dus moontlik vir skade 'n egte ekwivalent hied, maar nie vir nie-vermoenskade nie' 
Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 185-6. 
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payment of money cannot achieve perfect restitution. That is to say the distinction between 
patrimonial and non-patrimonial is not always as clear as one might like to think. For 
instance: 
[3.5.1.1) Earning capacity: Earning capacity is obviously patrimonial in the sense that 
evidence of earnings may be available. Nonetheless an award of general damages, 
particularly for children, may include allowance for earning capacity178 and possible 
future medical costs. 179 The anomalous dual nature of earning capacity has led 
Neethling to suggest that there should be recognition of a third class of personal 
immaterial rights. 180 
[3.5.1.2) Organ transplants: Modern medicine permits the transplanting of human 
organs and these days one finds market values being placed upon such organs. 181 
One suspects that trading of this nature would generally be viewed by the courts as 
contra bonos mores and thus to be disregarded. The main point, however, is that in 
r certain instances a court may have regard to the prices in such a market when 
determining the level of an award for general damages for an injury such as the loss 
of a kidney. 
[3.5.1.3) Services of wife and mother. The services rendered by a wife and mother in 
running the family home may be lost by reason of her death or injury. Such services 
do not have a commerCial value182 except in the rather inadequate sense of the cost 
of hiring a substitute housekeeper. It has been recognised that a wife's services in the 
home are something better and worth more than that of a hired housekeeper. 183 
[3.5.1.4) Overlapping heads of damage: A substantial award for patrimonial loss may 
affect the award for general damages in the sense that goods and services which can 
notionally be purchased with the funds will substantially relieve the pain and suffering 
or loss of amenities. 184 
[3.5.2) Assets less liabilities: In classical Roman times 'patrimonium' meant assets without 
118MacDonald v Parity Insurance 1967 1 C&B 748 (D); Assur v Protea Assurance 1981 3 C&B 196 (C); Dyssel v 
Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C); Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 3 SA 761 (A); Mashini v Senator Insurance 1979 3 
C&B 82 CN). 
119Celliers v SAR&H 1961 1 C&B 160 (T); Mashao v President Insurance 1993 (T) (unreported 1.6.93 case 
8370/92). 
180Neethling 1987 THRHR 316. 
111Time Magazine March 13 1989 88; February 20 1989 16; June 17 1991. 
112
'The work performed by women and men in households is not assigned any economic value; yet this work equals, 
in monetary terms, a huge proportion of the total amount of wages and salaries paid by all employers in SA'. 
Finance Week October 23-29, 1986 272. 
mRegan v Williamson [1976) 1 WLR 305; McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 897; Wood v Santam Insurance 1976 2 PH 
152 (C). 
'~Light v Conroy 1948 1 C&B 444 (T) 445; Celliers v SAR&H 1961 1 C&B 160 (T) 164; Niblock-Stuart v Protea 
Assurance 1973 2 C&B 323 (C) 327; Administrator-General SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A). 
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deduction for liabilities. 185 In later Roman law the law of bankruptcy changed to confine 
the creditors to the assets for satisfaction of their debts and the modem concept of 'insolvent' 
came into being. The perception of 'patrimonium' changed to assets less liabilities. From 
a utility point · of view liabilities have disutility .186 This disutility offsets the utility of the 
assets. The perception of the patrimonium with regard to bankruptcy is essentially the same 
concept as the estate which a person leaves on death. 
[3.5.3] lnappropria.te analysis: The spectacular success of scientific method in the natural 
sciences, particularly physics, led to attempts during the nineteenth century to apply the same 
scientific techniques to the human sciences. Bentham187 set out to develop utility theory 
as the science of social behaviour. Others sought to establish a science of law based on 
rights and duties. 188 One thus finds the commercial problem of the value of a patrimonium 
restated in the terminology of legal science: 'In later Roman law property came to mean the 
universitas of the plaintiffs rights and duties' .189 Pursuant to this type of analysis it has 
been said that the value of a chance does not form part of a person's patrimonium. 190 The 
classification by rights and duties may be appropriate for purely legal problems but is 
inappropriate for problems requiring the determination of economic value, 191 that is to say 
for the assessment of damages. Thus for example: 
[3.5.3.1] Value of a chance: In Chaplin v Hicks192 the plaintiff suffered a past loss, 
the loss of the chance of an acting contract. No legally enforceable rights or duties 
came into existence other than the right to sue for damages. 
[3.5.3.2] Injury to a child: When a child is injured the notional future earnings would 
have been derived from an hypothetical contract which does not exist in legal terms, 
and never will. 193 
mvan der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 166-73. 
186'fhe disutility of debt varies widely between different persons. There are some who will avoid debt and pay cash 
for everything. There are others for whom the possession of assets is everything and debt a minor irritation to be 
largely ignored. 
117Jeremy Bentham 'An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation' 1823. 
111eg Grueber 'The Roman Law of Damage to Property' (Oxford 1886) 269 'Accordingly, it is the whole loss which 
the plaintiff has sustained in his property (the word "property" being taken in the sense of a universitas or complex 
of legal relations, rights as well as duties), or, in other words, the difference of plaintiffs property, as it was after 
the act of damage and as it would have been if the act had not been committed, this so-called interesse ... which has 
become the object of the Aquilian action in the course of time'. 
119Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 665. 
190Erasmus 1980 De Rebus 389 391 ' ... the intended beneficiary (under a will) has nothing but an unstable spes to 
inherit which cannot be regarded as forming part of his patrimony' . The same, of course, may be said of the future 
earnings of a young child. 
191 Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 181 184-5 241-5; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 26-7. 
192(1911-13) All ER 224 (CA). 
19JReinecke 1976 TSAR 26 29 ' ... 'n persoon ... wat verhoed word om inkomste te verkry wat hy deur die beoefening 
van sy beroep sou gekry het, op vergoeding geregtig is, ten spyte daarvan dat geen bestaande vermoensreg uitgewis 
of aangetas is'. 
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The above examples have regard to 'legal rights and duties' in a very narrow sense. There 
are also 'legal rights and duties' in the more general sense, such as the right to physical 
integrity, and the right to work. It is the infringement of these general rights that gives rise 
to a child's right to claim damages for personal injury. The inadequacy, for assessing 
damages, of a classification by rights and duties does not mean that such a classification is 
irrelevant to the law of damages. The fact that there is a right, or duty, attaching to a 
financial prospect affects the likelihood that the prospect will materialise. 194 Much, for 
example, has been made of the so-called 'contract of employment' as a basis for assessing 
damages for loss of earning capacity .195 Close analysis of this 'contract' reveals that it 
includes a substantial contingent element subject to the employer's discretion, notably salary 
increases, bonuses, promotions, overtime work and leave pay. 196 The fact that a victim 
had a 'contract of employment' at the time of his injury will lead to a much larger award for 
damages than if the victim were a child or unemployed adult. 
[3.5.4] Patrimonium in the broadest sense: For purposes of the assessment of damages the 
concept of 'patrimonium' needs to be extended beyond not only legal rights and duties but 
also beyond the familiar notion of the deceased and/or bankrupt estate. 197 This leads one 
to question whether the word 'patrimonium' should be used at all in relation to damages? 
Today the word 'estate' tends to be used to designate 'patrimonium' in the narrow sense 
(deceased estate, insolvent estate). Regardless of its inadequacies the word 'patrimonium' 
is generally included in discussions of damages. For this reason in the context of damages 
I use the word 'patrimonium' in its broadest sense to include the present value of all future 
indeterminate gains and losses, 198 whether these be protected or enforced by the law or not. 
It is helpful to represent the concept using the schematics of a balance sheet as in table 2: 
Apart from house, car and bond the values in this 'balance sheet of life', this 'extended 
patrimonium', reflect the present capitalized values, the present utility, or disutility, for the 
prospect of the future benefit or outlay. This schematic herps to put earnings in perspective 
in relation to the other items which impact upon the utility of a life plan. Thus if earnings 
are removed from the balance sheet by reason of the injury of the breadwinner, taxation will 
be ~emoved on the liability side, but nothing else. The loss suffered is earnings less taxation. 
[3.5.5] Capitalization: Table 2 above contemplates the use of 'capitalized values'. 
'Capitalization' means to establish a present here-and-now lump-sum equivalent for one or 
more future payments, usually periodical. 199 This process involves not only adding up the 
194Dit 'beteken nie dat die bestaan van so 'n reg vir die skadeleer irrelevant is nie. Die bestaan van 'n reg op die 
verwagte vermoenstoename sal naamlik Jig werp op die mate van waarskynlikheid waarmee daardie 
vermoenstoename te verwag was' Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 285. See too Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 31. 
195Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A). 
196See 195. 
197Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 29-31 argues that financial expectations ('vermoensverwagtinge') do form part of a 
patrimony. 
198For damages assessment at a time after the injury or death it is convenient to have regard to both past and future 
gains and losses, certain and uncertain. 
199Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary. 
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TABLE 2 - THE BALANCE SHEET OF A LIFE PLAN 
ASSETS RlOOO LIABILITIES RlOOO 
Gross earnings 250 Support self 90 
Inheritance 5 wife 90 
Services of wife 100 children 135 
House 110 Taxation 55 
Car 12 Bond on house 20 
Net patrimonium 87 
Totals 477 477 
individual past and future amounts and applying discounts for interest, but also applying 
discounts for risk and uncertainty, that is to say for mortality and other 'general 
contingencies'. 200 It is important to note that the capitalization process is not complete 
until the deduction for general contingencies has been established and applied. 
Damages are usually assessed several years after the event causing the damage. For this 
reason the concept of 'capitalized value' needs to include the value of past losses accumulated 
to date of assessment. Ideally this 'capitalization' of past losses would include allowance for 
past delay by the adding on of interest,201 just as a discount for interest is applied when 
capitalizing future items. 202 Past hypothetical items are as much subject to a discount for 
risk as are future items.203 The percentage deduction for past risk and uncertainty is 
usually less than for the future, due to the benefit of hindsight. 204 
The formulation of classical differencing by Mommsen205 contemplates a mere adding up 
of items ('betrage'), as with the bill at a restaurant. This is something of an oversimplication 
because it ignores the discounting considerations which arise in the more complex problems 
associated with the evaluation of a life plan. The process of capitalization is a process of 
valuation comparable to that of putting a price on a block of flats206 or a share-market 
investment. The capitalized value of a life plan is the present utility of the expected income 





204See discussion of supervening events at 20. 
· -
205See 58. 
206See 215 . 
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Popular usage of the word 'capitalize' often contemplates the use of compound interest only, 
without any thought for a discount for risk. For actuaries the word 'capitalize' implies the 
application of a discount for interest, and also a discount for mortality in the sense of the 
risk or early death, but without allowance for other general contingencies. 
[3.5.6] Ever changing life plans: The patrimonium in its narrow as well as its extended 
sense is always changing. w7 As the breadwinner grows older the value of prospective 
earnings will decline as too will his capitalized liability for support. The bond will be 
reduced, the car replaced and the family home increase in value. If there is a divorce then 
the burden of support will change: a man may lose the services of his wife and half the house 
but still find himself burdened with the cost of providing his ex-wife with support. 
[3.5. 7] Present and future patrimonies: Reinecke208 distinguishes between a here-and-now 
and a future patrimony. 209 His here-and-now patrimony corresponds with the concept of 
an insolvent or deceased estate. His future patrimony contemplates prospective gains and 
losses of a contingent nature. Reinecke expressly refrains from consideration of past 
losses210 and the associated problems of the chance of a past gain, as in Chaplin v 
Hicki2 11 , and the value of past loss of buying power, as was awarded in the Everson 
case. 212 
The schematics of the balance sheet of a life plan illustrated under table 2 above bring 
Reinecke's divided patrimony together as a single undivided whole. For assessing damages 
some time after injury or death one needs to include in the patrimonium past income and 
outgo adjusted for inflation, or interest, to give present value at date of trial. 213 Inevitably 
the needs of a particular analysis will lead to divisions of the patrimonium in different ways. 
[3.5.8] Past and future loss: If damage is viewed as the lump-sum present value at the date 
of the delict of the chance of all subsequent losses then all damage is suffered once-and-for-
all immediately the wrongful act is committed. In this sense there is no such thing as future 
loss.214 The practice of damages assessment has, however, focused on the individual 
monthly, or weekly, items of loss of earnings or support which form the basis of the present-
value calculation, the so-called 'continuing losses'. The assessment is usually done several 
207Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 29: 'Die vermoe, soos 'n lewende organisme, deur 'n voortdurende proses van groei en 
afsterwing gekenmerk word. Bestaande vermoensbestanddele raak vir die persoon verlore, terwyl nu we bestanddele 
deurlopend bygevoeg word'; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 291. 
201Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 28. 
209
'die huidige en die toekomstige vermoe'. 
210Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 26. 
211 [1911-13) ALL ER 224 (CA). 
212Everson v Allianz Insurance 1989 2 SA 173 (C). Although there is a very real loss of utility suffered the legal 
measure of damages does not extend that far (SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A)). 
2131n this sense the upward adjustment of past loss for loss of buying power is of the same nature as discounting 
future items to present value. See paragraph 10.4.4. 
21
'See, for instance, the reasoning of the court in Ruby v Marsh 1975 ALR 385 (HC). 
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years after the wrongful act with the result that some of the 'continuing losses' lie in the past 
and others in the future relative to the date at which the assessment if made. The distinction 
between past and future loss is a procedural matter reflecting the manner in which the 
calculations are done. 215 The same is true of a separate award for general damages. In 
the end a single undivided lump sum is awarded representing the agglomerated present utility 
of all the various considerations that have gone into its making. 
[3.6] UTILITARIAN NATURE OF DAMAGES 
[3.6.1] The shadow of future events: I will demonstrate216 that when damage is 
compensated by the award of a lump sum which has been discounted for risk and for interest 
the lump sum cannot be used by consuming interest and capital to reproduce what has been 
lost by way of future instalments of earnings or support. The lump sum is thus something 
separate and distinct from the series of future payments that it represents. 217 It has 
equivalent value but only in the sense of being the shadow cast by the future upon the 
present. One cannot use a two-dimensional shadow to reproduce the three dimensional object 
that casts the shadow. With future financial losses the discounting process irreversibly 
' eliminates the dimension of time. 
A shadow is always larger than the object that casts the shadow. Not so with damages. The 
shadow of future financial events behaves like perspective in a picture. The further away is 
the three-dimensional object the smaller is its representation in the two-dimensional picture. 
Thus remoteness in time leads to a shrinkage in value, the discount for interest which I will 
discuss further below under the heading of 'The time value of money'. 218 The lump sum 
awarded as damages for future loss is best viewed as a single dimension monetary 
representation, a present-value shadow, of a complex series of future financial events from 
which the dimensions of time and risk have been eliminated by the discounting process. 
[3.6.2] General damages: The lump-sum present value of future loss of earnings or support 
has _an enigmatic quality. For this reason the rules of court219 specify that the amount 
claimed in this regard should be stated separately from special damages. The value of the 
chance of loss of earnings may be claimed either explicitly or as part of general 
damages. 220 This suggests that the lump-sum present value of lost earnings is of the same 
nature as general damages, a loss of utility rather than a loss of money. If the observation 
is true for loss of earnings then it is also true for the lump-sum present value of loss of 
support, and for future necessary expenses, damnum emergens. Because damages for loss 
of earnings, future expenses, and loss of support are measured according to the standard of 
msee r18(10) of the Uniform rules of court. 
216See paragraphs 5.3.1 and 6.1.1. 
217See too paragraph 12.1.4. 
211See chapter 8. 
219See r18(10) of the Uniform Rules of Court. 
220Neethling Potgieter& Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 210 'Algemene skade sluit dus vermoenskadeen nie-vermoenskade 
in'. See paragraph 11.8.3. 
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what is expected221 they have a patrimonial quality. This is not to say, however, that the 
related lump-sum present values provide the means for perfect restitution. 
[3.6.3] Capital and income: The concept of a capital asset separate and distinct from the 
income which the asset produces is a well established feature of tax law. 222 The same 
distinction is appropriate between a lump-sum award for damages and the complex pattern 
of past and future contingent losses which that lump sum represents. For reasons which are 
by no means clear the appellate division has in recent times resisted giving recognition to this 
distinction in the field of damages. 223 There are older dicta from the appellate division 
which point to a more realistic view of the nature of a lump-sum award. 224 The modern 
trend nonetheless raises the interesting question as to whether the doctrine of consuming 
interest and capital to effect perfect restitution is a question of law or a question of fact. If 
it is a question of law then how does one reconcile the technique of value of a chance225 
with a doctrine that every future item of loss can be reproduced by dutifully investing the 
lump-sum award at interest? It has been commented that modern practice is trying to sit on 
two stools at the same time. 226 
[3.6.4] The meaning of 'value': Closely linked with the distinction between capital and 
income is the ambiguity inherent to the word 'value'. In one sense 'value means market 
value', m that is to say the expected cost of replacement. In another sense 'value' means 
merely the sum total of a series of debits. 228 With damages for personal injury or death 
the word value takes on a different connotation still, dictated by the fact that present value 
is determined according to an objectivized standard recognized by our fellow men. Whereas 
for goods the value of the goods implies the cost of replacing those goods, for personal 
injury and death such replacement is generally not possible. The word 'value' in this latter 
context implies no more than a fair price measured according to an objective standard. 
Although for personal injury and death there is an adding up of items as envisaged by 
Mommsen, restitution, the notion of a perfect one-to-one match between loss and damages, 
is prevented by the necessary discounts for risk. 
221
'Die verlies van geskiktheid om inkomste te verdien, hoewel gewoonlik gemeet aan die standaard van verwagte 
inkomste, is 'n verlies van geskiktheid en nie 'n verlies van inkomste nie' Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleve/dt 1973 
2 SA 146 (A) 150A-C; Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 11 ID. 
=cJR v African Oxygen 1963 1 SA 681 (A); Taeuber & Corssen v SIR 1975 3 SA 649 (A). 
223See, for instance, General Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 614; SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 
1990 4 SA 833 (A) 838-9. 
224
'Die verlies van geskiktheid om inkomste te verdien, hoewel gewoonlik gemeet aan die standaard van verwagte 
inkomste, is 'n verlies van geskiktheid en nie 'n verlies van inkomste nie' Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 
2 SA 146 (A) 150A-C; Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 1110. 
=see 71. 
226Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 233n247 'Dit wil lyk of die praktyk op twee stoele probeer sit en 
verdienvermoe beide as 'n afsonderlike bate en as toekomstige skade sien'. 
22"1Monumental Art v Kenston Plramiacy 1976 2 SA 111 (C) 1180. 
228See quotation at 58 above. The word 'betrage' implies an adding up process such as one finds with the bill at a 
hotel or a restaurant. 
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[3.6.5] The pricing fonnula: When a court determines the value of lost support or earnings 
by discounting over the period of the loss, it is effectively using a formula by which to 
determine the price to be paid for what has been lost. The courts might prefer to describe 
their pricing activity in terms of a victim who in consuming interest and capital replaces what 
has been lost. 229 Such descriptions of the process do not alter the fact that lump-sum 
compensation for uncertain continuing loss is necessarily contingent and compensatory, 
as distinct from deterministic and restitutory. 'Compensation' implies a payment in 
substitution for what has been lost, to make amends, to give as recompense, to weigh 
against. 230 It does not mean to replace or restore. The lump-sum paid as compensation 
is essentially a fair price for forgiveness. Thus the formula or method used to calculate this 
price may be described as a 'pricing formula'. A change in the lump-sum value of an 
ongoing loss by reason of an event that supervenes between date of delict and date of 
trial231 may be described, using the above terminology, as a 'Bayesian revision of the 
pricing formula'. 
The thesis of these last paragraphs is explored at a technical level in the chapters that now 
follow. 
[3. 7] CONCLUSIONS 
Damage is the adverse effect on a patrimonial or personality interest regardless of whether 
or not the law regards it as worthy of protection. Otherwise stated damage is the reduction 
in the utility or quality of the affected patrimonial or personality interest that serve to satisfy 
the relevant person' needs. In practice lawyers will only have regard to those aspects of 
damage for which compensation may be claimed. In other words damages are circumscribed 
by the law, but not damage. 
Damages are the monetary compensation, the price that the law allows, for the diminution 
in the utility of the plaintiffs extended patrimony, including quality of life. By payment of 
this price as a lump sum the wrongdoer is released from all further obligation to the person 
who suffers loss. In its ideal form the award of damages would be equal in value to the 
damage that has been suffered. 
Due to the limitations of our human condition restitution for uncertain past and future loss 
can only be achieved in the abstract sense of topping up the present utility of the victim's life 
plan, having regard to the wrongful act, to the same level as that of the notional life plan that 
has been lost. The compensation payable for this purpose should have regard to the effect 
of the award itself on the overall utility of the person's life plan. 
729Gillbanks v Sigournay 1959 2 SA 11 (N) 15A; General Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 614; 
SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 838-9. 
l»fhe Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. See too paragraph 3.3.3. 
231See section 2.8. 
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CHAYfER4 
VALUE OF A CHANCE 
Summary: This chapter introduces the technique whereby the present 
value of an uncertain hypothetical event is calculated by taking the 
value of that event as a certainty and then reducing it by a 
percentage to allow for the contingency of non-occurrence. The 
technique is applicable equally to past and future losses. The 
technique is distinguished from proof in a civil court on the balance 
of probabilities. The determination of the percentage chance may 
have regard to historical statistics but will more often be based on 
subjective value judgments. The analysis of chances according to 




[4.1.1] Value of a chance: This is the technique of damages assessment for uncertain loss 
whereby the court awards a proportion of what the loss would have been if it were certain 
to occur: 
'A related aspect of the technique of assessing damages is this one; it is recognised 
as proper in an appropriate case, to have regard to relevant events which may occur, 
or relevant conditions which may arise in the future. Even when it cannot be said 
to have been proved, on a preponderance of probability, that they will occur or arise, 
justice may require that what is called a contingency allowance be made for a 
possibility of that kind. If, for example, there is acceptable evidence that there is a 
30 per cent chance that an injury to a leg will lead to an amputation, that possibility 
is not ignored because 30 per cent is less than 50 per cent and there is therefore no 
proved preponderance of probability that there will be an amputation. The 
contingency is allowed for by including in the damages a figure representing a 
percentage of that which would have been included if amputation had been a 
certainty'. 1 
A notable feature of this technique is that if the amputation becomes necessary the victim 
will, despite diligent investment of the compensation money, have only 30% of the full cost 
of the surgery. It is not possible to reconcile this consideration with popular concepts of 
restitutio in integrum. It nonetheless remains a valid technique for dealing with uncertain 
loss, which highlights the true nature of an award of damages for uncertain loss. The value 
1Burger v UNSB/C 1975 4 SA 72 (W) 75D-G (emphasis supplied); approved in Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 
191 (A) 225-6; see too Van Oudtshoorn v Northern Assurance 1963 2 SA 642 (A) 650-1; Kwele v Rondalia 
Assurance 1976 4 SA 149 (W) 152-3; Goedlzals v Graajf-Reinet Municipality 1955 3 SA 482 (C); Wilson v Birt 1963 
2 SA 508 (D) 517. 
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calculated using the technique of value of a chance is a fair price to pay now for the 
uncertain prospect of surgery in the future. In other words it is the present utility of the 
loss as a component of the victim's life plan. It is the essence of compensation as distinct 
from restitution. Restitution is achieved but only in the abstract sense of topping up the 
present value of the utility of the victim's life plan. The technique of value of a chance 
permeates every aspect of uncertain loss, including a continuing loss of earnings and a 
continuing loss of support. I will in coming chapters examine the manifestations of this 
phenomenon in the context of continuing loss. 
[4.1.2] Intuitive downward adjustment: In many instances the court does not explicitly 
identify a percentage chance of occurrence. Instead the value of the chance is assessed 
directly as a sum of money already reduced to the required extent.2 This would seem to be 
the manner in which the technique was known to the Roman-Dutch authorities. Grotius, for 
instance, records that present and certain losses are worth more than future and uncertain 
losses. 3 Buchanan records that the principle has for some time been implicit to the 
assessment of general damages. 4 Reinecke aptly describes this process of discounting for 
risk and uncertainty as follows: 
'Hoe hoer die waarskynlikheid van vervulling wat bewys word , hoe groter sal die 
waarde van die vermoensverwagting natuurlik wees totdat dit uiteindelik die waarde 
van die vermoensreg waarop dit gerig is , ewenaar' .5 
[4.1.3] Past loss: The technique of value of a chance applies not only to future losses but 
also to uncertain past losses. The locus classicus is Chaplin v Hicks: 6 The plaintiff had 
been one of 50 finalists from an original 600 entrants for a competition. From these 50 
finalists were to be selected twelve winners each of whom was to receive a three-year acting 
engagement, the top four at £5 per week, the next four at £4 per week and the remaining 
four at £3 per week. Due to the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff was denied the 
opportunity to present herself for the decisive personal interview. The jury made an award 
of £102. Had the plaintiff succeeded to a £4 per week contract she would have received 
about £600 in total. She was thus awarded some 17% of the value of the contract as a 
certainty. The award was confirmed on appeal, it being argued that what the plaintiff had 
lost was not the prize itself but the opportunity, or chance, to win the prize. This matter, 
it deserves note, was concerned with past loss of earnings. 
2Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 226C; see too Van Oudtshoorn v Northern Assurance 1963 2 SA 642 
(A) 650-1 (chance of epilepsy). 
3Grotius Inleiding 3.32. 16 ' ... onzeecker ende toekomend goed niet soo veel waerd en is , als bet zekere ende 
tegenwoordige' . 
4Buchanan 1960 SAU 187. 
sReinecke 1976 TSAR 26 31. 
6Chaplin v Hicks [1911-13) All ER 224 (CA) followed in Triclrardt v Van der Linde 1916 TPD 148; Davies v Taylor 
[1974) AC 207 (HL) 213. See too McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 196-203; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 82-3 'A plaintiff who 
has been deprived of all or part of his earning capacity has in reality lost the chance of exploiting that capacity to 
the full'; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 91-8 . 
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[4.1.4) Future loss: With future loss the technique of value of a chance tends to become 
obscured by misplaced emphasis on the 'period' over which future loss of income or support 
is to be discounted. The remarriage prospects of a widow have, for instance, been couched 
in terms of a period until remarriage. 7 This is an erroneous and misleading form of analysis 
because the vast majority of widows will never remarry. 8 Thus, for example, a 10% 
remarriage deduction for a widow aged 50 converts to a period until remarriage of 25 
years,9 that is to say remarriage at age 75. Clearly an absurd conclusion. The widow will 
either remarry within a few years after the death or not at all. IO 
Another example of the future loss of the value of a chance is the loss of inheritance 
prospects arising from the death of a breadwinner. 11 Yet another example is compensation 
for uncertain promotion prospects. 
[4.1.5) Desirable technique: The technique of value of a chance greatly facilitates giving 
effect to the ideal goal of comprehensive compensation. 12 This is particularly so within the 
framework of the lump-sum once-and-for-all rule . It is preferable that a plaintiff receive 
10% of his loss than nothing at all. Both Van der Walt and Boberg acknowledge the 
desirability of the principle of value of a chance under circumstances of lump-sum 
once-and-for-all compensation. 13 The methodology is well established m other 
jurisdictions. 14 
It has been said of the technique 'That is not a very satisfactory way of dealing with such 
difficulties, but no better way exists under our procedure'. 15 Instalment compensation, we 
may note, would eliminate uncertainty as regards a future medical procedure but cannot bring 
7Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617inf; Boberg 1966 SAL/ 402 407-9 'Remarriage is relevant because 
it reduces the period of dependency'; Boberg 1988 BML 55 56 'The whole object of reducing damages for 
remarriage is to ensure that, theoretically, nothing remains of the award by the time the widow remarries'. 
'See table of remarriage rates published 1988 De Rebus 67 70. 
9For details of the calculation see 326. 
JOSee 324 for further discussion. 
11 Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 248E item (b). This value may be roughly calculated by estimating the 
inheritable estate at the end of the breadwinner's expectation of life (usually by adding inflation to the present value), 
discounting for interest and then applying a further discount for the chance that the wife would not have been alive 
to inherit. Further deductions are made for general contingencies. Actuaries use a more accurate year-by-year 
method (see Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde 1974 TASSA 292 315 where the spes value is represented by A in the 
formula 1-A). For more detail see 330 below. 
12See paragraph 3.3.6. 
13Boberg 'Delict' 477-8; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 447 but not without heated criticism of the lump-sum 
once-and-for-all rule. Van der Walt glosses over the problem of uncertainty in relation to hypothetical events and 
tends to emphasise damnum emergens rather than lucrum cessans. Chaplin v Hicks [1911-13] All ER 224 (CA) is 
not mentioned in his case index. 
14Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 82-3 91-2; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 91-102 108-10; McGregor 
'Damages' 14ed 197-203. 
15Burger v UNSB/C 1975 4 SA 72 (W) 75G. 
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a deceased breadwinner back to life or throw light on lost prospects of promotion. 16 This 
point is most clear when one considers the loss of a chance in the past. 17 For lucrum 
cessans18 the technique is unavoidable regardless of what procedural regime is adopted. 
The recognition of value of a chance as an explicit separate technique of assessment may be 
viewed as a major step forward from the agglomerated 'jury>19 approach towards a more 
scientific approach. 20 It nonetheless retains its 'general-damages' character in the sense of 
being a substantially subjective21 determination based on what seems reasonable at the time 
of assessment. 22 
[4.1.6] Probabilities and possibilities: What is in modern times described as 'probability 
theory' used to be known in the nineteenth century as the 'theory of chances'. The older 
terminology distinguished between probabilities, that is to say chances greater than 50% and 
possibilities, that is to say chances of less than 50%. Modern financial and statistical 
literature uses the word ' probability' to designate a chance in general, be it greater or less 
than 50%. One also encounters instances where the word 'possibility' is used merely to 
designate uncertainty without any intention of suggesting a chance of less than 50%.23 
The most common manifestation of the technique of value of a chance is the deduction for 
general contingencies. 24 This deduction is made from both past and future losses. 25 
Possible losses, both past26 and future, 27 are compensated in like manner with a suitably 
16See, for instance, Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 59 where the court ordered that 
allowance be made for a 50% chance of promotion. 
17See, for instance, Chaplin v Hicks (1911-13] All ER 224 (CA) followed in Trichardt v Van der Linde 1916 TPD 
148. 
18See paragraph 3.2.7. 
1~e 'some-how-or-other' method (Boberg 1964 SAL! 194 204). 
20Reid v SAR&H 1965 2 SA 181 (D) 190H; Koch 'Damages' 2; McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 1029-30 1043-45; 
Munkman 'Damages' 4ed 54; Atiyah 'Accidents, Compensation & the Law' 3ed 39. 
211f suitable statistics are available (as for remarriage or death) then the relevant chance may be determined from such 
statistics. 
22Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 112-13. That is a subjective estimate of a fair price for which the plaintiff now 
foregoes the right to bring an action if and when the expense actually does arise (see Buchanan 1960 SAL! 143 
144-5; McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 176-7 190-2). 
23See too discussion of the expression certa spes at 76. 
24Boberg 'Delict' 487. The expression 'general contingencies' encompasses a wide variety of considerations other 
than risk (see Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 89-96). Uncertainty nonetheless remains the primary consideration (see 149 
below for a more comprehensive discussion). 
25See table of deductions in Koch 'Damages' 334-8. There is no fundamental difference between past loss and future 
loss other than that some of the uncertainty has been eliminated by unfolding reality (Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 
2 SA 552 (A) 557int). 
26Chaplin v Hicks (1911-13] All ER 224 (CA) followed in Trichardt v Van der Linde 1916 TPD 148. 
Tl Burger v UNSBIC 1975 4 SA 72 (y{) 75D-G (emphasis supplied); approved in Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 
191 (A) 225-6; see too Van Oudtshoorn v Northern Assurance 1963 2 SA 642 (A) 650-1 ; Kwele v Rondalia 
Assurance 1976 4 SA 149 (y{) 152-3 . 
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large deduction to allow for the very substantial uncertainty attaching to the loss. The 
technique is also appropriately described as a 'discount for risk'. 28 When damages are 
reduced for general contingencies29 the defendant is being given credit for the possibility 
that the loss is not suffered. Even-handed justice dictates that the claimant be given credit 
for possible losses and vice-versa. 
It has been held that an expected future benefit from employment should be ignored because 
it is discretionary. 3° Considerations of value of a chance and comprehensive compensation 
suggest that the proper procedure is to allow the benefit but to make a suitable deduction for 
the contingency that the discretion may be adversely exercised. 31 
[4.1. 7] Balance of probabilities: For a criminal conviction proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is required. For a civil action it is sufficient that the facts be established on the balance of 
probabilities, that is the alleged fact will be accepted as proven if on the basis of the evidence 
before the court it seems more likely than not that the fact is correct. A decision based on 
the balance of probabilities reflects a judicial opinion as to the probative value of the 
evidence before the court. The procedure implies the existence of a past event or present 
state of affairs. Our human condition prevents us having knowledge of future events but a 
witness may validly testify as to his beliefs concerning future events. · The state of mind 
of the witness as regards future events is a question of fact. Many events, such as marriage 
or continuing employment, are known to occur with greater or lesser likelihood. Although 
accurate prediction in respect of any one individual is not possible, averages32 and 
frequencies of occurrence for large groups can be predicted with some degree of 
confidence. 33 It is these perceptions of future possibilities and probabilities that form the 
basis of value judgments concerning the present price for which to exchange the prospect of 
an uncertain future financial gain or loss. 34 
Some judges view the technique of valuation of a chance as · applicable to possibilities 
only. 35 One may certainly point to recent judgments where no deduction has been made for 
28Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 116inf 'the rate of the discount'. 
29General Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 614H 'Ek veronderstel natuurlik dat daar by elke 
berekening behoorlik vir onsekere gebeurtenisse ('contingencies') toegelaat word'. The deduction for general 
contingencies is a complicated topic which covers many considerations other than pure risk (see 149 below). 
'30Gehring v UNSB/C 1983 2 SA 266 (C). 
31 Parry v Oeaver (1969] 1 All ER 555 (HL) 5761 'If pensions in general are to be taken into account, then such a 
discretion (to pay) does not take them out of account. It merely calls for some large or small or negligible discount 
in the value to be attached to the pension, according to whether the withholding of it is a real practical danger or 
(as in most cases) a mere theoretical danger'. See too Serume/a v SA Eagle Insurance 1981 1 SA 391 (T) 392-3; 
Krugell v Shield Versekeringsmpy 1982 4 SA 95 (T) 102-4. 
32Such as the average expectation of life used so extensively for damages calculations. 
33See section 5.6. 
34See 15. 
35See paragraph 4.1.6. 
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the chance of non-occurrence of a probable loss in the future. 36 These judgments take the 
view that the loss has been proved on the balance of probabilities and may thus be accepted 
as a certainty. The question of a deduction for the contingency of non-occurrence is then, 
quite unjustifiably, ignored.37 
[4.1.8) Certa spes: The expression 'cena spes' highlights the potential ambiguity in dealing 
with value of a chance and proof on the balance of probabilities. Voet38 states that the 
chance (spes) for which compensation is to be awarded must be neither too speculative (nimis 
incenum) nor too remote in time (nimis longe) but must nonetheless be established on the 
balance of probabilities (cena). The chance itself may be small, perhaps 5% or 10%, but 
nonetheless substantial. A cena _spes is a spes which is more than just a figment of the 
imagination, a flight of fancy pressed to extinction by the weight of accumulated 
contingencies. 39 Buchanan40 has pointed out that the word 'likelihood' does not necessarily 
denote a probability. It can be used to denote any reasonably foreseeable possibility,41 that 
is to say a cena spes. 
[4.2] APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES 
The technique of value of a chance is not the only instance where one finds a scaling down 
of the liability of the defendant. Liability for the damages will be apportioned between the 
wrongdoer and the victim.42 A similar apportionment of liability has been adopted between 
multiple contingent wrongdoers. 43 
The similarity between an apportionment of damages and the technique of value of a chance 
is unmistakable. Both involve a scaling down of the liability for damages. One may speak 
36Fortuin v Commercial Union Assurance 1983 2 SA 444 (C) and comments by Davel 'Broodwinner' 416n85; 
Modern Engineering Works v Jacobs 1949 3 SA 191 ([); Pallas v Lesotho National Insurance 1987 3 C&B 705 
(ECD) 713; Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority (1987] 2 All ER 909 (HL) and comments by Fleming 
'Probabilistic causation in tort law' 1989 CBR 661 672-5. Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 274-6 would seem to 
advocate this approach to future loss. 
37ln general the courts will make a deduction for the contingencies attaching to expected expenditure: Kriel v 
Administrator-General, SWA 1986 3 C&B 539 (SWA) 55linf (25%); Ncubu v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N) 
198B (15%). 
li•Dummodo lucri affulserit certa spes; nam si illud vel incertum nimis, vel nimis Longe petitum, eius habenda ratio 
non est' (Voet Ad Pandectas 45.1.9). Erasmus 1975 THRHR 268 269 states in this regard that 'The expectation of 
profits must, however, have been certain to render the defendant liable for the loss'. I assume that by 'expectation 
of profits' Erasmus means 'value of a chance'. 
39Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 31 'Bewys sal gelewer moet word dat die vervulling van die vermoensverwagting voor 
die plaasvind van die gewraakte gebeurtenis so waarskynlik was dat dit redelikerwys 'n geldelike waarde vir die 
betrokke persoon gehad het'; see too Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 114-15. Actuaries used to be trained to place 
a value for purposes of sale on inheritance prospects (Benz & Tappenden 'Valuation of reversions and life interests'). 
40J3uchanan 1960 SAU 187 190n14. 
41Joffe &: Co Ltd v Hoskins 1941 AD 431 451; Bristol Laboratories Inc v Ciba Ltd 1960 1 SA 864 (A) 873sup. 
Buchanan points out that Clerk & Lindsell Torts 12ed 395 para 643 use the phrases 'likely to occur' and 'may occur' 
as synonymous. See too Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1024E/F where the court uses the word 
'probability' in the statisticians' sense of a chance greater or less than 50%. 
42Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
43Fleming 'Probabilistic causation in tort law' 1989 CBR 661 664-9 . 
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of the 'degree of causation' in relation to an uncertain future event.44 Natural phenomena 
such as early death or economic adversity may be viewed as part causes of loss of earnings 
or support and then dealt with by a percentage deduction from the total possible damage. 
The need for medical costs may be terminated by the early death of the victim with a 
consequent reduction in the damage suffered.45 Apart from natural phenomena a victim has 
a duty of care in the sense that he is required to mitigate his damages. In suitable 
circumstances his own conduct subsequent to the injury may be viewed as the cause of part 
or all of his own losses. 46 Other events such as medical negligence or assault may serve 
to compound the damage suffered and introduce further wrongdoers liable for part of the loss 
suffered. 47 
It has been said by the appellate division that there is a close relationship between causation 
and the technique of value of a chance. 48 The considerations giving rise to this observation 
are by no means clear but one may surmise that they were concerned with scaled down or 
apportioned liability. One may note that judicial causation is concerned with the limitation 
of damages. 49 
Although the technique of value of a chance may involve the scaling down of damages in 
proportion to the chance of occurrence, it also involves the award of damages for 
possibilities, items of loss which would be disallowed if regard were had solely to 
probabilities in the sense of chances greater than 50 % . In this sense the technique of value 
of a chance is not a form of limitation of liability, as is generally the function of legal 
causation, but rather a procedural technique that enables the court to effect the most 
comprehensive possible compensation. 50 
[ 4.3] ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
[4.3.1} A.finding of fact: A medical expert may testify that according to his experience one 
hip operation in ten will require a major revision within three years and that the plaintiff is 
faced with the risk of substantial expenditure. Another medical expert may testify that all 
hip operations are good for 15 years. The court is then required to make a finding on the 
credibility of these witnesses. This finding will be based upon the balance of probabilities. 
44Fleming 'Probabilistic causation in tort law' 1989 CBR 661 discusses the allocation of liability for partial causation. 
45Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 34inf. 
46See, for instance, Mafesa v Parity Versekeringsmpy 1968 2 SA 603 (0). S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) was 
concerned with a criminal charge of mur.der where the victim's own negligence had accelerated the onset of death. 
47Bekker v Constantia Insurance 1983 1 PH J13 (E); Minister of Communications & Public Works v Renown Food 
Products 1988 4 SA 151 (C); Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 626-635; Hart & Honore 
'Causation' 247n3&4. Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 189 "n gebeurtenis net as actus novus 
interveniens sa1 kwalifiseer as die gebeurtenis nie redelikenvys voorsienbaar was nie'. 
488/yth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 226A ' ... it is not always possible to distinguish clearly between 
causation and quantification in this sphere'. Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 39 'Die skadebegrip is dus weliswaar 
gevolgsomskryf maar die suiwer skademaatstaf behoort neutraal teenoor kousaliteitsmaatstawwe te staan'. 
49
'Wat juridiese kousaliteit betref, beklemtoon hy tereg dat dit nie hier in werklikheid oor kousaliteit gaan nie, maar 
oor aanspreeklikheidsbegrensing of toerekenbaarheid van skade . . . ' Neethling & Potgieter 1993 THRHR 157 158. 
50See 50. 
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The court may find that there is a 10 % chance of an expensive revision operation within 3 
years. This then becomes an accepted fact to be applied when assessing compensation. The 
claimant will be awarded 10% of the cost of the operation. 
[4.3.2] A choice of alternatives: It is clear that if the need for a revision operation arises the 
plaintiff will have far too little money. If the need does not arise the plaintiff will have 
gained. It is situations of this nature which provoke agitation for instalment compensation. 
In practice the plaintiff would probably have been offered a 'provincial hospital certificate'51 
but refused to accept it by reason of the excessive delays with admission to a state institution. 
We see here utility in action. The plaintiff can choose between having all costs covered but 
with inconvenient delays, or receive 10% of the required mom~y with a 100% assurance that 
the funds can be applied immediately to buying, for example, a new hi-fi set.52 The 
plaintiff and his advisors may well be very happy with an award of 10% of the cost of the 
operation, even if idealists are not. In general it seems that plaintiffs prefer lump sums to 
instalments.53 · This preference is probably shared by legal advisors who usually need to 
look to their client for payment of those legal costs which the defendant does not pay.54 
[4.4] CONCLUSIONS 
The damages to be awarded for an uncertain past or future loss will be discounted having 
regard to the chance that the loss will occur, or would have occurred. This discount applies 
to chances both greater and less than 50%. By reason of the discount the award cannot be 
used to cover an actual future expense, or loss of earnings or support, when the time comes. 
The value calculated using the technique of value of a chance is the present utility of the 
prospective loss. Restitution is only effected in the abstract sense of topping up the present 
utility of the victim's life plan. 
51Purportedly in terms of article 43 of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989. Such a 'certificate' entitles the holder 
to free treatment at a provincial hospital. Maja v SA Eagle Insurance 1987 4 C&B B2-l (yV) held that a claimant 
is not obliged to accept such a certificate guaranteeing free treatment at a state hospital. Munro v NEG Insurance 
1988 4 C&B F2-l (D) ruled that the proposed undertaking was not as intended by the relevant Act and thus the court 
could not make it an order of court. 
52lt is for this reason that the present value discounted for risk is termed a 'substitution rate' (Savage 'Bayesian 
Econometrics' 112-13). 
53Pearson Cmnd 7054 1978 vol l 155 para 716; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 26. See quotation at 42 above. 
~hese are, it seems, often quite substantial. Future research as regards instalment compensation would do well 
to address the problems created by legal costs recoverable from the claimant (see, for instance, Hughes v Santam 
Insurance 1988 (yV) (unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86)). 
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CHAYfERS 
THE CHANCES OF LIFE AND DEATH 
Summary: The average expectation of life is a point estimate 
obtained by summing the survival chances for all possible years of 
life to age 99 and beyond. The chance of inheritance is similarly 
calculated but with the chance of death in each year substituted for 
one of the survival ratios. The standard actuarial calculation for 
ascenaining present value proceeds by taking the value of the chance 
in each year of the relevant income or expenditure and then summing 
the resulting series of separate values. It is generally unsound to 
suggest that by consuming interest and capital a claimant may 
reproduce the income that has been lost. 
[5.1] DEFINITIONS 
79 
The chances of life and death have been the subject of exhaustive analysis over the last 300 
years. 1 This chapter discusses the workings the risks of life and death. By actuarial 
standards the techniques discussed here are fairly elementary and well within the 
computational ability of a layman equipped with a modem microcomputer and a spreadsheet 
package.2 
[5.1.1] Period of survival: The single most prominent risk affecting the assessment of 
damages for personal injury and death is the contingency of life and death. It is usual to 
express this contingency as an average point estimate3 called the 'expectation of life'. This 
is expressed as a number of years but may be as little as few months" or as much as 70 or 
80 years. The expectation of life is popularly viewed as a prediction of when death will 
occur. This interpretation needs to be used with care because it can lead to seriously 
incorrect conclusions when dealing with marginal situations such as benefits after retirement 
and joint life expectancies. 
Survival to advanced ages well in excess of 100 years has been recorded. For purposes of 
damages assessments it is generally adequate to assume age 99 to be the limit of life.5 The 
discussion below proceeds on this basis. The limit of life is the age beyond which the chance 
'See 84. 
2Such as LOTUS 123. 
lSee 15. 
'See, for instance; Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 (W). 
~see Neill 'Life contingencies' 7. 
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of survival is negligible. It is important to distinguish the limit of life from the 'expectation 
of life' in the statistical sense of an average. 6 Popular usage of the expression 'expectation 
of life' sometimes has in mind the limit of life. 
Death is an event which is foreseeable as a certainty. What is uncertain is when death will 
occur. 
[5.1.2] Chance of survival: The chance that a person now aged 40 will survive to age 65 is 
calculated by taking from the life table the number of survivors at age 65 and dividing this 
by the number of survivors at age 40. 7 The survival chance for a white female, for example, 
is 82,6%. It is assumed for purposes of the discussion that the life table used gives a fair 
indication of the true mortality risks. 
[5.1.3] Chance of death: The chance that a person now aged 40 will die during the 65th year 
of age is calculated by differencing the survivors to ages 64 and 65 and then dividing by the 
number of survivors at age 40. 8 The chance of death for a white female, for example, is 
then 1,5%. 
[5.1.4] The expectation of life: This is best described as an index by which to compare one 
life table with another. It is calculated by adding up the separate chances of survival for each 
individual year between the present age, say 40, and age 99 or older, the limiting age of the 
life table which is being used. 9 In this sense it is best described as the average duration of 
life because it is derived from life-table averages. Of particular importance in this regard 
is the concept of a series of chances of survival, one for each year between age 40 and age 
99. These chances become less and less with advancing age and reduce to nil at the end of 
the life table. The importance of these chances is that they permit a calculation of a separate 
value of the chance of survival to each year between age 40 and age 99. The expectation of 
life falls between age 40 and age 99. The standard actuarial calculation is not terminated at 
the expiry of the expectation of life but at age 99, the limit of life. 
The expectation of life is not generally used by actuaries. 10 The standard actuarial 
calculation proceeds on the basis of the year-by-year application of the value of the chance 
6See 80 and 81. 
'Using SALT79/81 white females we have 79077/95760=0,826. This may be expressed as a percentage by 
multiplication by 100 giving 82,6%. · 
8SALT79/81 white females (80542~79077)/95760=0,0153 which is 1,53% . The chance of death between age 40 
and 65 is 1 minus the chance of survival to age 65, ie 1-0,826=0,174, ie 17,4% . 
9See example in table 5 at 88. Strictly speaking this gives a particular type of expectation called the 'curtate' 
expectation (see Neill 'Life Contingencies' 201-2). The reader need not concern himself with the fine distinctions 
between the different types of expectations. The main point to grasp is that they are obtained by a summation of 
separate chances of survival, usually on a yearly basis. 
10Prevett 1972 MLR 140 147. The standard text for trainee actuaries mentions it only briefly under a chapter headed 
'Population theory' (see Neill 'Life Contingencies' 201-2). 
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of survival to each relevant year. 11 Much of actuarial science is devoted to techniques for 
arithmetically manipulating these complex contingencies. 
[5.1.5] Reduced expectation of life: The evidence may indicate that a claimant has a reduced 
expectation of life. 12 This means that the chance of early death has been increased and 
that the life table must be recalculated so that the survival chances for each separate year add 
up to the reduced life expectancy. The adjustment to the chances of death will often be 
expressed in the form 'plus 100% extra mortality' ,13 for example, that is to say the risk of 
death in any one year is doubled. Hrubec & Ryder report 40% more deaths for persons with 
a limb amputation. 14 For serious brain injuries Roberts reports studies which indicate a 
reduction in life expectancy of about 4 years. 15 For paraplegics, quadriplegics and 
epileptics the risk of death due to their condition does not increase with advancing age 
although the underlying risk of death does increase, as for any normal member of the 
population. For such persons it is preferable to adjust the life table by a constant addition 
to the risk of death such as 1 % of survivors at the beginning of each year. 16 
Consider a white female aged 40 whose life expectancy has been reduced by 10 years. Had 
she not been injured her expected age at death would have been 76, 75 years. 17 Now that 
she is injured her expected age at death has been reduced to 66, 75 years. Some analysts 
might conclude that her reduction in life expectancy does not affect the value of her earnings 
up to age 65. This would be an invalid conclusion because, as has been stated above, 
reduced life expectancy implies that the risk of early death has been increased. The 
reduction of 10 years to life expectancy would in fact reduce the value of the claim for loss 
of earnings by 8,5 % .18 
[5.1.6] Anecdotes and averages: Each individual has a personal perception of survival, the 
11 Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 167; Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 10240-H. See 
88 below. 
12See, for instance, Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1024-27. 
13An actuary would probably prefer to see this expressed algebraically in the form +k%. 
-14Hrubec & Ryder 33 (1980) J Giron Dis 239-50. 'The lack of physical exercise makes him a candidate for 
coronary artery disea8e and obesity' August v Guardian National Insurance 1990 4 C&B E2-13 (C) 14. 
15Roberts 'Severe accidental head injury' 1979 148-51. Earlier in the same chapter Roberts attempts to analyze extra 
mortality by separating normal deaths from death directly caused by brain injury. This approach is statistically 
unsound in that it presumes that medical practitioners are capable, many years after the event, of accurately 
identifying the cause of death. Brain injury has a variety of subtle life threatening effects, one of these being to 
reduce the victim's ability to identify his own illnesses and to manage them. The scientifically correct approach to 
measuring mortality is to take a population of brain injured persons and compare the number of deaths from this 
population with the number of deaths in the normal population. 
16Thus if the normal risk of death in a 12-month period is 4% then the adjusted risk is 5% (4% + 1 %). If the normal 
risk of death in a subsequent 12-month period is 6,5% then the adjusted risk is 7,5% (6,5% + 1 %), and so on. For 
more detail see Fisher & Young 'Life assurance' 134-9. 
17SALT79/81 females (40+36,75). 
18Using 2,5 % per year net capitalization rate (see lJO) and an extra mortality of 173 % . Lockhat 's Estate v North 
British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) ruled that when assessing loss of earning capacity the calculations 
for both the injured and uninjured conditions should be based on the reduced life expectancy (see 225 below). 
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utility of the duration of life. The biblical three score years and ten probably colours this 
perception to a substantial degree. For many younger persons the difference between a 
prospect of death at age 70 or age 170 is of scant significance, so remote is it in time. For 
some persons the expression 'expectation of life' implies the limits of life, age 90 or 100 and 
beyond. Such longevity is, however, only a remote possibility. For compensation purposes 
one needs to objectivize the expectation of life19 and balance the prospect of possible 
longevity against possible early death. This implies the concept of an average expectation 
of life. 
Medical experts are often consulted as regards the effect of injuries on the expectation of life. 
Not all such experts are astute to use the average expectation and one quite frequently finds 
opinions as to expectation of life couched in anecdotal terms: 'I know of a paraplegic who 
has lived the normal span. A normal lifespan is possible therefore all paraplegics have a 
normal life expectancy'. 20 In practice the average expectation of life for paraplegics is 
below normal. 21 
Another form of medical opinion that gives rise to some degree of confusion arises when 
there is, for example, a 20 % risk of epilepsy. The opinion will often be expressed that 
provided epilepsy does not occur the expectation of life is normal. The fact of the matter 
is that if there is a risk of epilepsy then there is an associated increased risk of early 
death,22 and thus an immediate reduction to life expectancy. The risk exists even if epilepsy 
as a certainty does not. 
Not all evidence leads to reduced life expectancies. Evidence of a family history of longevity 
may justify a longer-than-normal life expectancy. 23 
Medical opinion concerning life expectancy, if it is to be accurate, should specify the life 
table considered normal and the effect in relation thereto of the victim's condition. Most 
medical experts have only limited access to life tables and the interpretation thereof and their 
opinions should ideally be formulated in consultation with an actuary, as is done by medical 
underwriters at a life office. The focus of medical inquiry in relation to damages claims is 
usually on whether the life expectancy of the victim has been reduced. It is often relevant, 
however, to consider the effect on life expectancy of pre-existing conditions such angina, a 
history of heart attacks, multiple sclerosis, diabetes, tuberculosis, etc. The question of AIDS 
19See 22. 
2<>'fhis approach equates life expectancy with the limit of life. 
21 Walsh & Yeo 1985 FESPJC 142 report for Australia under optimal care conditions a 5% reduction for paraplegics 
and a 15% reduction for quadriplegics. Geisler (1983) 21 Paraplegia 364 reports very much heavier rates of 
mortality. The two papers both cover much the same period of time. The observed differences are thus not 
explained by improvements in medical science. Walsh & Yeo have probably observed a very much more affluent 
and better educated sector of society. 
22Brackenridge 'Life Risks' 2ed 604-8 reports extra mortality for epileptics ranging from nil to +200%. Laidlaw 
& Richens 'Epilepsy ' 28 report for the USA that ' the rates are significantly higher for non-whites. This applies 
particularly to males for whom the rates are three times as high as those for whites'. 
23Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (f) 721-2. 
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has to date not received much attention from the courts. 
[5.2] HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
[5.2.1] Ulpian 's table: The life table recorded by Ulpian24 is of considerable historical 
importance. For over 1000 years it was the primary reference for length of life for jurists 
following the Roman-law tradition. 25 Kopf26 suggests that it may reflect the mortality 
experience of the mutual aid societies which provided pensions to Roman legionaries after 
their retirement at age 46. 







40-50 60 minus age minus 1 
50-55 9 
55-60 7 
61 and over 5 
An abridged version provides for the expectation to be taken as 30 years up to age 30 and 
thereafter 60 minus age with 5 years being used for anyone over age 55. This rule-of-thumb 
was popular with jurists. 77 
There is reason to believe that Ulpian' s table records not life expectancies but annuity factors 
which include a discount for interest: The original purpose of Ulpian' s table was to capitalize 
usufructs over property for estate duty purposes. 28 The value of a perpetuity29 is based 
on a multiplier of 30 years. This implies a net capitalization rate of 3,3 % per year. For 
young persons Ulpian' s table limits the period to 30 years, falling far short of the biblical 
'three score years and ten'. 
24035.2.68. 
2
'0avel 'Broodwinner' 7-17. The word 'lijfrente' used by Grotius 'lnleiding' 3.33.2 is a reference to Ulpian's table. 
26Kopf (1927) 13 PCAS 225 232 233. 
27See, for instance, Matthaeus 'De Criminibus' 47.4.5 48.7 .11; Azo '/nstitutiones' 4.4.11. 
28035.2.68 is concerned with 'The Jaw of 5% tax of estates'. 
29Regular yearly, or more frequent, payments which never cease. 
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[5.2.2] Modem life tables: The intuitive perception of a life table is that of a table of life 
expectancies. Life expectancies are difficult to measure directly and do not lend themselves 
to sophisticated mathematical treatment. The introduction in 166230 of a life table based on 
survivors at selected ages anticipated the flexible modem life table. The SALT79/81 table31 
shows for a notional 100000 born the number surviving to each age up to age 90. 32 From 
this table of survivors may be calculated related factors: the chance of survival, the chance 
of death, the expectation of life. Most life tables are constructed from direct observations 
of death rates over fairly short periods of time and the associated lives exposed to the risk 
of death, what one might call a 'snapshot basis' .33 
[5.3] RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM 
Consideration of the expectation of life as a number of years free of the risk of death can 
lead one into the error of thinking that something approximating perfect restitution is 
possible. I have already pointed to the construction of the expectation of life from the 
accumulated sum of intervening chances of survival. 34 I will now examine some further 
features of the chances of death and survival. 
TABLE 4- EXPECTED AGE AT DEATH 
Attained Expected 






SALT79/81 white female mortality 
[5.3.1] 'End-of-the-rainbow' phenomenon: The most notable feature of the expectation of 
~y John Graunt. His table based on christenings and burials in the City of London was too imprecise to be of any 
real value (Dublin & Lotka 'Length of Life' 40-2; Benjamin & Haycocks 'Analysis of Mortality ' 385-9). 
31 Department of Statistics (whites coloureds asiatics); the 1984-86 tables are those most commonly in use for 
compensation purposes in 1993 (see Quantum Yearbook 1993 72-83). These are differ little from the older tables. 
32For reasons of convenience. These tables extrapolated to age 99 appear in 1986 De Rebus 551 552-4. Survival 
beyond age 99 is rare but not unknown. 
33Cox 'Demography' 198-200. Life offices are able to use more sophisticated methods due to their extensive 
policyholder data (see Benjamin & Haycocks 'Analysis of Mortality' 35-51. 
3
'See table 5 at 88. 
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life is that as a person gets older the expected age at death advances into the future. 35 This 
point is illustrated in table 4. 
The expected age at death is thus like the pot of gold at the end of a rainbow, fleetingly 
unattainable. This phenomenon has the important consequence that if a plaintiff has been 
compensated at age 40 on the basis of consuming interest and capital to replace the required 
income36 and acts precisely in accordance with this directive then the capital will be 
exhausted by age 77. 37 By that time the expected age at death will have increased to over 
81 years. 
From a statistician's point of view the advancing of the expected age at death to older ages 
would be described as a Bayesian revision of the expected age at death based on the new 
information that the plaintiff had actually survived to an older age. 38 Jurists would describe 
this procedure as 'taking account of events supervening between date of death and date of 
trial'. 39 
[5.3.2] Expectation of working life: The vast majority of compensation matters are 
concerned with the working lifetime of the plaintiff. It is usual to assume retirement at age 
65 although ages ranging from 45 to 80 and beyond are encountered in practice.40 The 
standard actuarial calculation includes a substantial deduction for the risk of early death. It 
follows that the lost income cannot be reproduced by. consuming interest and capital over the · 
expectation of working life as calculated by an actuary. The same conclusion follows from 
the end-of-a-rainbow phenomenon. 41 Actuaries testifying in court have experienced singular 
difficulty with explaining the process of discounting for risk for a single individual.42 
Actuarial literature records the following hypothetical exchange in court:43 
3
'Boberg 1963 SAL.I 538 545n29; Davel 'Broodwinner' 507n536 record this phenomenon. 
36See Gil/banks v Sigournay 1959 2 SA 11 (N) 15A; SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 838-9. 
37Provided earlier death has not intervened. 
38Savage 'Bayesian Econometrics' 44 60 65. 
39Wigham v British Traders Insurance 1963 3 SA 151 \"N) 155-6: Plaintiff aged 81 with an expected age at death 
of 87 survived pre-trial period of 3 years and then had an expected age at death of 89 ' ... the Court is entitled in 
the case of prospective damages to inform itself of subsequent facts which are known at the date of the trial and 
which if taken into account would enable the Court to determine with a greater degree of certainty or accuracy the 
actual Joss of a plaintiff. 
40Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 108 comments on the general acceptance by the courts of age 65 as standard retirement 
age and the absence of evidence to indicate other retirement ages. The court records reflect only a very small 
proportion of claims. My own experience is that a wide variety of retirement ages are used and that allowance will 
generally be made for a post-retirement pension, if not for post-retirement employment. 
41 See paragraph 5.3.1. 
42Younger actuaries are these days receiving training in utility theory. One may thus expect to see utilitarian 
reasoning advanced in years to come. 
43Crocker 1980 TIM 517 586-7. 
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'Judge: "Just a moment, Mr Actuary, I don't quite follow that line of argument. 
You say that $300 will replace a $1 per week over the lifetime44 of the plaintiff or 
until he attains age 65, whichever is earlier." 
'Actuary: "Yes, Your Honour." 
'Judge: "But what happens to the $300 if the plaintiff dies in 6 months time?" 
'Actuary: "The greater part of the $300 will be remaining, Your Honour." 
'Judge: "But you said that $300 would provide the income just over the plaintiff's 
lifetime." Here follows a long circular explanation by the actuary about averages etc 
which confuses the judge even more and raises the actuary's pulse. 
'Judge: "Well, j!JSt let us leave that argument aside for one moment. Let us examine 
the situation in say 20 years' time45, Mr Actuary, which you state in your certificate 
. is the life expectancy of the plaintiff. Will the income be provided by the $300 for 
this period?" 
'Actuary will probably say - to simplify the argument: "Yes, Your Honour". 
'Judge: "And what part of the $.300 will then be remaining?" 
'Actuary: "Very little, Your Honour." 
'Judge: "Well, from where is the plaintiff going to obtain his $1 per week until age 
65, which is then still 5 years off?" At this stage the actuary gives up'. 
The 'expectation of working life' discussed above is calculated in the same way as the full 
expectation of life save that chances of survival after age 65 are ignored. The expectation 
of working life terminates several years before normal retirement age because it includes 
allowance for early death. Thus for a coloured male aged 40 the period to age 65 is 25 years 
but the expectation of working life is 19,88 years, that is to say it expires just before the 60th 
birthday. 
[5.3.3] Contingency of early death: The above quotation discusses a possible working 
lifetime of 25 years with an expected working lifetime of just short of 20 years. This reflects 
a deduction for the contingency of early death of 20%. This deduction is made by the 
actuary as part of his calculations. The court will usually make a further deduction for 
general contingencies of about 10 % , giving a total deduction for all contingencies of about 
30%.46 We can observe here an application of valuation of a chance. We have earnings 
as a certainty calculated over 25 years less 20% for the chance of early death47 less a 
further 10 % for other contingencies. 
«-rhe word 'lifetime' is here clearly intended to mean 'working lifetime', ie expectation of working life as distinct 
from the full expectation of life. This looseness of terminology is common in both South Africa and, it seems, 
Australia. 
4
'Crocker's paper uses the period 23 years. I have replaced this with 20 years to bring the flow of the argument into 
line with the calculation example given below this quotation . 
46Strictly speaking 28% (0,28=[1-0,8x0,9]). 
47 A number of writers have pointed to the failure by the courts to appreciate that a calculation by an actuary includes 
allowance for the contingency of early death: Boberg 1964 SAIJ 194 204n54; Street 'Damages' 120; Luntz 
'Damages' 2ed 280; see, for example, Ncubu v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N) 193H 198A. Not all courts miss 
the point, see Bester v Silva Fishing Corp 1952 l SA 589 (C) 600B 'In the determination of the expectation of life 
due regard has been had to the probability of earlier demise' ('probability' here used in the sense of a chance less 
than 50%). 
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[5.3.4} To put in the position he would have been in: The 'gross multiplier method' 48 
envisages a yearly payment discounted at interest over a period, the expectation of life49 or 
the expectation of working life.50 By this means the courts often presume to effect restitutio 
in integrum, an exact replacement of the lost income. 51 The phenomenon of increasing 
expected age at death, the end-of-a-rainbow anomaly, demonstrates that the gross multiplier 
approach does not achieve perfect restitution. A similar problem is apparent when one uses 
a working lifetime discounted for the risk of early death. The actuarial year-by-year 
method52 demonstrates that the end-of-a-rainbow problem is but one manifestation of the 
more fundamental problem with the value of a chance. The result is always the same - the 
compensation money will either be too much or too little but seldom, if ever, just right. 
Precisely how we can explain and justify a measure of damages based on an average, the 
expectation of life at the time of making the award, requires a closer look at utility theory.53 
Utility theory, as I have already noted, indicates that restitution is achieved in terms of a 
'price in a manner of speaking' representing the present utility of the future income, that is 
to say the lump-sum payment. The claimant's present lump-sum utility is restored. Restitution 
is not achieved in terms of the future income represented by that lump sum. 
[5.3.5} The risk of living too long: There is a substantial risk, of the order of 50%, that a 
plaintiff will survive beyond the age indicated by his expectation of life. The prudent 
plaintift'54 should have regard for the likelihood55 that he will outlive his original actuarially 
determined expectation of life. Such a plaintiff should have the sense to ignore suggestions 
that he consume all capital by the expiry of his original expectation of life.56 A safer 
investment policy would be directed towards preservation of a substantial proportion of 
capital throughout life in order to provide for the contingency of longevity, like any other 
person. 
[5.4] THE ACTUARIAL YEAR-BY-YEAR METHOD 
[5.4.1} Sliding-scale survival chances: We have observed that the modern life table is based 
on the notion of survivorship, the number alive at a selected age from an original 
hypothetical cohort of 100000 who were all born at the same moment. From this table may 
be calculated the proportion of those now alive who are expected to survive to a specified 
48Boberg 1964 SAU 194 204-5; Davel 'Broodwinner ' 511; Koch 'Damages' 47. 
49See, for instance, Bester v Silva Fishing Corp 1952 1 SA 589 (C) 600B. 
YJNhlumayo v General Accident Insurance 1986 3 SA 859 (D) 8611-J. 
'Whlumayo v General Accident Insurance 1986 3 SA 859 (D) 8611-J 'He was quite emphatic that his method was 
the way of putting the plaintiff in exactly the same position as he would have been if there had been no 
accident' (emphasis supplied). In this matter the court was concerned with the expectation of working life (at 8611) 
'The sum which invested will produce an annuity which would theoretically expire in the course of his working life'. 
See too Crocker 1980 TIAA 517 586-7. 
52Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 167; Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1024G-H. 
53See 5 et seq. 
54The question of risk averse and risk seeking personalities has already been discussed (see paragraph 2.4.1). 
"'Likelihood' is used here in the sense of 'certa spes'. 
~ie that prevailing at the time that the award is made. 
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TABLES - GROSS MULTIPLIER & YEAR-BY-YEAR METHODS 
Gross multiplier method Year-by-year method 
Survival Interest Present Survival Interest Present 
Age Ratios Discount Value Ratios Discount Value Age 
16%py RlOOOOx 16%py RlOOOOx 
A B AxB c D CxD 
40 1.000 0.928 9285 0.995 0.928 9237 40 
41 1.000 0.800 8004 0.984 0.800 7878 41 
42 1.000 0.690 6900 0.973 0.690 6713 42 
43 1.000 0.595 5948 0.961 0.595 5717 43 
44 1.000 0.513 5128 0.949 0.513 4864 44 
45 1.000 0.442 4421 0.935 0.442 4135 45 
46 1.000 0.381 3811 0.922 0.381 3512 46 
47 1.000 0.329 3285 0.907 0.329 2979 47 
48 1.000 0.283 2832 0.891 0.283 2524 48 
49 1.000 0.244 2441 0.875 0.244 2135 49 
50 1.000 0.210 2105 0.857 0.210 1803 50 
51 1.000 0. 181 1814 0.838 0. 181 1520 51 
52 1.000 0. 156 1564 0.818 0. 156 1279 52 
53 1.000 0. 135 1348 0.796 0.135 1074 53 
54 1.000 0.116 1162 0.774 0. 116 900 54 
55 1.000 0.100 1002 0.752 0.100 753 55 
56 1.000 0.086 864 0.728 0.086 629 56 
57 1.000 0.074 745 0.704 0.074 525 57 
58 1.000 0.064 642 0.680 0.064 437 58 
59 0.884 0.055 489 0.655 0.055 363 59 
60 0.000 0.000 0 0.630 0.048 301 60 
61 0.000 0.000 0 0.605 0.041 249 61 
62 0.000 0.000 0 0.578 0.035 205 62 
63 0.000 0.000 0 0 .552 0.031 169 63 
64 0 .000 0.000 0 0.525 0.026 138 64 
I: 19,884 R63790 19,884 R60039 I: 
Note that due to rounding probJems the total of 19 ,884 does not exactly match the total of the rounded figures shown in the 
table. 
later age. Thus the SALT79/81 table for coloured males shows a figure of 77361 for 
survivors to age 40 and 39557 for survivors to age 65. The proportion expected to survive 
to age 65 is thus 51 % , ie 49 % of the group are expected to die before attaining age 65. It 
would be wrong however to assume from this statistic that a deduction of 49 % should be 
made for the contingency of death prior to age 65. The expected working life from age 40 
to age 65 based on the individual survival chances in each year is 19,88 years. This 
indicates a deduction of about 20% for mortality prior to age 65,57 in lieu of the 48,9% 
57 19,88/25=0,795, ie 79,53. 1003-79,53=20,53 which is 203 in round figures (SALT79/81 coloured male). 
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indicated by looking at survivors to age 65 only. The reason for the difference is that we 
are concerned with the average risk of death over the period. 
[5.4.2] Yearly slices: The figures of the previous paragraph emphasise the need to cut the 
calculation into 'slices' which take account of the time at which the financial benefit is to 
be received. As a general rule earnings are received weekly or monthly. Life tables tend 
to work with yearly 'stops'. 58 The practical 'slice' is generally a yearly one. 59 The value 
of the chance that earnings of RlOOOO will be received at age 65 is 51 % of RlOOOO, ie 
R5100. 60 A similar calculation may be done for the value of earnings at ages 64, 63, 62, 
etc down to age 40. These individual values of a chance are summed to give the total value 
for RlOOOO per year over the entire period. 
[5.4.3] An example: The calculation is illustrated in table 561 using a yearly payment of 
Rl000062 which remains fixed in nominal terms, that is to say does not increase with 
inflation,63 a discount rate of interest of 16% per year, and SALT79/81 coloured male 
mortality. 64 The table also shows a comparable calculation using the 'gross multiplier 
method' .65 The reader should note under column Chow the expectation of working life of 
19,884 years is obtained by adding up the individual chances of survival to each intervening 
year. For the gross multiplier method I have shown under column A the survival chances 
which are implicit to that cruder method66 • The total rand value using the gross multiplier 
method is R63791 whereas that using the year-by-year method is R60038. I have 
deliberately used a high net capitalization rate (16% per year) in order to emphasise the 
5
'The mathematics of life contingencies discusses the problem in terms of infinitesimals and the 'force of mortality' 
(Neill 'Life Contingencies' 14-19). 
59De Witt in Holland used half-yearly stops in his presentation to the States General made in 1671 (Bouwstoffen 
'Levensverzekeringen en Lijfrenten' 5-6). This seems to be the earliest recorded use of the year-by-year technique. 
De Witt's work was lost during the subsequent political upheaval. The year-by-year method first obtained general 
public recognition from the writings of De Moivre and Simpson during the years 1740-44. 
60For sake of clarity of argument I have ignored the discount for interest. This is equivalent to an assumption that 
the discount rate of interest equals the expected rate of inflation. The former cancels out the latter. If no discount 
is made for interest then the gross multiplier and year-by-year methods yield identical results. The higher the net 
capitalization rate the greater the difference between the two methods. 
61 At 88. 
62For reasons of convenience I have here assumed that the payment is made in the middle of each year. Payments 
made monthly or weekly may for calculation purposes be conveniently replaced with a single payment at mid-year 
for the same total amount. 
63Such payments are not uncommon in compensation matters: Housing subsidies often take this form. Retirement 
annuities (pensions) in payment are often of a fixed monthly or yearly amount. It is common to find maintenance 
payments which do not increase. 
~e chance of survival to the middle of a year is approximated by the average of the chances of survival to the 
beginning and end of that year. 
65Boberg 1964 SAU 194 204-5; Davel 'Broodwinner ' 51 l; Koch ·Damages' 47. 
66 100% certainty of survival prior to expiry of the expectation of working life, 0% chance thereafter. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
different results produced QY these two methods. 67 When the calculation is done over the 
whole of life the differences become very much more pronounced. 68 The lower figure of 
R60038 would be considered by actuaries worldwide to be the preferable value.69 It gives 
proper weight to the timing and contingencies attaching to the relevant payments. 
[5.4.4] Restitution of income: What is evident from table 570 is that the individual yearly 
values, the yearly 'slices' reflecting the value of the chance of the income, have each been 
reduced for the contingency of early death. An important observation is that each 'slice' if 
invested diligently to produce investment returns equal to the discount rate of interest will 
be inadequate when the time comes to fully replace the income lost. This is so because 
of the deduction for the risks of death and general contingencies. The overall inadequacy 
is evident if one considers survival by the claimant to age 65. 71 For children who have lost 
support the deductions for the mortality of the parent during dependency are often of minor 
consequence (perhaps 1 % or 2 % ). 72 It can then be correct for practical purposes to speak 
of consuming interest and capital to replace the lost support. It is otherwise with the example 
in table 5.73 Restitution, as has already been noted, is achieved under lump-sum 
compensation in terms of present utility but not in terms of the future income represented by 
that present value. 
[5.4.5] Contingency funds: The notion of consuming interest and capital has in mind the 
familiar home loan repaid by regular instalments, otherwise known as a 'sinking fund'. In 
its ideal form there is no risk or other uncertainty attaching to either the payments or the 
capital. When the payments are subject to the contingencies of human life and the accidents 
of employment and inflation there is no neat relationship between the payments and the 
present value of those payments. A fund established to cover uncertain future payments is 
appropriately termed a 'contingency fund'. The reserves held by life offices and pension 
funds to secure their future contingent liabilities are calculated by actuaries and are correctly 
described as 'contingency funds' although actuaries do not use such terminology. Actuaries 
who calculate these reserve funds are described as 'valuators'74 but this is a most misleading 
expression because the amounts calculated are not values for the exchange °.f goods in a 
67 As the effective discount rate of interest reduces the difference becomes smaller. For a nil discount rate of i_nterest 
there is no difference at all. Substantial differences can arise with uneven cash flows, eg where allowance is made 
for major promotions. · 
68See comparative tables in Koch 'Damages' 304 and worked examples 257-91. 
69Kemp 'Damages' 3ed 103; Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 167; Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde 1974 
TASSA 292 298; Street 'Damages' l18; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 281; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 98-9; Crocker 1980 
TIM 517 576; Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 789sup; Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 
(C) 10240-H; Koch 'Damages' 46-7; Koch 1982/83 TASSA 78 87 (note comments by De Bruijn at 107-9 and De 
Bruijn's use in the Carstens matter of a year-by-year approach ; Davel op cit 98n602). 
70At 88. 
71 See paragraph 5.3.2. 
72This was the example used in General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613-14 to validate a 
compensation model based on consuming interest and capital. 
73At 88. 
74sl0 of the Insurance Act 27 of 1943. 
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market. Strictly speaking the actuary is not a valuator but a financial manager. For a life 
office or pension fund many lives are involved and statistical averaging gives rise to 
substantially predictable cash flows. A contingency fund for a single individual does not 
have the benefit of statistical averaging and requires very different reserving techniques. I 
will discuss below the concept of an overfunded reversionary trust,75 a contingency fund 
appropriate to providing a future contingent cash flow for a single individual. 
[5.4.6] Present utility: In relation to a single individual claimant the actuarial year-by-year 
method with its deductions for risk based on averages is, as I will discuss further below, a 
tool of utility analysis, the determination of a present financial equivalent for the utility of 
the life plan which has been lost. It is a price for which the plaintiff foregoes the right to 
claim further compensation. 
[5.4. 7] Retirement benefits: The example in table 576 assumes that no further income would 
have been received after age 65. This is generally a false assumption. Many employers 
today provide pension funds. Those without such benefits must rely on their savings or a 
state pension or continue working. Statistical conclusions based on the expectation of life 
can be misleading: Thus for a coloured male aged 40 the expected age at death is 65,3.77 
It would be incorrect to reason that such a man has the expectation of only 0,3 years of 
retirement. 78 The actuarial year-by-year method reveals that for a coloured male aged 40 
now the correct present value of a pension of R5000 per year from age 65 onwards is 
Rl2210.79 The present value of earnings of RlOOOO per year prior to age 65 is R153014. 
The total for earnings and pension is then R165224, the pension making a substantial 7,4% 
of this figure. 
[5.4.8] Joint survivorship: A claim for damages by a widow for loss of support requires 
consideration of the joint survivorship of the breadwinner and the widow. 80 The mortality 
of healthy children has little financial significance and it is usual to ignore it. The chance 
that a husband and wife81 both aged 40 today will both survive to age 65 is the product of 
the survival chances for each spouse separately. For a white male aged 40 the chance of 
"See 108. 
76At 88. 
77SALT79/81 coloured males. 
78As in Quntana v Union & SWA Insurance 1976 2 C&B 680 (E) 682 2nd paragraph . In Reid v SAR&H 1965 2 SA 
181 (D) 190-1 the court incorrectly chose to ignore increased mortality because the expectation of life after reduction 
still exceeded age 65. When there is increased mortality the chance of death prior to retirement increases and a 
larger deduction needs to be made for pre-retirement mortality. Crocker 1980 TIAA 517 572 observes that 'Knowing 
the misuse to which life expectancies are prone to be put by lawyers I would be loath to quote a value for the 
expectation of life without first soliciting information on the use which is to be made of it'. 
79Using a net capitalization rate of 2,5 % per year and the SAL T79/8 l table for coloureds. Pensions are normally 
capitalized at a somewhat higher rate of 5 ,5 % per year for the period after retirement. 
'IKlQair v PE Harbour Board (1886) 5 EDC 311 318; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 245. See Davel 'Broodwinner' 
522n591 for numerous other instances. 
8
'1 will refer to husband and wife for sake of convenience. This is intended to include other joint life relationships 
(father and son; mother and son, etc) where the mortality of the dependant is not negligible. Typically a mongoloid 
child will be dependent for life but with little prospect for survival beyond age 35. 
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survival to age 65 is 0,69, ie 69%. 82 For a white female of the same age the chanc~ is 
0,83, ie 83 % . 83 The chance that they will both survive to age 65 is 0,69x0,83 =0,57, ie 
57%. The value of dependency during the years up to age 65 would be based on a 
year-by-year calculation, with the joint survivorship chances substituted in column C of table 
584 for each possible age 64, 63, 62, etc back to age 40. By adding up these survivorship 
ratios one obtains the joint expectation of working life. The joint survivorship ratios may 
be calculated for all possible ages up to when the oldest spouse attains age 99, the limit of 
life. 85 The sum of these ratios provides the joint expectation of life. 86 The joint 
expectation of life is always less than the lesser of the individual expectations of life. 87 This 
is so because the individual survival ratios for one spouse are each reduced by the 
corresponding survival ratios for the other spouse. 88 
[5.5] CHANCE OF INHERITANCE89 
[5.5.1] Gross multiplier method: 90 The value of a spes of inheritance depends on a number 
of factors including the survivorship of the wife and the chances of the husband's death. 
This calculation is best done using the actuarial year-by-year technique. 91 One may, 
however, obtain a rough approximation as follows: Assume that the husband would have died 
at the expiry of his expectation of life and discount the expected inheritance sum with interest 
to present time. A deduction must then be made for the chance that the wife may not have 
survived to that time together with any other contingencies affecting inheritance prospects. 92 
Thus a white male presently aged 40 has an expectation of life of 31 years,93 an expected 
age at death of 71 years. The chance that his wife aged 40 will survive until then is 71%.94 
112SALT79/81 white males. 
13SALT79/81 white females. 
MAt 88. 
"After that age the chance of joint survivorship is nil ex hypothesis. 
86See Koch 'Damages' 281 288 for worked examples. 
170ne does find instances where it is incorrectly argued that the wife's mortality should be ignored because women 
have longer life expectations than men (see, for instance, Davel 'Broodwinner' 363-4; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 84 
123). 
11A good estimate of the joint expectation of working life may be obtained by calculating for each spouse separately 
the ratio of the expectation of working life to the period to retirement age for the breadwinner. If these ratios are 
designated Rm and Rf then the ratio for their joint survivorship is given by RmxRf. 
19For a discussion of the extent to which compensation may be claimed for loss of inheritance prospects see 330. 
90For a definition of a 'gross multiplier' see 97. 
91 See Koch ' Damages' 290; see table 21 at 335 for a worked example. 
92Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 84 123 suggests that if the survivor is older than the deceased and may be expected to 
die earlier then inheritance prospects should be ignored. Davel here fails to appreciate that the e'xpiry of the 
expectation of life merely marks the point where survival ratios drop below 50% . She treats such chances as nil (see 
the pseudo ratios in table 5 column A at 88). 
93SALT79/81 white males. 
94'fhe 71 years and the 71 % similarity is entirely fortuitous. 
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An expected inheritance of RlOOOOO implies a present value of R46511 95 before allowance 
for the wife's mortality and R46511xO,71 = R33023 after allowance for her mortality. In 
practice there would be a further adjustment for general contingencies to allow for the risks 
of life that affect the accumulation and preservation of capital.96 
[5.5.2] Actuarial year-by-year method: Apart from being a powerful analytical tool this 
method provides a more precise value based upon the chance in each year that the husband 
will die and the chance that his wife will still be alive. · For instance during the 12 months 
following the 60th birthday the chance of death for a white male now aged 40 would be 
0,020, ie 2 % . ,,.., The chance that his wife would then still be alive is 89 % . 98 The chance 
that she will inherit in that year is 0,020x0,89=0,0178, ie 1,78%. The present value of 
inheritance of RlOOOOO in that year is Rl 78099 less a discount for interest for 201/2 
years, 100 giving Rl780x0,603=Rl073. Using an electronic computer such values are 
readily assessed for each and every possible 12-month period between ages 40 and 99. The 
sum of the values gives the value of the spes before any deduction for general 
contingencies. 101 I have calculated this to be R35 l l 6 which is 6 % higher than the value . 
of R33023 calculated above using gross-multiplier reasoning. 
[5.5.3] Retirement lump sums: The gross multiplier approach to inheritance prospects does 
not yield very good results when the breadwinner will only acquire possession of the asset 
in years to come. Perhaps the most common example of this is the accrual of a substantial 
retirement lump sum to civil servants at age 65. Consider the prospect of a lump sum 
retirement gratuity of RlOOOOO for a coloured male presently age 40. This will only be 
available for inheritance after age 65. The gross multiplier approach would place on this the 
same value of R33023 as if the breadwinner had taken immediate possession. The 
year-by-year approach indicates a nil value for the spes in each year prior to age 65 and 
gives a total value for the spes on death after age 65 of Rl5450. Such deferred inheritance 
prospects are also to be found under trust funds and with aged parents. The year-by-year 
calcul~tion can be readily extended to cover complicated death and survival contingencies 
involving 3 and more lives and a variety of different sequences for the occurrence of the 
deaths. 102 
[5.5.4] Awards of damages: In the next chapter I will discuss the concept of consuming 
95Discounting at a net capitalization rate of 2,5 % per year compound. 
96See footnote 455 at 336. 
-
97SALT79/81 white males: (73231-71386)/91723. 
98SALT79/8 l white females: (85445 + 84361)/2/95760 (allows for her survival to mid-year). 
99R l OOOOOx 1, 78/ l 00. 
100At 2,5% per year compound. 
101See footnote 91. 
102There was time when life offices would buy the contingent rights of beneficiaries to income or capital from trust 
funds. The valuation considerations formed a part of the syllabus for trainee actuaries (Benz & Tappenden 
'Reversions & Life Interests'; see too Hooker & Longley-Cook 'Life Contingencies' vol l 87-109; Neill 'Life 
Contingencies' 249-80). 
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interest and capital over the expectation of life of an injured claimant. This concept takes 
as its premise that the claimant will as a matter of certainty live until the expiry of his 
expectation of life at which point in time the entire damages award will have been consumed. 
In terms of this model the heirs have a nil prospect of inheritance because the chance of 
death prior to expiry of the expectation of life has been assumed to be nil. However, if one 
considers the year-by-year use of the value of the chance of death one finds a substantial 
value for the prospect of inheritance. This is so because the chance of early death prior to 
expiry of the expectation of life is in fact close to 50%. It will take many years to consume 
the capital but in each of those years there is a very real chance of early death. If one 
assumes that the award of RlOOOOO will be consumed in accordance with model B under 
table 6103 then for a coloured male aged 40 the value of the chance that his wife, also aged 
40, will inherit before he attains age 60 is R20251, 104 that is to say 13 % of the original 
capital awarded. 
It is clear that because of the risk of early death the heirs of the claimant acquire the 
expectation of a substantial inheritance regardless of what amount the court chooses to award. 
Another important conclusion is that the possession of substantial capital provides financial 
security for the family of a breadwinner claimant in the event of his early death. For this 
reason he no longer needs the life insurance and widow's pension benefits that may otherwise 
have been provided by his employer. The value of such death benefits should thus, in many 
instances, be omitted from any compensation awarded. 105 
[5.6] LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS 
[5.6.1] Frequency predictions: When an actuary does his reserving for a life office or 
pension fund he establishes contingency funds 106 on the basis of life-table averages. This 
is appropriate in the circumstances because life offices and pension funds have numerous 
members. The statistical law of large numbers107 tells us that under such conditions 
averages provide good predictors of what will happen in the future. For this reason the 
actuary can predict with considerable accuracy for a life office the number of deaths which 
will occur during the coming years. The law of large numbers provides not only accuracy 
but also a measure of the likely size of errors. 108 
[5. 6.2] Consuming interest and capital: The actuary manages the life office and pension 
fund financial reserves by thinking in terms of groups of claims. His statistical tables tell 
him that out of 1000 policyholders 5%, ie 50, will claim accident benefits of RlOOO each in 
10 years' time. The total liability of the life office in that year will be 50xR1000, ie 
R50000. The actuary can invest fairly accurately to meet this liability. A single individual 
103See 100. 
1().4SALT79/8 l coloured mortality. 
105See 60. 
106See 106. 
107The 'central limit theorem' (Levin 'Statistics for Management' 2ed 262-3). 
108By way of the standard deviation and other such measures. 
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equipped with 5% of RlOOO, the value of the chance, has no hope of benefiting unless he 
takes advantage of the law of large numbers and uses his R50, 5 % of RlOOO, to buy suitable 
insurance. 109 He loses the use of his premium but gains the advantage of knowing that his 
expense will be met if it arises. 
[5. 6.3] Cross subsidies: When working with large numbers the notion of consuming interest 
and capital is a valid financial model because those who die early provide the funds for those 
who live long. The effect of this cross subsidy is that the reserve for a portfolio of life 
annuitants does not run down over the original expectations of life but is continually extended 
to take account of the 'end-of-a-rainbow' phenomenon,110 the Bayesian reassessment of the 
risk. Ill 
[5. 6.4] Individuals and utility: Statistical prediction tells us what proportion of a group will 
suffer loss but it cannot tell which members of the group will suffer .112 The power of an 
average as a predictor is at its absolute worst when applied to a single individual. In fact it 
is no predictor at all and it would be an abuse of the information to use it in the sense of a 
predictor. 113 What the average does indicate to us is the present marginal utility of an 
uncertain future event. It is the decision criterion, the point at which in the mind of a 
reasonable person the prospect of gain balances the prospect of loss. 114 
[5.6.5] Classical statisticians: Actuarial explanations for lump-sum once-and-for-all awards 
to individuals are generally unsatisfactory. 115 The wording of many actuarial reports 
describing damages calculations contemplates a one-man pension fund but fails to explain the 
relevance of averages and the funding of longevity when there is no cross subsidy with those 
who die early. Typical of such inappropriate explanations is the large-numbers model used 
by Prevett: 116 
'If there had been a very large number of similar individuals of the same age all 
receiving the same amount, then overall they would have equated to the stated 
payments, allowing for the operation in due time of compound interest and 
mortality ... if this very large number of individuals made a pool investment of the 
total of the identical amounts awarded ... and if each received from the pool for the 
remainder of his lifetime the annual loss for which he had been compensated by 
'
09In practice insurance premiums also include allowance for administration expenses and discounts for interest. 
11
°Kemp 'Damages' 3ed 103 'by recourse to both interest and ... capital, then the total investment would be exhausted 
- on the death of the last survivor'. 
111Bayesian reassessments are familiar to jurists in the sense of more accurately assessing the loss in the light of 
events supervening between date of delict and date of trial (eg Wigham v B1itish Traders Insurance 1963 3 SA 151 
~ 156C). 
112Van Rensburg Huldigingsbundel Danlel Pont 384 390-1. 
113Cr0cker 1980 TIAA 517 572 'Knowing the misuse to which life expectancies are prone to be put by lawyers .. .'. 
114See 5 et seq for further discussion of 'utility'. 
-
115See hypothetical discussion between judge and actuary quoted at 86. 
116Kemp 'Damages' 3ed 103. I have rearranged some of the phrases for ease of reading. 
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recourse to both interest and (to the extent necessary) capital, then the total 
investment would be exhausted on the death of the last survivor'. 
The picture we have here is that actuaries apply familiar procedures (ie law of large numbers 
with cross subsidy) in an unfamiliar context (ie no large numbers, no pooling of experience). 
These actuarial explanations brand the actuaries as classical statisticians in the sense that 
chance ('probability' in the statistician's sense) is interpreted as a frequency ratio. In relation 
to a single individual claimant we need, however, to fall back on very much more intuitive 
notions of chance. 
[5. 7] CONCLUSIONS 
The standard actuarial calculation proceeds on the basis of the year-by-year application of 
value of a chance, each year being separately discounted for the risk of early death. The 
lump-sum present value is the sum of the separate values of a chance and is itself no more 
than the value of the overall chance. Restitution in the sense of reproducing the lost income 
is only possible when the risks are very small, as may arise with the dependency of a child. 
It is otherwise unsound to speak of reproducing the lost income by consuming interest and 
capital. The use of life annuities for this purpose is generally resisted due to the absence of 
suitable contracts. 117 
A focus on the value of the separate chances of life and death permits solutions to complex 
problems involving retirement benefits and inheritances. Actuaries are specially trained to 
handle the complex arithmetic of life-table chances. 
117See 118. 
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CHAPTER6 
CONSUMING INTEREST AND CAPITAL 
Summary: A compensation model based upon consuming interest 
and capital it is a useful concept provided its limitations are borne 
in mind. Conditions of high inflation dictate that there is a 
'ballooning' of the original capital/or many years before inroads into 
accumulated funds begin to be made. To test the consumable income 
from investing an award a coun should ignore high nominal rates of 
return and look to rates closer to the real rate of return. The 
prudent investor will save for a retirement that extends well beyond 
the expiry of the expectation of life. The impact of tax on interest 
receipts is aggravated by high rates of inflation and renders such 
investments unattractive compared to growth investments such as 
shares and immovable property. 
[6.1] DEFINITIONS 
97 
In this chapter I examine some basic capitalization concepts which will be developed further 
under the chapter on the time value of money. 1 
[6.1.1] Multipliers: Much has been made of the proposition that: 
'When one is asked to assess a claim based upon an estimated Joss of future earnings 
one is really required to arrive at such a sum presently payable as will give to a 
plaintiff a periodic payment, and the figure arrived at should be such that at the end 
of the period there would be no capital sum left'. 2 
There is a regular payment, a period over which it is payable and a rate of interest. The 
resulting sum is adjusted for 'general contingencies'. Boberg3 has aptly described this as 
the 'gross multiplier method'. A 'multiplier' is a period which has been reduced for risks 
and by a discount for interest. A 'gross multiplier' has been reduced for interest and the 
contingency of early death but not for general contingencies. 
In England the multipliers used by the courts include discounts not only for early death and 
interest but also for general contingencies and are for this reason described by Boberg as 'net 
multipliers'. 4 The English net multipliers are determined on a 'gut feel' basis coupled with 
'See 125 et seq. 
2Gillbanks v Sigournay 1959 2 SA 11 (N) ISA. 
3Boberg 1964 SAU 194 204-5. 
' Boberg 1964 SAU 194 204-5. 
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regard for the multipliers used for previous awards. 5 Actuarial evidence as regards the value 
for a multiplier will not be tolerated by the English courts because it is felt to introduce a 
misplaced impression of certainty. 6 Such fears may be appropriate when dealing with a jury 
but of dubious relevance when dealing with a highly educated judge. 
A multiplier is expressed as a number of years regardless of what discounts have been 
applied. For this reason it is readily confused with a pure period of time unadjusted for risk. 
Thus, for example, if the normal retirement age is 65 years then for a man now aged 40 
years the period of working life is 25 years. If allowance is made for early death the 
expected duration of working life reduces to 19,884 years.7 If a discount for a net 
capitalization rate of 2,5 % per year compound is then applied this reduces to 15, 782 years. 
This duration, reduced for the discounts of risk and interest, is best described as a 
'multiplier' and not a period. The expectation of life includes a discount for early death and 
is thus not a true period but a rather a gross multiplier based on a nil discount rate of 
interest. 
If the risk of death were to be wished away then the period of survival becomes infinity. For 
a mortal person the chances of survival beyond age 99 so small that the period may for 
practical purposes be terminated at age 99. For corporations with perpetual succession the 
mortality risk is eliminated and damages calculations should then be based on a perpetuity 
for which the relevant multiplier is calculated as the reciprocal of the discount rate of 
interest. 8 
A multiplier is but one example of a larger class of risk-adjusted measures generally known 
as expected values or 'point estimates' which have been dealt with under the general 
discussion of utility .9 
[6.1.2] The actuarial year-by-year method: This involves the year-by-year application of the 
principle of valuation of a chance: 
'In calculating the loss of future income, the actuaries discounted each year's loss to 
allow for the probability that Clive would not have been alive to earn the income' .10 
This method gives the most accurate present lump-sum value for a risk-adjusted series of 
payments. 
sSee, for instance, Lim Poli Oroo v C&IAHA [1979) 1 All ER 332 (CA) (HL) 343h-j. 
60wen & Shier 1985 J/ASS 'The actuary in damages cases'. 
7See table 5 at 88. 
'Thus for a discount rate of interest of 2,5 % per year the multiplier for a perpetuity is 1/0,025 = 40 years. 
9See 15. 
10Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 10240-H. The word 'probability' here clearly refers to the 
chance of survival the chance of death in each year being a possibility of less than 50%. For a calculated example 
see table 5 at 88. 
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[6.1.3] Approximations: It has been noted in the previous chapter that the 'gross multiplier' 
method provides a short-cut means for estimating the result of a year-by-year calculation.1 1 
The gross multiplier method gives fairly good results with simple cash flows but fails badly 
for more complicated situations. 12 The notion of consuming interest and capital over a fixed 
period is a useful aid to solving problems in discounting provided it is not slavishly adhered 
to and is seen in its proper perspective as an aid to thought. Flat maps provide useful 
guidance to navigating on a spherical earth. This does not mean that the earth is flat. By 
the same token use of the gross multiplier method as an aid to assessing damages does not 
mean that the claimant can then reproduce his future lost earnings by consuming interest and 
capital. 13 
[6.1.4] Interest and inflation: Under conditions of inflation the regular payment is assumed 
to increase over the years, usually in line with inflation. The expected rate of return on 
investments is itself inflated as investors demand a real rate of return over and above the rate 
of reduction in the buying power of their capital. The nominal rate of investment return 'I' 
offered to investors thus comprises an inflation component 'F' and a real rate of return 'R' 
with I= R + F. However, when inflation rates are high then one must work with the more 
accurate formula: 
II 1+1/100= (1 + F/lOO)x(l + R/100) II 
Thus, for example, a rate of 16% per year comprises a real element of, say, 2,5% per year 
and an inflation element of 13,2% per year (l,16=1,132xl,025). 
[6.1.5] Sinking funds: The notion of a sinking fund14 is familiar to all persons who have 
taken out a mortgage bond on their home. There is a regular payment, a period and a rate 
of interest. If the interest rate remains unchanged and the payments are regularly made then 
at the end of the period the original debt will have been extinguished. It is against this 
background that the notion of consuming interest and capital would seem to have developed. 
With the advent since 1970 of relatively high rates of inflation15 the identity between home 
loans and the compensation model of consuming interest and capital has become less and less 
apt. Under home loans the repayments are not regularly adjusted upwards to allow for 
inflation whereas compensation calculations take account of escalating payments. 16 The 
financial effect of this difference is illustrated in table 617 by modelling the outstanding 
capital in each year for a 20-year period. The calculation has been done using 3 different 
11 See comparative values in Koch 'Damages' 304 257-91. 
12Typically promotions and retirement benefits. 
13See SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 838-9 for an example of m.isplaced 'flat-earth' reasoning. 
14Donald 'Compound Interest' 82-3; Brigham 'Financial Management' 489-92. 
1
'See tables in Koch 'Damages' 294; Corbett & Buchanan Jed 105. 
16Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 I SA 98 (A) 115-16. 
17At 100. 
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financial models: 18 
TABLE 6 - 20-YEAR SINKING FUND MODELS 
Model A Model B Model C 
D=2,5%pye E=0%py D=l6%py E=l3,2%py D=l6%py E=0%py 
Payment Capital Payment Capital Payment Capital 
Rpy R Rpy R Rpy R Yr Yr 
1 10000 159788 10000 159788 23234 159788 1 
2 10000 153533 11317 173754 23234 158403 2 
3 10000 147121 12808 188427 23234 156796 3 
4 10000 140549 14495 203718 23234 154932 4 
5 10000 133813 16404 219499 23234 152770 5 
6 10000 126908 18565 235590 23234 150262 6 
7 10000 119831 21010 251749 23234 147352 7 
8 10000 112577 23777 267657 23234 143977 8 
9 10000 105141 26909 282901 23234 140062 9 
10 10000 97520 30453 296951 23234 135520 10 
11 10000 89708 34464 309138 23234 130252 11 
12 10000 81701 39003 318622 23234 124141 12 
13 10000 73494 44140 324358 23234 117052 13 
14 10000 65081 49954 325053 23234 108829 14 
15 10000 56458 56533 319115 23234 99290 15 
16 10000 47619 63979 304595 23234 88225 16 
17 10000 38559 72406 279115 23234 75390 17 
18 10000 29273 81942 239782 23234 60501 18 
19 10000 19755 92734 183094 23234 43230 19 
20 10000 10000 104818 104818 23234 23234 20 
21 0 0 0 21 
Model A: A fixed unvarying payment of RlOOOO per year discounted at a rate of 2,53 per year compound. 
Model B: An increasing payment which commences at RlOOOO per year and which is increased at the end 
of each year by 13,23 per year compound. Discounting has been done at a nominal rate of 163 per year 
compound, that is to say an effective net capitalization rate of 2,5 3 per year compound has been used . 
Model C : A fixed unvarying payment of R23234 per year discounted at a rate of 163 per year compound. 
The repayment of R23234 per year has been selected to give the same initial capital for all 3 models. This 
model reflects the repayment of a typical home loan. 
Note that for all models payment has been assumed to be made in advance, at the beginning of each year. The 
outstanding capital balances shown in the table reflect the balance at the beginning of each year immediately 
before the payment for that year is made. D is the discount rate of return . E is the rate of escalation applied 
to the payments. Due to rounding errors the figures in row 20 do not exactly match the values indicated by 
calculations applied to row 19. 
18Just as one may model an aeroplane or ship or building so too may one construct logical models (these days usually 
on computer) to provide guidance as to the nature of financial events (Fama 'Finance' 11-12; Brigham 'Financial 
Management' 80n2). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CONSUMING INTEREST AND CAPITAL 101 
[6.1.6} Discussion of model A: This model in table 6 shows the reducing of capital under 
a sinking fund scheme at a rate of 2,5 % per year. 19 It will be noted that the calculation 
requires yearly payments that ostensibly do not increase over the years. This does not mean 
.to say that such payments will not be increased but it does emphasise that for purposes of the 
calculation the increases are ignored. In England this is known as the 'Diplock approach': 
'In estimating the amount of the annual dependency in the future, had the deceased 
not been killed, money should be treated as retaining its value at the date of the 
judgment, and in calculating the present value of annual payments which would have 
been received in future years, interest rates appropriate to times of stable currency 
such as 4 % to 5 % should be adopted'. 20 
[6.1.7] Discussion of model B: This model in table 6 shows the effect of making explicit 
allowance for inflation in conjunction with a high nominal rate of interest. 21 The initial 
capital sum is the same under both models A and B, as too is the net capitalization rate of 
2,5 % per year compound. For model A the net capitalization rate is introduced explicitly 
while under model B it is introduced implicitly by the difference between 16% per year and 
13,2 % per year. 22 Under model A the notional capital balance reduces steadily from its 
initial value to nil at the end of 20 years. 23 Under model B the initial interest receipts 
exceed the required payments. The excess interest is capitalized and the capital balance 
increases over the years. It is only in the 14th year that the payments increased for inflation 
overtake the interest receipts and then rapidly consume interest and capital to nil during the 
last seven years. This is a very different cash flow from that pictured by analogy with the 
simple home loan. The expression 'balloon effect' aptly describes this swelling of the 
capital that is required to meet inflation-adjusted payments in the distant future. 
In Bailey's case24 the appellate division approved the actuarial practice of making explicit 
separate allowance for inflation. In doing so it did not emphasise that such an allowance is 
appropriate only in conjunction with a high nominal discount rate of interest.25 This was 
unfortunate because the need to use a correspondingly high nominal discount rate is not 
always obvious to those untrained in financial mathematics. 
[6.1.8} Discussion of model C: This model in table 6 has been included to show a 
comparable capital reduction pattern for a modern home loan based on high rates of interest. 
It deserves note that notwithstanding the very high repayments (R23234 per year compared 
to RlOOOO per year) the rate of capital redemption is very much slower than under a home 
19Nominal rates were at this level for a while after the 2nd world war (see table in Koch 'Damages' 297). 
20Following Mallet v.McMonag/e (1969) 2 All ER 178 (HL) 190H-I. 
21This should not be confused with the standard actuarial year-by-year technique which not only makes explicit 
allowance for interest and inflation but also allows for the risk of mortality on a yearly basis. 
ZZJJy rearranging formula 1 above we have the calculation 1,025=1, 1611, 132. 
23Strictly speaking at the beginning of the 19th year. This example reflects payments in advance. 
24Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 l SA 98 (A) 115-16. 
25See paragraphs 6.1.4 and 8.1. 7. 
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loan at 2,5 % per year. In other words higher bond rates not only mean additional interest 
on the current outstanding balance but also a more substantial and prolonged state of 
indebtedness. This consideration is important when placing a value upon bond subsidies 
provided by an employer. Consider a bond subsidy26 of R13234 per year (R23234 less 
RlOOOO) towards repayment of a loan at commercial rates of 16% per year. 27 This 
apparently has the same value as an employment benefit as a bond at a low rate of 2,5 % per 
year. 28 However, the rate of capital redemption is much faster for the bond at a low rate 
of interest. The employee who wishes to repay the bond prior to full term is at an advantage 
if he has the benefit of a low-interest bond. One might say that a subsidy by way of a low 
rate of interest has the higher utility. In practice the capital repayment advantage of a low 
interest rate is often offset by the granting of extremely long repayment periods. 
[6.2] CONSUMABLE INVESTMENT INCOME 
[6.2.1] Preservation of capital: In an utopian economy with a nil rate of inflation an investor 
may consume all interest earned on his money and at the end of the day have capital with a 
constant and unchanged buying power. Under conditions of inflation the investor who wishes 
to preserve his capital will capitalize that portion of his investment income which is needed 
to maintain the buying power of his capital and restrict his consumption to the net real rate 
of return. The real rate of return may then be consumed with equanimity in the knowledge 
that as long as the buying power of the capital is maintained the buying power of the real rate 
of return derived from such capital will also be maintained. For some people such a scheme 
may well have attractions, a utility superior to that of any other investment strategy. The 
capitalization of investment returns would usually be achieved through investments offering 
substantial capital growth, such as mutual fund units, immovable property and life insurance 
plans. 
[6.2.2] Retirement funding: However, most persons will take the view that life does not go 
on forever. For them it is attractive to consume more than the real rate of return. The 
buying power of their capital will then diminish despite substantial 'ballooning' in nominal 
terms. If they plan to consume all their capital over the expectation of life they are faced 
with a 50% chance of living out old age with no money at all. For this reason the prudent 
investor will reduce expenditure and target for adequate capital well into old age. Although 
income may only accrue up to say age 65, living expenses will continue long beyond that 
age. It would be foolish indeed to follow judicial directives about consuming interest and 
capital over the expected term. 29 Firstly part of the capital should be retained as provision 
for a retirement. Secondly substantial 'ballooning' of capital is necessary, that is to say 
plough back of investment returns, if the income to be drawn from the capital is to increase 
adequately in years to come. 
One does find instances a court teste the adequacy of an award by reference to the income 
260ne. that remains constant in rand terms, that is to say is not escalated for inflation. 
27This is typical of the bond subsidies provided to civil servants and teachers. 
28Such as are commonly provided to the employees of banks and insurance companies. Compare models A and C 
under table 6 above. 
29See, for instance, Gil/banks v Sigournay 1959 2 SA 11 (N) 15A. 
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which can be derived from investing that award. 30 Such cases as there are have tended to 
focus upon a high nominal rate of interest. This is clearly incorrect for it fails to have regard 
to the considerations described above. A suitable testing rate would be above a real rate of 
return of about 2,5% per year, but much less than the nominal rate of, say, 16% per year. 
The precise level to be used should have regard to the desired level of living expenses and 
the extent to which provision is to be made for old age, including above-average longevity. 
[6.3] TAXATION 
[6.3.1] Taxable and tax-free investments: Some forms of investment income, particularly 
interest payments, are subject to taxation.31 For this reason the net rate of return obtainable 
by a plaintiff on his award may be less than the full nominal market rate. The courts require 
that the discount rate of interest be determined by reference to an investment return net of 
taxation. 32 In South Africa this has, for various reasons, proved to be an impractical 
directive given lip service but little financial application. Not the least reason being that 
there substantial opportunities for avoiding tax on investment returns. In practice the 
discount rate is with few exceptions determined without regard for the particular tax 
circumstances or investment abilities of the plaintiff. More of this later.33 For the moment 
let us consider the effect of taxation on a sinking fund of the sort illustrated in table 6, model 
B with the 'ballooning' of capital.34 
[6.3.2] Estimating future tax rates: Before performing calculations we need to identify some 
basis on which to estimate future tax rates. The usual approach used in South Africa35 and 
in England36 is to assume that current tax rates will be maintained in real terms, ie the 
proportion of a man's earnings paid by way of tax will remain constant in time if his gross 
earnings are adjusted over the years in line with inflation. 37 For present purposes I have 
used the tax tables applicable to the tax year 1989/90 for married persons with no 
dependants. 
In order to assess the effect of income tax on investment income not only is an assumption 
-as to future tax rates required but also an assumption as to the extent to which investment 
YJKloppers v Rondalia Assurance 1972 2 C&B 289 (W) 296 (injury claim); Waring & Gil/ow Ltd v Sherborne 1904 
TS 340 350 (claim by dependants). 
31 Capital gains are presently tax free providing the investor does not actively trade his investments. 
320berho/zer v Santam Insurance 1970 1 SA 337 (N) 342E; Pitt v Economic Insurance 1957 3 SA 284 (D) 287sup; 




35Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde 1974 TASSA 292 305-6. 
361n BTC v Gourley (1955] 3 All ER 796 (HL) 806H 'No one can foresee whether tax will go up or down, and I 
advise you not to speculate on the subject but to deal with it as matters are at present'. The English multiplier 
system is based on model A in table 6 above, ie no explicit allowance for inflation in the calculation. This has the 
same financial effect as assuming that tax rates will be adjusted in future in line with inflation. See too Boberg 
'Delict' 543 who describes the Gourley approach as the one generally favoured by commentators. 
37There are minor variations on this basic approach which need not concern us here. 
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income will be taxable. A few investments provide tax-free interest, put at rates that are 
generally too low to deserve serious consideration. 38 Growth investments produce tax-free 
capital growth plus largely tax free dividends, or rents which are taxed on the excess over 
expenses. There are numerous interest-bearing investments providing taxable interest, the 
first R2000 being tax free. 39 For illustrative purposes I have in table 7 worked with three 
models all based on an income of R30000 per year net after tax.40 
[6.3.3] Effect of tax on present value: When provision is made under model D for tax on 
a real rate of return the additional capital required is a negligible 0, 1 % , one thousandth of 
R479334. When provision is made for tax on interest earnings under model Ethe additional 
capital required is 23% of R479334. A substantial reduction in present value can thus be 
achieved merely by adopting a sensible investment strategy. Can a plaintiff b~ required to 
mitigate his damages by choosing a growth investment strategy (model D)? I will return to 
this topic later. 41 
An alternative approach to taxation is to ignore its effect both on the earnings which have 
been lost and the interest income which will now accrue.42 A net-of-tax income of R30000 
per year implies gross earnings of roughly R39000 per year. Taxation on the salary earnings 
is then 23 % of R30000. The additional capital required to offset the tax on the interest 
income per model E is 23 % of the capital required under model B. Tax on earnings and tax 
on interest thus largely cancel one another out. The offset works quite well but, as I shall 
now demonstrate, only at this level of earnings. · 
For yearly salary earnings of RlOOOO tax liability is negligible but the add-on for tax on 
interest is 7, 7 % . The offset thus does not work so well at this low level of income. 
Yearly earnings of R90000 net of tax require a before-tax income of roughly R145000. Tax 
in this instance is 61 % of the net income. This is substantially in excess of the 33% needed 
to offset tax on interest income. 
The above calculations reveal that it is not generally valid to assume that the present value 
of tax on notional expected earnings can be equated to the tax on notional expected interest 
income. 
A substantial increase to the damages for tax on interest income is only justified if heavily 
taxed fixed-interest investments are the only investment medium available to the claimant. 
In practice in times of high inflation the prudent investor may be expected to seek growth 
31See table in Koch 'Damages' 296. 
39In terms of tax legislation for the 1992/93 tax year (sslO(l)(i)(xv) and (xvi) of_ Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as 
amended). 
40Roughly R39000 per year before tax for a single person in the 1989/90 tax year. 
41 See 125. 
42Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 568. 
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TABLE 7 -TAXED SINKING FUNDS 
Model B Model D Model E 
0% taxable 2,5%py taxable 16%py taxable 
Net yield = 16%py Net Yield = 1S,9S%py Net Yield = 11,50%py 
Yr 
Payment Capital Payment Capital Payment Capital 
Yr Rpy R Rpy R Rpy R 
1 30000 479334 30000 480020 30000 693350 1 
2 33951 521227 33951 521698 33951 731714 2 
3 38422 565240 38422 565528 38422 770472 3 
4 43482 611109 43482 611252 43482 809264 4 
5 49209 658447 49209 658492 49209 847650 5 
6 55690 706716 55690 706718 55690 885054 6 
7 63024 755190 63024 755192 63024 920734 7 
8 71324 802913 71324 802915 71324 953766 8 
'· 
9 80717 848643 80717 848646 80717 983088 9 
10 91347 890794 91347 890798 91347 1007335 10 
11 103377 927359 103377 927363 103377 1024953 11 
12 116992 955819 116992 955824 116992 1034030 12 
13 132400 973039 132400 973045 132400 1032435 13 
14 149837 975141 149837 975148 149837 1016741 14 
15 169571 957353 169571 957361 169571 983446 15 
16 191904 913827 191904 913836 191904 927396 16 
17 217178 837431 217178 837441 217178 842216 17 
18 245780 719493 245780 719505 245780 719815 18 
19 278149 549507 278149 549521 278149 549469 19 
20 314781 314781 314781 314781 314781 314781 20 
21 0 0 0 21 
Model D: Investment in growth assets which provide tax-free capital growth of 13 ,2 % per year plus a fully 
taxable real rate of return of 2;5% per year. 
Model E: Investment in interest bearing investments the income from which is fully taxable. A taxable rate 
of return of 16% per year has been assumed. 
Model B: As illustrated in table 6 at 100 above: This model assumes a tax-free rate of return of 16% per 
year. 
For each model a net yield has been calculated, this being the internal rate of return (see 128 below) needed 
to relate the original capital to the actual net payments expected. The tax table for the 1989/90 tax year for 
married persons has been used. 
investments which yield tax-free capital growth.43 
105 
[6.3.4] Net capitaliwtion rates: Under model Bin table 7 above the discount rate of interest 
which gives a result equal to the initial capital sum is 16% per year. Under model D the rate 
43See 139. 
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is 15,95% per year, only marginally different. Under model Ethe rate required to produce 
the capital sum of R693350 is 11,50 % per year. The rate of inflation is 13 ,2 % . This 
implies a net capitalization rate of minus 1,5 % per year to allow for tax on investment 
income. 44 
[6.4] CONTINGENCY FUNDS 
The discussion thus far has focused on a gross multiplier obtained by discounting over the 
expectation of life, or working life, or joint life. We now examine an alternative financial 
device, the contingency fund. This enables an individual to provide for uncertain past or 
future financial contingencies without resorting to the purchase of a life annuity. 45 
[6.4.1} Definition: I use the expression 'contingency fund' to describe a fund established to 
provide for the income and outgo of uncertain future events. The degree of uncertainty may 
vary quite widely. Thus, for instance, an accountant may set up a provision for taxation, a 
contingency fund to cover the tax liability of a company pending final assessment by the 
revenue authorities. A major actuarial responsibility is the determination of proper reserves, 
contingency funds, to ensure that life offices and pension funds will be able to meet their 
future contingent liabilities under life policies as and when these arise. Boberg states that 
'besides granting regular maintenance the court may order the creation of a "contingency 
fund" to provide for expenses of an extraordinary nature connected with a child's health' .46 
I use the expression 'contingency fund' to embrace the entire fund set aside and not just the 
additional amount referred to by Boberg. The most important characteristics of a 




The prospect of making an uncertain payment or payments at some future time. The 
uncertainty may relate to the size of the payment or whether or not it will be made at 
all. 
The prospect of a reversion to the original provider of any surplus remaining in the 
fund once it has fulfilled its purpose. 
The prospect that the provider may have to make further payments to meet excess 
liabilities. 47 
I will now examine in greater detail three examples of contingency funds: 
[6.4.2} Provision for taxation: A contingency fund set up by an accountant for a trading 
company is concerned with an open-ended liability by the company for errors in its estimate 
of tax liability. If the contingency fund proves inadeqtJate the company will have to make 
44 1,0152=1,132/l,115. See 145 for discussion of net capitalization rates. Pearson (Cmnd 7054 1978) in England 
recommends (vol 1 147 table II) net capitalization rates of+ I% 0% -1,5% -2% per year depending on the level of 
earnings lost; by way of contrast the official actuarial tables issued by the Government Actuary in England (1984) 
make allowance for positive real rates of return only of 1,5% to 5% per year. 
''See 113. 
46Boberg 'Persons & family' 288. 
47 As a general rule there is always some limitation to the liability of the provider. A company generally has limited 
liability. The courts will lay down limits of liability (In re Estate Visser 1948 3 SA 1129 (C) 1139 (£1000)). 
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additional payments. Such additional payments may cause financial embarrassment. An 
excessive provision may unduly inhibit dividend payments and perceptions of the enterprise's 
ability to accept profitable business risks. 48 The accountant can be expected to make a 
reasonably accurate provision, neither too large nor too small. 
[6.4.3] Reserves of a life office: These are calculated by actuaries with considerable accuracy 
using past statistical experience as a guide to the future claims and premium payments of a 
large number of policyholders. It is well known that deviations from the averages do occur 
and life offices normally retain an 'estate', an additional contingency fund which ensures 
financial stability even in extreme circumstances.49 The liability is open-ended. If the 
reserves prove inadequate the estate, the contingency fund in Boberg's sense, must bear the 
burden. If the reserves prove more than adequate the estate will be swelled and there will 
be profit distributions to with-profit policyholders, and to shareholders, if any. If reserves 
are too large this can affect the competitive position in the market due to inadequate profit 
distributions to policyholders. If the reserves are too small there is a risk of insolvency due 
to adverse fluctuations. The art and science of the actuary is the determination of accurate 
reserves, neither too large nor too small. 
[6.4.4] Supporl from a deceased estate: If a breadwinner dies under circumstances which 
do not give rise to an action for damages by his dependants then his dependent child has the 
right to claim support from his estate. This is not a claim for damages but a new 
compensating duty of support which comes into being after the death. This claim interacts 
with the claim for damages.so and, due to its superficial resemblance to a damages claim, 
needs to be discussed in the present thesis, quite apart from its relevance as an example of 
a contingency fund. 
Unlike the defendant in a damages claim the estate of the deceased is not bound to provide 
the same level of support as was enjoyed by the dependants prior to the death. It is only 
bound to provide what it can afford.s1 The interests of the heirs will not be ignored.52 For 
this reason one may anticipate that the courts will place reasonable limits upon the funds 
available from a deceased estate for the provision of support. s3 A second important 
difference from damages claims is that the money set aside serves as a provision, a 
contingency fund to ensure payment of the required maintenance. If the child suffers an 
early death the balance re.maining in the . contingency fund , unless otherwise agreed, is 
48See, for example, the risk-management techniques described in 171e Economist April 10-16 1993 16-20. 
49With-profit policies have further flexibility due to the removal of some contractual guarantees. The profits earned 
on the estate are generally distributed to with-profit policyholders, or used to pay dividends to shareholders who 
provided the surplus funds in the first place. 
'°See 285. 
"Boberg 'Persons & family' 288n40. 
ricouper v Flynn 1975 1 SA 778 (R) 780A. 
53Boberg 'Persons & family' 288n41. 
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repayable to the estate. 54 If the contingency fund is depleted while the child is still 
dependent then the child may seek further funds from the heirs to the estate. The prodigal 
son who wastes the money given to him for his support may always return and demand to 
be supported. 55 It is conceivable that such a claim may be brought against the heirs after 
an estate has been wound up. 
[6.5] FUNDING CRITERIA 
[6.5.1} 50% risk of ruin: The ideal funding level for a contingency fund is that which 
ensures sufficient money no matter what happens. Such absolute protection requires 
inordinately large amounts of money. In practice financial resources are limited to a greater 
or lesser degree and some risk must be accepted. The big question is 'How much risk'. The 
major issue in this text is the provision of sufficient funds for an injured plaintiff or a needy 
widow. 56 The expectation of life provides an indication of the age up to which 50% will 
survive from a group of persons now living of the same age and sex. An accountant whose 
tax provisions were inadequate 50% of the time would probably lose his job. The same 
applies to an actuary . Therefore if a meaningful contingency fund is set up the expectation 
of life should not be used as a funding criterion. Something better is needed. The purchase 
of a life annuity is one option, but not without problems.57 Another option, which we now 
examine more closely, is for the victim to retain control of the capital, but with funding 
based on a risk of inadequate funds of less than 50 % : 
[6.5.2} Deciles & quarliles: We could fund on the basis of survival to age 99, the limit of 
life. There are, however, intermediate funding levels with definable levels of risk, the 
median, quartile and decile ages. For a white woman now aged 40 these ages are illustrated 
in table 8 above. 58 The median is the age at which exactly 50% of such women alive now 
are expected to die. The quartile reflects the age at which 25 % are still alive, a 25 % risk 
of inadequacy, the decile a 10 % inadequacy risk. The contingency fund is calculated to 
provide RlOOOO per year escalating in line with inflation over the relevant period.59 It is 
entirely valid in this context to speak of consuming interest and capital subject to the 
'balloon' phenomenon that arises with escalating payments. The main point to be observ~ 
in able 8 is that lower the risk of running out of money, the larger is the contingency fund 
required. 
scContra Bouwer 'Bestorwe Boedels' 318 'Die voog en eksekuteur kan in 'n gegewe geval ooreenkom dat die 
minderjarige se eis vir toekomstige onderhoud gedelg word met 'n enkele uitbetaling in volle en finale vereffening 
van die eis. Die minderjarige word dan reghebbende t.o. v. die geld. Ashy die dag mondig is, word die ongebruikte 
gedeelte daarvan aan horn uitbetaal. Sterfhy voor mondigwording, is dit dee) van sy boedel wat onder sy erfgename 
vererf. The master's office in Natal does not follow Bouwer. For practical purposes the wording of the relevant 
agreement or court order will be decisive. The heirs do, it seems, have the right to demand that a reversion clause 
be included in the agreement. 
HVoet 25 .3.5; Schierhout v Union Government 1926 AD 286 291 ;. Cross v Cross 1922 EDL 224 232; Greathead 
v Greathead 1946 TPD 404 411. 
561 shall ignore for present purposes the dependent child, for whom considerations of utility values and contingency 
criteria tend to lead to very much the same amounts. 
57See 113. 
58SALT79/81 white females. 
59Using a net capitalization rate of 2,5 % per year. 
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TABLE 8 - CONTINGENCY FUNDING CRITERIA 
Measure Risk Expiry Contingency %ge 
% age reserve increase 
(years) R 
Expected age at death 56% 76,75 242000 -
Median 50% 78,79 250000 3% 
Quartile 25% 85,86 275000 14% 
Decile 10% 90,86 290000 20% 
One percentile 1% 98,81 310000 28% 
SALT79/81 white female mortality. 
[6.5.3] Even-handed justice: The is one major objection to using a contingency fund to 
compensate a plaintiff is the need to be equally as fair to the _defendant who provides the 
money. If the plaintiff dies while funds still remain then these funds should revert to the 
defendant. 60 By reason of this reversionary interest the defendant could quite reasonably 
demand that the funds be placed in trust and that there be some modest financial reporting. 
There would also need to be stipulated restrictions as to the use which can be made of the 
money lest it be dissipated on luxuries and other expenditure for which the defendant could 
not reasonably be held liable. The potential administrative complications make it clear that 
a defendant is better off paying compensation by instalments and thereby retaining possession 
o( the funds. 61 
[6.5.4] Unfettered use of compensation money: The lump-sum once-and-for-all rule has a 
corollary which states that the court may not place any restrictions on what an adult plaintiff 
in sound mind does with his money. 62 A court is thus, it seems, prevented from making 
its award subject to a reversionary trust, such as is necessary to achieve fairness with an 
overfunded contingency fund. 
[6.5.5] Optimal expenditure criteria: Overcompensation can arise with allowances for future 
medical expenses at the maximum possible cost, without regard for the actual extent to which 
the plaintiff will in fact incur the expense. The courts are clearly aware of this problem and 
one thus finds today substantial deductions for 'general contingencies' from the capitalized 
fA!Pal/as v Lesotho National Insurance 1987 3 C&B 705 (ECD) 713 provides an example of a contingency fund of 
100% of the cost for a 75% risk. No provision was made for a reversion to the defendant who was here clearly 
prejudiced by the decision. 
61 /n re Estate Visser 1948 3 SA 1129 (C) provides an excellent example of contingency funding based on a mortgage 
bond. The provider of the funds was thus not needlessly deprived of his assets. 
62Malgas v Guardian Assurance 1960 1 C&B 158 (A). 
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value of expected expenditure. 63 
[6.5.6] No general solution: Contingency funds provide no general solution to the 
compensation problem, but do give important insight into the nature and problems of a 
compensation model which purports to consume interest and capital over the expectation 
of life. When compensation is assessed as the sum which will reproduce the lost income by 
consuming interest and capital over· the expectation of life we are dealing with a contingency 
fund with a 50% chance of inadequacy. 
[6.5. 7] 'Another bite aJ the cherry': One may summarize the above considerations by saying 
that a contingency fund has the important characteristic that one may 'have another bite at 
the cherry', may claim more money, if one's original estimates prove incorrect. It is this 
characteristic that distinguishes a contingency fund so sharply from a once-and-for-all 
lump-sum payment. It is the absence of the opportunity to revise the payment that gives to 
a once-and-for-all lump-sum the character of price, 'value in exchange', 'verkeerswaarde'. 64 
This is not to suggest that one can make a 'silk purse from a sow's ear'. The point is, 
however, that the prohibition on the revision of a once-and-for-all lump-sum payment, for 
all its warts, identifies the payment as a particular type of financial phenomenon, 'value in 
exchange', something with which we are all intimately familiar. It has formed the subject 
of intense study by economists. For the more frequently traded goods there may be an 
established market which provides direct evidence of value in exchange without the need to 
resort to indirect valuation procedures. With many of the simpler valuation problems a 
contingency-fund approach and a value-in-exchange approach lead to much the same 
numerical result. It is when the problems become more complex that the distinction needs 
to be borne in mind. 
[6.5.8] Add-on for risk: In table 865 I have calculated the percentages by which the 
contingency funds based on the reduced risk criterion exceed the fund based on the 
expectation of life. These percentages illustrate an important feature of a contingency fund, 
namely that the prospect of risk requires an addition to the fund based upon an average . . ~ 
risk averse person66 will demand considerably more than value based on the average as 
compensation for the anticipated risks of living off a lump-sum payment. We know, 
however, that the courts, almost without exception, make a deduction for general 
contingencies. 67 A deduction for risk is a feature of value in exchange.68 The fact that 
63 Kriel v Administrator-General, SWA 1986 3 C&B 539 (SWA), 1988 3 SA 275 (A); Ncubu v NEG Insurance 1988 
2 SA 190 (N) 198B. 
64Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 280-1. 
6
'At 109. 
66Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279. 
67See tables in Koch 'Damages' 334-8; Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 295-301. See too 149 below. 
61ln share market analysis one finds reference to the 'beta adjustment' which is an upward adjustment to the discount 
rate of interest, ie a downward adjustment to the capitalized value (Weston & Brigham 'Managerial Finance' 267-8; 
Brigham 'Financial Management' 137-8). The discount rate of interest used to value a transaction comprises a basic 
return plus a premium for long periods of time plus an allowance for risk (Pepper 39 [1984] TFA 145 146-7; Weston 
& Brigham Joe cit). The higher the discount rate of return the lower the present capitalized value. 
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the courts persist in making deductions suggests that, whatever they may say they are doing, 
in practice they apply an intuitive notion of value in exchange, not a contingency fund. 69 
The assessment process is eclectic, drawing on an variety of financial models, not all 
consistent with one and other. 
[6.6] CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of consuming interest and capital in times of high rates of inflation requires a 
massive 'ballooning' of the original capital for many years. The prudent investor will save 
for a retirement that extends beyond his expected age at death, that is to say will refrain from 
consuming all interest and capital by the time of the expiry of the expectation of life. 
Investment in fixed-interest investments in times of high inflation will lead to an intolerable 
tax burden that renders tax-free growth investments far more attractive. 
The relevance of contingency funds to claims by children for support from deceased estates 
deserves particular note. These are not claims for damages and are subject to different 
assessment principles. 
69Critics of the contingency deduction seem to have a contingency fund in mind (Boberg 'Delict' 598-9; Boberg 1988 
BML 11 12). Considerations of utility require that 'there should be a further scaling down for the advantages of a 
lump sum as compared with the prospect of a long series of future and therefore uncertain payments' (Pearson Cmnd 
7054 1978 vol 1 155 para 716; see too Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed 79). 
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Summary: Life annuities provide a medium for contractually 
transferring the risk of early and late death to a life insurer. The use 
of actuaries by the couns has its origin in the need for evidence as 
to the price at which to purchase a life annuity. This evidence has 
with time become corrupted into a fiction about consuming interest 
and capital over the expectation of life. In recent years there has 
been a resurgence of interest in life annuities in the form of 
'settlement annuities'. There are a variety of different annuity 
contracts of which the 'annuity certain' and the 'life annuity' deserve 
special note. It was the practice in the classical Roman-Dutch law 
to ignore the price at which 'life annuities' were commercially 
available. That practice, with few exceptions, continues today. 
[7.1] DEFINITIONS 
113 
An annuity is the right to two or more payments, 1 usually at monthly or yearly intervals, 
perhaps subject to various conditions. An annuity is distinguished from a loan at interest by 
the feature that at the end of the term there is no repayment of the original capital.2 There 
are a variety of different types of annuity distinguished by the contingencies to which they 
are subject: 
[7.1.1] Life annuity: The right to a series of periodic payments, usually made monthly or 
yearly, which will cease upon the death of the contingent life. 
[7.1.2] Joint-life annuity: An annuity payable until the first death amongst the two or more 
contingent lives. 
[7.1.3] Joint-life and survivor annuity: An annuity payable until the last death amongst two 
or more contingent lives. 
[7.1.4] Deferred life annuity: The right to a series of periodic payments commencing at 
some future time, usually retirement age and thereafter payable until the death of the 
contingent life or lives. 3 This annuity is familiar to the South African public as a 'retirement 
annuity' or simply 'annuity'. This last colloquial usage can be a source of some confusion 
1SIR v Watenneyer 1965 4 SA 431 (A). 
2KBI &: MMF v Hogan 1993 (A) (unreported 28.5.93 cases 663/91 & 683/91). 
3Such annuities are usually guaranteed payable for the first 5 or 10 years after commencement regardless of whether 
the contingent life lives or dies. 
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when annuities, in the more formal sense, are discussed. 
[7.1.5] Immediate annuity: An annuity in terms of which payments commence 
immediately. In this thesis the word 'annuity' refers to an immediate annuity, as distinct 
from a deferred annuity. 
[7.1.6] Annuity cerlain: The periodic payments are unconditionally guaranteed for a stated 
period of time, regardless of whether the annuitant lives or dies. 
[7.1. 7] Increasing annuity: The periodic payments increase on a regular basis according to 
a stated formula or set of rules. Usually there is a fixed rate of increase (5 % 10% or 
perhaps 15% per year compound or simple).4 Some increases are determined on .a 'with 
profits' basis, ie according to the investment profits achieved by the particular life office 
underwriting the contract. 5 There is a reported instance from Australia of a life annuity 
which increases in line with the consumer price index.6 
[7.1.8] Settlement annuity: This is an immediate increasing life annuity actuarially designed 
by a life office to provide for instalments of compensation for loss of income or support . 
. Evidence of the purchase price for such an annuity has been used in lieu of the more usual 
form of actuarial evidence.7 The MMF effectively issues such an annuity when it elects to 
pay compensation by instalments. 8 For a number of reasons South African life insurers are 
unwilling to quote for such annuities. 9 
[7.1.9] The right to an annuity: This is acquired by the payment of a lump sum to the 
insurer, the price or premium. A number of life offices10 will these days provide a 
surrender value should the owner of the contract wish to redeem the remaining capital. With 
retirement annuities there are restrictions placed by legislation on the extent to which capital 
may be withdrawn. Under a life annuity the insurer may demand evidence of good health 
before releasing the surrender value. 
4Such contracts are issued by Sanlam, Old Mutual, Norwich Life, inter alia. 
5The increasing annuity offered by Liberty Life would seem to be of this nature. 
6Gratton 'Immediate Annuity Business in Australia' 1985 (unpublished) 'at least one office in Australia alread·y offers 
CPI indexed annuities'. The political uncertainty of the South African economy renders such contracts unduly risky 
for South African insurers who must consider the possibility of a long period of high inflation rates coupled with 
· 1ow investment returns. 
7Blattenburg (1986) 20 171e Actuary 5; Lloyd's List August 9 1991; Patel 1993 The Actuary 16. In England 
settlement annuities provide a means for introducing actuarial evidence which would otherwise not be acceptable (see 
Koch 'Damages' 49). 
8ln terms of article 43 of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989. See Marine & Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 4 SA 
961 (A) . 
9For such a scheme to work every claimant must be compelled to invest the compensation-money with the life insurer 
and write it all off in the event of death. This eliminates what actuaries call adverse selection. It is well known that 
persons who voluntarily purchase life annuities have above average expectations of longevity. Life insurers in South 
· Africa are also unwilling to assume liability for payments which increase in line with wages or commodity prices 
(see 132). 
10Sanlam, Federated Employers, inter alia. The facility is not generally advertised. 
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[7.1.10] Taxation of annuity payments: In general annuity payments are gross income and 
subject to income tax. 11 If the annuity has been purchased with free capital, 12 then the 
capital content of the payments is not taxed. 13 An actuarial certificate is issued by the life 
office as to the proportion of the regular payment that represents capital. With increasing 
annuities this leads to a far more favourable tax position than with fixed interest deposits 
because the initial taxable income is relatively low compared to interest receipts on invested 
capital. With fixed-interest deposits subject to consumption of interest and capital the interest 
income will decline as the years go by; with an increasing annuity the taxable income will 
increase in line with the annuity payments. If the tax tables are regularly adjusted downward 
for fiscal drag14 the average tax liability is far less with the increasing annuity that it would 
be for an equivalent interest-bearing deposit. 
Annuities paid in terms of ss39(l)(c) or (d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act15 are 
exempt from tax. 16 The exemption does not apply to temporary pensions payable in terms 
of s38 nor to payments for loss of support made in terms of s40. This is probably an 
oversight. The incomes involved are usually so small that they, in any event, do not give 
rise to a liability for taxation. 
Revenue practice is to tax instalments of lost earnings or support made in terms of the 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act17 except when such payments are made in 
respect of medical and related expenses. 
[7.2] FORENSIC APPLICATIONS 
[7.2.1] Price of a life annuity: The issue price, the premium payable for the right to a life 
annuity, is these days calculated using the year-by-year method. During the 19th century the 
issue price was often calculated using the gross multiplier method, a safe approach for the 
life office since, as I have noted, 18 the gross multiplier method tends to overstate the present 
value, that is to say the issue price. The original purpose of actuarial evidence would seem 
to have been to advise the court as to the appropriate price for the issue of a suitable life 
annuity. The earliest recorded use of an actuary by a South African court was in 1886 when 
Mr Mouat was called 'to shew that it would require about £1100 to buy an annuity of £104 
on the life of a man aged 48' 19 and between £703 and £861 to secure an annuity 'upon the 
''SIR v Watenneyer 1965 4 SA 431 (A); definition of 'gross income' subsec (a) of sl oflncome Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
See too KB/ & MMF v Hogan 1993 (A) (unreported 28.5.93 cases 663/91 & 683/91). 
12That is to say capital which does not by law have to be invested through an approved pension funding scheme. 
13s10A Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
14See 232. 
1530 of 1941. 
16slO(l)(gB) of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
17 Article 43 of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989. 
18See 97. 
19Qair v PE Harbour Board (1886) 5 EDC 311 317sup. 
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contingency of the joint lives of plaintiff and her late husband' .20 The court here clearly 
had in mind life annuities and not annuities certain. This would seem to be the first, and the 
last, case in which a South African court has made any clear distinction between the two 
types of annuity. There is one subsequent explicit reference to a life annuity but it is by no 
means clear that the court appreciated the significance of the words. 21 
[7.2.2] Changing perceptions: A number of judgments from the early twentieth century 
would seem to suggest that the purchase of an annuity certain was at least contemplated.22 
In 1935 we find the first reference to a plaintiff consuming interest and capital,23 a notion 
which was subsequently given unambiguous expression in Gillbanks v Sigoumay. 24 The 
notion of a plaintiff who himself, instead of the life office, consumes interest and capital has 
substantially displaced consideration of a purchased annuity. 25 It may be that this 
displacement is more a preference for a particular terminology than a conscious decision in 
favour of any particular financial instrument. It may well be that the purchase of an annuity 
certain, a life annuity or self-investment and consuming interest and capital are not properly 
distinguished from one another and are thus all perceived, for practical purposes, to involve 
restitution through the medium of consuming interest and capital. What is clear is that the 
role of risk has been increasingly ignored by the forensic dialectic, possibly due to the 
absence of an adequate theoretical basis for its inclusion. 
[7.2.3] Modern life annuities: The availability of life annuities has certain significance within 
the modern context: 
* A life annuity permits a risk-averse plaintiff to insure himself against the risk of living 
too long. The rates for early ages are unattractive26 by comparison with other 
investment media, such as participation mortgage bonds. 27 A diligent investor would 
probably defer the purchase of an increasing life annuity until his late 60's or early 70's 
when a significant advantage is perceivable. 28 Comparison with a fixed-interest 
20Qair v PE Harbour Board (1886) 5 EDC 311 318sup. 
21 Butler v Durban Corporation 1936 NPD 139 150. 
22See, for instance, 01islwlm v ERPM 1909 TH 297 302; Waring & Gil/ow Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340; Dale v 
Hamilton 1924 WLD 184 204. 
23Davies v Crossling 1935 WLD 107 114. 
24 1959 2 SA 11 (N) 15A. 
25Some jurists still allude to the purchase of an annuity certain: Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 99n615; Boberg 1988 BML 
11 (Boberg does not distinguish between consuming interest and capital and the purchase of an annuity). 
261..argely due, it seems, to life office fears of selection against the office by persons of unusual longevity. The poor 
competitiveness of the rates for young ages may also reflect an unwillingness by the offices to write annuity business 
of very Jong duration. 
27These offer comparable if not better short-term returns and guarantee a return of the capital invested. See table 
lOB at 123 for rates of interest on PMB schemes. 
28For earlier ages the rate of return does not significantly exceed that available on investments which do not require 
the forfe iture of capital. 
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deposit leads to a perception that the purchaser's capital is forfeited to the life office.29 
The ability to purchase an increasing annuity certain provides access for persons with 
limited capital to the very high rates of investment return achieved by life offices. 
Investment income can be released at rates appropriate to the needs of the investor. 
The problem of forfeiture of capital on early death can be avoided by using annuities 
certain coupled with an endowment plan. This form of investment can be taken for a 
period as short as 10 years. This availability of this investment medium, and the 
associated high returns, can have considerable relevance to the duty of mitigation.30 
[7.2.4] Discount rates of return: In Kotwane v UNSBic31 the court took judicial notice of 
a nominal discount rate of interest of 5 % per year compound. One sometimes finds similar 
unrealistically low nominal discount rates used by actuaries, although instances of this have 
become rare. As I have noted above the availability of increasing annuities ensures that even 
claimants with fairly small amounts of money can invest at quite good rates of return. A 
survey of increasing annuity prices in 1991 indicated a rate of return to the purchaser of 
about 17% per year compound,32 well above the rate of inflation. 
[7.2.5] Immunisation theory: Actuarial theory as regards the discount rate for pricing 
immediate annuities focuses on fixed-interest investments coupled with annuity payments that 
do not increase. This permits 'immunisation '33 and avoidance of the 'reinvestment risk'. 34 
These considerations, however, are generally given only lip service by life insurers in South 
Africa when competing for investor funds by way of immediate annuity contracts: 
* 
* 
In South Africa there are insufficient fixed-interest investments of long enough duration 
to permit immunisation in the classical sense. 
The rates at which immediate annuities are being issued (17% per year in 1991) 
discount returns that exceed the rates available on fixed interest investments (16,3 % per 
year in 1991).35 The rate of 17% per year is the internal rate of return36 offered by 
29This is true of the standard form of immediate life annuity quoted by a life office. A guarantee of a return of 
capital can be obtained by writing a whole life contract together with a life annuity contract, but then with a major 
reduction in the rate of return offered by the contract. 
301n Kotwane v UNSB/C 1982 4 SA 458 (0) 466-7 the court did its own actuarial calculations and adopted a net 
capitalization rate of minus 6,25% per year. The plaintiff could at the time have purchased an increasing annuity 
certain based on a net capitalization rate of about 0% per year which included allowance for real increases in 
earnings above the rate of inflation. 
31 1982 4 SA 458 (0) . . 
32Based on a survey in 1989 of 5 Ii fe offices that issue such contracts. A follow-up survey in 1991 revealed much 
the same levels of discount rates. In 1993 the rates have dropped to about 1 % per year compound. 
33See, for instance, Redington 1952 JIA 286. 
34When a future interest payment is received the investment rates then current may be different, higher or lower, 
from those at which the original investment was made. Where use is made of an expected future rate of return there 
is an implicit assumption that the reinvestment rates will be the same as the original investment rate. This is a valid 
assumption for pricing one-off payments, such as damages awards, but not necessarily valid when the solvency of 
a life office may be at risk and reserves need to be set up to ensure continuing solvency. 
35See table lOB at 123. 
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the contract to the investor. 37 The life office actuary would have used a higher 
discount rate but would then have built in allowance for the expenses of the life office, 
thereby reducing the effective internal rate of return to the investor. Observed high 
rates of return on immediate annuities can only explained if one assumes investment in 
growth investments such as share market equities and immovable property. The pricing 
of immediate annuities in South Africa has not been the subject of any paper to the 
Actuarial Society. 
The contracts used for the survey that revealed an internal rate of return of 17% per 
year were all with payments increasing over 25 years at 13,2 % per year compound. 
The long period and fact of increasing instalments placed the problem firmly outside 
considerations of the classical theory. The actuary setting the rates was thereby 
compelled to take a view on the expected long-term investment return in general. 38 
I conclude that actuarial theory as regards immunisation and avoidance of reinvestment risk 
is irrelevant to the assessment of damages for a single individual. This is so not only 
because of the inordinately long periods of time usually covered by an assessment, but also 
because the calculation has regard to payments that increase, usually in line with inflation. 
The theory, in any event, seems to be little applied, even in the life office context. 
Prevett39 lists a number of objections to the use of life annuities for compensation purposes 
but these objections reflect more on the limited nature of the contracts available than on the 
principle in general. The more flexible forms of annuity contracts have been designated 
'settlement annuities' .40 
[7.3] THE ROMAN-DUTCH PRACTICE 
[7.3.1] Market values: The available evidence suggests · that in 17th century Holland the 
courts ignored the current market prices for life annuities and based compensation on the 
tables from the Digest, 41 by then 1000 years old. The commercial rates, unlike modem 
rates, had no regard for the age of the contingent life. Quite apart from this aspect the 
financial differences are quite startling. Table 9 below shows 16th and 17th century 
commercial rates42 together with Ulpian's life table from the Digest. 
[7.3.2] Meaning of 'liifrente': Grotius notes that compensation for dependants should be 
calculated on the basis of a 'lijfrente'43 regard being had to the age of the deceased.44 
36See 128. 
37Contracts (annuities certain) free of the mortality risk were examined. 
38See 135. 
39 1972 MLR 140 144 155. 
"°See 114. 
41 See table 1 at 15. 
42Kopf (1927) 13 PCAS 225 238; Houtzager 'Lijfrente/eningen' 43 58 73 74 84 85 90 98. The bond rate refers to 
what we would today call fixed interest government bonds. Withey ' Annuities' 107 records that life annuities about 
1800 were yielding 12% to 14% per year, ie 7 to 8 years' purchase. 
43Grotius lnleiding 3.33.2 'ghereeckent by maniere van /ijfrente' . 
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TABLE 9 - EUROPEAN LIFE ANNUITY & BOND RA TES 
ULPIAN'S TABLE Years' 
---Purchase---
Years' Single Joint Bond 
Age Purchase Year life life rate 
0-20 30 1554 6 8 8,3% 
21-25 28 1606 7 9 7,1% 
26-30 25 1608 8 10 6,3% 
. 30-35 22 1634 9 11 5,0% 
36-40 20 1646 10 12? 5,0% 
40-50 60-age-1 1653 11 13? 5,0% 
50-55 9 1665 12 15? 4,0% 
55-60 7 1671 14 17 4,0% 
61 + 5 
Rates flagged with '?' have been estimated. 
Years' purchase is the present v'!-lue of one unit of currency after discounts for 
delay and the risk of death. This is the multiplier to be applied to the yearly 
amount to obtain the capital sum. The lower the multiplier the lower the capital 
sum and the higher the associated discount rate of return. 
The allowance to be made for mortality was not based on any scientific life table 
approach as it is today. A form of 'gut feel' approach seems to have been used, 
strongly influenced by what was popularly considered to be a fair price. An 
attempt by De Witt to place annuity price calculations on a sound basis (see 
paragraph 7.3.3) was one of the factors harked on by his enemies in bringing about 
his downfall. 
119 
Grotius was well aware of the commercial rates. 45 His note that account be taken of the 
age of the deceased clearly points to Ulpian's table, despite the dramatically lower values for 
commercially available life annuities. 46 It is interesting to note that in the 17th century the 
standard joint life annuity expired on the last death, and not on the first death as is required 
for dependency calculations. One co~ld not in those days buy a life annuity as one may 
«Grotius De be/Ii ac pacis 2.17. 13 ' ratione habita aetatis occisi'. 
45Grotius lnleiding 3.14.19 'soo magmen oock voor ghereed geld niet meer renten koopen dan de redelickheid toe 
en laet, te weten zes ofte zeven ten honderd'; 3.14.20 'Hier van ;:.ijn vrij de /ijfrenten, dat is renten die alleen duiren 
soo lang als duirt het /even van de rentheffer'. 
46-J"his is the view of Feenstra 1958 Al 27 3ln23 and Davel 'Broodwinner' 126n95. 
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today. Governments and municipalities raised capital by the issue of life annuities.47 Only 
when such a fund-raising issue occurred could a life annuity be purchased. There was no 
market such as exists today for trading in the fixed interest securities of government and 
semi-government bodies. 
[7.3.3] Johan de Witt: In table 9 one may observe a trend of declining interest rates during 
the 17th century in Holland. This did · not reflect the operation of free market forces but 
government intervention in a deliberate attempt to keep down the cost of the borrowings 
needed to fight the incessant wars. The mastermind behind the reduction in interest rates was 
Johan De Witt, onetime advocate and later 'Raadspensionaris' of Holland. In 1671 De Witt 
presented the States General with a life annuity scheme calculated using a scientific 
year-by-year technique. The resulting annuity prices were far higher than the Hollanders had 
been accustomed to pay. De Witt's political enemies accused him of seeking to line his own 
pocket and the scheme was rejected. With the coming to power of the Prince of Orange in 
1672 De Witt and his brother were gaoled and then officially executed.48 
[7.3.4] Voet's silence: Life annuities became in the process a politically charged issue and 
the discussion of loans and life annuities became a socially taboo topic. 49 It has been noted 
by South African courts that Voet does not mention 'lijfrenten' as a basis for assessing 
compensation for personal injury and death.so If one bears in mind that Voet was an 
impressionable 23 year-old when De Witt met his horrendous end one may speculate that 
Voet tactfully refrained in his writings from any discussion of life annuities. 
[7.3.5] The rise of life of.fices: De Witt's tragic tale was but a forerunner of a wave of 
annuity schemes, sound and unsound, that were inspired by the new mathematical techniques. 
Notable amongst these was the taking over of the finances of England by the South Sea 
Company. To stem the tide of unsound schemes the 'Bubble Act' was passed.st The South 
Sea 'bubble' collapsed shortly thereafter leaving many destitute. si These events led to 
legislation to restrict the issue of life annuities to approved institutions subject to actuarial 
control. 
The earliest mathematical technique was what we today know as the gross multiplier 
47This practice was by then on the wane but had been the dominant fund raising technique during the medieval 
centuries (ADlOOO to AD1500) when the prohibition on borrowing at interest had been at its most intense 
(Cambridge Economic History vol 3 527-53 vol 5 358-92; Kopf (1927) 13 PCAS 225 230). 
4
'Bouwstoffen 'Levensverzekeringen en Lijfrenten' 21 'Met geweldt uyt de Gevangenpoorte ghehae/dt, doodt 
gheslagen, ende haerluyder Lichamen schandelijck ende Moeder-naeckt op 't Schavot gebracht, ende met de Beenen 
aen de Wip aldaer staende ghehangen'. De Witt is today remembered as one of Holland's great statesmen and his 
statue stands before the Hague. 
49
'Men lioort weinig meer spreken van leeningen en /ijfrente' Bouwstoffen 'Levensverzekeringen en Lijfrenten' 21 
!A!Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 243-4; Maasberg v Hunt Leuchars & Hepburn 1944 WLD 2 14-15. 
51Bubble Companies etc Act 1825 (6 Geo 4c9 l) 
52Kopf (1927) 13 PCAS 225 253-5. 
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method53 • This was superseded by the more accurate year-by-year method54 which was 
first made public in the writings of De Moivre and Simpson during the years 1740 to 1744. 
Once a sound mathematical basis had been established for tackling the contingencies of 
human life it was possible for the first time to conduct life insurance business on a scientific 
basis. In 1756 the Equitable Assurance Society was formed by Royal Charter. The 'Old 
Equitable' conducted business on the novel basis of charging a premium that varied 
according to the age of the life to be assured. In 1777 the 'Annuity Act' was passed 
placing onerous registration requirements upon those who wished to issue annuities. The 
scientifically managed life offices, the 'Old Equitable', the 'Royal Exchange' and others, 
were granted exemption from the requirements of the Act. 55 This placed the life annuity 
business exclusively in the hands of the life insurance companies and today in South Africa 
only licensed insurers are permitted to conduct life annuity business. 56 
[7.4] CONCLUSIONS 
Life annuity contracts are historically important to an understanding of modern forensic 
attitudes to damages contingent upon human life. 
Increasing annuities for short periods, such as 10 years, provide a useful investment medium, 
particularly for smaller awards. Life annuities proper are not generally popular as an 
investment medium because they are perceived as requiring the investor to forfeit his capital 
when he dies. There are a number of other technical difficulties with using conventional life 
annuities as an investment medium. 
The discount rate of return used by life-office actuaries in South Africa to price life annuities 
is determined primarily by considerations of competition for investors' funds and thus 
provides one of the best guides to future investment returns. 
'Settlement annuities' have had their greatest success in jurisdictions where actuarial evidence 
is otherwise unacceptable, as in England, or where complex financial issues need to be 
communicated to an unsophisticated audience such as a jury. Neither of these factors prevail 
in South Africa. Instalment settlements in terms of third-party legislation provide a form of 
settlement annuity. 
53See paragraph 6.1.1. 
S4See paragraph 5 .4.1. 
55Supple 'The Royal Exchange Assurance' at l 18n. 
56See definition of 'life business' sl of the Insurance Act 27 of 1943. 
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TABLE lOA - YIELDS ON STOCK EXCHANGE EQUITIES: 1960 - 1991 
Year Div Capital Total CPI Real Averages 
Yield Growth Yield Yield /Oyr 15yr 20yr 
1960 7,1 9,5 7,7 10,9 
1961 7,0 3,2 10,2 2,0 8,3 8,9 6,2 9,7 
1962 6,1 20,8 26,9 1,5 26,3 11,1 5,6 9,3 
1963 5,5 17,0 22,5 1,1 22,1 8,5 5,6 8,3 
1964 5,3 13,4 18,7 2,5 16,5 7,3 8,3 7,4 
1965 5,3 1,8 7,1 3,7 3,3 4,3 9,6 8,2 
1966 5,1 15,0 20,l 3,7 16,6 1,3 7,5 8,9 
1967 4,5 14,1 18,6 3,3 15,4 1,4 7,6 7,1 
1968 3,1 46,1 49,2 1,8 48,0 (0,5) 4,9 5,1 
1969 3,7 (13,2) .. (9,5) 2,9 (12,5) 6,3 5,7 7,4 
1970 5,5 (29,7) (24,2) 4,9 (29,3) 12,4 9,6 8,3 
1971 5,3 4,1 9,4 6,4 3,0 10,5 11,4 8,8 
1972 3,7 57,2 60,9 6,5 53,l 7,6 6,9 5,7 
1973 5,1 1,2 6,3 9,5 (2,9) 8,1 7,2 
1974 6,4 9,5 15,9 11,6 4,4 7,4 9,1 
1975 8,1 (18,9) (10,8) 13,5 (22,8) 12,4 9,6 
1976 8,6 (10,9) (2,3) 11,2 (13,0) 17,0 11,6 
1977 7,3 20,6 27,9 11,0 16,6 13,1 9,3 
1978 6,6 27,8 34,4 10,9 22,8 11,0 
1979 5,2 81,8 87,0 13,2 69,0 8,5 
. 1980 7,0 32,2 39,2 13,8 24,3 4,2 
1981 7,9 (7,3) 0,6 15, 1 (13,1) 7,0 
1982 5,5 27,0 32,5 14,7 16,8 3,8 
1983 5,7 8,1 13,8 12,3 1,7 
1984 5,6 3,6 9,2 11,6 (2,0) 
1985 4,9 34,4 39,3 16,2 21,3 
1986 3,8 49,1 52,9 18,7 30,4 
1987 4,7 (8,0) (3,3) 16, 1 (17,0) 
1988 4,5 9,6 14,l 13,0 1,4 
1989 3,6 49,5 53,l 14,7 35,0 
1990 4,1 (8,6) (4,5) 14,3 (16,8) 
1991 3,3 26,5 29,8 15,3 13,3 
1992 3,6 (5,4) (1,8) 
Averages 5,4 12,4 17,8 9,5 8,3 
Source: 'The Quantum Yearbook' 1993 50 
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TABLE lOB - YIELDS ON FIXED-INTEREST INVESTMENTS: 1960 - 1991 
Year CPI Yield Es com Part Home Bank Deposits Guardians 
Index Stock Bonds Loans Fund 
1960 1,3 5,3 5,8 6,2 6,5 5,0 4,0 
1961 2,0 5,8 6,3 6,7 7,0 5,5 4,5 
1962 . 1,5 5,4 5,3 5,7 6,5 4,5 4,5 
1963 1,4 4,8 5,1 5,7 6,5 4,5 4,5 
1964 2,5 4,8 5,6 6,2 7,0 5,5 4,5 
1965 3,7 5,6 6,7 6,7 7,5 6,0 4,5 
1966 3,7 6,3 7,0 7,6 8,5 6,5 4,5 
1967 3,3 6,5 7,3 8, 1 8,5 7,0 5,0 
1968 1,8 6,5 7,2 8, 1 8,5 6,5 5,0 
1669 2,9 6,5 7,3 8,6 8,5 7,0 5,3 
1970 4,9 7,1 8,8 8,6 9,0 7,5 5,5 
1971 6,4 8,4 9,3 9,5 9,0 7,5 6,0 
1972 6,5 8,4 8,4 9,5 9,0 7,0 6,4 
1973 9,5 7,8 8,3 8,5 8,3 6,5 6,5 
1974 11,6 9,0 11,3 11,0 10,3 10,0 6,8 
1975 13,5 9,7 11,4 11,5 10,5 10,0 6,9 
1976 11,2 10,4 12,7 12,0 10,5 10,0 7,2 
1977 11,0 10,9 11,6 12,0 10,5 10,0 7,8 
1978 10,9 10,4 10,0 11,0 10,5 9,0 7,9 
1979 13,2 9,3 9,5 9,0 11,5 7,5 8,5 
1980 13,8 10,l 12,2 9,0 11,8 9,5 9,0 
1981 15,1 13,0 13,4 14,5 14,3 14,0 9,0 
1982 14,7 13,4 11,8 18,5 16,3 14,5 9,5 
1983 12,3 12,7 14,5 17,5 17,0 16,0 9,5 
1984 11,6 15,3 16,6 22,3 20,0 18,0 10,1 
1985 16,2 16,7 18,7 16,0 19,8 16,0 10,8 
1986 18,7 16,8 15,5 14,0 16,0 12,8 11,9 
1987 16, 1 15,4 15,7 12,5 14,5 13,0 12,4 
1988 13,0 16,4 16,6 15,0 16,8 15,0 12,8 
1989 14,7 16,8 15,5 18,0 20,0 17,5 13,0 
1990 14,3 15,9 15,8 19,0 20,0 18,5 14,5 
1991 15,3 16,2 16,3 18,0 20,0 17,5 14,5 
1992 13,9 15,2 15,0 15,0 16,8 12,8 15,0 
Avge 9,5 9,9 11,0 11,6 12,0 10,2 8,1 
Excess 
over CPI 0,4 1,5 2,1 2,5 0,7 (1,4) 
Source: 'The Quantum Yearbook' 1993 48 
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CHAYfER8 
THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY 
Summary: The 'discount rate of interest' is preferably described as 
the 'discount rate of return'. A nominal rate (I) comprises a real 
rate of return (R) and an offset to inflation (F). For compensation 
calculations R is the most imponant measure. Historical analysis 
suggests that/or South Africa R has a value of about 2,53 per year 
compound. The net capitalization rate will be different from R if the 
cash flow to be valued does not escalate in line with inflation. The 
allowance for the risk aspect of general contingencies is best 
achieved by an increase to the discount rate of return. 
[8.1] BASIC CONCEPTS 
125 
[8.1.1) Disutility of delayed payment: A payment of RlOOOO immediately has greater present 
value than an equal payment of RlOOOO due in ten years' time. 1 The proposition is true 
whether the RlOOOO is subsequently adjusted for inflation or not. The difference is the 
disutility of delay, that is to say that people will prefer to receive R 10000 now rather than 
later. 2 Typical of all personal utilities some people are less concerned about delayed 
payment than others. The discount for delayed payment is commonly ascertained by 
consideration of what amount invested now will yield RlOOOO in ten years' time. This 
procedural definition objectivizes the discount. 
It needs to be borne in mind, however, that in most instances of damages assessment the 
period of investment is uncertain because the claimant may die soon or live a very long life. 
There will also be the general contingencies that attach to earnings or support or future 
expenses. There is usually no question of the claimant using his award by consuming interest 
and capital to reproduce the required payments. For this reason the discount rate of return 
has an abstract quality when used in damages assessments. Bearing in mind that the lump 
sum awarded by way of damages is compensation, that is to say a price reflecting the present 
utility of what has been lost, it is preferable to view the discount rate of return as a pure 
time-money preference. In other words the disutility of delay rather than the actual return 
which the claimant will achieve on his compensation money. 
[8.1.2) Estimated market value: Consider the sale of a business or block of flats or offices 
by a willing seller to a willing buyer. Payment of the agreed purchase price acquires not 
only ownership of the asset but also entitlement to all incomes and profits generated by 
1
'0nzeecker ende toekomend goed niet soo veel waerd en is, als het.ze_kere ende tegenwoordige' Grotius 'lnleiding' 
3.32.16. 
~Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed 37-40. 
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that asset, and other benefits from the use thereof. 3 In other words the market value of 
the asset includes the present value of all income and profits expected from that asset. 
If by reason of a wrongful act there is a prospective loss of income or profits the market 
value of the asset will decrease. The present value of the future loss of profits or income 
is the reduction in the market value. Alternatively one might assess the present yalue of 
the loss by discounting at interest using a net capitalization rate of about 2,5 % per year, say, 
and then making a deduction for general contingencies to allow for the risks and 
uncertainties. This is the method generally used when assessing damages for personal injury 
or loss of support. A third approach is to build the general contingencies into the discount 
rate of interest and then discount to present value using a very high net capitalization rate of 
5% to 30% or more per year compound.4 These are all different ways of arriving at the 
reduction in present value of the future losses of income or profits that have been caused by 
the wrongful act. Each of these approaches is valid and whenever possible more than one 
approach should be used, the one being used as a check on the other. 5 The ultimate purpose 
of the inquiry is to identify a fair present value for what has been lost. With damages for 
personal injury and death there is no commercial market where earning capacities, or rights 
to support, are traded for lump-sum prices. For this reason it is not possible to check the 
validity of the discounting process by reference to actual lump-sum market values, as can be 
done with a business or a block of flats. Nonetheless it is useful to bear in mind that the 
result of a calculation discounting future losses for interest and general contingencies is 
merely an estimate of the notional lump-sum price that would be agreed if there was a 
commercial market. 6 
[8.1.3] Duty to mitigate: The assessment of damages, I have previously noted,7 is 
characterized by a tension between concretization, meticulous regard for the personal 
circumstances of the victim, and abstraction, the use of generalized rules which ease the 
burden of proof and speed up the assessment process. In theory a court should not deny a 
claimant or defendant the right to concretize. In practice exceptions to this guideline are to 
be found in the victim's duty to mitigate his damages and in the rules which require that 
certain collateral benefits be disregarded in the assessment process. 8 The disutility of delay 
in the payment of past debts has been held to be zero, 9 an example of legal abstraction. 
Future payments, however, when compensated by a present lump sum, will be reduced for 
the advantage of being received earlier. 10 In theory a claimant could testify that for him 
3See footnotes 22 at 8, 170 at 30, 55 at 221. 
4See table 11 at 161. 
ssee paragraph 3.3.9 . 
6See paragraph 12.1.4 for discussion of similarity between pricing earning capacity and pricing a block of flats . 
7See 31. 
'See, for instance: Assessment of Damages Act 9of1969; Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 
153; Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 920-1. 
9SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
IO General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A). 
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payment in advance has no advantage, no positive utility .11 It is conceivable that a court 
would then award compensation without making a discount for the advantage of early receipt. 
It is more likely, however, that a court apprised with such evidence would objectivize the 
disutility of delay by observing that the claimant should mitigate his damages by profitably 
investing the compensation money. 12 The expected return on the investment of the award 
would then be the measure, for compensation purposes, of the utility of the time value of 
money. 
[8.1.4] Objective investment standard: That objectivization is the general rule is evident from 
the total absence in court records of any mention of an actuary having consulted with the 
claimant as regards the claimant's investment abilities. This is consistent with the principle 
enunciated in Radebe v Hough 13 that the utility of money awarded to a claimant should be 
the same for all claimants. In Boonzaier v Provincial Insurance14 the court used as a 
discount rate the lower returns available from the Guardian's Fund. The modem tendency 
is, however, to create a trust15 thereby avoiding the relatively low rates of interest paid by 
the Guardian's Fund. 16 Exceptional costs associated with the management of the money 
will lead to an increased award. 17 As a general rule the rate of return assumed for 
discounting purposes would be net of investment management charges. 18 
[8.1.5] lntemal rate of return: The expected return on an investment is generally expressed 
as a yearly proportionate rate of increase to the monetary value of the investment, typically 
20% per year compound. 19 Compounding implies that the increase in year two builds on 
11This is probably true of many poorly educated persons living in subsistence economies where money plays only 
a minor role. Such persons may well keep cash savings under the mattress or in a box buried in the garden. 
12Usually on the basis of actuarial testimony (for example, Shield Insurance v Hall 1976 4 SA 431 (A) 443; AA 
Mutual Insurance v Maqula 1978 1 SA 805 (A) 812F; Ngubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 781E). There are 
recorded instances, however, when courts have taken judicial notice of the expected advantage from investment 
(Protea Assurance v Matinise 1978 1SA963 (A) 975E-F; Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 963C-D). 
In Kotwane v UNSBIC 1982 4 SA 458 (0) 466 the court refused a request to lead actuarial evidence and did its own 
actuarial calculation using a discount rate of its own choice. 
13 1949 1 SA 380 (A). 
141954 1 C&B 87 (C). 
15See, for instance, Dysse/ v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C). 
160ver the 32 years from 1960 to 1992 average rates for the Guardian's Fund were 8,1 % per year compared to an 
inflation rate of 9,5% per year and average returns on participation mortgage bonds of 11,6% per year (see table 
lOB at 123). 
17Marine & Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 985; Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 
10290-G; Arnold v Teno (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 609 (SCC) 635-6 . These cases are concerned with the administrative 
costs of a curator bonis rather than the cost of skilled investment advice. 
18Fama 'Foundations of Finance' 141-2 observes that the additional returns provided by skilled investment advice 
roughly match the cost of acquiring that advice. A survey by my office of the pricing of immediate annuity contracts 
issued by five life offices in March 1987 (unchanged at November 1991) revealed yields of 16,6% to 17,4% per year 
net after management expenses compared to a long-term Escom stock yield of 15% per year (16% per year in 1991; 
see table lOB at 123). The life office would in this instance serve as the skilled investment manager. 
1 ~able lOA at 122 shows an average return over 30 years of 9,3 % per year on share-market equities above the rate 
of inflation. If future inflation is expected to be 13% per year this implies a nominal rate of return of 23,5% per 
year (1,235=1,093xl,130). 
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both the original capital and the capitalized return from year one. The traditional analysis 
of investment returns uses fixed-interest investments as its paradigm. The annual rate of 
return is then referred to as the 'discount rate of interest'. This terminology focuses 
exclusively on fixed-interest investments when regard really needs to be had to the entire 
range of possible investments, particularly immovable property and share market equities. 
For this reason it is preferable to use the expression 'discount rate of return'. Financial 
analysts prefer the expression 'internal rate of return' (IRR)20 being the yearly rate of 
accrual needed to roll up the initial investment to its final value, including allowance for all 
capital growth, or depreciation, and payments of interest,21 dividends or rents. In this sense 
the rate of return is an abstract ratio that is derived from the investment model,22 that is say 
from the formula relating input rands to output rands. 
[8.1.6) Historical returns: The figures in table 10A23 are derived from the JSE Actuaries 
All-Share Index for December each year. The average return is based on a geometric 
average (also known as logarithmic). The figures reflect the returns available to persons who 
invest in a portfolio comprising the same assets as the index. In practice private individuals 
must be satisfied with a smaller spread of investments such is can be obtained by purchasing 
units in a mutual fund. 24 
[8.1. 7] The nominal rate and its components: The expected rate of return on an investment 
will include what the investor requires to offset inflation and also to offset the risks attaching 
to the investment. For fixed-interest investments this rate is known as the nominal rate of 
return (I)25 and needs to be distinguished from the real rate of return (R) which is the 
nominal rate of return less the rate of inflation (R=I-F).26 Thus for example a nominal rate 
~cCutcheon & Scott 'Mathematics of Finance' 38 88; Weston & Brigham 'Managerial Finance' 216-17; Mishan 
'Cost-Benefit Analysis' led 118-24. The concept of an internal rate of return goes hand-in-hand with a financial 
model reflecting expected payments (Brigham 'Financial Management' 437). 
210n long-dated fixed-interest investments which are traded the internal rate of return does not equal the rate of 
interest (the so-called ' running yield') , unless the price paid for the investment was equal to the maturity value. 
Government stocks, for instance, are not like building society fixed deposits. They are bought and sold at prices 
which reflect a premium or discount on the maturity value. The capital differential on maturity gives rise to an 
internal rate of return different from the running yield. Fixed-interest stocks are often traded by reference to the 
internal rate of return rather than the price per RlOO of stock. This practice implies that the interest payments can 
be re-invested at the same rate as the yield. For the longer dated stocks this is probably a reasonable assumption 
for purposes of choosing between different investments. 
22Brigham 'Financial management' 3ed 80n2 'In finance the term model refers to an equation or set of equations 
designed to show how one or more variables affect some other variables. Thus, a bond valuation model shows the 
mathematical relationship between a bond's price and the set of variables that determines this price'. Conversely 
the price may be known and the formula is then used to give the associated internal rate of return. 
23See 122. 
24My office has analyzed the performance of three general mutual funds (UAL, Guardbank, Old Mutual) using the 
same method as in table JOA at 122. This analysis suggested that mutual funds, even the better ones, do not perform 
as well as the index for all shares (used in table 10). 
2
'Grove 1990 THRHR 28-42 discusses the difference between what he calls a 'nominal' and an 'effective' rate. I 
use the term 'nominal rate' in this thesis in the sense of what Grove terms the 'effective annual rate'. 
26The formula 1-R is a rough approximation of the correct ratio formula (1 + R) = (l +1)/(1 +F) where F is the rate 
of inflation (see 99). This complication arises because the functions 1 + I, l + R and 1 +Fare ratios. For more detail 
I 
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of return of 20% per year compound with an inflation rate of 15 % per year would be 
associated with a real rate of return of 4,3 % per year.27 The real rate of return includes 
a basic real rate of return on a minimum risk investment,28 typically 2 % to 3 % per year, 
plus a premium for the effects of risk. 29 An increase to the discount rate of return reduces 
the associated present value. It follows that the deductions for general contingencies and the 
risk of death could be introduced by way of an increase to the discount rate of return. 30 In 
practice when assessing damages for personal injury and death it is usual to allow for risk, 
other than investment risk, by way of explicit percentage deductions separate from the 
discount rate. 31 Thus the risk of death is introduced actuarially by percentage deductions 
on a sliding scale applied on a year-by-year basis. 32 Other categories of risk are allowed 
for by way of a deduction for general contingencies.33 The allowance by the courts for risk 
separately from the discount rate of return, has its origin in the early damages cases where 
the cost of purchasing a life annuity was used as the basis for the damages calculation34• ·• 
[8.1.8] Risk of morlality: There is no reason why allowance for a risk such as mortality 
should not be included simply by using a higher discount rate of return.7 Instances of such 
an adjustment are to be found: The MMF has, for instance, recommended that its agents use 
a net capitalization rate of 4% per year. This may seem to be excessive in relation to 
actuarial rates of 2% to 3% per year. However, the calculations done by fund agents often 
do not make explicit separate allowance for mortality in the same way as is done by an 
actuary. The higher 4% rate used by fund agents then gives much the same end results as 
those obtained by actuaries8 because the actuaries include an additional discount for 
mortality. Similar comments apply to the high rates of 3% per year to 6% per year used by 
see Koch 'Damages' 74-6. 
27If one uses the correct formula 1,20/1,15=1.043=1 + R/100, ie R=4,3 3. 
21No investment is wholly free from risk, but some have lower risk profiles than others (see Wright v British 
Railways Board (1983) 2 All ER 698 (HL) 703c). 
29The add-on for risk can be substantial: In re Bird Precision Bellows (1984] 3 All ER 444 (ChD) 457-8 the business 
was valued using a real rate of return of 26,66 3 per year compound; in Buckingham v Francis [ 1986) 2 All ER 738 
(QBD) 742 a real rate of 253 per year compound was used. 
30See table 11 at 161. 
31 For the general application of this technique in business and social analysis see Weston & Brigham 'Managerial 
Finance' 272-3; Mishan 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed 298-9; Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed 74-80. 
32See paragraph 5.4.1. 
33The deduction for general contingencies is not confined to risk but extends to other factors such as the costs of 
travelling to and from work and the deduction of income tax which had not originally been deducted. 
34See, for instance, Rowley v London and North Western Railway (1861-73] All ER Rep 823 (Exch); Phillips v 
London & South Western Rail [1874-80) All ER Rep 1176 (CA) 1180-1; Gair v PE Harbour Board (1886) 5 EDC 
311 316-17; Smart v SAR&H 1928 NPD 361 366; Laney v Wal/em 1931 CPD 360 362 364. 
7Grotius 'lnleiding' 3.14.19-20 records that risk free investments are subject to a maximum rate of interest of 6,253 
per year, but that higher rates are permitted on life annuities because of the attendant risk of death. Gil/banks v 
Sigournay 1959 2 SA 11 (N) 14H 'Mr Warner suggested that I should use 5 per cent and not worry about 
contingencies' . The actuary had discounted at 4 3 per year compound. 
'Except when discounting over the expectation of life when the values calculated using 43 per year will usually be 
too low. 
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the courts mero motu when unassisted by an actuary. 9 The main danger with such an 
approach to mortality is that the court when using an actuarial calculation may not appreciate 
that in doing so it has already made adequate allowance for the contingency of early death 
and may then proceed to make a further unjustified contingency deduction. 10 
[8.1.9] Residual earning capacity: Compensation money in the hands of an entrepreneur may 
provide opportunities to generate income far · in excess of what was possible had he not been 
injured. Typical of such victims is the labourer who uses his money to buy a taxi. If his 
injuries prevent him from driving it himself he can easily hire a driver. One can also 
imagine the victim who buys a caravan park or an hotel. Any adjustment to the discount rate 
of return on this account would be an adjustment for residual earning capacity." If a 
widow takes up employment after the death of her husband the earnings from this source are 
ignored when assessing her damages. 12 The same principle will undoubtedly be applied to 
her successful use of an award for damages for loss of support. 
[8.2] THEORY OF REAL RATE OF RETURN 
[8.2.1] Net capitaliwtion rate: The vast majority of damages assessments are not concerned 
with the absolute values of future inflation and future nominal rates of investment return. 13 
The most important parameter14 for the courts is the real rate of return and the associated 
net capitalization rate. The real rate of return needs to be distinguished from the net 
capitalization rate because the latter includes allowance for non-investment factors such as 
future salary escalation above or below the rate of inflation. 15 Although the real rate of 
return and the net capitalization rate are often numerically equal, this is not always so. 
[8.2.2] Consistency between awards: The net capitalization rate is a matter of some 
9See table in Koch 'Damages' 331-3. Cases from 1966 onwards with actuarial input are recognizable by the 
separation of interest and inflation. 
10See footnote 47 at 86. 
"See paragraph 12.17.7. 
12Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A). 
13The use of separate allowances for future inflation and investment returns is generally confined to actuaries (see, 
for example, Bailey v Southern Insurance 1981 3 C&B 178 (C) and the subsequent approval of this practice in 
Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 115-16; see too cases listed in Koch 'Damages' 332-3). In Kotwane 
v UNSBJC 1982 4 SA 458 (0) 468 one finds judicial notice being taken of the separation of the two components. 
A nominal rate of return is only needed when the cash flow to be valued does not increase in line with inflation. 
This arises most commonly with certain housing subsidies and pensions under retirement annuity plans. 
14A parameter in applied mathematics is a linking common factor. The discount rate of return in this instance is not 
derived from observation of a market in earning capacities or lump-sum values for lost support, but by reference to 
a suitable surrogate market (see 26) such as the pricing of life annuities (see 113). 
"In Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 60 68 the court allowed for future salary increases in 
line with inflation only every second year with one third of the rate of inflation for intervening years, an effective 
net capitalization rate of 4,5% per year. In Brunt v M Mutual Insurance 1990 (W) (unreported 26.2.90 case 
19198/87) the court ordered the use of a nominal discount rate of return of 15 ,5 % per year coupled with a rate of 
salary escalation of 10,96% per year, that is to say a net capitalization rate of 4, l % per year. In Standard General 
lnsurance v Maluleka 1976 2 C&B 579 (A) 582-4 the court allowed, with reservations, for future increments in 
excess of the rate of inflation. More generally see Koch 'Damages' 133-5. 
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considerable importance when assessing damages. 16 Considerations of concretization would 
suggest that each claim be assessed on the basis of available evidence. Available evidence 
in this context does not mean having regard to the personal investment idiosyncrasies of the 
claimant but to general investment considerations such as one might expect to be adopted by 
the reasonable man who is neither too cautious nor too reckless. 17 As I have observed this 
is an objective standard. 18 If the courts have regard to the historical record as a basis for 
predicting the future one might anticipate some degree of conformity between the net 
capitalization rates used for different awards. Some recent rulings19 have rejected the 
historical record and the conventional wisdom of actuaries20 and preferred what can best be 
described as a 'gut-feel'21 approach in favour of a real rate of return of 1 % to 1,5% per 
year compound. These 'gut-feel' assessments are nonetheless objective in that they have no 
regard for the claimant's personal opinions on the matter. The use of 1 % per year would 
seem to have its origin in the practice of a prominent life office22 which had taken to 
valuing its pension fund liabilities using this rate. The rate has been described as a 
conservative one and, in the life-office context, includes allowance for future increases in 
16Rl0000 per year over 20 years discounted at 3 % py has a present value of R148775, at 2 % py this becomes 
R163514, at 1 % py R180456, at 0% py R200000. A court that adopted 0% py would arrive at a value for the 
damages 34 % higher than a court using 3 % py. If consistency between awards were of any importance then a 
standard rate for all claims should be used. Considerations of what is called the 'yield curve' (see 147) suggest that 
different discount rates should be used for different periods of loss. With damages calculations this refinement is 
generally ignored (see 147). 
11Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC) 488 line 41 ' the rate should be that produced by reasonably safe 
investments - such investments as a prudent man in the position of the plaintiff, very much concerned to preserve 
his capital, but not overcautious, would make'; see too Fleming 1977 AJCL 51 64n76. Friedman & Savage 1948 
JPE 279 284 'the probability is that the classes of investments which on the average return most to the investor are 
neither the very safest of all nor the very riskiest, but the intermediate classes which do not appeal either to timidity 
or to the gambling instinct'. Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 567G 'He said that he himself was 
accustomed to use 4 per cent but that he could not speak for all actuaries ... The actuary agreed that present day rates 
were substantially higher and that even for Government stock the rate was now 5,5 per cent or more. His evidence 
convinces me that by averaging out one could obtain 4,5 % , still within the limits of practicably unassailable security 
over a long period'. 
11See paragraph 8.1.3. 
190berholzer v NEG Insurance 1988 4 C&B A3-1 (C) (1 % per year); Gallie NO v NEG Insurance 1992 2 SA 731 
(C) (1,5 % per year) 'I do not, however, consider myself bound by the conventional wisdom prevailing in the 
actuaries profession at the present time' (2,5% per year); Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 
60-4 (1 % per year). Contra Brink v 171e MVA Fund 1991 (C) (unreported 2.8.91 case 6038/89) 2,5% per year; 
Ngubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 781E 'the actuary, having regard to inflation and capitalization of the award, 
used a nett capitalization rate of 3 % per annum compound'. 
21>Martens (1987) surveyed discount rates being used by actuaries active in compensation work in South Africa. This 
revealed net capitalization rates with 7 replies falling between 2 % and 3 % per year, 3 above this range and 2 below 
this range. A survey by my office at March 1987 of rates used by 5 major life offices to price increasing annuities 
certain revealed nominal rates ranging from 16,6% per year to 17,4% per year. The 20-year bond index for 1987 
averaged 15,4% per year, 1,4% per year below what life offices were prepared to guarantee. If a real rate of return 
of 2,5 % per year was implicit to the 20-year bond index then the life office rates implied a real rate of return of 
3,9% per year. See footnote 66. 
21 Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 114D. 
220Id Mutual. See next footnote. 
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salaries at rates above the rate of inflation. 23 The use by some courts of low rates of 1 % 
to 1,5 % per year is sporadic and higher rates are also in use24 depending on which actuaries 
give evidence. There is certainly no general rule in this regard. Actuaries favouring the 
lower rates would seem to be very much in the minority .25 There are substantial difficulties 
with fixing a real rate of return by reference to evidence. Even-handed justice and forensic 
efficiency would be best achieved by laying down a fixed standard real rate of return in the 
rules of court. 26 
[8.2.3] Good times and bad times: Considerations of hypothetically consuming interest and 
capital over a stated period of time casts the calculation into the contingency-fund mould27 
and can give rise to inappropriate margin building when pricing compensation for a single 
claimant. 28 Thus, for example, the failure of the ·defendant to offer compensation by 
instalments was held to cast onto the claimant the risk that inflation may exceed investment 
returns over an extended period of time. 29 It is of note in this regard that no life insurer 
in South Africa is prepared to issue a life policy which guarantees that benefits will increase 
in line with inflation. The reason for this lies in the contractual nature of a life office's 
obligations. A claimant who is faced with poor investment conditions can lower his standard 
of living or defer certain expenditure, as he would have done had he not been injured and 
had difficulties with his job. A life office does not have the same flexibility, it cannot reduce 
policy benefits which are contractually guaranteed. 30 The quid-pro-quo for the claimant 
who is faced with adverse investment returns is the prospect that if investment returns are 
far better than expected he can increase his standard of living. The real rate of return used 
for discounting the award, if fair to both claimant and defendant, would balance the down-
side chances against the upside chances. 
[8.3] INVESTMENT INDICES 
Personal expectations of the real rate of return are not readily measured. Prevailing financial 
indicators in South Africa provide us with a few rough guides: The consumer price index, 
23Brink v T11e MVA Fund 1991 (C) (unreported 2.8 .91 case 6038/89) 'Mr Cartwright was of the opinion that a 
discount rate of 1 % ought to be used, but this was based on what he readily conceded to be the "cautious" and 
"prudent" approach adopted by insurance companies (by one which he was employed)'. This 1 % per year rate is 
used by the pensions department at Old Mutual to value pension-fund liabilities and includes allowance for future 
real increa8es in the salaries. With compensation calculations it is usual to make explicit allowance for real 
increases, if any. The use of a 1 % per year rate can thus lead to double compensation. 
24Brink v The MVA Fund 1991 (C) (unreported 2.8.91 case 6038/89) 2,5% per year; Ngubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 
756 (A) 78 lE 3 % per year based on actuarial evidence. 
25See footnote 20. 
26See 144. 
27See 106. 
21See . footnote 23. 
29Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 64; the court elsewhere (at 66) noted the contingency that 
investment returns might substantially exceed the rate of inflation. See too Smith v SA Eagle Insurance 1986 2 SA 
314 (C) 318-19 'I must also inter a/ia weigh the possibility that the investment of the award might achieve a return 
greater than the.inflation rate against the possibility that the converse might occur'. The court then made a deduc.tion 
of 20 % for all contingencies including the investment issue. 
~ost life offices offer benefits which increase in line with investment returns. 
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the yield index and the dividend yield. These are now discussed in greater detail: 
[8.3.1] The consumer price index: The consumer price index as published by the Department 
of Statistics, despite its many weaknesses, 31 is generally accepted as a fair reflection of the 
rate of inflation. 32 Because of its high credibility it gives rise to a degree of self-
fulfilment. 33 Personal beliefs as to the rate of inflation will find expression in price and 
salary increases which will in turn determine the level of the index. There are a number of 
other indices such as the GDP deflator and the retail price index. In an active economy these 
indicators, along with the consumer price index, are all expected to give the same average 
values over an extended period of time. 34 There are a number of papers on inflation in 
relation to damages awards35 but these will not be discussed further here because they 
proceed from the unsound premise that the award can be used by consuming interest and 
capital to replace the lost income. 
[8.3.2] The dividend yield: The closest we can come to a direct measure of the real rate of 
return is to observe the dividend yield on the FT-Actuaries index for stock exchange 
prices. 36 This averages the yields on numerous different shares and reflects the dividend 
return obtainable if a portfolio was held which matched the shares making up the index. The 
historical analysis in table 10A37 suggests that over periods of 15 to 20 years the overall 
return, capital growth and dividends combined, will exceed the dividend yield at the 
beginning of the period by about 2 % per year. 38 If one accepts this observation as a 
predictor for future share-market returns in South Africa then a current dividend yield of 3 % 
per year indicates an average real rate of return over the next 15 to 20 years of 5 % per year 
compound above the rate of inflation. A small reduction may need to be applied to allow 
for taxation. 
[8.3.3] The yield index: An index is published daily in the South African financial press 
31The popular financial press includes numerous tilts at this all-too-conspicuous and potentially fallible index. The 
fact remains that it is the best general price index that can be achieved within the practical limitations of economic 
and demographic research. For a recent well balanced discussion see Farmer's Weekly April 16 1993 11 (Havinga). 
The Department of Statistics provides numerous subindices focusing upon select areas of expenditure. The building 
trade has developed its own special index (the Haylett formula). 
32 1985 Finance Week 31.1.85-6.2.85 152 'While noting their reservations, economists generally seem fairly satisfied 
by the cpi's reliability. "It's the best indicator that's available and I have no hangups about using it," concludes 
Falkena'; see too Corbett & Buchanan vol 4 at lxiv. 
33
'The prices of existing assets will always adjust themselves to changes in expectation concerning the prospective 
value of money' Keynes 'The General Theory' 142 . 
34For the same reason, the index is not very sensitive to the weightings used for the different classes of expense 
(Osborn Business Day 10.9.91 8). 
35See, for instance, Spandau 1975 SAU 31; Fleming 1977 (26) Al CL 51. 
363 ,3 % per year at April 1992. 
37At 122. 
38See analysis in table lOA at 122. 
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showing the average yields on an aggregated portfolio of fixed-interest stocks39 issued by 
government4° and other corporations. Yields are published for terms to redemption of 1 
to 25 years. The index record commences at 1960. Prior to the introduction of this index 
the heavily traded stocks issued by Escom served as a substitute for a formal index. The 
significance of the index is that it gives some guidance as to prevailing investor expectations 
on long-term investment returns. If the South African investment market was efficient41 
then the long-term yield would be in equilibrium with other forms of investment, such as the 
stock exchange and the property market, and would give an accurate guide to expected 
minimum-risk returns for all classes of investment. One suspects that the South African 
market is by no means as efficient as the markets in London and Tokyo.42 We may safely 
assume, however, that a reasonable degree of investor choice is reflected in the pricing of 
fixed-interest stocks43 and that the yield index, although not accurate to the second decimal 
place, does provide a fair indication of minimum44 long-term yield expectations by the 
market. It is certainly sufficiently accurate for the very approximate calculations required 
by the courts for assessing damages. The main problem is that the index gives a nominal 
rate of return and not a real rate of return. The expected level of future inflation implicit 
to the index is thus not immediately apparent. For tax reasons the purchasers of fixed-
interest stocks are largely investors who are not liable for tax on the interest receipts.45 
Thus for practical purposes the yield may be viewed as gross of taxation,46 that is to say 
39 A stock is a negotiable security which, in its most common form, promises to pay a fixed amount, the face value, 
at the end of the investment term, perhaps 20 years, with fixed interest payments every six months calculated on the 
face value. As market interest rates go up and down the price at which these securities are traded will fall below 
or rise above the face value. The yield to redemption, the internal rate of return, includes the value of the difference 
between price paid and redemption value. 
40Spandau 1975 SAU 31 46 records that the prices of government stocks are artificially increased by reason of 
prescribed asset requirements, that is to say the yields are artificially reduced. This restriction on the investments 
of life insurers and pension funds was removed early in 1989. The yields on long-dated stocks then moved upwards 
by about 'h % per year but ended the year on the same level as they began. 
41That is to i.ay that if all investors were well informed as to a wide variety of alternative investment opportunities 
and were able to switch their investments to take advantage of that information then the market prices for different 
investments would relate to one another in a rational manner. In practice all markets are inefficient to a greater of 
lesser degree and thus exhibit a certain degree of irrationality. It should be borne in mind, however, that even a 
fairly inefficient market will be substantially more efficient than a court of law. 
42A market with poor information transfer, and associated pricing anomalies, provides numerous opportunities for 
bargains for perceptive investors. For a highly critical discussion of conventional views on market efficiency see 
Clarkson & Plymen 'Improving the performance of equity portfolios' 1988 J/A 631 634-6 660-3. 
43Kantor reproduced in Koch 'Damages' 244-5 'All participants in financial markets have much to gain from 
estimating the inflation rate correctly.- Therefore, the current market long-term interest rates implicitly reflect the 
consensus of financial opinion about the average rate of inflation expected over the next 20 years'. Keynes 'The 
General Theory' 142 'The prices of existing assets will always adjust themselves to changes in expectation concerning 
the prospective value of money'. 
44See paragraph 8.3 .12. 
45Pension funds are major investors who are not liable for tax on interest. Life offices do not pay tax on interest 
receipts associated with retirement annuity and immediate annuity business. Until recently non-residents were 
substantial investors in government stock. They paid a flat 15 % withholding tax on the interest payments with the 
balance being remittable overseas, an attractive opportunity to withdraw substantial funds fr..om South Africa. 
46lf all investors experience the same tax liability in relation to an investment then that liability will be reflected in 
the market value at which such investments are exchanged. 
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investors can be expected to arrange their affairs to minimise liability for taxation. 
[8.3.4] Consumption of capital: The ballooning of investment funds47 will for many years, 
if not indefinitely, ensure sufficient funds for living off dividends and rentals alone. After 
prolonged periods of time (20 to 40 years) it may become necessary to sell some investments. 
This may well be achieved by the opportune switching to investments which provide more 
income and less capital growth, such as property trusts and syndication schemes.48 
Immovable property cannot be sold in small quantities and will usually be retained either for 
rental income49 or as owner accommodation. The notion that a plaintiff should consume 
interest and capital over his lifetime suggests that even the immovable properties must be 
sold in order to ensure total consumption of assets at the date expected for death at the time 
of the trial. This is unsound as an investment strategy. In the absence of injury or death 
many families will accumulate savings, usually in the form of a family home, but also 
through endowment policies, pension funds and other planned savings. The award of a 
capital lump sum has the result that these savings plans are fulfilled many years ahead of 
schedule. By paying cash for the home the family is relieved of bond repayments. The 
family car can be purchased for cash instead of on lease. Freedom from the burden of 
interest or lease charges are investment advantages which do not attract taxation. 
[8.3.5] Expectations and outcomes: Reliance on the yield index does not imply that 
investment should be made in the assets measured by the index. Investment in fixed-interest 
stocks should, as a general rule, be avoided by compensated victims and dependants. Thus, 
for instance, a 25-year investment bought in 1975 would have guaranteed a yield of 9,5% 
per year compound.50 A fair rate of return at the time of purchase but, with hindsight, 
hopelessly inadequate in relation to the average inflation rate of 13,9% per year which has 
prevailed since 1975. 51 This example emphasises the risks attaching to seemingly safe 
fixed-interest investments. Only investments such as share market equities and immovable 
property have provided returns since 1975 in excess of the rate of inflation. 9,5% per year 
compound nonetheless was a fair nominal rate in 1975 for discounting future losses. This 
is what Pepper has in mind when he states that: 
'Econom.ists tend to focus on the rate of interest at the start of a transaction, more 
precisely on the expected real rate of interest, ie on a nominal rate of interest less the 
expectation of inflation over the relevant term. The expected real rate of interest 
influences decisions to invest, eg to build a factory, and decisions to save. Actuaries 
are more interested in the realised rate of interest at the end of a transaction, ie the 
48Such schemes usually involve holding shares and loan accounts in a company which owns a substantial commercial 
or industrial property. These schemes give the small investor access to large-scale property investments. 
49Property neglect in later years will have the short-term effect of increasing cash income whilst depreciating the 
underlying asset. 
~Assuming consumption of income receipts or reinvestment at the original guaranteed rate. 
"If income receipts had been invested at the higher returns that have since been obtainable this would have increased 
the overall yield above that notionally obtainable when the investment was purchased. 
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nominal rate of interest less actual inflation over the relevant period. '52 
This passage states that the returns expected at present are one thing, but that the actual 
returns that will be achieved are something quite different. It also states that decisions to 
invest are based on present expectations and not eventual outcomes. In the next paragraph 
I discuss Keynes' concept of a 'barometer' of investment levels. 
[8.3.6] 'Barometer' of prevailing investment conditions: A claimant who was compensated 
in 1975 was able to invest the money into a market where business was conducted on the 
basis that future long-term yields would be 9 ,5 % per year. Hindsight tells us that there were 
ample opportunities to profit from the low level of yields in 1975. For instance had the 
claimant used the award to pay off the mortgage bond on his house he would have been 
spared the cost of subsequent increases in bond rates. The prices of share market equities 
and property were all very much lower in 1975 than they are today. The long-term yield of 
9,5% per year in 1975 was not a prediction of what interest rates would be but a measure, 
a 'barometer'53 of investment opportunities at the time that the award was made. It 
was a fair and proper basis for comparing investments in 1975. The victim who claims 
damages is required to accept a single lump sum in lieu of contingent future earnings and 
expenses. He then has cash which he can invest into a market where investment 
opportunities are being traded in anticipation of future investment returns of 9 ,5 % per year. 
It is submitted that if fairness is to be achieved the award that is made for damages should 
have regard to the state of the market at the time that the award is made. That lump-sum 
award, I have argued, 54 is the price that the wrongdoer pays as financial equivalent for what 
has been lost. The point I here seek to make is that it is a price of the same nature as the 
price that would be paid to purchase shares on the share market or immovable property or, 
if one wanted it, a long-term fixed-interest investment. 55 
[8.3. 7] Dispute resolution amongst actuaries: In their normal activities life-office and 
~1984 TFA 145 146. Collings 1982/83 TASSA 119 128-9 makes the same point when h.e states that 'Sometimes it 
is hard to understand why we spend so much time trying to devise plausible alternatives to market value. After all 
it is as far as is possible objective (ie independent of the opinions and methods of the valuator) .. . Personally I would 
hate to be accused of pretending to be wiser than the market'. See too Brown (presidential address) 1985/86 TASSA 
604 605 'We have often observed the dangers resting in our mystique. Many clients see the financial importance 
of their pension fund. They are puzzled by the underlying actuarial valuation assumptions, which seem to have little 
bearing on the assumptions they would make in their business activities'. In Brink v 711e MVA Fund 1991 (C) 
(unreported 2.8.91 case 6038/89) the court rejected a 1 % per year net capitalization rate on the grounds that it 
reflected life office conservatism. 
s3Keynes 'The General Theory' 151. 
s.see chapters 2 to 6. 
mThe considerations upon which expectations of prospective yields are based are partly existing facts which we can 
assume to be known more or less for certain, and partly future events which can only be forecasted with more or 
less confidence ... our usual practice (is) to take the existing situation and to project it into the future , modified only 
to the extent that we have more or less definite reasons for expecting a change . . . The actual results of an investment 
over a long term of years very seldom agree with the initial expectation' Keynes 'The General Theory' 147-52 
(emphasis supplied). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY 137 
pensions actuaries56 are seldom concerned with the pricing of financial instruments with a 
view to immediate re-investment in the wider market. One notable exception in this regard 
is the pricing of immediate annuities, 57 and then only when the life office wishes to be 
competitive. 58 Having regard to the tendency of some actuaries to use artificial discount 
rates for financial management purposes, 59 it is notable that the professional guidelines for 
actuaries emphasise the need to have regard to market rates of interest when calculating the 
value to be placed upon transfer values60 for the transfer of the savings61 of a pension-fund 
member to another pension fund. This directive ensures that a common standard of value 
is applied when calculating the transfer values, despite different actuarial bases for the 
normal financial management of the various funds involved.62 Pension funds generally 
invest part of their funds in growth investments such as share-market equities and immovable 
property. The yield to redemption on fixed interest investments thus also serves as a 
benchmark for the yields expected on other investments. The directive permits an actuary 
to deviate from the market rate if a future reinvestment risk63 is perceived as being of 
material proportions. One suspects that such a discretion would only be exercised when 
discounting is being done over fairly short periods up to 10 years. 
[8.3.8] Surrogate markets: If the damages assessment process were perceived as setting a 
fair price in exchange for what has been lost then we could describe the pricing of fixed-
interest stocks, and the associated yields, as a 'surrogate market'64 which enables the court 
to establish a market related value, that is to say a fair value, for what has been lost. The 
yield index65 commends itself for this purpose for a number of reasons: First and foremost 
~ere are some actuaries who specialise in trading investments rather than the setting of insurance premiums and 
ensuring the solvency of the fund. 
57See discussion of this topic at 117. 
58For various reasons a number of life offices do not wish to compete for immediate annuity business. 
»i"hat is to say when setting premiums and testing the solvency of a fund. For this purpose the artificial rates are 
quite satisfactory. 
60Faculty of Actuaries Members' Handbook paras 3.1 3.2 'One of the ways in which a market value assessment may 
be made is on the basis of market redemption yields on British Government Stocks of appropriate duration and type 
at the time of transfer with allowance for investment of future interest receipts as the actuary considers reasonable'. 
The point made by Pepper (see quotation at 135 above) is that here-and-now economic decisions assume that future 
interest receipts will be at the yield rate. The award of damages is a once-and-for-all here-and-now decision. The 
victim cannot come back later and ask for more money; the defendant cannot claim back surplus funds (see chapter 
on Contingency Funds at 106). 
611 use the word 'savings' here for the benefit of legally trained persons. Actuaries would not view these amounts 
as savings but rather the present value of the member's prospective rights to a pension and future lump sum payment. 
62Dissolution of a pension fund on the insolvency of an employer may result in transfer values going to several 
different funds as the employees find employment at different places. In South Africa the law does not prohibit the 
payment of a transfer value directly to the member. 
63Re-investment of interest receipts. 
64Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed 9-13 discusses the problem of estimating consumer willingness to pay when 
there is no market in the commodity whose value needs to be determined. A notional market price is then estimated 
by reference to a 'surrogate market' with suitable parallel characteristics. See Todd v Administrator, Transvaal 1972 
2 SA 874 (A) 8850 for an example of judicial pricing by reference to a surrogate market. 
65See 133. 
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it is readily ascertainable. Secondly it offers more than adequate accuracy for the fairly 
rough and ready requirements of a court.66 Thirdly actuaries have close regard to this index 
when setting the prices at which they will issue immediate annuities. 67 The long-term yield 
in the surrogate fixed-interest market provides a common valuation parameter just as for 
business premises the rental per square meter is commonly used to compare the rents of 
premises of different sizes. 
[8.3.9] Compensating errors: The long-term yield will include full allowance for prevailing 
investor perceptions of future fluctuations in interest rates. This allowance is by way of an 
add-on to the yield, the so-called liquidity premium. 68 The higher the yield the lower the 
market value. The risk of fluctuations thus gives rise to a reduction in market value. 
Judicial reasoning has been quite the reverse. Thus in one instance one finds a reduction 
in the discount rate of return to allow for the disutility of anticipated fluctuations.69 This 
is an example of the general theorem that the present utility of an expected value subject to 
uncertainty is always less than or equal to the expected value as a certainty. 70 Similar 
considerations explain why the allowance for general contingencies is almost always a 
deduction. 71 The reduction in the discount rate of return leads to an overstatement of the 
capital value. This is then, it seems, compensated by an over-deduction for general 
contingencies. An extreme example of this process is to be found in Kotwane v UNSBIC72 
where the court applied a contingency deduction of 60% to a capital value obtained by 
discounting at the very low rate of 5 % per year against wage escalations of 12 % per year.73 
[8.3.10] lmporlance of nominal rate of return: In practice the expected real rate of return 
is of far greater financial importance than the yield on long-dated fixed-interest stocks. The 
expected. long-term yield is nonetheless relevant: Firstly it provides a bench mark from 
66ln practice the expected real rate of return is far more financially important. The survey of actuarial bases by 
Martens (1987 - see footnote 20) revealed gross discount rates ranging from 8,5% per year to 15,5% per year at 
a time when the long-term stock yield was ranging between 15% to 16% per year. With such wide divergences of 
actuarial opinion it is clear that errors in the yield index of 'A% to 1h % are insignificant by comparison. A survey 
by my office at March 1987 of yields on increasing immediate annuities certain issued by 5 life offices revealed gross 
discount rates ranging from 16,6% per year to 17,4% per year (a repeat survey in 1991 revealed similar rates). This 
very much narrower range suggests that the life office actuaries had seriously applied their minds to the problem 
whereas the consulting actuaries had not. The annuities were to be contractually increased by 13,2 % per year 
compound. 
67See, for instance, Gratton 'Immediate Annuity Business in Australia' 1985 (unpublished - at page 43 of the 
discussion paper) 
68Pepper 1984 TFA 145 147. 
69The minority judgment in Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 587F ' It seems clear that the current rate of 
interest is not the proper rate for calculating the capital value of a future income over a long period. As was pointed 
out in the evidence, interest rates fluctuate' . 
70
' • • • the utility from a benefit that occurs with certainty is greater than the utility that comes from the expected value 
of a benefit . . . this is the same as inserting the expected value of the benefit and deducting the "cost of risk 
bearing"'Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed 79. See 157 below. 
71See 157. 
72 1982 4 SA 458 (0). 
73The court had refused to allow actuarial evidence to be led. 
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which to measure the real rate of return. Secondly the expected long-term yield provides a 
paradigm which gives a clearer insight into how we discount future losses. Thirdly the 
expected long-term yield is the relevant net capitalization rate when the future cash flows do 
not increase to offset inflation, as with some home loan subsidies and some pension benefits. 
The expected long-term yield is also relevant in the determination of the net capitalization 
rate when increases in future payments will only partly offset the effects of inflation as with 
most pensions, particularly those provided by the Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner.74 An actuary who adopts a nominal discount rate below the market rate will 
usually75 place too high a present value76 on future payments which are expected to 
escalate at rates below the rate of inflation. 
[8.3.11] Reliability of long-tennfixed-interest yield index: Despite its rejection in Sigournay 
v Gillbanks77 the current long-term yield has not been entirely disregarded. 78 The main 
objection to using a current rate is that a court might fall into the trap of using a nominal rate 
without a compensating adjustment for future inflation. 79 This would lead to too high a net 
capitalization rate with a consequent understatement of the capital value. That such fears are 
well founded is documented by the Australian experience. 80 An objection which has been 
raised against using the current long-term yield is the observation that future interest rates 
will fluctuate. 81 This objection is, however, without foundation because the market rate 
includes the market's allowance for the prospect of fluctuations. The tendency of the courts 
is to reduce the discount rate of return for the prospect of fluctuations. The market's 
allowance for fluctuations will be to add a margin for risk, that is to say to increase the rate 
of return. The overall effect is that the one adjustment tends to cancel out the other. 
[8.3.12] Mixed investment portfolio: Having thus far concentrated on the long-term stock 
yield it is as well to recall that what is really required is a guide to the general level of 
expected future returns on a mixed portfolio comprising a variety of investments (including 
7~hese are increased at about 403 of the rate of inflation (Koch 1987 THRHR 475 479). 
"I ·say 'usually' because some actuaries make special adjustments to compensate for their use of an unduly low 
nominal discount rate of return. 
76Compared to other investments available at the time. 
77 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 567 587. 
71Fabian has stated that: 'The most important area is that of interest and inflation. The author fixes the interest rate 
as the Jong-term rate on Escom stock and he chooses the CPI for inflation. I have no argument with either of those' 
Koch 1982/83 TASSA 78 104. 
19Andrews v Grand & Toy Alta Ltd (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 452 (SCC) 471-2 'One thing is abundantly clear: present 
rates should not be used with no allowance for future inflation. To do so would be patently unfair to the plaintiff. 
It is not, however, the level of inflation in the short term for which allowance must be made but that predicted over 
the long term. It is this expectation which is built into present interest. rates for long-term investments'. 
M>Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 319 'Murphy J drew attention to the injustice to plaintiffs that was being perpetrated by 
ignoring future wage increases while discounting at comparatively high rates of interest'. The problem was 
subsequently removed by the ruling in Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC) that a rate of 3 % per year 
compound be used in all instances. 
81 Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 587F; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 264. 
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immovable property and stock exchange equities). Fixed-interest stocks are perceived82 to 
have a low risk profile. For this reason the associated yields will generally be lower than 
for other forms of investment. It follows that the yield index may be viewed as a guide to 
a minimum expected level of return for a mixed portfolio. Tax liability depends on the mix 
of investments selected for the portfolio. Fixed-interest investments are generally heavily 
taxed and will thus be avoided by most portfolio managers except for the temporary 
harbouring of surplus funds. Small amounts of interest are tax free. 83 The capital growth 
on equities is tax free provided one does not buy and sell so actively as to qualify as a 
'trader' for tax purposes. Immovable property is subject to tax only on net rental after 
deduction of expenses, and provides tax-free accommodation for an owner-occupier. 84 The 
value of immovable property, can be expected to increase more or less in line with 
inflation. 85 Rentals on residential property are expected to be about 6% to 8 % on value 
before deduction of property taxes and maintenance costs. 86 Such rental statistics as are 
available indicate increases about 1,5 % per year below the rate of inflation.87 Considering 
the low level of the rentals revealed by the survey88 the low rate of increase may well 
reflect subsidised housing for persons of low income. One suspects that a survey of the 
rentals paid for higher priced residential properties, and business premises, would reveal 
rentals that increase, with leads and lags, in line with inflation. Social-welfare housing is 
not a recommended avenue for private investment. 
[8.3.13] F'ixed-interest investment involves high risks: Under conditions of high inflation 
fixed-interest deposits of short to medium term assume a very high risk profile indeed. This 
will in many cases be higher than that attaching to good immovable property and share 
market equities. The explanation for this is as follows: When interest rates are low, say 4 % 
per year, the ratio of total interest receipts over 25 years to capital invested is roughly 1 to 
1. When interest rates are at 16% per year the ratio rises to 4 to 1.89 Although the original 
nominal capital may be guaranteed, the rate of interest, the major portion of the investment, 
is not guaranteed. If the interest rate is guaranteed, as with long-dated stocks, then the 
interest risk is replaced with fluctuating values for the original capital invested.90 As has 
82The risk of default is very low but the risk of fluctuations in value is high. Many investors perceive risk in terms 
of preservation of nominal capital rather than preservation of real capital. This leads to overrating the security of 
fixed-interest investments. For long dated fixed-interest stocks the risk of fluctuations will often lead to a reduction 
in the market price of the stock, and thus in a higher yield, ie internal rate of return. 
13R2000 for 1992/93 tax year per sslO(l)(i)(xv) and (xvi) of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended). 
"'This reflects the consideration that persons with capital, unlike wage earners, are in a good position to take 
advantage of tax shelters (Beach v Reed Corrugated Cases [1956) 1 WLR 807; McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 322). 
15TRENDS 3 1991 30 gives an index for house prices which indicates that over a 10-year period to 1990 prices have 
kept pace with the rate of inflation. Houses bought 15 years ago have fallen behind inflation by 1 % per year. 
16Squire 'SA property & the valuer' 29-33. 
17CSS News Release of 10.4.90 indicates that flat rentals have increased over the 10 years 1979 to 1989 by 1,5% 
per year below the rate of inflation. 
11CSS News Release of 10.4.90 indicates, for example, R358 per month in i989 for a 3-bedroom unfurnished flat, 
that is about R540 per month in 1992 if escalated in line with inflation. 
89 And would be higher still if allowance were made for compounding. 
90See 136 for a discussion of the effect of inflation persistently exceeding the guaranteed rate of interest. 
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been discussed above large fixed-interest deposits are subject to the additional risk of heavy 
taxation compared to share market equities and immovable property. 
[8.4] QUANTIFYING THE REAL RATE OF RETURN 
[8.4.1] Estimates: If the yield index shows 16% per year for 25 year stocks and the dividend 
yield is 3,2 % this suggests91 that inflation is expected to average roughly 12,4 % per year 
in the long term.92 Traditionally fixed-interest investments have been viewed as having a 
lower risk profile than equities and immovable property. This conventional wisdom would 
give rise to a lower expected real rate of return for fixed-interest investments. One might 
guess this real return for this class of investments to be somewhere between 1 % per year and 
2,5% per year implying expected future inflation of between i3% and 15% per year. This 
expectation was appropriate in 1992. In 1993 the long-term yield index for fixed-interest 
stocks had dropped to 15% per year. Expected future inflation is thus 12% to 14% per year. 
There is an undemonstrable suspicion that in South Africa the pricing of long-term fixed-
interest stocks is based on investor expectations of a real rate of return of about 2,5 % per 
year. 
[8.4.2] Anomalous investor preferences: During times of high inflation real long-term rates 
of interest are generally lower than during times of low inflation.93 This is an odd 
phenomenon because inflation increases the risk attaching to the investment, and one would 
expect investors to demand a higher real rate of interest during times of high inflation. The 
explanation is probably that with the higher interest rates, and associated greater volatility, 
there is less demand, relative to the money supply, for borrowings with a consequent 
weakening of the lender's negotiating strength. The fact that many investors in fixed deposits 
continue to accept the lower real rate of return suggest substantial investor conservatism, a 
preference to stay with poor returns on a familiar form of investment.94 It has been noted 
that investors tend to be either too conservative or too reckless. 95 The middle-path 
investments which offer the best returns relative to the risks involved are generally 
considered too risky by risk-averse people and too dull for entrepreneurs. 
At a technical level one may note that there is a difference between the apparent real rate of 
return and the true effective real rate of return, and that the true real rate of return reduces 
as the rate of inflation increases. Suppose, for example, that an investor seeks an apparent 
91This is no more than a superficial impression. The analysis of share equity returns in table lOA at 122 suggests 
that expected returns on this type of investment are about 2% per year higher than the dividend yield, ie 5,2% per 
year (3,2%+2%). 
92Using the ratio formula (see 99). 
93Kantor as published in Koch 'Damages' 244 245. See too the graphs in Pepper 1984 TFA 145 148 151. Pepper 
146-50 qualifies his forecast of real rates of 3,25% to 3,5% per year with the assumption that 'there will not be a 
continuing rise in the rate of inflation, ie that the UK will not become a banana republic ' . 
94Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 168 maintain that 'the plaintiff could only be asked to place his capital in 
a safe and steady investment, which would normally produce a lower rate of interest than would an investment with 
more risk attached to it'. This echoes the now dated criterion of 'unassailable security over a long period'; 
Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 567G. Anderson 'Actuarial Evidence' 28 notes that a preference for bank 
deposits can lead to a loss of investment returns equal to a loss of half the capital. 
9
'Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 280 284. 
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real rate of return of 2,5 % per yea,r above the rate of inflation. If inflation is 5 % per year 
then he will ask for a return of 7 ,5 % per year. His true effective real rate of return is then 
2,4% per year.96 If, however, inflation rises to 15% per year then he will look for a return 
of 17, 5 % per year. His true effective real rate of return will then have dropped to 2, 2 % per 
year97 by reason of the increased rate of inflation. The observed fact that the real rate of 
return reduces with increasing rates of inflation may be cited as evidence that the market 
focuses on the apparent real rate of return and not on the true effective rate. 
[8.4.3] Measurement of liquUlity premium: Analysis of historical real rates of return has 
generally been by way of a comparison between the long-term yield and the current rate of 
inflation. 98 This seems prima facie to be unsound procedure in that it involves a 
comparison between 'apples and pears'. The procedure is sound, however, because it 
involves two stages rolled into one: Firstly a comparison between the current rate of inflation 
and short-term interest rates, usually 3 months or less; secondly, an analysis of the interest 
premium for long terms, that is the additional yield required by investors for the greater risks 
attaching to the extended period of exposure to risk. 99 
[8.4.4] Results of studies: Examination of interest and inflation rates in the United Kingdom 
over the period 1824 to 1983 has led Pepper to expect a real rate of return in the long term 
of 3,25% to 3,5% per year before tax on fixed interest investments.100 The period 
examined includes a number of major wars, the great depression, and the rise of 
communism. Kantor101 after comparing historical yields on Government long-term stock 
with the associated rates of inflation expresses the opinion that South African real rates will 
average between 1 % and 3 % per year over periods of 15 to 20 years. Yields on long-dated 
Escom stock have averaged 0,7% % per year more than Government stock over the years 
1960 to 1991. 102 The yield guaranteed on 'increasing annuities certain' sold by life offices 
in South Africa has exceeded the Escom yield by about 1 % per year. 103 
The above analyses have all focused on fixed interest investments and have no regard to the 
effect of income tax. These considerations do not invalidate the analyses if one accepts that 
the returns on fixed interest investments provide only indirect evidence of the investment 
96 1,075+ 1,05=1,024. 
97 1,175+ 1,15= 1,022. 
98Kantor as published in Koch 'Damages' 244 245; Gibson 1978 8 MU 637 650-1; Anderson 'Actuarial Evidence' 
30; Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC) 512-13. 
99Pepper 1984 TFA 145 147 'My preferred approach is, first, to examine the history of short-term real rates and, 
secondly, to investigate the liquidity premium, ie the difference between short- and long-term nominal interest rates'. 
uxiPepper 1984 TFA 145 150. 
101Published in Koch 'Damages' 244 245. 
102see table lOB at 123. 
103Based on a survey by my office conducted in March 1987. Replies were received from 5 life offices to a request 
for the price to issue a contract for R500 per month increasing at 13 ,2 % for a fixed period of 25 years. The Escom 
yield at March 1987 was 15,7% per year compared to a 17,03 per year average yield for the annuities certain. A 
repeat survey in 1991 yielded similar results. 
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returns available generally on a very much wider range of investments, that is to say serve 
as an index of investment conditions. As I have already noted fixed-interest investments per 
se are only attractive to persons who incur little or no tax liability, such as pension funds, 
banks and investors of relatively small sums of money. 
It has been said that the real rate of return proposed by actuaries for assessing compensation 
matters has been decreased over the last 30 years 'from 5 per cent to 4 per cent to 3 per cent 
and now, the majority, to 2,5 per cent'. 104 This trend, it has been argued, suggests that 
further decreases may be prognosticated for the future. There is little doubt that actuarial 
credibility as experts on the real rate of return is called into question by this trend. In 
fairness to actuaries, however, it should be borne in mind that the higher rates of 5 % and 
4 % per year were nominal rates before allowance for future inflation. 105 Economic theory 
suggests that if there is to be any motivation to save then the expected real rate of return 
must be greater than zero by a sufficient amount to make saving attractive as compared to 
immediate consumption of the capital. Low investor confidence for the future, such as 
prevailed in South Africa in 1992 and 1993, will generally give rise to reduced asset values, 
that is to say good long-term investment opportunities. Economically difficult periods such 
as the great depression have historically not lasted for extremely long periods compared to 
the 20 to 50 years generally required for damages calculations in resp~t of personal injury 
and death .106 
One would also like to think that consistency between different awards is an important 
consideration. 107 General consensus as to the real rate of return is essential to achieving 
such consistency. If one accepts the view proposed in this thesis that an award for damages 
is no more than a fair price for what has been lost, that is to say the lump-sum award is not 
the means by which to replace the lost income but merely a substitute for it, then it becomes 
evident that actual investment returns are not as important as the discount for delay that 
claimants' are prepared to accept now for immediate payment in lieu of the uncertain 
prospect of some future financial accrual or expense. 
[8.4.5) 2,5% per year real return: The above considerations suggest that the expected real 
rate of return net after tax on a mixed portfolio substantially exceeds 1 % per year and may 
well be as high as 4,5% per year. A middle path view would thus be about 2,5% per 
'
04Dusterwa/d v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B AJ-45 (C) 62 (per actuary Munro). 
'
0
'In other words they were nominal rather than real rates. Until the ruling in Bailey v Southern Insurance Assn 1984 
1 SA 98 (A) it was still arguable in court that allowance for future inflation was speculative and thus to be ignored. 
Rulings such as New India Assurance v Naidoo 1950 (A) (unreported 19.5.50) allowed for future wage escalation 
but would seem to have been ignored in the debate, possibly due to non-publication. 
106For a man aged 40 the standard actuarial calculation will be taken to age 99, that is to say over a period of 59 
years. The expected age at death would be about 65, that is to say some 25 years in the future. When analysing 
investments periods of 20 years or more in the future would generally be classed as being of very long term. 
107In Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B AJ-45 (C) 63 the court dismissed as irrelevant the general 
consensus of the majority of actuaries and the fact that their opinion had remained unchallenged. This was 
effectively a rejection of the normal basis used to assess damages. 
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year. 108 This presumes that the investor seeks professional advice from a reputable 
organisation. For larger sums the money to be invested might be split equally between two 
and possibly more investment managers with a view to making performance comparisons. 
Extended investment in fixed-interest stocks or deposits will generally be avoided. For small 
sums of money109 immediate life annuities with increasing instalments provide an attractive 
investment medium. 110 Every effort should be made to avoid investment in the Guardian's 
Fund. Ill By far the greatest investment risk faced by a compensated victim is the choice 
of a suitable investment advisor. 112 
The MMF capitalizes claims by discounting at 4% per year. This is done, however, without 
separate and explicit allowance for mortality as is done by actuaries. 113 The higher net 
capitalization rate includes the additional discount needed to allow for early death and thus 
tends to reproduce the results of actuaries fairly well. 
The English net multipliers are based on a fairly high net capitalization rate of 4,5 % per 
year. This does not seem to include allowance for the risk of early death but does seem to 
include allowance for the discount for general contingencies. 114 
[8.4.6] Prescribed real rate of return: There has been increasing disagreement in South 
Africa as to an appropriate real rate of return for discounting damages awards. 115 If there 
is to be conformity between awards, and the principle of distributive justice applied, then 
much the same rate should be used for assessing all claims. Determination of the real rate 
of return by reference to the evidence116 is to be condemned if it opens the door to wildly 
10sln Dusterwa/d v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 60-4 the court took an average view of future 
investment returns and found in favour of 1 % per year. 
1~ypically awards to dependent children. 
11
°These are subject to the favourable tax provisions of slOA of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. As a rule funds are 
invested in one of the so-called 'lOxlO plans' which combine an immediate annuity with an endowment policy having 
a 10-year term to maturity. 
111The average return on investments in the Guardian's Fund over the period 1960 to 1992 (see table lOB at 123) 
was 8,1 % per year compared to participation mortgage bonds at 11,6% per year and inflation at 9,5% per year. 
See Anderson 'Actuarial Evidence' 28 concerning the dangers of so-called 'safe investments'. 
112See, for instance, the article 'I relied on professional advice' published in Finance Week 19.12.85 790 and 27.2.86 
413-16. For more recent instances in South Africa see S v Vennaas (T) sub iudice 1991 to 1993 and the Masterbond 
debacle. The Financial Services Act 1986 in England requires that investment managers be registered with an 
approved financial body. 
113See 129. 
114See, for instance, the discussion of net multipliers in Mallett v McMonagle (1969) 2 All ER 178 (HL) 191. See 
too table 11 at 161. 
115See paragraph 8.2.2. 
116The South African courts have on the whole avoided the excesses that led the Australian High Court to lay down 
a fixed net capitalization rate of 3% per year compound (Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC)). Many 
Australian courts had failed to distinguish between a net capitalization rate and the nominal discount rate. An 
excessive proportion of court time had been devoted to extensive inconclusive evidence as to investment returns, 
inflation rates and taxation. 
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differing assessments. 117 Persistent substaptial divergences require the introduction of a 
prescribed real rate of return, 118 ideally by amendment to the Uniform Rules of Court. 119 
One might argue that the rate should be introduced by statute. However, if one bears in 
mind that the laid down rate is a procedural formalism 120 rather than a rule of law then 
resort to statute does seem to be unnecessary. 
[8.5] NET CAPITALIZATION RATES 
[8.5.1] Real increases in earnings: The standard net capitalization rate laid down for British 
Colombia in Canada includes allowance for real increases in earnings of 1 % per year 
compound above the rate of inflation. 121 This reflects the general tendency in the past122 
for wages in the Western World to increase in real terms. 123 South Africa has special 
features compared to the highly industrialized a,nd homogeneous populations of North 
America and Europe. Real growth in gross national product needs to exceed 3 % per year 
in South Africa merely to ensure adequate job creation. Much of the growth in Western 
earnings has stemmed from labour saving technology, particularly computers. In South 
Africa a major trend is to 'narrow the wage gap' between whites and non-whites. Average 
real earnings for whites in South Africa have barely increased between 1975 and 1990, 124 
whilst blacks have had real increases of 2,7% per year compound over the same period. 125 
117ln Kotwane v UNSBJC 1982 4 SA 458 (0) 466-7 the court allowed for wage escalation at 12 % per year coupled 
with a discount rate of interest of 5 % per year, a so-called negative net capitalization rate. A return in excess of 
13 % per year could have been obtained by investment in an immediate annuity with a life office. The low rates 
ordered in a series of Cape judgments of 1 % to 1,5 % per year (see footnote 19) are modest in comparison. 
111Anderson 'Actuarial Evidence' 12 records laid down net capitalization rates in Canada of 2,5% per year for 
Ontario and Nova Scotia with 2 % per year for British Colombia (the latter includes allowance for real increase in 
earnings at 1 % per year above the rate of inflation). 3 % per year has been laid down for Australia in Todorovic 
v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC). A similar result has been achieved in England by Mallett v McMonag/e [1969) 
2 All ER 178 (HL) 190 which held that the multipliers should be assessed without express allowance for inflation. 
The effect of this ruling is to lay down a net capitalization rate of about 4,5 % per year, that being the rate implicit 
to the English multipliers. 
119Anderson 'Actuarial Evidence' 12 records that the rate for Ontario is laid down in terms of the Supreme Court 
Rules of Practice. 
120See 34. 
121See footnote 118. 
122lndications are that these re.al rates of increase in earnings will not be repeated in the future to the same extent. 
123Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 157 record real increases in earnings of 2,72% per year 
compound since the beginning of the century with 3,3% per year after World War II until 1975. Anderson 
'Actuarial Evidence' 30 records more modest increases of 1,8% per year for the years 1958 to 1982 with -0,6% for 
the years 1978 to 1982. Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 208 records that average earnings in the 
United Kingdom increased by almost a factor of 10 between 1948 and 1977 compared to a price escalation factor 
of about 5. 
124TRENDS 3 1991 86. 
'"TRENDS 3 1991 86. De Bruijn has stated tl)at this real rate of increase includes allowance for promotions which 
are normally assessed separately in a damages ·calculation (Koch (1982/83) TASSA 78 109). Anderson 'Actuarial 
Evidence' 31 states that 'The wage and salary index is based on national averages and, therefore, does not reflect 
increases resulting from individual seniority, merit and promotion'. Anderson's view would be correct if the 
proportion of managers to workers was fixed throughout the period of observation. A black wage index would 
undoubtedly be greatly effected by the promotion of large numbers of blacks to management and other skilled posts 
such as nursing and teaching. 
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The very high levels of unemployment in South Africa are bound in time to weaken the 
negotiating strength of employees and it seems unlikely that the substantial real increases of 
the past will be maintained in the future. At the same time one may postulate the decline of 
real earnings for whites. 126 Older workers tend to be better paid than younger ones 
performing the same task. 127 
[8.5.2] Medical inflation: It is frequently necessary to capitalize expected future expenses 
by way of medical treatment or prostheses and related equipment. In some instances judges 
have dispensed with discounting altogether and merely multiplied the expense by the period 
over which it is expected to be incurred. 128 This practice led to speculation that there was 
a rule of law that future expenses should be treated in this manner. This speculation has 
been laid to rest by an appellate division ruling129 that the rate determined by actuarial 
evidence should apply. Past medical inflation has averaged below the rate of inflation in the 
long term but has exceeded the rate of inflation in the short term.130 The earnings of 
medical practitioners have not generally kept pace with inflation131 but have increased well 
above the rate of inflation over short periods. 132 These trends illustrate the point that care 
should be exercised with the interpretation of a substantial short-term increase in prices which 
may be no more than a temporary phenomenon. Allowance for the costs of future equipment 
and prostheses may justify an allowance for increases in excess of inflation if the goods are 
likely to be imported for long periods in the future. 133 Modem technology has, for 
126In Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 60 68 the court allowed for future salary increases in 
line with inflation every second year with only one third of inflation for intervening years, an effective investment 
differential of 4,5% per year average. In Brunt v AA Mutual Insurance 1990 (W) (unreported 26.2.90 case no 
19198/87) the court ordered a discount rate of return of 15,5% per year coupled with salary escalation of 10,96% 
per year, an investment differential of 4,1 % per year. 
127Kantor & Rees 'SA Economic Issues' 47. That is to say for persons who are not promoted and thus remain in 
the same job grade. 
128See, for example, Stockenstrom v Commercial Union Assurance 1974 2 C&B 435 (C) 436; Erdmann v Santam 
Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 404G. Newdigate & Honey 'The MVA Handbook' 158 express the opinion, in 
consultation with an actuary, that medical expenses will increase faster than inflation and should thus be discounted 
using a marginally lower net capitalization rate of 2 % per year. 
129Ngubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 769H 781E. 
" 1»fhe medical component of the consumer price index increased by an average 16,5% 0 per year over the 10 years 
1981 to 1991. The overall index increased by a comparable 14,6% per year. This indicates average medical price 
escalation of 1,7% per year compound in excess of the rate of inflation. However over the longer period 1970 to 
1991 medical inflation was 12,2% per year compared to the overall index at 12,6% per year. Thus over the longer 
term medical inflation has been marginally below the rate of inflation. 
131The earnings of self-employed medical practitioners have increased by an average 11,8 % per year compound over 
the period 1973 to 1990 with inflation averaging a comparable 13,7% py over the same period, that is 1,7% py 
below the rate of inflation. The earnings of self-employed surgeons have, however, increased by a higher 12,6% 
py which is only 1 % py below the rate of inflation ('The Income of Male Graduates' HSRC reports for 1984 1987 
1990). 
132For self-employed general practitioners the rate of increase in earnings has been 2,4% py above the rate of 
inflation for the period 1987 to 1990. For self-employed surgeons the rate has been 1,4 % py above. 
1330ver the 20 years 1970 to 1990 the Consumer Price Index escalated by an average 12,6% per year compound. 
Over the same period the combined effect of currency depreciation and foreign inflation gave rise to effective import 
price escalation of 13,3% py for United States of America, 15,6% py for United Kingdom and 15,3% per year for 
Federal Republic of Germany. This reflects real increases of 0,6 % py, 2,6 % py and 2,3 % py respectively (TRENDS 
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instance, increased the costs of motor cars due to the addition of enhanced features. 134 
Much of the related price increases have, however, contributed to the increase in the rate of 
inflation. In other words the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index 
includes a substantial component representing an improved standard of living and quality of 
goods rather than pure depreciation in currency values. The rate of inflation is also increased 
by high prices for expensive imported goods, usually technically advanced. Technology, on 
the other hand, has also greatly reduced the cost of devices such as radios and computers. 
In some instances price reductions will be achieved by local manufacture. 135 Persistent 
price rises above the rate of inflation are likely to bring about substitution as buyers seek 
cheaper alternatives or change their lifestyles by doing without. 136 Alternatively the rate 
of inflation will increase to accommodate the higher price levels. Over and above this 
consideration claimants who have been compensated by lump sum will be spending their own 
money and may be expected to optimize cost relative to effectiveness of goods or services 
purchased. 
In suitable circumstances medical and prosthetic expenditure may be deducted from taxable 
income. 137 Allowance for this advantage may be by way of a deduction for general 
contingencies or by way of an increase to the net capitalization rate. 
[8.5.3] Reducing rates of inflation: The reports of many actuaries state a rate of inflation 
that reduces each year for 3 to 5 years after the date to which discounting is done. This is 
not, as one would suppose, in anticipation of lower inflation rates in future. Discussions 
with such actuaries reveals that the assumed declining rate of inflation is intended to adjust 
for the phenomenon under stable investment conditions whereby short-term rates are lower 
than long-term rates. 138 For this reason the actuary seeks to use a lower net capitalization 
rate for the cost of items in the near future than in the more distant future. The approach 
is acceptable in principle but would be less confusing if it were achieved by using a discount 
rate of return that increased rather than an inflation rate that reduced. The approach may 
also be criticized on the ground that South African investment conditions have in recent years 
inverted the normal state of affairs with short-term rates higher than long-term rates. 139 
On no occasion observed by my office140 has the actuarial inflation/interest assumption been 
adjusted on this account. It would be preferable if actuaries did not reduce their rate of 
inflation but used instead a suitable flat average rate. 141 
September 1991). 
134See, however, paragraph 12.15.1 and the associated adjustment to the award of general damages. 
135A locally manufactured stand-up wheelchair is less than half the cost of an imported one. 
136Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 75-6. 
137See footnote 118 at 231. 
13
'What is known technically as the normal yield curve. 
139 A phenomenon described by analysts as an inverted yield curve. 
1400ver a period of 15 years embracing several thousand actuarial reports. 
141This view is not altered by the reduction in inflation in late 1992 because expected long-term investment returns 
reduced together with the -rate of inflation. 
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[8.6] CONCLUSIONS 
Although it is usual to speak of the 'discount rate of interest' it needs to be borne in mind 
that this is a reference to the expected investment rate of return obtainable on a wide variety 
of possible investments including shares and immovable property. Fixed interest investments 
are but one of the investment options. The discount for interest is best explained as the 
reduction to the present utility of a payment by reason of its being deferred in time. There 
is no evidence which can conclusively decide the choice of a discount rate. In order to 
ensure consistency in awards it is desirable that the real rate of return to be used for 
discounting damages claims be prescribed by the authorities at a level of about 2,5 % per year 
compound. Medic~ expenses and the costs of assistative devices can be expected to increase 








Summary: The deduction for general contingencies reflects the 
court's subjective impression as to the adequacy, or otherwise, the 
comparative utility, of the primary actuarial calculations. Although 
collateral benefits are sometimes viewed as part of the general 
contingencies the risks attaching to what has been, or will be lost, 
are the major component of the deduction. Allowance for such risks 




[9.1.1] Early judgments: The adjustment for general contingencies enables the court to give 
expression to its overall feelings about the basic actuarial calculation. The primary purpose 
of the adjustment is to allow for risk and uncertainty .1 Few texts communicate the nature 
of general contingencies more vividly than the English judgments which first introduced it 
as an explicit adjustment: 
'She had lost an annuity for the joint lives of herself and her son ... The value of the 
annuity spoken to in the evidence was the value of an annuity on government or other 
very good security, and that the annuity lost was that secured by the personal security 
of the deceased and, therefore, of much less value'. 2 
'When the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, was passed, it was thought for a short time by 
soine that damages might be given "to the full extent of a perfect compensation" ... 
"It would be most unjust" (however) "if whenever an accident occurs, juries were to 
visit the unfortunate cause of it with the utmost amount which they think an 
equivalent for the mischief done"' .3 
'A thousand circumstances might have prevented him from making that income if he 
had remained well, and the accident had not happened ... the jury would be wrong if 
they did not consider those circumstances as upon the doctrine of chances'. 4 
[9.1.2] All embracing adjustment: The adjustment is not confined to considerations of risk 
and uncertainty: The court may, for instance, wish to make adjustments for taxation or costs 
1 
'Risk' is the prospect that things may not turn as out as expected. 'Uncertainty' is doubt as to the correctness of 
existing verifiable information. 
2Rowley v London & NW Rail (1861-73] All ER Rep 823 (Exch) 828. 
3Rowley v London· & NW Rail (1861-73] All ER Rep 823 (Exch) 829-30. 
4Phillips v London & SW Rail (1874~80] All ER Rep 1176 (CA) 1180-1. 
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saved by the victim with no longer having to travel to work on a daily basis. The court may 
feel that the earnings basis used as input for the calculation is too low or too high. The court 
may wish to make allowance for the chance of future employment in the injured condition.5 
Such considerations of factual input can, however, also be corrected by referring the matter 
back to the actuaries for a recalculation using inputs dictated by the court. 6MMF 
[9.1.3] Implicit adjustments: In Roman-Dutch times the adjustment was introduced by an 
implicit scaling down of the input parameters: 'Since proof of damage is difficult, the judge 
should in doubtful cases adopt the course most favourable to the defendant and award low 
damages rather than high damages'. 7 
[9.1.4] Deductions used in practice: In general the deduction for contingencies will increase 
with the lengthening of the period of risk. A short period of past loss of one to three years 
may attract no deduction at all whereas a five or seven year period may well justify some 
deduction. For future loss one finds a deduction of 20% being made for a man in his 20's 
but only 10% for a claimant aged 46. 8 For a man close to retirement a low or nil deduction 
may be more appropriate. These percentages suggest a formula of 1/2 % per year of working 
life to 65 as a general guide to the sort of deduction that is usual. The formula has intuitive 
appeal giving expression to the concept of a widening funnel of doubt9 as one extends the 
earnings projections into an increasingly dim and distant future. The formula presumes a 
person with only moderate job stability. For a person with a proven history of job stability 
the deduction may well be much less. For a person with a history of frequently interrupted 
employment the deduction might rise as high as 33% 10 to 50 % , 11 even for past losses. 12 
The self-em.ployed person and the employee with substantial overtime would be assessed as 
having a higher risk profile than an employee who draws a regular salary. · The earnings of 
an employee who enjoys substantial insurance cover and pension benefits will generally have 
a lower risk profile than for the employee who does not enjoy such benefits. 13 Further risks 
5For further items see Koch 'Damages' 59 62. 
6Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 728 'The matter will now stand down until such time as the 
actuaries have completed their calculations on the aforegoing basis. It may then be mentioned again for the purpose 
of leading further evidence, if necessary, and of enabling me to make such final awards or orders as may be 
appropriate'. See too Smart v SAR&H 1928 NPD 361; Snyders v Groenewald 1966 3 SA 785 (C); Bailey v Southern 
Insurance 1981 3 C&B 178 (C); Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C). A court that has adopted 
this procedure cannot be said to have considered the general equities of the case if it has not been informed of the 
result of the recalculations (Noclwmowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 3 SA 640 (A) 644H). 
7Erasmus 1975 THRHR 268 269inf. D50.17 .125 'Favorabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur' cited in Bay 
Passenger Transport v Franzen 1975 1 SA 269 (A) 274H. 
'Goodall v President Insurance 1978 1 SA 389 (W) 393. 
9Redington 1952 JIA 286 287 'Thus we may say that there is an expanding funnel of doubt. The contours of the 
funnel vary with each one of us, for the concept is personal. Nevertheless, they must inevitably have much in 
common, since they all start from a common point now'. 
10See, for instance, King v Geldenhuys 1983 3 C&B 379 (C) 38linf. 
11AA Mutual Insurance v Maqula 1978 1 SA 805 (A) 813D. 
12AA Mutual Insurance v Maqula 1978 1 SA 805 (A) 813D. 
usee 151. 
-
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
GENERAL CONTINGENCIES 151 
such as divorce14 or remarriage 15 would be additional to these percentages. In the event 
of injury leading to a partial loss of earning capacity the court may assign different 
contingencies to the career path but for the injury and the career path having regard to the 
injury. 16 
[9.1.5] More than just days unemployed: It would be a gross oversimplification to view the 
deduction for general contingencies as a number of days or weeks per year of unemployment. 
A massive loss of earnings can arise merely because future salary increases fall behind 
inflation by 1 % or 2 % per year. Seemingly stable employees have been known to suffer 
substantial capital losses over short periods of time through unsuccessful attempts to set up 
their own businesses or to emigrate overseas. · 
[9.2] RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS 
· [9.2.l] Insurance reduces the risks of life: The qualities that render a man a stable employee 
and a good wage earner are much the same qualities that will lead him to insure himself 
against risk. 17 Earning capacity is not merely the ability to generate earnings but also the 
ability to minimize the risks attaching to continuing income. 18 The deduction made for 
general contingencies when assessing loss of earning capacity19 is in one sense20 the 
notional insurance premium needed to render future earnings free of all risk. Many 
employers today provide substantial insurance cover as part of the remuneration package. 
This relieves them of the moral pressures which would otherwise arise to provide gratuitous 
benefits in the event of an accident befalling an employee. The future income of employees 
so protected is subject to less risk, that is say contingencies, than the inc_ome of an employee 
who does not enjoy insurance cover. 
The self-employed person who insures himself will have to pay the premiums from his 
earnings. For an employee there will often be little or no deduction from his basic earnings, 
the majority of the cost being met the employer. An employer is less likely than an 
employee to allow insurance cover to lapse. The average self-insured income earner thus has 
a higher risk profile than the average employer-insured employee. 
[9.2.2] The unemployed victim: An adult victim may have been inbetween jobs at the time 
of the injury or death. Even for persons who were in employment at the time of the injury 
14De Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W) 83E-F. 
15Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617G. 
16Hutc/1ings v General Accident Insurance 1986 3 C&B 737 (C) (10% & 20%); Venter v Mutual & Federale 
Versekeringsmpy 1988 3 C&B 749 (f) (10% & 25%); Brink v 111e MVA Fund 1991 (C) (unreported 2.8.91 case 
6038/89) (15% & 30%). More generally see Koch 'Damages' 164-5 and 219 below. 
17McGregor 1965 MLR 629 . 
1
'Where earnings are highly at risk a large deduction will be made for general contingencies (see, for instance, AA 
Mutual Insurance v Maqula 1978 1 SA 805 (A) 813; King v Ge/denhuys 1983 3 C&B 379 (C) 381). 
19See, for instance, Goodall v President Insurance 1978 l SA 389 (W) 393F-G for a general discussion of what 
deductions are usual. 
21l'fhe deduction for general contingencies is concerned with very much more than just pure risk. 
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or death It IS common that the employer has by the time of the trial ceased trading or 
engaged in major layoffs. Such circumstances may justify a substantial contingency 
deduction of 10% to 50% or more when assessing past loss of earnings or support. 21 For 
an unemployed person the chances of finding employment will increase with the passage of 
time. The deduction for general contingencies for future loss will thus in certain instances 
be less than the deduction applied to past loss. 
For an unemployed child or young adult who has never worked there will be uncertainty not 
only as regards the finding of employment when the time comes but also as regards 
educational progress. This consideration is particularly relevant when the education system 
is subject to major disruptions. Education on its own does not guarantee a job. The 
industrial psychologists who testify as to the potential earnings of a victim tend to have 
regard to potential rather than likelihood. 22 The more common salary surveys used for 
these estimates are based on the salary structures of large corporations in the formal 
sector.23 Indications are that rates of pay in the informal sector are about half of the rates 
for the formal sector. 24 In Southern Insurance v Bailey25 a contingency deduction of 25 % 
was applied despite substantial positive factors such as an unduly low earnings basis for the 
actuarial calculation. In Khuduge's case26 the claimant had never worked but the court, in 
a somewhat maverick mood,27 saw fit to make no deduction whatsoever for general 
contingencies. 28 
One may expect the deduction for general contingencies for an unemployed victim to be 
substantially greater than for an employed victim of the same age and having regard to the 
same employment. 
[9.2.3] Coits of travelling to and from work: The deduction for general contingencies 
sometimes includes allowance for the saved costs of travelling to and from work and the 
21 For example see the 50% deduction applied in AA Mutual Insurance v Maqula 1978 1 SA 389 (y{) 393G-H. See 
too 220 below. 
22Property valuators refer to 'highest and best use' for land (see 30 above). In Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 
3 SA 1010 (C) 10200 the court emphasised that compensation should be based on probable earnings rather than 
potential earnings (see 235 below). 
23See footnote 87. Business Day February 11, 1993 at 4 reports that only about 45% of the population is employed 
in the formal sector. True unemployment, the article states, is more like 7% to 12 % with roughly half the workforce 
employed or self-employed in the informal sector. See next footnote. Only 8,5% of persons entering the job market 
find employment in the formal sector. 
241 base this observation on claims processed by my office. Not the least factor in this regard is the negotiating 
power of the trade unions. 
25Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 117. 
26KJ1uduge v Santam Insurance 1991 (y{) (unreported 23.5.91 case 4637/90). 
27The defendant seems have had inadequate legal representation because elsewhere in the judgment the full costs of 
a bed are awarded without deduction for what claimant would have spent on a bed and mattress had he not been 
injured. 
28See too Guardian National Insurance v Engelbrecht 1989 4 SA 908 (T) where a nil deduction was approved by 
an appeal bench of three judges. For an employed victim in his 20's the usual deduction according to the 1/z % per 
year formula would be about 20 % . 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 GENERAL CONTINGENCIES 153 saved cost of work clothes. 29 In those instances where a deduction has been made for 
travelling costs it has been about 8 % of earnings. 30 If the usual deductions for general 
contingencies included an allowance for saved travelling costs then the deduction for both 
past and future losses should not reduce below 8 % . The deductions generally made do not 
follow this pattern31 so we must conclude that many such deductions have not included 
allowance for saved travelling expenses. It needs be borne in mind that travelling costs are 
not saved by a victim who continues to work, albeit at a lower rate of pay. A deduction for 
saved travelling costs should also not be made from the value of a pension which the victim 
would have enjoyed had he not been injured or killed. 32 This saving is sometimes offset 
after the injury by the costs of travelling to obtain medical attention. 
[9.2.4] Early retirement: Medical experts quite frequently prognosticate that the injuries 
suffered by a victim, who has remained in employment, will bring about retirement at an 
earlier age than had there been no injury. 33 It is also common practice to allow a higher 
percentage deduction for general contingencies for the injured condition than for the 
uninjured condition, the allowance for reduced mobility in the job market, otherwise known 
as 'reverse contingencies'. 34 A court faced with such considerations needs to exercise care 
that the contingency of early retirement is not brought into account twice, once by way of 
explicit allowance for early retirement in the actuarial calculation, and then .again by way of 
general contingencies. 35 
[9.2.5] Divorce: With claims for loss of support the deduction for general contingencies 
would need to include allowance not only for the risks attaching to the deceased's 
employment but also for the risk of divorce. If one in five marriages, that is to say 20%, 
are ending in divorce then one would expect an add-on to the usual contingency percentages 
of about 10%.36 This suggests normal contingency deductions of about 30% for young 
couples. 37 The add-on for divorce will probably reduce to close to zero for ages of 55 and 
over. Although maintenance may be provided on divorce this is often of short duration 
pending employment by the ex-wife. For children from lower income groups there is a high 
29Kontos v General Accident Insurance 1989 4 C&B A2-l· (T) lists the saved costs of travelling to and from work 
as one of the factors to be borne in mind when assessing general contingencies; see to Corbett & Buchanan Jed 66-7. 
30Deductions for travel costs were made in Sumesur v Dominion Insurance 1960 l C&B 228 (D) 232-3 (7,5% 
deducted); Maasberg v Hunt Leucl1ars & Hepburn 1944 WLD 2 12 (9%). There may of course be alternative costs 
with travelling to medical centres. See 226 below. 
310% for past loss; 1h % per year to retirement for future loss (see 150). 
32See 155. 
33See, for instance, Dusterwa/d v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B AJ-45 (C) 70-2. 
34See 219. 
35Dusterwa/d v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B AJ-45 (C) 72 'Self-evidently, this finding incorporates a built-in 
contingency allowance'. 
360ne half of 20% assuming that divorce occurs on average at ages of about 40 to 45. Available statistics indicate 
divorce rates of about 1 % per year with higher rates for marriages concluded more recently (see 289). 
3720% according to the 1h % per year formula plus 10% for divorce. 
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incidence of failure by fathers to comply with maintenance orders. 38 It follows that the 
contingency of divorce is relevant to the claims by the children. 
[9.2.6] Early death: The standard actuarial calculation includes full allowance for the risk 
of early death39 and the deduction for general contingencies should thus make no allowance 
for this consideration. Exceptions to this rule arise when the calculation has not been done 
by an actuary40 and when the evidence indicates heavier mortality, a greater risk of early 
death, than has been allowed for in the actuarial calculations.41 
[9.2. 7] Medical and related expenses: A deduction for general contingencies will be made 
from the present value of future medical treatment and assistative persons or devices.42 
This would reflect the chance that the relevant expense may not be incurred or that cheaper 
alternatives may come available. An expert may recommend a device or a procedure but a 
compensated victim may thereafter not wish to follow the advice. Conversely allowance 
should be made for the unforeseen costs of complications. Advances in medical science may 
devise a cure for paraplegia. 43 These issues will be discussed below under damages for 
personal injury. 44 
[9.2.8] La,yers of earnings: The risk attaching to earnings varies not only with time but also 
with the level of earnings. The top layer of earnings is subject to much greater risk than the 
lower levels. This is particularly obvious with overtime earnings or commission earnings 
added to a basic salary. An employer who wishes to reduce an employee's salary may 
achieve this merely by discontinuing increases to offset inflation . The vast majority of 
employment contracts do not entitle an employee to increases to offset the effects of inflation. 
The extent to which such increases are granted by an employer depends on the relative 
negotiating strengths from time to time of employer and employee. The same is true of 
salary increases associated with promotions. In analysing general contingencies one might 




Basic earnings at time of delict. 
Future increases to offset the effects of inflation. 
Future increases associated with promotions. 
38See Burman 'African Customary Law' 36-51 and 307 below. 
39See 87. 
~ere the 'Murfin method' has been used (see Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 166-73) then for injury 
claims adequate allowance will have been made for the risk of early death. When a widow claims for loss of support 
the 'Murfin method' does not make an adequate deduction for the joint-life risks of early death. 
41See, for example, Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 10271. 
42Administrator-General SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A) (25%); Van der Plaats v SA Mutual Fire & General 
Insurance 1980 3 SA 105 (A) 113-14 (5%); Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 4050 (50%); Ncubu 
v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N) 198B (15%); Hutchings v General Accident Insurance 1986 3 C&B 737 (C) 
745 (30%). In Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) different deductions were applied to different 
classes of expenditure. 
43See Time Magazine December 14 1992 at 48. 
44See section 12.9. 
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* Overtime and commission earnings. 
Basic earnings would only be lost in the event of total unemployment not covered by 
unemployment insurance or sick pay. 45 The risks attaching to the higher levels of earnings 
would require progressively larger percentage deductions. The earnings of the self-employed 
generally include a core income of fairly low risk plus a fluctuating upper layer which 
behaves like overtime or commission income. 
High levels of unemployment may lead to low levels of overtime as unions seek to preserve 
jobs. Employers who fear industrial court actions when laying off employees may well 
prefer higher levels of overtime, certainly to meet temporary exigencies. Fairly heavy 
deductions for general contingencies are appropriate if the earnings calculation includes 
allowance for substantial overtime. 46 
[9.2.9] Risk attaching to pensions: Once an employee has retired on pension his income is 
then not necessarily free of risk. If his pension is funded entirely from accumulated capital 
then the level of risk would equal that attaching to the capital itself and its investment 
potential. However, a number of major pension funds are not fully funded,47 a factor which 
calls into the question the sustainability of increases to pensions in payment. The ability of 
such funds to continue payments, let alone make increases to offset inflation, may depend 
on the willingness of the original employer to continue to apply profits to the benefit of non-
productive pensioners. 48 Active employees may well begrudge increases for pensioners at 
the expense of increases for themselves. The risks attaching to future pension payments will 
often be no better than the risks attaching to the primary business venture which funds the 
pension payments. Actuaries generally escalate future pensions at rates below the rate of 
inflation.49 A positive contingency would then be the prospect of full inflation linking. 
There is an increasing tendency by employers to provide disability income benefits in lieu 
of an early retirement pension. These benefits provide for the guaranteed payment of 100% 
of the employees salary for a period of 12 to 24 months after the cessation of employment. 
The benefit then reduces to 75 % of salary and continues until normal retirement. At the 
normal retirement age a retirement pension is then provided based on the disability income 
being paid at the time of retirement. The disability income is usually subject to an ongoing 
deduction by way of a pension contribution. The policy conditions usually provide for the 
disability income to reduce or cease if the victim takes up alternative gainful employment. 
4~is is essentially the risk analyzed by Luntz 'Damages' 295-303 but without allowance for cataclysmic events. 
46What is substantial will depend on the type of work being done. Some jobs, such as engine driver for the railways, 
require regular overtime. For some employers paying overtime is preferable to paying salary for a number of 
reasons: Overtime usually does not give rise to increased bonus and expensive pension entitlements, and it relieves 
the employer of the need to employ additional staff with scarce skills or long on-the-job training requirements. 
47See, for instance, Wassenaar 'Squandered Assets' 75-117. 
48Pensions payable in terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941 have a sorry track record (increases 
have been 10% in 1987; 15% in 1989; 10% in 1991; 6% in 1992) averaging about 40% of the rate of inflation 
compared to the 67% to 100% of inflation that is achieved by most pension funds. 
490bservation based on several thousand reports received over the years by my office. 
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The contingencies attaching to these disability income benefits can be quite high particularly 
when future increases to the income, and even the income payments themselves, are subject 
to the discretion of the employer. 
In general the risks attaching to a pension are less than those attaching to earnings. Not the 
least because the ill-health or changed life plan of the recipient will not affect the pension 
payments, except, of course, if the events bring about an early death. An injured victim may 
receive a substantial early retirement pension from his employer. It is tempting to argue that 
when assessing damages a lesser deduction for general contingencies should be applied to the 
pension benefits than to the earnings but for the injury. There is much to be said for this 
approach provided it is borne in mind that the availability of substantial disability-insurance 
cover provided by the employer substantially reduces the general contingencies for the overall 
earnings. 50 
[9.2.10] Subjective impression: The adjustment is assessed on the basis of subjective 
impression rather than objective calculation.51 The opinion of an actuary as regards general 
contingencies has in the past been condemned52 but in more recent years accepted without 
demur. 53 A number of analysts have observed that the deductions made in practice do not 
bear any sensible relation to unemployment statistics. 54 The focus on a quasi-irrational 
impression55 leads to a preference for round percentages such as 5% 10% or 20%.56 In 
many earlier judgments awards were adjusted to round sums of money.57 These factors all 
point to a subliminal pricing psychology. 
50See 151. 
"Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 965G 'The determination ... for such contingencies involves, by 
its very nature, a process of subjective impression or estimation rather than objective calculation'; Sigournay v 
Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 569A. 
'2SJiield Insurance v Hall 1976 4 SA 431 (A) 444F 'Mr Murfin is a consulting actuary. He is in no position and is 
not qualified to give evidence as to the hazards and contingencies applicable to any particular type of work'. This 
was a most unfair condemnation of a man with extensive experience in compensation work. 
53See, for instance, Brink v The MVA Fund 1991 (C) (unreported 2.8.91 case 6038/89) (15% uninjured, 30% 
injured). Some actuaries handle in excess of 1000 claims a year. The actuary who testifies in this regard provides 
guidance as to the established legal norms, not the implications of statistical analysis. Actuarial evidence on 
contingencies should, however, be received with care because the actuary will usually not have heard all the evidence 
presented to the court. 
54Street 'Damages' 120-5; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 255-9; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 295-
300; Boberg 1964 SAL.I 194 212. In South Africa unemployment statistics do not give a reliable guide to actual 
unemployment levels. Outright unemployment is not the only contingency. Also to be considered is the risk that 
wage escalation will fall behind inflation or that the claimant may have ventured unsuccessfully into self-employment. 
HColourfully described in Goodall v President Insurance 1978 1 SA 389 (yV) 392-3 'In the assessment of a proper 
allowance for contingencies, arbitrary considerations must inevitably play a part, for the art or science of foretelling 
the future, so confidently practised by ancient prophets and soothsayers, and by modern authors of a certain type 
of almanack, is not numbered among the qualifications for judicial office'. 
S6See table in Koch 'Damages' 334-8. -
57Qair v PE Harbour Board (1886) 5 EDC 311 317 318; Waring & Gil/ow v Sherborne 1904 TS 340 349-50; 
01isl10lm v ERPM 1909 TH 297 302; Union Government v Clay 1913 AD 385 389; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 246; 
Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 568-9. 
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[9.2.11] Consistency between awards: In theory the adjustment for general contingencies is 
assessed de novo for each new matter. In practice the need for consistency between awards 
leads to guidance being sought from past judgments58 in much the same loose manner as 
with awards for general damages. 59 This reflects the principle that a discretion accorded 
to the court should be exercised judicially and not idiosyncratically. 60 
[9.3] THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
[9.3.1] Always a deduction: The adjustment for general contingencies is almost without 
exception a deduction. 61 There is a theorem in utility theory which states that the utility of 
an expected value subject to uncertainty is always less than or equal to the expected value. 62 
The fact that the allowance for contingencies is so frequently a deduction is evidence of the 
validity of this theorem. However, if the basic inputs to the calculation by way of earnings, 
taxation, inflation, interest and mortality have been properly selected to evenly balance the 
chances of excess or understatement63 then it is tempting to suggest that no deduction at all 
should be made for general contingencies. 64 Such a conclusion presupposes that all 
contingencies affecting earnings and living expenses have been brought into account. The 
majority of earnings' scenarios presume, however, that the employer will continue to prosper 
and that the economy will continue to thrive. Two world wars, the great depression, the 
collapse of communism, and the advent of AIDS65 are reminders that wholly unpredictable 
cataclysmic events can supervene. It would not be unreasonable to assume that seemingly 
objective assessments of risk made during a time of peace are somewhat optimistic.66 
51Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 246 'Of course, each claim must depend on its own facts, and a comparison with other 
cases can never be decisive, but it is instructive'. 
59See, for instance, Protea Assurance v Lamb 1971 1 SA 530 (A) 535-6. 
flJCookson v Knowles (1978] 2 All ER 604 (HL) 606H; Hahlo & Kahn 'The SA Legal System' 215. See 38 above. 
61See schedule in Koch 'Damages' 334-8. It is arguable that upward adjustments were made in Maasberg v Hunt 
Leuchars & Hepburn 1944 WLD 2 15-16 and Laney v Wal/em 1931 CPD 360 364 but these are notably isolated 
instances. In Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) the court acknowledged the existence of substantial 
positive contingencies in that the earnings basis had been pitched at too low a level. This consideration 
notwithstanding the court increased the deduction for general contingencies from the trial court's 10% to 25%. One 
wonders what the deduction would have been had a more substantial earnings basis been adopted! The 1h % per year 
formula suggests a deduction of about 30 % . 
62Pearce 'Cost-Benefit Analysis' 2ed 79. See footnote 70 at 138 above. 
63Expected values in the statistical sense. 
64Boberg 1972 SAIJ 147 150 'The pract"ice of making a deduction for "contingencies" ... is illogical and should be 
abandoned. In the absence of supporting evidence, there is no better reason for assuming that the occurrence of so-
called contingencies would reduce the plaintiffs loss any more than it would increase it ... In a field where nothing 
is known and all is surmise, it is better not to speculate at all than to speculate one-sidedly'. See too 1.964 SAIJ 194 
· 215n24; Newdigate & Honey 'The MVA Handbook' 176; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 246-
9; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 8; Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 22-3. 
651°he question of AIDS does not as yet seem to have received judicial consideration in relation to damages 
a8sessments. 
6&fhe adversary system encourages exaggeration, both up and down. Sympathy for the victim may well colour the 
evidence of some experts and subliminally that of a judge. A general practice of downward adjustment for 
contingencies ensures that the defendant is afforded some relief from such tendencies. A wealthy western economy 
can afford to take a more generous approach to damages awards than a less prosperous economy such as exists in 
South Africa. 
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Keynes has observed that the expectations of investors are seldom borne out by unfolding 
reality. 67 Pearson has pointed to the 'variety of misfortunes which can befall nations as well 
as individuals' .68 These would seem to be the considerations that justify the preference for 
a downward adjustment for general contingencies. 
In Bailey's case69 the court made the observation that not all contingencies are negative. 
In the circumstances of that case, despite regard for positive contingencies, the deduction 
for a child victim was increased to 25 % from the 10 % deducted by the trial court. The 
observation as regards positive contingencies was thus with a view to moderating the 
deduction for general contingencies having regard to the otherwise substantial future 
uncertainties facing a child. 
[9.3.2) Utility of capital: One suspects that capital has a positive utility for many persons70 
which vastly exceeds the normal actuarial interest and mortality discounts. From the 
acquisition of capital flows a material upliftment of status and the provision of new 
opportunities to obtain and use desirable assets. This utility factor will be greatest for 
persons who aspire to upward social movement. 71 There will undoubtedly be those who 
prefer to live their lives with a regular income untroubled by ambition or temptation to 
spend. The general popularity of football pools and horse-racing jackpots suggests that there 
is a marked preference for a large sum of immediate capital. This assertion could be 
measured by allowing claimants to choose between lump-sum damages and instalments and 
monitoring subsequent awards. Instalment payments by a quasi-government institution such 
as the MMF would be subject to a very low risk of default. The considerations voiced in 
Rowley's case72 would then be relevant. A pronounced claimant preference in favour of 
lump sums would justify an increase to the general contingencies applied to a lump sum over 
and above those applied to the instalment payments. Defendants, however, may choose to 
abandon this discount because of the adm.inistrative costs that attach to instalment payments. 
[9.3.3) Widening funnel of doubt: It has been noted above that the usual pattern of 
deductions for general contingencies is described with fair accuracy by the formula 1/2 % for 
each year to normal retirement.73 Underlying this formula is the concept of a widening 
funnel of doubt74 as one projects into the dim distant future. A major objection to this 
formulation of risk is that the deduction is applied to the total present value of future earnings 
67Keynes 'The General Theory' 152 'This does not mean that we really believe that the existing state of affairs will 
continue indefinitely. We know from extensive experience that this is most unlikely'. 
68See quotation at 42. 
69Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 117B 'It is, however, erroneous to regard the fortunes of life as 
being always adverse: they may be favourable'. 
70As compared to the utility of the equivalent income. 
71Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279. 
72See quotation at footnote 2. 
73This implies a percentage deduction of 20% for a young man in his 20's, 10% for a claimant aged 45 and 0% for 
a claimant close to retirement age. 
74Redington 1952 J/A 286 287. 
J 
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or support, that is equally to notional earnings one year after the date of calculation as to 
earnings 20 years after the calculation. 75 A seemingly preferable approach is to make the 
deduction separately for each future year on a sliding scale, as the actuaries do with 
mortality.76 For example for year 1 a deduction of 1/2 % would be made; 1 % for year 2; 
l1/2 % for year 3, etc; 5% for year 10; 10% for year 20; and so on. This reflects the real 
nature of the widening funnel of doubt. The major objection to such an approach is that its 
application requires a lengthy calculation. The judge cannot just make a final percentage 
deduction from the overall value. The approach is to be commended, however, under 
circumstances where the court has referred the matter back to the actuaries for purpose of 
recalculation. 77 
[9.3.4] Increase to the discount rate: The discount rate of interest comprises a basic real rate 
of return plus an additional return to compensate the investor for the risk attaching to the 
investment. For long-term fixed interest investments this has been described as the 'liquidity 
premium'. 78 For more complex investments one finds that the price, the value in exchange, 
decreases with increasing risk79 so that a higher internal rate of return is needed if one is 
to reproduce the price by discounting the future cash flow.80 Hence one may allow for risk 
by increasing the discount rate of interest. The same procedure would be entirely valid for 
pricing damages awards. The allowance for general contingencies could be brought in by . 
way of an addition to the discount rate of interest, perhaps + 1/2 % or + 1 % per year. 81 The 
deduction for risk would then increase with remoteness in time giving proper effect to the 
widening tunnel of doubt. 
I have noted82 that the MMF uses a net capitalization rate of 4 % per year but without 
separate allowance for mortality, as is done by actuaries. The difference between 4 % per 
year and the 2,5% per year generally used by actuaries introduces a suitable discount for 
early death. 83 The calculations by the MMF thus reproduce fairly well the results obtained 
by actuaries using more sophisticated techniques. 
A similar effect is achieved by the English courts who use net multipliers based on a net 
75 A further reservation is that although risk in relation to employment is generally highest during the unsettled early 
years the income of a young working person is generally an understatement of his career average (Kantor & Rees 
'SA Economic Issues' 47). 
76See year-by-year method described at 88. 
77See footnote 6. 
71Pepper 1984 TFA 145 147. 
79Mainly risk of fluctuations of which ruin and total Joss of capital is the extreme case. 
'°Beta theory is summarized by Weston & Brigham 'Managerial Finance' 247-75 312-13. 
"In Gillbanks v Sigournay 1959 2 SA 11 (N) 14H counsel suggested that a discount rate of 5 % per year be used and 
that general contingencies then be ignored. This reflected a I% per year addition to the actuary's rate of 4% per 
year. 
82See 129 and 144. 
neut not when discounting is done over the expectation of life because that period already includes full allowance 
for the risk of mortality. 
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capitalization rate of about 4,5 % per year. 84 The English net multipliers include allowance 
for general contingencies and mortality. The discount for general contingencies, excluding 
mortality, is not introduced by way of separate deduction, as in South Africa with its gross 
multiplier system. The fairly high discount rate of 4,5 % per year thus includes the additional 
discounts needed to allow for general contingencies. This rate is applied to a period which 
includes allowance for the risks of mortality. 85 The rate of 4,5 % per year thus does not 
include allowance for the risk of mortality. 
[9.3.5] Illustrative calculations: One way of giving effect to a widening funnel of doubt is 
to increase the discount rate of interest by, say, 1/2 % per year from 2,5 % per year to 3 % per 
year. Losses one year ahead would then be discounted by 3 % per year (2,5 % for investment 
return and 1/2 % for general contingencies). The losses for year 2 in the future would be 
discounted by 2,5 % per year for 2 years plus a further 1 % ('Ii% per year for 2 years). The 
losses for year 10 in the future would be discounted by 2,5 % per year for 10 years plus a 
further 5% (1/2 % per year for 10 years). A loss 40 years in the future would be discounted 
by 2,5% per year for 40 years plus a further discount of 20% (1/2 % per year for 40 years). 
Each separate year would be subject to a different percentage deduction. 86 For sake of the 
argument I have used simple interest. In practice compound interest would be applied so the 
percentages for deduction in each year would be larger than the percentages stated above. 
Table 11 shows the effect in terms of a flat percentage contingency deduction of increasing 
the net capitalization rate. 87 Under the column 'Equivalent general contingency deduction' 
is shown first the normal deduction according to the 1/2 %-per-year-to-retirement formula. 
It is evident from the table that this level of contingency deduction is fairly accurately 
reproduced by increasing the net capitalization rate by 1,5 % per year over and above the 
basic real rate of return. 88 
[9.3.6] Different approaches - same result: The effect of discounting at a low net 
capitalization rate is to introduce a positive, that is to say add-on adjustment for general 
contingencies. The effect of using a 1 % per year net capitalization rate has been illustrated 
in table 11 . The use of a 1 % net capitalization rate coupled with a normal deduction for 
general contingencies has roughly the same effect as using a 2,5 % per year net capitalization 
rate with a nil deduction for general contingencies. 
[9.3. 7] Share-market risk profiles: The analysis of share market returns shown in table 
lOA 89 indicates expected future investment returns in the long term of at least 2 % per year 
above the prevailing dividend yield, that is to say an expectation in June 1992 of at least 
5,5% per year. The figures in table 11 for a 5,5% per year net capitalization rate show the 
84See 144. 
85See Mallett v McMonag/e [1969] 2 All ER 178 (HL) 191. 
86See table 5 at 88. 
"Separate allowance has been made for the contingency of early death using SALT79/81 coloured male mortality . 
88Here taken to be· 2,5 % per year compound. 
89See at 122. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
GENERAL CONTINGENCIES 161 
TABLE 11 - GENERAL CONTINGENCIES and THE DISCOUNT RATE OF INTEREST 
Net Cap Present Equivalent 
Rate py Value General 
RlOOOOpy Contingency 
Deduction 
Age 55 to 65 -5% 
(10 yrs) 
1,0% 81010 +5% 
2,5% 76896 0% 
4,0% 73170 -5% 
5,5% 69789 . -9% 
Age 45 to 65 -10% 
(20 yrs) 
1,0% 147433 +12% 
2,5% 132030 0% 
4,0% 119200 -10% 
5,5% 108437 -18% 
Age 25 to 65 -20% 
(40 yrs) 
1,0% 270601 +26% 
2,5% 214520 0% 
4,0% 174735 -19% 
5,5% 145785 -32% 
general contingency deductions which need to be made if the risk attaching to the continuing 
loss of earnings of RlOOOO per year is to be assessed as the same as that for the average 
investment in the share market. If one takes the view that salaries and dividends paid by a 
listed company are derived from the same profit source then the risk profiles of these 
payments should be subject to fairly similar risks. The comparison in table 11 suggests that 
deductions for general contingencies at 1/i % per year to retirement are by and large correctly 
assessed relative to the investment market's assessment of risk on listed shares. In other 
words the prices at which earning capacities are traded in the 'forensic exchange' are being 
correctly assessed relative to share-market investments. This observation is, however, only 
valid for the very low dividend yields of about 3 ,5 % that have prevailed since 1989. 
[9.3.8] Low share prices indicate high risks: The analysis in table lOA of share-market 
returns shows an average real yield of 9,3% per year since 1960. Against this background 
an allowance for general contingencies of 1/2 % per year to retirement, that is to say an 
addition of only 1,5 % per year to the net capitalization rate will be unduly favourable to a 
claimant. It follows that when dividend yields in the share market are significantly above 
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3,5 % then the deductions for general contingencies should, in theory, be increased above 
1/2 % per year to retirement, possibly to as high as 1 % per year. This same conclusion 
follows from the consideration that there are bargain-price investments to be had on the stock 
exchange. 90 It is useful to bear in mind that when prices are low, and prospective yields 
are high, the market is discounting the prospect of larger-than-usual future business risks. 
Whether one justifies the lower awards for damages for loss of earning capacity or support 
by reference to investment returns or by reference to risk and general contingencies is, in the 
final analysis, immaterial. The end result is a price, a single once-and-for-all lump-sum 
amount of money. 
[9.4] CONCLUSION 
The deduction. for general contingencies is an important component of what one may call 'the 
forensic pricing mechanism'. Utility theory suggests that this adjustment will almost always 
be a deduction. In theory the adjustment for risk is best effected by increasing the discount 
rate of return. In practice a percentage deduction from the actuarial value generally gives 
much the same result. 
90 An unusually high dividend yield on the Ff-actuaries all-share index will generally indicate that share prices are 
unusually low. 
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CHAPrER 10 
LOSS OF USE 
Summary: Interest is the measure of loss for deprivation from the use 
of money. The loss of use of goods can generally be quantified by 
interest on the value of the goods subject to an adjustment for the 
rate at which the goods increase or decrease in value with the 
passage of time. A court is competent to award damages expressed 
in terms of a foreign currency. The rate of mora interest should then 
be adjusted to that appropriate to the relevant foreign economy. 
[10.1] INTRODUCTION 
163 
[10.1.1] Money and goods: Within the context of damages for loss of earnings or support 
the question of loss of use only arises as regards loss of use of money. However, there is 
a general presumption in law, based on considerations of mitigation, that when goods are 
destroyed the owner is expected immediately to purchase substitute goods thereby confining 
his loss to a loss of money. 1 For this reason, and the benefit of comparison, the discussion 
will not be confined to loss of use of money. 
[10.1.2] Inadequacies in the law: The common law tends to deny that the use of goods or 
money has value. 2 Neither loss of interest nor loss of buying power will be allowed as an 
addition to past losses. 3 Funum usus is not a common-law crime. 4 Compensation for loss 
of use of capital has been subjected to an onerous burden of proof.5 The phenomenon is not 
confined to South Africa. In England the courts had long been empowered to award interest 
on damages for personal injury and death6 but no such awards were made.7 ·Legislation was 
1See footnote 2. 
2General Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613B 'Dit is natuurlik waar dat indien 'n voertuig wat 
se maar R20000 werd is op 'n sekere dag vernietig word en die eienaar daarvan eers drie jaar later by die verhoor 
daardie bedrag as skadevergoeding toegeken word, hy eintlik nie ten voile vir sy skade vergoed word nie. Hy het 
immers die gebruik van R20000 vir drie jaar ontbeer, maar hierdie ongelukkige gevolg is daaraan te wyte dat die 
reg blykbaar aanvaar dat die eienaar op die dag van die delik 'n antler ewe goeie voertuig vir R20000 sou kon 
gekoop het, of hy dit kon bekostig het of nie, en dat sy skade dus nie meer as R20000 kan wees nie' . Stoll & Visser 
1990 De Jure 347 349 'The South African law on the loss of use appears, in certain aspects, to be underdeveloped'; 
see too Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 23ln232; Reinecke 1988 De Jure 221 236-7. 
3SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
'R v Sibiya 1955 4 SA 247 (A). This lacuna in the law was subsequently filled by sl(l) of Act 50 of 1956. 
5Broderick Properties v Rood 1964 2 SA 310 (T) 316A-F. 
6s3(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. 
7McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 338 'Before 1970 it was not the practice to make awards of interest on damages in 
claims arising out of personal injury and wrongful death'. 
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then introduced in 1969 to render compulsory the award of interest on damages. 8 
[10.1.3] Exceptions: On the positive side one can point to a number of judgments which have 
taken a more progressive view regarding loss of use: 'Interest is the lifeblood of finance' it 
has been said. 9 Interest on past losses has been awarded by agreement between the 
parties. 1° Compound interest, interest on interest, is no longer prohibited. 11 Past loss of 
use of a motor car has been compensated12 as too has the rental value of premises which 
could not be occupied for a while. 13 
[10.1.4] Loss of utility: A primary theoretical objection to awarding compensation for loss 
of use is the differencing principle in its classical formulation by Mommsen. 14 A simple 
comparison of assets before and after deprivation of use reveals no loss because the assets 
have at all times remained part of the victim's patrimony. This is particularly true of a 
measure of damages which focuses upon money that actually changes hands. Van der Walt 
has pointed to the inadequacy of the traditional globular differencing technique. 15 That 
there can be a substantial loss of utility is illustrated by the example of the spilt mug of 
beer. 16 If a substitute mug of beer is not immediately purchased then there is a loss of the 
utility, the pleasure of drinking that beer. If a substitute mug of beer is purchased then the 
loss of pleasure becomes a loss of money. Deprivation of the use of a motor car can be 
made good by hiring a substitute motor car. But, just as with the spilt mug of beer, there 
is a loss of utility even if the monetary expense is not incurred. The problem lies in 
assigning a monetary value to the use of goods when no expense is explicitly incurred. 17 
[10.2] ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
[10.2.1] Cost of hiring a substitute: On the one hand one can argue that the notional cost 
of hire is a fair measure. On the other hand one may argue that if the claimant was not 
motivated to incur the expense then the utility to the claimant of the use of the car must be 
less than the hire cost. This presumes, of course, that the claimant has the means whereby 
to pay the cost of hire. The assessment of damages usually ignores the personal utility of 
1s22 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 amended s3(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1934. See Jefford v Gee (1970) 1 All ER 1202 (CA) for a comprehensive commentary on the new legislation. 
9Linton v Corser 1952 3 SA 685 {A) 695G; Be/lairs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A). 
10Legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 622E. 
"Davehill (Pty) Ltd v Community Development Board 1988 1 SA 290 (A) 298H-I. 
12Shrog v Valentine 1949 3 SA 1228 (T) ; Castle & Castle v Pritchard 1975 2 SA 392 (R) ; Modimogale v Zweni 1990 
4 SA 122 (B) 135H; 1993 2 SA 192 (BA); Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C). 
13Monumental An Co v Kenston Phannacy 1976 2 SA 111 (C) 124A (9 days). 
14Mommsen 'Obligationenrecht' (1853) vol 2 3; Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657. See 58. above. 
15Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 181 184-5 241-5; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 26-7. 
168loembergen • Schadevergoeding' 17. 
17Stoll & Visser 1990 De Jure 347 349.53 discuss the German experience in this regard. 
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the claimant in favour of a general communal standarp of value. 18 This latter consideration 
suggests that the rental value of the goods is a fair and proper measure of the lost utility of 
use. 19 
[10.2.2] Unused goods: What of the owner who does not use his asset? By way of analogy 
loss of earning capacity is compensated by reference to the earnings likely to be generated 
by the use of the capacity to work.20 If there was little likelihood that a victim would have 
worked then there will be no compensation for loss of earning capacity. This suggests that 
evidence indicating non-use is a ground for denying compensation for loss of use. From the 
point of view of an employer, however, an employee may be paid a salary merely to be on 
standby. 21 Similarly a car may be used only intermittently. Its usefulness derives from its 
availability as and when it is needed. A good deal of money may be paid for availability 
without-use. 22 The true measure of the utility of use is the rate which the owner, in the 
absence of litigation, would have agreed to part with the availability of the goods. Evidence 
of such a personal value is seldom, if ever, available. 
[10.2.3] Tradeable goods: An injured victim who loses part of his bodily functions will be 
compensated by an award of general damages. Although such awards are generally viewed 
as non-patrimonial they do have a patrimonial quality.23 Deprivation of the use of goods 
impinges on the quality of life of the owner. Injury and upset relating to commercially 
tradeable goods such as a car, ship, or a mug of beer, can generally be relieved by acquiring 




The disutility of loss of use has a patrimonial quality for which a value can be 
objectively determined.24 
The reasonable cost of substitution, even if not explicitly incurred, is a fair measure of 
11Voet 'Ad Pandectas' 45. l.9 'lllud extra dubium est, in definiendo eo quod interest, neutiquam affectionem 
peculiaris rationem habendam esse, sed communem, ut ita dicam, affectionem oportere spectari'. See too 22. above. 
19Stoll & Visser 1990 De Jure 347 353 record that German courts have been unwilling to award compensation for 
loss of use except when an expense has actually been incurred and this was necessary to avoid an equally large or 
even larger pecuniary loss. In Monumental Art Co v Kenston Phannacy 1976 2 SA 111 (C) l 24A damages were 
awarded, by agreement between the parties, for the rental for the damaged premises for 9 days. The claimant had 
not incurred the expense of alternative premises and the award was thus for wasted rental costs. 
20Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1020; Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 1110 
'verwagte inkomste'. 
21
'They also serve who only stand and wait' from 'On his blindness' by John Milton. 
22McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 701-2 cites a number of judgments where damages were awarded for loss of use of 
ships kept available but not in use. The damages were assessed as interest on the value of goods. This is a fair 
measure provided the value of the asset remains constant in nominal terms with the passage of time. 
23 Awards for general damages must maintain a sensible relationship with the reasonable costs of partially relieving 
the victim's condition (see 259). · 
24Edwards v Hyde 1903 TS 381 385-6 suggests that provided adequate evidence is led then a claim for patrimonial 
loss will be allowed. In this instance the wrongful detention of pigs for a brief period would have given rise to a 
negligibly small value quite apart from the advantage that the pigs were being cared for elsewhere with possible 
savings in the need to clean pens and to feed the pigs . 
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the loss suffered. 
[10.2.4] Non-tradeable goods: Not all goods are commercially tradeable. Highly specialized 
equipment cannot be immediately replaced. Family heirlooms may have a low commercial 
value but high utility for the owner. Sentimental value may become commercialized, as with 
antiques, or the personal possessions of famous people. Considerations of objectivization and 
mitigation suggest that a claimant must in general make do with the objective commercial 
value as the basis for the calculation, the value generally recognized by one's fellow men. 25 
[10.2.5] Investment rates of return: The English courts have calculated the damages for loss 
of use of unmarketable and unused assets as interest on the depreciated cost of the goods.26 
Interest is the cost of acquiring the use of money. It is the rental value of money. It is a 
fair measure of the rental value of other goods only if the value of such goods depreciates 
at the same rate as does money. If the goods increase in value in line with inflation then one 
should use a real rate of return such as 2,5% per year, not a nominal rate of interest. On 
the other hand some goods, such as a motor car, will depreciate faster than money. 27 One 
should then use a nominal rate of interest of, say, 16% per year on the current value plus 
the rate of depreciation .28 On the other hand if the value of the asset is increasing with the 
passage of time then the use value would be the nominal rate of 16% per year less the rate 
of increase in value. Where the rate of increase exceeds the rate of inflation the court may 
be justified in allowing at least a real rate of return. However, if the asset was being held 
solely as a store of value29 then there would be no use value at all, the sole consideration 
being that the asset is safe and undamaged. 
[10.2.6] Running costs: Lee & Honore30 states as regards transportation: 
'Damages should be assessed as the difference between the cost of substitute transport 
and the usual running costs of the damaged vehicle' . 
The notional substitute transport may, however, be superior or inferior to what has been lost 
and its cost thus not necessarily a fair measure of the utility of use of the goods damaged. 
Where the expense of substitute transport has been incurred this would be measured 
according to considerations of reasonableness and mitigation. One cannot expect to be 
compensated for the cost of hiring an expensive mercedes benz motor car if the damaged 
vehicle was a small cheap city golf. An expense somewhat greater than the basic utility of 
use of the damaged goods may well be acceptable if this prevented an even greater loss of 
2sSee 22. 
26McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 701-2. 
27The Automobile Association allows for 4.3 % per year depreciation on purchase cost in their tables giving cost per 
kilometre of running a motor car. Some prestige vehicles may increase in value relative to the original purchase cost 
but probabl~ below the rate of·inflation. Vintage cars on the other hand, may well appreciate faster than the rate 
of inflation. 
21See footnote 27. 
29 As with Kruger Rands, undeveloped plots of land, etc. 
30Lee & Honore 'Obligations' 252; Boberg 'Delict' 627. 
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business profits. 31 The same, it seems, would apply to costs incurred to save life and 
health. 32 Lee & Honore maintains that 'the usual running costs of the damaged vehicle' 
should be deducted. This deduction would only be appropriate if the 'usual running costs' 
had fallen away as a result of the wrongful act. Licence and insurance costs and depreciation 
may well continue unabated. Additional depreciation flowing from the damage to the vehicle 
will be compensated if this is not made good by the repairs. 33 
[10.3] THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
[10.3.1] Anomalous legal principles: In general a claimant is obliged to m1t1gate his 
damages. Thus if his motor car has been destroyed he is expected to purchase immediately 
a substitute vehicle. 34 It then follows, in theory at any rate, that his loss is the cost of 
replacement, the market value at the date of the delict. His loss ceases to be the loss of a 
car and becomes a loss of money, the cost of purchasing the replacement car. The loss of 
the use of the car is substituted by a loss of use of money .35 The indications are that under 
South African law compensation will be awarded for the temporary loss of use of goods 
where substitution is by way of hire. 36 However, when there is total destruction of the 
goods, the date-of-delict rule would seem to come into play .37 The rule against interest on 
damages38 then denies the claimant compensation for the loss of the use of the money 
notionally used to acquire the substitute goods. 39 The relevance of interest calculations to 
the rental value of goods has been discussed above.40 
[10.3.2] Date-of-delict rule: In general it has been said that a claimant's duty to mitigate 
does not impose on him 'an obligation to take any step which a reasonable and prudent man 
would not ordinarily take in the course of his business' .41 One may thus question the 
31 Shrog v Valentine 1949 3 SA 1228 (T) 1229; Modimogale v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 (B) 135H; 1993 2 SA 192 (BA). 
321n Castle &: Castle v Pritchard 1975 2 SA 392 (R) the costs of air fares from Rhodesia to Durban were not disputed 
after the car had been seriously damaged far from home. 
33Erasmus v Davis 1969 2 SA 1 (A); Boberg 'Delict' 637. 
34General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613B quoted in footnote 2 above. See earlier discussion 
of this issue at 24 above. 
HBJoembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 55 62 notes that at the date of the delict the damaged goods are replaced by an 
action for damages. This is, however, a technical tautology that provides little assistance with solving the problem 
in equity. 
36Shrog v Valentine 1949 3 SA 1228 (T) 1129; Modimogale v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 (B) 135H; 1993 2 SA 192 (BA); 
Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C). 
31Philip Robinson Motors v NM Dada 1975 2 SA 420 (A) 429F; Heath v Le Grange 1974 2 SA 262 (C) 263C/D; 
Monumental An Co v Kenston Phannacy 1976 2 SA 111 (C) ll8G. 
38Victoria Falls&: Transvaal Power v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines 1915 AD 1 32; SA Eagle Insurance v Hanley 
1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
39See footnote 2. 
40See paragraph 10.2.5. 
41Asamera Oil v Sea Oil & General (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 1 (SCC) 20. Novick v Benjamin 1972 2 SA 842 (A) 858B-
C 'The duty to mitigate would go no further than to require the innocent party to act reasonably in all the 
circumstances, the onus of proof being on the defaulting party'. See Kerr 1986 SAL! 339. 
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existence in South African law of a general rule that damages be assessed as at the date of 
the delict. The two main decisions on the subject42 were concerned with persons who 
traded in the goods concerned and could reasonably be expected to effect immediate 
replacement. With depreciating assets such as motor cars43 it is generally in the claimant's 
favour to fix the value at the date of the delict. 44 If replacement is to take place at date of 
trial then this should be with a vehicle of depreciated value comparable to that which the 
damaged vehicle would have had, had it not been damaged.45 The problem of fairness to 
the claimant only arises when the cost of substitution has been increasing during the pre-trial 
period.46 Boberg47 says of the date-of-delict rule that 'Since the alleged rule has no 
meanirig (apart from expressing the concept of a collateral source), it is suggested that it be 
discarded'. However in Voest Alpine lntenrading v Burwilr8, an action for breach of 
contract, the damages were fixed according to exchange rates at the date of breach. 49 In 
SA Eagle Insurance v Hanley5° damages for past loss of earnings were pegged at the date 
of the loss without regard for subsequent loss of buying power. Despite what Boberg has 
said the date-of-delict rule still has a draconian stranglehold on South African concepts of 
justice. 
[10.3.3] Trading costs: What of the claimant who has had to pay commission or a purchase 
tax in order to acquire substitute goods? Will this cost be allowed in addition to the basic 
market value of the goods? In Wikner v TPA51 the court refused to add general sales tax 
to the damages suffered despite the fact that if the claimant had actually purchased substitute 
goods he would have incurred this cost. The court reached this conclusion having regard to 
the money value of the claimant's patrimony and ignoring the fact that the claimant was 
being provided only with money, and not a motor car. Had the court sought to restore the 
utility of the patrimony by providing a substitute motor car then general sales tax should have 
been added to the compensation money. It would have been appropriate to apply a deduction 
for the contingency, if any, that the claimant would have been able to buy a substitute vehicle 
free of sales tax. The claimant was not compensated for the loss of the use of the vehicle 
42Philip Robinson Motors v NM Dada 1975 2 SA 420 (A) 429F; Monumental Art Co v Kenston Phannacy 1976 2 
SA 111 (C) 118G. 
43See footnote 27. 
44The judgment in Modimogale v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 (B) is somewhat vague as to whether the cost of replacement 
was taken at the date of the delict or the date of the trial. 
45 Although the prices of new cars increase over the years justice does not require that a claimant should be provided 
with a new vehicle in substitution for an older vehicle. 
46See, for instance, Bimlingham City v West Midland Baptist ([rust) [1969] 3 All ER 172 (HL). 
47Boberg 'Delict' 487inf 625. 
411985 2 SA 149 (W). 
4~e court indicated (at 151C) that the additional loss due to currency fluctuations might have been claimable as an 
additional head of damages had it been argued. This comment would seem to have in mind consideration "of fault 
in the conduct of the proceedings, ie a claim for what is more in the nature of costs of litigation than damages (Union 
Government vJackson 1956 2 SA 398 (A) 416E 417-18) . 
'°1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
51 1992 (T) (unreported 4.6.92 case no 17826/91). 
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during the pre-trial period. However, he was awarded the value at the date of the delict and 
thus spared the cost of depreciation, this being part of the use value.52 
The Wikner ruling highlights one of the differences between damnum emergens and lucrum 
cessans. 53 The sales tax is damnum emergens whereas the loss of the proceeds of the sale 
is lucrum cessans. There is no reason why the claimant should not have been awarded the 
value of the chance of incurring the expense of sales tax. 
[10.3.4] Value encapsulates all use options: The market value at which goods can be 
purchased includes full allowance for the present value of the utility of the future use of such 
goods in all its variety.54 This consideration has the important rider that the calculated 
present value of the use value of goods should not exceed the lump-sum market value of 
those goods. Otherwise stated the discounted present value of future notional rentals less 
future notional expenses should not exceed the market value of the goods. If it does then 
something has gone wrong with the calculations. 
[10.4] INTEREST AND DAMAGES 
[10.4.1] Single undivided debt: Interest is the rental one pays for the use of money. It has 
been held that no interest may be claimed on a debt which can only be ascertained after a 
long and complicated inquiry. 55 This ruling took the view that the damages were a single 
undivided debt which arose at the date of the delict and for which the claimant then sued. 
Separate heads of damage are merely the reasoning by which a court arrived at the overall 
figure. 56 The Roman-Dutch jurists may well have distinguished between a debt and a claim 
for damages. 57 The modern South African law has, it seems, abandoned any such 
distinction. 58 For most practical purposes the distinction is not material for damages arising 
from late payment of damages were not awarded in Roman-Dutch times.59 
[10.4.2] A series of separate pseudo-debts: The distinction between debt and damages does 
become apparent, however, if damages for a continuing loss is viewed as a series of separate 
monthly, or weekly, losses. The appellate division has abandoned the traditional view of 
damages as an undivided debt and elected instead to view damages for loss of earnings or 
'2See paragraph 10.2.5. 
'
3See 46 . 
s.Bloembergen 'Scl1adevergoeding' 47. 
''Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines 1915 AD 1 32; SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 
1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
'6Van der Plaats v SA Mutual Fire & General Insurance 1980 3 SA 105 (A) 1180. 
YT Jefford v Gee (1970) 1 All ER 1202 (CA) 1207d 'In Scotland ... the courts followed the civil law ... (They) drew 
a distinction between debt and damages'. 
"Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines 1915 AD l 32 'The civil law did not attribute 
mora to a debtor who did not know and could not ascertain the amount which he had to pay'. SA Eagle Insurance 
v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
'
9Yoet Ad Pandectas 45.1.11; Van Bynkershoek Obs T11m11/t11ariae 1478. 
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support as a series of separate debts, 60 one for each weekly or monthly loss of earnings, one 
for each purchase of analgesic pills. This was done, it seems, to avoid a general relaxation 
of the date-of-delict rule when wanting to discount future loss of earnings and support to date 
of trial. The 'separate debts' approach is highly artificial in that is disregards the effect of 
contingency deductions and value of a chance in respect of past and future indebtednesses. 
With true debt the cause of action arises once the due date for payment has passed and 
payment has not been made.61 With Aquilian damages for personal injury and death the 
cause of action usually arises as at the date of the wrongful act. As from that date the 
claimant has a right of action for all losses flowing from the wrong, albeit the discounted 
present value thereof. · 
With a claim for damages prescription runs in respect of the single indivisible sum of the 
damages. With true debts prescription runs separately for each separate amount that has 
fallen due and remained unpaid. The appellate division has created a theoretically untenable 
state of affairs which is likely to cause problems in years to come. 
[10.4.3] Liquidated damages: A distinction may be drawn between interest 'as' damages and 
interest 'on' damages. Mora interest, that is interest 'on' damages, is awarded without the 
need to lead evidence as to the application of the funds. 62 Interest 'as' damages will only 
be allowed if properly claimed and proved. 63 The most common example of interest 'as' 
damages would be interest charges incurred on money factually borrowed during the pre-trial 
period. 
There is no recorded instance where interest 'on' or 'as' damages has been awarded.64 This 
is surprising because there are instances where past damages are ascertainable upon 
reasonable inquiry. 65 Down the years the original requirement of 'reasonable inquiry' has 
changed into 'liquidated damages', a much more stringent test. 66 A claim for interest on 
past medical or prosthetic costs, if admitted, will only be allowed if the expense has been met 
and then only from date of payment. A claimant who incurs debt in order to survive during 
the pre-trial period may, in theory, claim compensation for the associated interest charges. 
The intellectually smothering effect of the ruling in Hartley's case67 has had the effect that 
- . 
r;iGeneral Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613-14; SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 
(A) 838-9. 
61This may be in respect of single sum of money but may also arise with a series of debts such as unpaid rentals or 
maintenance payments. Each non-payment gives rise to a separate cause of action. 
62Bellairs v Hodnett 1978 1 SA 1109 (A) 1145F '(Mora) interest is payable without the creditor having to prove that 
he has suffered loss'. 
63Broderick Properties v Rood 1964 2 SA 310 (T) 316A-F. 
64lnterest has been awarded by agreement between the parties (see Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 l SA 608 (A) 
622E). 
6
'Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 10211-J. 
66Probert v Baker 1983 3 SA 229 (D) 237A 'The amount of the claim is thus capable of prompt and ready 
ascertainment and of speedy and easy proof; and the Court is not required to inquire into any facts or to exercise 
an independent judgment on any aspect such as the reasonableness of the amount'. 
67SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
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there probably never will be a common-law award for interest 'on' or 'as' damages.68 
[10.4.4] Different standards of justice: When damages for future loss have been discounted 
to date of trial69 then no further interest should be added to the present value of the future 
loss because the discounting process includes the necessary allowance for interest. 70 Some 
foreign legislation for interest on damages has specified that interest is to be added to the 
entire award from the date that the award fell due, that is to say from the date of the delict. 
In such instances discounting of all losses, past and future, should be done to date of 
delict.71 
The normal practice in South Africa is that past losses are accumulated without adjustment 
for interest for the period between the date when the notional earnings or support would have 
been received and the date of trial. This accumulation of past losses without adjustment for 
delay reflects an economy where the disutility of delayed payment is nil. Conversely for 
future losses a court will assume, without the need for argument or evidence, that the 
claimant will invest the award profitably ,72 in other words that delay does have disutility. 
This difference between the treatment of past and future losses is anomalous and undesirable. 
Interest on damages is allowed by statute in most western jurisdictions73 but not in South 
Africa. 
[10.4.5] Loss of buying power. By 'loss of buying power' is meant an add-on to past losses 
so that the award made has the same buying power as the claimant would have enjoyed had 
the amounts been received timeously. This adjustment is calculated by adding inflation to 
the nominal amounts that would otherwise have been awarded as damages. The adjustment 
for loss of buying power is to be distinguished from normal escalations in earnings to offset 
the effects of inflation. 74 It is made in addition to such estimates of notional nominal 
earnings, or support. 
The rule against interest on damages includes a prohibition on adjusting past losses for loss 
of buying power between date of loss and date of trial. 75 This rule flows from the principle 
681n Muller v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1993 4 C&B 12-56 (C) the court came to the conclusion that the distinction 
between interest 'as' damages and interest 'on' damages was impractical and that a claim for overdraft interest 
actually paid (R65529) should not be distinguished from a claim for the prohibited interest on damages. 
69 As is the preferred practice in South Africa (General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A)). 
70Cookson v Knowles [1978] 2 All ER 604 (HL) 61 lf-g; Koch ' Damages' 110. 
11Ruby v Marsh (1975) 6 ALR 385 (HC); Cookson v Knowles (1978] 2 All ER 604 (HL) 61 lf-h; Luntz 'Damages' 
2ed 492-4. 
12SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 838-9. 
73For England and Scotland see Jefford v Gee [1970] 1 All ER 1202 (CA); for Australia see Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 
493-8; for Canada see Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 413-4; for France Germany and 
Switzerland see Mann (1985) LQR 30. 
74 SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 840-41. 
"SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
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of currency ,nominalism. The rule is unsatisfactory and is presently under consideration by 
the Law Commission.76 
The Roman-Dutch law did not allow a claim for damages arising from the late payment of 
damages.77 • Voet links this prohibition to the prohibition on compound interest because in 
Roman-Dutch times mora interest was viewed as a form of damages. With little evidence 
of debate or deep reflection the prohibition on compound interest has been revoked by 
judicial decree. 78 The appellate division has, however, since withdrawn from this liberal 
approach to judicial law making to one of extreme conservatism.79 
[10.4.6] Use of collateral benefits: A claim for interest on damages has been refused by an 
English court on the grounds that the claimant had the benefit of insurance money which had 
not been deducted in assessing the claim. 80 The extent to which South African courts will 
have regard to such considerations remains to be seen, if and when legislation for interest 
on damages is ever passed. 
[10.4.7] Fault in conduct of proceedings: If mora interest may be viewed as a form of 
damages for delayed payment then liability for such interest would depend on the 
wrongfulness of the conduct that gave rise to the delay. 81 Reasoning of this nature suggests 
that mora interest should not run from a date earlier than the date of the issue of summons 
and may be denied altogether if the court finds that the delay until date of trial is attributable 
entirely to the fault of the claimant. In Muller v Mutual & Federal Insurance82 the delay 
until trial was viewed as a novus actus interveniens, in other words overdraft interest 
incurred on the debt created by the loss was viewed as not 'caused' by the wrongful act. In 
Smit v Abrahams83 delay and impecuniosity were regarded as foreseeable. This judgment 
was distinguished in the Muller case. 
[10.4.8] Interest or inflation?: Frequently a past loss of earnings or support represents an 
income which, had it been received timeously, would have been expended entirely on living 
expenses such as food, clothing or equipment. This point is well illustrated by the example 
of the spilt mug of beer. 84 The money would not have been invested and there can thus be 
no question of a loss of investment returns. Fair compensation for a mug of beer spilt three 
years ago is primafacie the price today of a mug of beer. The price ~t the date of the loss 
16SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 841-2. 
77Voet Ad Pandectas 45.1.11. 
18Davehill v Community Development Board 1988 1 SA 290 (A) 298H-I. 
79See SA Eagle v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) (past loss of buying power will not be compensated); LTA Construction 
v Administrateur, Tvl 1992 1 SA 473 (A) (interest may not accumulate to more than the original capital). 
"'Harbutt's Plastidne v Wayne Tank & Pump [1970) 1 All ER 225 (CA) 228-9. 
81 Union Government v Jackson 1956 2 SA 398 (A) 416E 417-18. 
12 1993 4 C&B 12-56 (C). 
83 1992 3 SA 158 (C) wherein it was held that the impecuniosity of a victim is foreseeable. 
84Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 17. 
\. 
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should be adjusted for inflation to the date of the award. This presumes, of course, that the 
claimant did not immediately purchase a substitute mug of beer at the time and thereby 
convert his loss of utility into a loss of money. Many of the claims for past loss of earnings 
or support have the characteristic that the victims have no assets to consume nor the 
creditworthiness to borrow. Their past loss is pure utility comparable to the unreplaced mug 
of beer. One measure for compensating such a loss is the amount of money that would have 
been expended, usually earnings net of tax, adjusted for price escalation to the date of the 
award. In the absence of explicit evidence as to what would have been purchased the rate 
of inflation as measured by the consumer price index for all classes will usually be a fair 
basis for escalating the original monetary amount. 
It can be argued that interest is the reward for deferring expenditure on goods and services. 
It then follows that proper compensation for past loss of utility is not merely the present cost 
of acquiring the goods or services but also the addition of a real rate of return to compensate 
for the disutility of being kept out of spending the money on real goods and services. This 
is the same thing as saying that interest, not just inflation, should be added to past losses. 
It deserves note that in England awards for general damages are increased by a real rate of 
return in addition to an adjustment for inflation. 85 I have also noted that the English 
measure for the loss of use of goods is notional interest on the value of those goods.86 The 
same consideration, it seems, holds good for the loss of the use of money .87 
[10.4.9] Notional borrowings: If there has been a loss of investment opportunity then the 
expected investment rate of return is the proper basis for adjustment. If the claimant has 
borrowed money in order to maintain his standard of living then the cost of borrowing such 
money would be the proper measure. But what of the claimant who has been lent money 
interest free? Should the defendant's liability not be determined as though the money had 
been formally borrowed in an 'arms-length' transaction? And what of the claimant who has 
dispensed with borrowing altogether by adopting a cheaper standard of living during the pre-
trial period? Should the defendant's liability not be determined as though the normal 
·standard of living had been maintained by full borrowing at interest? The prevailing practice 
for calculating past loss of earnings88 or support presumes that the full standard of living 
has been maintained throughout the pre-trial period but without allowance for interest on the 
money notionally expended. 
[10.4.10] Penalty interest: The reasoning of the previous paragraph suggests that an 
unqualified award of interest on past loss of earnings or support is the proper measure. It 
is clear that any such development must be by way of reforming legislation and not judicial 
15Pickett v British Rail Engineering [1979) 1 All ER 774 (HL) 799-800; Birkett v Hayes [1982) 2 All ER 710 (CA) 
715a 716a 717a. The rate applied is presently 2% per year but this rate may be amended from time to time by 
judicial decree (Wright v British Railways Board [1983) 2 All ER 698 (HL) 704-5). The real rate of return in 
England is generally considered to be about 4 % to 5 % per year (see Mallett v McMonagle [ 1969] 2 All ER 178 (HL) 
190-1). The rate of 2 % per year may thus reflect a typical past loss calculation based on half the rate for the whole 
period (see 175). 
86See 166. 
"The same considerations apply to services gratuitously rendered (see 192 and 297). 
81See 219. 
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decree. 89 However, if one bears in mind the role of interest as a penaltx in the 'snakes and 
ladders' of litigation90 then the preferable approach may be to use the rate of inflation as 
the fundamental basis for adjustment. The penalty is then limited to the real rate of return. 
In addition the court should be free to use any higher or lower rate that is established in 
evidence. This gives effect to the need for an objective measure for purposes of forensic 
efficiency coupled with a provision to enable the claimant to concretize the issues, if so 
desired. 91 
[10.4.11] Prescribed rate of interest: The Prescribed Rate of Interest Act92 governs the rate 
of mora interest applicable to liquidated debts where no explicit rate otherwise applies. This 
statutory rate is that generally applicable to judgment debts. 93 A variety of rates have been 
laid down from time to time.94 The rate applicable for the entire period of delay is that 
'prescribed as at the time when such interest begins to run'. During times of widely varying 
rates, such as have in recent times prevailed in South Africa, this leads to rates of 12 % being 
applied to debts long after the commercial rate has risen to 20 % and more, and vice versa. 
The solution to this problem is the publication of an interest index95 for each year in the 
same manner as is done for the consumer price index.96 The adjustment for delay is then 
done in the same way as an adjustment for inflation; that is to say by increasing the debt by 
the ratio of the index now to the index at the time that interest commenced to run.97 
Mora interest is, in theory, taxable income. It is doubtful that, in practice, claimants declare 
such income. 
The Act98 provides for simple interest. Compound interest is now permitted in terms of the 
common law. 99 However the rule that interest may not accumulate to more than the 
19SA Eagle Insurance v Hanley 1990 4 SA 827 (A) 842A-B. 
90Union Government vlackson 1956 2 SA 398 (A) 416E 417-18. 
91See 31. 
9255 of 1975. 
93In SA Eagle Insurance v Hanley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 841H passing reference is made to this legislation. 
94 11 % per year for period 16.7.75 to 8.2.85; 203 to 1.8.86; 15% to 1.9.87; 12% to 1.7.89; thereafter 18,53 per 
year simple interest (cf rates in table lOB at 123). 
9~Ideally based on the prime bank overdraft rate, perhaps increased by about 1 3 per year. The index would show 
the cumulative effect of compound interest (compounded monthly) at the bank rate on an initial debt of RlOO at the 
time that the index commences. 
96J"he Johannesburg Stock Exchange jointly with the Actuarial Society of South Africa already publishes interest 
indices in the financial press on a daily basis. This procedure could readily be adapted to provide the necessary data 
for mora interest. 
97Suppose the index was 100 in 1987 when interest commenced to run and has increased to 229 by 1992 (an average 
18 % per year compound) this would mean increasing the debt by a factor of 2,29 with 1,29 times the debt reflecting 
interest. 
98Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975. 
99Davehill (Pty) Ltd v Community Development Board 1988 1 SA 290 (A) 298-9. 
\ 
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original debt, the duplum, continues to apply in the modem South African law. 100 
[10.4.12] Date from which interest runs: When a civil debt remains unpaid the cause of 
action arises at the due date for the debt. It is appropriate that mora interest commences to 
run at that date. With damages for personal injury and death the right of action is available 
from immediately after the injury or death has occurred. The claim lies for the discounted 
present value of all future lucrum cessans and damnum emergens. 101 
Mora interest on a judgment debt runs from the date that the trial court gives judgment and 
not from the date that the appeal court varies the award made by the trial court. 102 When 
there has been a split trial with liability determined at a separate and earlier hearing from the 
damages then mora interest runs from the date that the damages are determined.103 
The fact of a payment into court does not relieve the defendant of liability for mora interest, 
and the payment should include a tender to pay interest. 1<» 
When calculating interest on a continuing past loss of monthly or weekly earnings or support 
the arithmetic may be simplified by applying the rate to the total past loss for half the period 
or half the rate for the whole period. 105 This short-cut method is only valid if there has 
been an unbroken series of losses. 106 If the past loss of earnings was for only a short 
period after the injury then the full rate of interest should be applied for the full period. 107 
[10.4.13] Indexation: If the parties to the action had the opportunity to contract prior to the 
commission of the delict they would have had the opportunity to stipulate for interest in the 
event of wrongful conduct. It can be argued for such claimants that a statutory provision 
allowing an adjustment for interest, or loss of buying power, constitutes unjustified 
interference with freedom of contract. Conversely one may argue that if there is freedom 
of contract the parties may readily agree to exclude an adjustment for inflation, should they 
wish to do so.108 The South African authorities would seem to have generally discouraged 
the indexation of monetary liabilities. 109 This is unfortunate because indexation of 
liabilities does not cause inflation, it merely determines who will bear the cost of inflation. 
100LTA Construction v Administrateur, Tvl 1992 1 SA 473 (A); Otto 1992 THRHR 472-80. 
101But see footnote 71. 
imoeneral Acddent Versekeringsmpy v Bailey 1988 4 SA 353 (A). 
103 7710mas v Bunn (1991) 1 All ER 193 (HL). 
'
04Government of RSA v Midkon (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 552 (f) 567. 
'
0
'Je.fford v Gee [1970) 1 All ER 1202 (CA) 1208g-inf. 
'~he method also presupposes fairly even increases over the relevant period, a condition that is generally satisfied. 
107In Dexter v Courtaulds (1984) 1 All ER 70 (CA) the court failed to grasp this principle and ordered that interest 
on such a loss be calculated according to the 'half-the-period' principle. 
108Spandau 1975 SALJ 31 35-6 lists a number of deficiencies in this reasoning. 
109'fhe indexation provision in s4 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 is a rare exception to the general 
emphasis upon currency nominalism. 
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Those who hold real assets which increase in value with the passage of time, such as shares 
or immovable property, will profit at the expense of investors who maintain fixed deposits 
in building societies and banks at inadequate rates of return. 110 
[10.5] FOREIGN CURRENCIES 
This topic is included under the discussion of loss of use because it involves an adjustment 
for the change in currency values with the effluction of time. In other words it reflects a 
form of 'loss of buying power' .111 
[10.5.1] Judgment in a foreign currency: The loss of earning capacity or support suffered 
by a foreign visitor to South Africa is a loss of financial benefits in another country. The 
damages should be determined in accordance with the inflation rates and investment 
opportunities prevailing in that foreign economy .112 This implies that judgment for 
damages should be given in a foreign currency and that the rate of exchange for converting 
the currency is that prevailing on the date that payment is made. 113 A contrary view has 
been expressed in the Voest Alpine case114 but this seems to be an isolated instance. The 
Hanley case115 has emphasised currency nominal ism and the principle that a debt owing 
is not adjusted for subsequent changes in 'currency values', notably inflation. It remains 
arguable that a debt in a foreign currency is fixed in terms of that currency. It then follows 
that conversion at the date of trial does not offend against a rule of currency nominalism. 116 
[10.5.2] Mora interest: Foreign economies have different rates of interest from South Africa. 
Strictly speaking the appropriate 'legal rate of interest' for such claims is that prevailing in 
the foreign economy. The differential between South African and foreign interest rates will 
often reflect the yearly rate of decline of the South African rand relative to the other 
currency. In the absence of express evidence as to the foreign 'legal rate' some degree of 
equity will generally be achieved by applying the South African 'legal rate' to the debt 
converted to South African rands using the rate of exchange that prevailed at the time that 
interest commenced to run. If the foreign 'legal rate' is to be used then this should be 
applied to the debt expressed in the foreign currency. 
110Particularly after payment of income tax. 
111See paragraph 10.4.4. 
112The high cost of living in many foreign countries, such as Japan, coupled with a weak South African rand can give 
rise to awards which, after conversion, are staggeringly high by South African standards. 
113As was done for a claim. for loss of support in lnfolsdottir v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1988 (SWAZI) 
(unreported 27.5.88 case 1054/86). See too Murata Machinery v Cape/on Yarns 1986 4 SA 671 (C); Elgin Brown 
& Hamer v Dampskibsselskabet 1988 4 SA 671 (N) (3 judges); Makwindi Oil Procurement v National Oil 1989 3 
SA 191 (Z). See too Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 228n206. 
114Voest Alpine lntertrading Gesel/schaft v Burwill 1985 2 SA 149 f.YV). Discussed by Radesich 1987 THRHR 233-7. 
11
'SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
116The reference in SA Eagle v Hartley (at 839F) to Voest Alpine lnrertrading Gese/lschaft v Burwi/I 1985 2 SA 149 
f.YV) would seem to directed purely at the statement that the quantum of a debt should not be altered by the date at 
which one chooses to exact it, and not by any intention to confirm the decision made by the court. 
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[10.6] CONCLUSION 
Interest is the measure of loss for deprivation from the use of money. The loss of use of 
goods can generally be quantified by interest on the value of the goods subject to an 
adjustment for the rate at which the goods increase or decrease in value with the passage of 
time. Interest 'on' damages and interest 'as' damages are not permitted under South African 
law. 
A court is competent to award damages expressed in terms of a foreign currency. The rate 
of mora interest should then be adjusted to that appropriate to the relevant foreign economy. 
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Summary: Before dealing with the actions for personal injury and 
death it is useful to examine the impact of collateral-benefit rules 
upon the distribution of the costs of damage within the community at 
large. A comprehensive approach to damages requires the deduction 
of insurance and employment benefits. A coun making an award of 
damages should specify that a claimant should reimburse cenain 
welldoers, including an employer. Benefits provided by the State are 
not gratuitous and are generally deducted. 
[11.1] INTRODUCTION 
179 
I conclude this thesis with chapters on damages for personal injury and damages for loss of 
support. The subject of collateral benefits cuts across both these concluding chapters1 and 
would seem to be best dealt with in a chapter of its own. When a death or injury occurs the 
event not only brings about losses but also compensating advantages that have the effect of 
reducing the overall loss suffered. The substantive law requires that a number of these 
compensating advantages be ignored when assessing the damages. There are three main 
classes of collateral benefit: 'insurance benefits', 'gratuitous benefits', and 'pigeonholed' 
benefits. 
[11.1.1] Grounds for deduction: In general a claimant who has received from a collateral 
source money or valuable benefits, or the right to such advantages, cannot complain if the 
present value thereof is deducted when assessing his damages. He has had the benefit 
thereof. Money, regardless of its source, has utility, often very high utility. The overall 
utility of the claimant's life plan is substantially enhanced by the provision of collateral 
benefits. It follows that as a general rule such benefits should be brought into account when 
assessing the damages. 
The present utility of such benefits may be reduced by reason of uncertainty or by reason of 
a sense of obligation, moral or legal, to repay such benefits to the welldoer who has provided 
them. It would not be unfair on a claimant who argues for non-deduction to expect him to 
provide explicit evidence of those collateral benefits which are subject to a moral or legal 
obligation to repay, and to confine non-deduction to such benefits. A major criticism of the 
prevailing approach by the courts to some collateral benefits is that a defendant is denied the 
right to lead evidence that repayment will not take place, or to cross-examine the claimant 
in that regard. In cases of doubt it would be appropriate to allow a _deduction from the 
damages for the value of the chance of non-repayment. 
'Reinecke 1988 De Jure 221 222 'Die probleem van voordeeltoerekening doen hom op die hele terrein van die 
skadevergoedingsreg voor'. 
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[11.1.2] Justifiable non-deduction: Evaluation of the rules governing collateral benefits 
reveals that some of the rules against deduction are highly desirable. For instance it is 
clearly desirable that an insurer's right of recourse be protected.2 The death of a 
breadwinner transfers liability for support within the extended family unit without giving the 
substituted breadwinner a right of action for compensation.3 Justice is achieved by ignoring 
the fact of the substitute support.4 Persons who act in terms of a duty of support reflect a 
special class of welldoers. 5 
[11.1.3] Micro- and macro-economics: The subject of collateral benefits echoes a general 
tension in society between the needs of the individual and the needs of the community at 
large. 6 Van der Walt7 perceives the function of insurance to effect compensation and the 
function of law to determine which members of the community will bear the cost.8 He 
points out9 that conclusions will differ depending on whether one considers the community 
at large or the individual. An important function of the courts is to uphold the rights of the 
individual. These rights are concretized in the form of contracts of insurance; contracts of 
employment, and acts and regulations governing a statutory insurer such as the MMF. Is it 
proper for a court to have regard to macro-economic considerations of overall cost to the 
community at large? The traditional problem solving skills of the lawyers are focused upon 
analysis of contracts and statutes, not macro-economics. This consideration may explain the 
prevalence of such reasoning as 'The wrongdoer may not benefit from insurance for which 
the claimant has paid' 10 instead of the macro-economic view which would focuses upon the 
overall cost to the community at large and says instead 'The victim is compensated at the 
expense of the community at large' .11 Corbett & Buchanan state that: 
'Awards must take into account the state of economic development of the country, 
2Ackennan v Loubser 1918 OPD 31 36; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 452; Van Niekerk 1976 Codicillus 20-4 
discusses the right of recourse by the insurer of an employer against an employee who has caused damage. See 187 
below. 
3With personal injury the law does accord such persons a right of action eo nomine (Schnellen v Randalia Assurance 
1969 1 SA 31 (W); see discussion at 193 below). 
4Groenwald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. Although. this principle is desirable in general its application 
in Groenewald v Snyders to support provided from surplus life insurance money is questionable. 
'See 193. 
6Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 230; see too Van der Walt 1980 THRHR l 24. 
7See previous footnote. 
1ln general see Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 582-613. 
9Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 215 . 
10Parry v Qeaver (1969] l All ER 555 (HL). The emphasis upon a denial of benefit to the 'wrongdoer' has strong 
punitive overtones (see in particular at 558C-D). 
"Perhaps the most colourful exposition of the macro-economic approach has been the reference to the body of policy 
holders of insurance companies as 'the whipping boys of the twentieth century' Browning v 111e War Office [1962] 
3 All ER 1089 (CA) 10941. The macro-economic views of Trollip JA in South Africa (Bay Passenger Transport 
v Franzen 1975 1 SA 269 (A) 274-5; Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 173-4) have had 
remarkably little impact on the substantive law. There are exceptions (Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 
(C) 1087G-H). 
• 
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and should tend towards conservatism. In circumstances of doubt and difficulty, 
defendants are to be regarded with greater favour than plaintiffs. In short the figure 
of justice carries a pair of scales, not a cornucopia'. 12 
181 
There is some doubt that this passage provides an accurate description of prevailing judicial 
attitudes in South Africa: 13 When faced with doubt and difficulty in the Byleveldt matter the 
appellate division opted for non-deduction14 whereas adherence to Corbett & Buchanan's 
directive would have meant deducting the disputed salary payments; In the absence of 
evidence it has been presumed by the court that a collateral benefit is res inter alias acta and 
that it should not be deducted; 15 a court has refused to make a deduction for the chance that 
a medical expense will not arise. 16 It seems true to say that there is a growing modern 
ethic, certainly not universal, 17 that in cases of doubt and difficulty claimants are to be 
preferred to defendants. This ethic is undoubtedly reinforced by dissatisfaction with the 
once-and-for-all lump-sum system of compensation. 18 Suffice it to say that the South 
African judiciary are divided on this important aspect of policy as regards the assessment of 
damages. 
[11.1.4] The role of large institutions: It is rare for an uninsured defendant to be brought 
before the civil courts. Common sense says that one just does not sue an impecunious 
wrongdoer, and men of reasonable means will generally seek to protect their patrimony by 
way of insurance. 19 The modern law of damages for personal injury and death is thus 
concerned primarily with actions against large financial institutions with substantial financial 
resources. Such institutions, particularly in South Africa, have monopolistic powers which 
enable them to recover from customers or taxpayers or policyholders the costs of meeting 
the claim for damages. 20 The distributive nature of an active economy can be expected 
12Corbett & Buchanan Jed 6. 
13Visser 1986 De Jure 207 216-17 discusses conservatism in relation to awards for general damages. 
14Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 197J 2 SA 146 (A) 15J. The prospect of double compensation ('dubbel 
vergoed sou word') was here perceived to be the lesser of two evils. 
uMaroso v SA Eagle Insurance 1987 J C&B 6J8 (W) 642-J . 
16Pallas v Lesotho National Insurance 1987 J C&B 705 (ECD) 713. A plaintiff will not be denied compensation 
for a possible loss (Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 l SA 191 (A) 225-6). Even-handed justice would apply the same 
principle in a defendant's favour if there was a possibility that the loss would not arise. 
170ne may point to many modern judgments in the traditional mould, eg Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 
904 (A); Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A); Santam Insurance v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 84J (A). 
11See, for instance, Wade v Sanlam Insurance 1985 1 PH I3 (C); Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B AJ-45 
(C) 64 ' ... if defendant were concerned at all about the risks I have mentioned which attach to the insurer in a lump 
sum situation, defendant could have taken steps to minimise these by resorting to the procedures stipulated in section 
8(5) of Act 84 of 1986. This defendant has not done' (payment by instalments). More generally see Van der Walt 
'Sommeskadeleer' whose principal theme is the abolishment of the once-and-for-all lump-sum system of 
compensation; Boberg 'Delict' 598-9. 
19Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 260 271. 
20Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 J SA 1084 (C) 10870 'The award I propose making comes ultimately from the 
taxpayer's pocket'; see too Browning v T71e War Office [1962) J All ER 1089 (CA) 1094; Kanda/la v BEA [1980] 
1 All ER J41 (QB) J49; 1981 SAU I 6; Rowley v London & North Western Railway [1861-73] All ER Rep 823 
(Exch) 829-30 'the defendants most liable to such actions will not be able to carry on their business upon the same 
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to pass on the cost directly or indirectly to all members of society as part of the overall 
cost of living.21 The only relief for 'society' in this broader sense is a reduction in the 
overall cost of damages claims. Escalation in awards for damages will influence the rate of 
inflation which will in turn influence the awards for damages. Damages awards are but one 
of the many costs of living that drive inflation.22 
It has been said that the Lex Aquilia contemplates the payment of damages by the wrongdoer 
and no-one else. 23 The conclusion sought to be drawn from this observation was that 
compensating advantages should be ignored because they would lessen the liability of the 
wrongdoer by distributing the loss more widely. The focus here is on burdening the 
wrongdoer with as large a liability as possible, rather than concern for comprehensive 
compensation for the victim. Such a consideration is clearly punitive. It is useful to bear 
in mind in this regard that when the Lex Aquilia was first passed over 2000 years ago it had 
a mixed purpose being both punishment and compensation. The modern Aquilian action is, 
in theory at any rate, no longer punitive. 24 
[11.1.5] Abdication of judicial responsibility?: It has been argued that it does not matter 
what decision a court makes, the system will adjust accordingly.25 One thing is clear, 
whatever decisions the courts make the large institutions, including government, always have 
it within their power to stipulate contractually for a right of recovery or to legislate that 
certain collateral benefits should be deducted. 26 If government and the large institutions are 
indifferent to taking steps to protect the public purse why should the courts shoulder the 
burden? The government in South Africa has certainly, to date, shown little interest in 
keeping down the cost of damages to the public.27 The primary concern of the courts is 
surely to protect the rights of the underdog? But is this the limit to judicial responsibility? 
The underdog includes not only the claimant before the court but also the voiceless mass of 
the general public who are not represented before the court. Should the courts not have 
terms to the public as now'. 
21Through the pricing mechanisms (premiums, mark-ups on sales, taxation) by which such institutions obtain funds 
from the public at large: Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 212 533 539 542; Parry v Oeaver [1969) 
1 All ER 555 (HL) 5790-E; Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C) 10870. 
12Moekoena v President Insurance 1990 2 SA 112 (W) 116A4 11604. For the financial year ended April 1987 total 
liability for payments in . respect of motor accidents was R29 l million (Department of Transport Statistics for 
30/04/89). If the cost of claims were to increase roughly in line with inflation this would suggest a cost for claims 
in the 1990/91 financial year of R500 million. Payments under social pensions for the 1990/91 financial year were 
budgeted at R7 billion. The cost of motor vehicle accidents is thus only about 7 % of total expenditure on social 
welfare. 
23Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 152E ' ... eis die Lex Aquilia in hierdie verband vergoeding 
deur die delikpleger en nie deur iemand anders nie •. 
24See paragraph 11.10.1. 
25Atiyah 'Ac~idents Compensation & the Law' Jed 588-9. 
26Government has, for example, stipulated for itself a 6-month prescription period: s32 of the Police Act 7 of 1958; 
sl 13 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
27 Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 terminated the judicial practice of deducting life insurance and pension 
monies from the claims of dependants (Hansard 17/02/69 842-8). Wassenaar 'Squandered Assets' details a number 
of other examples of government financial wastefulness. 
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regard to their burden as well? As I have noted above a court which focuses upon the needs 
of the community at large will favour rules which minimize the cost to society .28 For this 
reason there is a general rule against double compensation. 29 
There are a number of other objections to the philosophy of judicial abdication of 
responsibility, the main one being that the courts already do deduct a number of collateral 
benefits. If they are to cease deducting just how far is non-deduction to go? With a personal 
injury is there, for instance, to be no deduction for earnings in alternative employment found 
after the date of injury?30 Another problem is that the amount to be recovered sometimes 
bears no fixed relationship to the amount deducted. Thus an employer might seek to recover 
from a claimant salary payments gross of taxation whereas the damages will have been 
assessed by deducting salary payments net of taxation. If the court does not have regard to 
the nature and amount of the recovery a claimant may find himself paying out to his 
employer more than he has received by way of damages. For this reason recoveries in terms 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act are limited to the relevant damages. 31 The prospect 
of overrecovery is a very real problem when there has been an apportionment of damages 
but the welldoer seeks to recover without apportioning his claim. 32 Research has indicated 
that the costs of enforcing a right of recourse often negate the benefits.33 
The power vested in the courts is substantial. Many of the rules concerning the non-
deduction of collateral benefits are not in accordance with common sense or intuitive 
concepts of damage. To determine rules of law on a haphazard basis comforted by the 
thought that legal subjects will just rearrange their affairs to accommodate the law is rather 
like the inconsiderate driver of a motor car who takes the view that other drivers have eyes 
and brakes and should thus adapt their behaviour to his driving. The philosophy of 
abdication of responsibility has the ring of an ex-post justification for doing nothing about 
a decision incorrectly made. 
[11.2] INSURANCE AND PENSION BENEFITS 
[11.2.1] Deduction of pension benefits: Pension benefits payable in terms of the contract of 
21See paragraph 11. l.3. 
29Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 16 25. Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 113F 'In making separate 
awards, the court must of course guard against any overlapping and resulting duplication'; Administrator-General 
SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A) 289 'an appreciable ... improper duplication of damages'; Cooper-Stephenson & 
Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 275-91 ; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed para 5.2.09. 
30See 52. 
31 s8(1)of Act 30 of 1941. See too Koch 1987 THRHR 475-80; 1990 De Rebus 343-6. 
32See, for instance, Koch 1987 THRHR 475-80; 1990 De Rebus 343-6 concerning the deduction of benefits paid in 
terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
33Bloembergen 'Sclradevergoeding' 382-4; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 217-20 236. Van Niekerk 1976 
Codidllus 20-4 describes how an insurer can exerc ise a right of recourse against an employee of the insured. An 
employer has substantial control over employees. It seems undesirable that an employee of limited financial means 
should be deprived of insurance cover enjoyed by the employer. 
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employment are deducted when assessing the damages. 34 This ruling has b~n criticised35 
on the grounds that pension benefits are savings and hence that the Dippenaar case rules for 
the deduction from damages of savings accumulated prior to the injury. A prominent feature 
of all this criticism has been the absence of any detailed analysis of the damages calculation 
and the contingent nature of the pension benefits. 36 Table 12 below summarises the method 
of calculation used in the Dippenaar case. 
We may note that for the uninjured condition the value of pension savings to date of injury 
(R87046) was added to the total value of salary earnings (R62250).37 By reason of the 
injury the present value of pension benefits, including savings, was increased from R87046 
to Rl 11254, an increase of R24208 derived from risk insurance provided by the pension 
fund. The effect of the Dippenaar calculation was thus to treat savings as an in-out item, 
a matter of calculation convenience. The increase in value of R24208 one might 
appropriately describe as the 'accelerated value' of the expected pension benefits.38 
An important feature of savings by way of pension benefits provided by an employer is that 
these only accrue to the employee if that employee satisfies certain conditions of service as 
laid down in the pension fund rules. One important condition is that the employee remain 
in service until retirement age. If the employee leaves service prior to retirement age then 
he will forfeit a greater or lesser part of the R87046 described above as 'savings'. 39 This 
'savings' element reflects the value of the chance40 of receiving a pension from normal 
retirement age. Some pension funds, but not all, provide special benefits on death or 
disablement. In Dippenaar's case there was provision for a substantial disability pension on 
early ill-health retirement. 
34Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A). This has created inconsistency between the employed from 
whom a deduction is made, and the self-employed from whom no deduction is made. (Pauw J979 TSAR 256 259). 
It has also placed the injured employee upon a different footing from the deceased employee (Assessment of Damages 
Act 9 of 1969). These anomalies attest that something is wrong, not that the Dippenaar case is incorrectly decided. 
HBoberg 'Delict' 609-10; Pauw 1979 TSAR 256; Claasen & Oelofse 1979 De Rebus 588. Boberg motivates the 
non-deduction of pension benefits on the grounds that the action is specifically for loss of earning capacity as distinct 
from general financial loss. Boberg's reasoning is clearly unsound for, if applied consistently, it would mean that 
an injured person has no claim for medical and similar expenses. The practice of 'pigeonholing' is discusse4 under 
section 11.8.1. Conflict between obiter dicta in Sanlam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) and the 
Dippenaar ruling should, in terms of the rules of precedent, be decided in favour of Dippenaar which was handed 
~own by an undivided court. 
36Reinecke 1988 De Jure 221 227-9 discusses the problem having appropriate regard to the mixed insurance and 
savings nature of a pension fund. He is a notable exception. 
37This follows the formula stated by the court in which all benefits which would have accrued were capitalized 
together (Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917E). This methodology is less confusing for complex 
situations than the more popular approach of differencing first and then capitalizing (see paragraph 12.2.1). 
31Accelerated inheritance benefits are discussed at 333. 
3~is would not happen if pension funds were compelled to provide a transfer value of the member's interest to his 
new fund. An attempt in South Africa to introduce legislation to provide for compulsory transferability was aborted 
by the trade unions on the grounds that it deprived a worker of access to his savings. 
"°The value of R87046 discounts only the risk of early death. A further d~duction should be applied for the risks 
of premature termination of service, and below-average salary increases. 
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TABLE 12 - IN-OUT PENSION SA VIN GS 
Uninjured Injured Difference 
R R R 
Earnings 6225.0 nil 62250 
Pension benefits 87046 111254 (24208) 
Totals 149296 111254 38042 
Net loss = R149296 - Rl 11254 = R38042 
In Oberholzer v Santam Insurance41 the court was presented with the net accelerated value, 
the capitalized difference (R2200) between the before and after pensions. The savings 
element had been eliminated in advance. 
The Dippenaar methodology was followed in Krugell v Shield Insurance42 where pension 
savings but for the injury were taken to be R76731 with the increased value after injury being 
R148770, an increase by reason of the injury of R72039. 
[11.2.2] Exceptions to the 'Dippenaar' rule: The approach in Dippenaar's case is 
appropriate for what are called 'defined benefit' pension funds. That is to say pension funds 
which provide a guaranteed level of pension at retirement regardless of how little or how 
much money the particular member has contributed. A number of funds do not guarantee 
final benefits, the pension payable being determined by whatever savings have been 
accumulated by the time that retirement occurs. For such funds iris usual to allow for future 
pension benefits by adding to the claimant's notional earnings the contribution that the 
employer would have made. This method has no regard for what has been accumulated in 
the past. If the claimant has received a lump-sum refund of contributions from the pension 
fund, that is savings to date of dismissal, it would be wrong to follow the Dippenaar ruling 
and deduct this lump sum when assessing compensation. If justice is to be achieved one 
must adapt one's rules for collateral benefits to the calculation methodology. This highlights 
the point that when dealing with collateral benefits an unquestioning application of precedent 
is to be.deplored. It is essential that the relevant financial transactions be properly analyzed. 
[11.2.3] Insurance as savings: Many forms of life insurance policy display the same features 
as pension benefits, there is an accrued savings component, the surrender value,43 and a 
contingent element making up the balance. of the sum assured. Thus a disability insurance 
41 1970 1 SA 337 (N) 34 lA-E. 
42 1982 4 SA 95 (I') 106A-E. 
43For retirement annuity policies this would be the transfer value. 
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might have paid out RlOOOOO of which R8000 was the surrender value immediately prior to 
the injury and R92000 is the contingent cover provided because the injury has taken place. 
Had there been no injury the policy would have been worth only R8000. Accident 
benefits44 and term insurances45 do not give rise to surrender values46 and thus involve 
no savings element at all. 
Insurance benefits provided by an employer in terms of the 'contract of employment' are 
deductible in full.47 
[11.2.4] Privately negotiated insurances: No deduction is made for pension and insurance 
benefits which the claimant had negotiated privately: 
'If a person makes a decision to insure himself against loss by accidents he does so 
voluntarily, and his decision, and the fruits thereof, are completely divorced either 
from his employment, or from the liability of the wrongdoer. Moreover the amount 
he received from the policy bears, in the normal course, no relationship to the terms 
of his employment or the amount of his salary, the duration of his employment, or 
indeed to whether he is employed at all. His payment of premiums to secure a 
personal indemnity against injury, hardship, or loss are payments from what he has 
earned, and the fruits of those payments are no more the concern of the wrongdoer 
than would be the fruits of an investment in a building society or in the stock 
exchange. He would be entitled to payment of the benefits of the policy irrespective 
of the wrongdoer's negligence and irrespective of the terms of his employment'. 48 
A prominent view discernible here is that the court is not concerned with how a claimant 
would have spent his earnings. This follows from a view that the action for personal injury 
is an action for loss of earnings. The ambiguities and problems associated with this view are 
discussed more fully in the next chapter. Suffice it say for the moment that the courts are 
divided on the extent to which regard may be had as to how a man would have spent his 
earnings. 49 
[11.2.5] The insurance principle: When there is injury to a man who is covered under an 
accident policy is injured he receives payment under the policy far in excess of the premium 
paid. A large proportion of his benefit is derived from the premiums paid by numerous other 
policyholders who have not claimed under their policies. The costs of the insurance payment 
«Benefits payable according to a specified tariff, eg R20000 for loss of a l~g, if the injury results from a violent 
accident. 
45Life insurance policies for specified durations, such as 20 years, which do not provide a payment on expiry are 
pure insurance contracts without any savings element. These may include benefits payable in the event of injury in 
addition to the benefits payable on early death. 
46Cash benefits payable on premature termination of an insurance plan. 
41Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 
48Cited with approval, but obiter, in Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 920-1. 'It is trite law that 
insurance benefits are not to be set off against a plaintiffs damages' Mutual & Federal Insurance v Swanepoe/ 1988 
2 SA 1 (A) 8-9. See too Boberg 'Delict' 609-11; Maroso v SA Eagle Insurance 1987 3 C&B 638 C#) 642-3. 
49See 225. 
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are directly met by the insurer from the pool of funds derived from premiums charged. The 
insurer fulfils the function of an administrative conduit between the population of policy 
holders and those who suffer loss by accident. When the time comes to pay damages an 
insurer, or perhaps a statutory body such as the MMF, will meet the cost from funds derived 
from the population at large by way of premiums or a petrol levy. In terms of this 
macro-economic view if the insurance benefits were to be ignored when assessing damages 
the population at large would be paying twice over,50 and the claimant receiving double 
compensation. 
Pauw51 refers to the interests of the community that pensions should not be deducted. It 
is difficult to grasp his reasoning since an important desideratum of society is clearly that 
costs be contained. Boberg52 maintains that we should be pleased to pay a small additional 
charge on the cost of a 'dinner for two'. That is fine for the claimant who has pension 
benefits which can be ignored, but what of the millions of persons without pension rights 
who also contribute through the petrol levy and other price mechanisms to the cost of 
meeting damages claims? The rules against deduction of insurance benefits tend to 
concentrate wealth in the hands of those who can afford the luxury of privately funded 
pension and insurance benefits. 53 
[11.2.6] Right of subrogation: An insurer who wishes to keep down premium costs may pay 
the insured, but subject to a right of subrogation.54 A court would then be fully justified 
in making no deduction for the insurance payment. The claimant would be receiving the 
excess payment as a sort of trustee for his insurer and would thus not be receiving double 
compensation. 55 Alternatively the insurer would take over the claimant's right of action and 
recover the payment directly. The cost of the incident would be passed on to the public 
through the wrongdoer's insurer. Rights of recourse, such as subrogation are often 
administratively expensive to enforce relative to the amounts recovered and should in general 
be avoided. 56 Following the 'knock-for-knock' approach of the motor insurers57 it is 
economically more efficient for each institution to recover its outlay through its normal 
'°See 180. 
'
1Pauw 1979 TSAR 256-7 ('gemeenskapsbelang'). 
'
2Boberg 'Delict' 599. 
'
3 As distinct from state social welfare benefits. Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 10-11 makes the point that non-deduction of 
insurances transfers wealth into the hands of the wealthy at the expense of the less -fortunate who cannot afford 
insurance. The Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 thus operates against the wealth redistribution ethic that 
prevails in South Africa. 
,.Ackerman v Loubser 1918 OPD 31 36. Article 47 ofMMF agreement ito Act 93of1989 (s28 of the Compulsory 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 56 of 1972) provides for a right of recourse against unlicensed or drunken drivers. 
"Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 23 'Die benadeelde kan in dergelike gevalle van sy versekeraar en van die dader 
ontvang totdat sy skade volledig vergoed is, en slegs vir wat hy meer as dit ontvang, is hy in 'n trusteeposisie 
teenoor sy versekeraar'. 
'6See footnote 33. · 
,., An agreement not to recover from one another. 
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pncmg or taxation or premium charges. 58 Life insurance contracts often include a 
substantial savings element and are never subject to subrogation. 59 
[11.2. 7] Casual frolic: It can be argued that the spontaneous taking out of insurance does not 
form part of a life plan and for this reason benefits accruing from that source should be 
ignored. In one nineteenth-century case the claimant had60 taken out temporary accident 
cover from a vending machine at a railway station before embarking on his fateful journey. 
The court ruled that the cause of the insurance payment was not the accident but the taking 
out of the insurance. 61 The claimant, it seems, did not take out the insurance cover as part 
of a general life plan to be insured. His taking of temporary accident cover was an 'off-the-
cuff' action, a casual frolic outside the framework of his general life plan. 62 The court 
ruled that no deduction be made. 
The taking out of extensive insurance as part of a life plan would indicate a person who was 
risk averse and thus likely to be a stable earner of income, one not inclined to take risks. 63 
[11.2.8] Durable and ephemeral 'investments': It has been noted above that when an insured 
person is injured the benefit paid is usually substantially in excess of the premium paid. The 
additional money comes from accumulated savings, that is to say the surrender value, and, 
more importantly, from other policyholders via the insurer for the contingent component. 
Analogously one may invest R500 in share market and after a price rise one may then sell 
for RlOOO. The profit comes from the fact that other persons are prepared to buy in at 
RlOOO shares that originally cost R500. There is a superficial resemblance between the 
insurance transaction and the share market transaction. The major difference, however, is 
that the shares would have increased in value regardless of whether there had been an 
accident or not. 
Without an accident a typical short-term insurance contract has no intrinsic value in 
exchange. 64 At the end of the insurance year the policy will expire leaving a valueless piece 
58An exception to this general principle is when the allocation of cost serves to reduce the incidence of accidents 
causing damage as in a factory environment (Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' 3ed 587). 
59Reinecke 1988 De Jure 221 232-3 speculates that the reason for non-deduction of life insurance money probably 
lies in the special nature of these contracts. 
(:IJBradburn v GWR [1874-80] All ER 195 (Exch D). 
61 Causation does not provide a satisfactory solution to such problems (Santam v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 15 lF). 
In S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) the victim was rendered a paraplegic by the wrongdoer's bullet. The victim's 
subsequent death from infection was held to have been caused by the victim's subsequent failure to follow med.ical 
advice as to pressure sores (see Potgieter 1990 THRHR 267 for commentary). Similar reasoning in Bradburn's case 
would have led to deduction of the insurance payment. 
62Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 286n16 'Special life insurance policies purchased to cover a single railroad or 
airplane trip are probably more nearly comparable to a lottery ticket than a means of achieving certainty'; McGregor 
1965 MLR 629 636. 
63See 151. 
MThe discussion here focuses on insurance contracts which never acquire a surrender value , ie which do not involve 
any savings element. 
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of paper. 65 The benefit gained from paying the premium was the utility of peace of mind 
of being covered. 66 In this sense insurance is a consumable like food and drink, not durable 
savings that increase patrimony. Insurance reduces the risk of a reduction to patrimony. 67 
The payment of the premium purchases an entitlement to participate in a loss-sharing scheme. 
The same wrongful act that causes permanent loss from injury also renders durably valuable 
the otherwise ephemeral accident policy. 68 The purchase of share-market investments 
entitles one to share in a profit-and-loss scheme, the difference being that in the normal 
course of events this is an asset with a marketable value enhancing the value of patrimony, 
not something that vanishes with the expiry of the period of insurance. 
If one examines the uses for life insurance listed by a top life insurance salesman, 69 one 
finds that pure life cover is not sold as an investment per se. Rather life insurance is sold 
as protection for investments in the sense of ensuring adequate cash liquidity in the event that 
the purchaser's life plan as regards investment and family support is prematurely terminated. 
Reinecke70 records that the purchase of life insurance is directed at ensuring the completion 
of a life plan. 
In terms of utility theory one would say that an insurance policy is a largely unmarketable 
commodity.71 Typical of such insurance is 'term' life insurance, a form of life cover which 
provides no savings element, that is to say it never acquires a surrender value. As a general 
such life insurance has little or no utility for a third party. Any advantage is offset by the 
cost of the premiums that need to be paid. However, once the insured event has occurred, 
the utility, the value in exchange of the insurance policy, is vastly enhanced. The utility of 
bringing about the insured event can be so high that persons will take their own lives.72 
65Parry v Deaver [1969) 1 All ER 555 (HL) 560B-C; see too Smoker v London Fire & Civil Defence Authority 
[1991) 2 All ER 449 (HL). 
66Friedman & Savage 1948 J PE 279 285 'The empirical evidence for the willingness of persons of all income classes 
to buy insurance is extensive. Since insurance companies have costs of operation that are covered by their premium 
receipts, the purchaser is obviously paying a larger premium than the average compensation he can expect to receive 
for the losses against which he carries insurance. That is, he is paying something to escape risk'. 
67ie reduces the general contingencies deductible if my life plan were to be valued. Due to the incidence of the 
insurer's expenses the cost of the insurance will usually be greater than or equal to the actuarial value of the risk 
which it serves to neutralize (Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 285-6). 
68People have been known to take drastic steps to bring about payment under a policy: eg Beresford v Royal 
Insurance [1938) 2 All ER 602 (HL) suicide; S v Robinson 1968 1 SA 666 (A) 675A 'The deceased wanted to be 
murdered so that the proceeds of his insurance policies would be paid out to his widow'. 
69Feldman 'The Feldman Way' 131-99. This work discusses the selling of life insurance policies in the United States 
of America where legislation severely restricts the sale of life policies with a savings (investment) element. 
'°Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 54 'Deur die afsluiting van lewensversekering in sy verskillende vorme maak 'n persoon 
juis seker dat sy toekomsprojeksies ten opsigte van sy vermoe, sy beoogde spaargeld of selfs verwagte inkomste, 
nie deur 'n te vroee dood in die wiele gery word'. 
71 Apart from the .surrender value. 
72See, for instance.Beresford v Royal Insurance [1938) 2 All ER 602 (HL) suicide; S v Robinson 1968 1 SA 666 (A) 
675A 'The deceased wanted to be murdered so that the proceeds of his insurance policies would be paid out to his 
widow' . See too 256 below. 
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[11.2.9] Take your victim as you find him: In general a wrongdoer must take his victim as 
he finds him. If he is so unfortunate as to injure a person with the proverbial 'eggshell skull' 
then the damages will be substantial. If justice were even-handed then the injury of a 
well-insured victim wm1ld likewise require the payment of minimal damages.73 Certainly 
the non-working millionaire can expect no compensation for loss of earnings74 despite 
having paid for this condition with all his assets. The insured claimant, by way of contrast, 
has paid only a premium. It has been argued that the damages payable should not be 
influenced by so fickle an issue as the extent of the victim's insurances.75 One may 
likewise argue that the damages should not be influenced by so variable a factor as the rate 
of pay which a victim receives. 76 The ultimate in such egalitarian arguments would be to 
pay the same money to all victims regardless of their financial circumstances.n This takes 
us back to the tariff systems of the Germanic weergeld.78 
Foreseeability is commonly invoked by the courts as a test for whether a gain or loss should 
be ignored. It is usually foreseeable that the victim may be insured.79 
[11.2.10] Premiums paid by the claimant: In deference to the perception that the claimant 
has paid for the insurance benefits with his own money ,80 justice would be done if the 
defendant reimbursed the claimant for the cost of the premium paid. But justice does not 
require that the claimant retain the benefit of premiums paid by numerous other 
policyholders. 
[11.3] GRATUITOUS BENEFITS 
[11.3.1] General: Benefits provided gratuitously to an injured person, or the family of a 
deceased breadwinner, will not be deducted when assessing the damages. 81 The justification 
for this rule is that the welldoer has personally borne part of the loss suffered and should for 
this reason be reimbursed, or at the very least be provided with the opportunity for 
73This reasoning was rejected in Parry v Cleaver (1969) l All ER 555 (HL) 575F. 
74Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 105-6. 
75
'Surely it is nonsensical that the responsibility of a wrongdoer should be determined on the basis of whether he has 
hit an insured or an uninsured victim' 17.02.69 Hansard 841 846 (concerning the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 
1969). 
mWhile society might condone the difference in salary scales between an engineer and a clergyman (or value the 
products of the former more than the latter), it would not necessarily condone a larger award to the former after an 
accident when both have ceased to be productive in the same way as previously' Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 10. 
77To ignore collateral benefits is to objectivize the damages and to deviate from the fully concretized loss: 
Bloembergen 'Sclradevergoeding' 360-8 378-84 389; Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 190-193; 
Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 349-51. 
78See Davel 'Broodwinner' 62nl93. A more colourful, perhaps less academic, description is to be found in Churchill 
'History of the English-Speaking Peoples' vol 1 52. 
19Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) 
~urchell 1978 AS 278-9; Smoker v London Fire & Civil Defence Authority (1991) 2 All ER 449 (HL). 
81 Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A). 
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reimbursement. 82 Little or no value should be placed upon the prospect of future gratuitous 
benefits because they are likely to cease. 83 Another reason is that if the payments continue 
after the payment of compensation then it cannot be said that the payments have been caused 
by the injury or death. 84 
If it has been pre-arranged that the welldoer will be reimbursed when the award for damages 
has been made there is no problem in equity. But a problem arises when the claimant retains 
both the gratuitous benefit and the full damages. When this is done with the full knowledge 
and consent of the welldoer one is dealing with a donation subsequent to the award of 
damages. Such a donation is truly res inter alios acta. 
[11.3.2] Directive by the court: In general, the waiver of a right will not readily be presumed 
by the courts. 85 With a right to reimbursement one would thus expect a requirement of 
clear evidence of intention to waive, that is the welldoer is demonstrably aware of his right 
to reimbursement and has expressly indicated agreement to waiver or has allowed 
prescription to run. 86 Boberg87 argues that collateral benefits should be ignored because 
the persons who pay the collateral benefits do not have a right of action to recover the loss 
which they suffer by having to pay the benefits. His reasoning has merit if the damages are 
to be paid out of the pocket of the wrongdoer and there is a strong likelihood of 
reimbursement. But such wrongdoers are rare, if they exist at all. Claimants and welldoers 
generally have only a hazy understanding of the reasoning behind a court's award. The 
maxim ubi ius ibi remedium is not of unqualified universal validity.88 It is thus highly 
desirable that a court which makes an award should at the same time give an express 
indication of the amounts which have been included by way of non-deduction to permit the 
reimbursement of welldoers. Many judgments include a list of the expert witnesses whose 
fees qualify for payment. 89 An analogous order concerning approved welldoers and the 
amounts involved would not be misplaced. In general doubt has been expressed as to the 
courts' capacity to make such an order. 90 If so then a suitable enabling provision should 
12Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 153. 
13Browning v 171e War Office (1962) 3 All ER 1089 (CA) 1092C. 
84 /ndrani v African Guarantee & Indemnity 1968 4 SA 606 (D) 6 IOA-D. 
85Mutual Life Insurance (New York) v Ingle 1910 TS 540 550; Botha v Finanscredit 1989 3 SA 773 (A) 791-3. 
86Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See Loubser 1990 THRHR 43-60: weak prescription (claim may be offset against 
future claims) is to be preferred to strong prescription (set-off not possible) under circumstances when many years 
may elapse before the welldoer in straitened circumstances himself may need to rely on the beneficence of the 
assisted victim. 
87Boberg 'Delict' 492. 
11An appeal to the maxim was unsuccessful in Union Government v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp 1956 1 SA 
577 (A) 5840. Ismael v General Accident Insurance 1989 2 SA 468 (D), on the other hand, is an instance when 
the maxim was invoked to justify giving a right of action directly to a dependent child in lieu of the traditional group 
action of the child.'s father. 
19See, for instance, Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1029-30. 
wa1oembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 347; Street 'Damages' 76 ; Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 
(A) 151A. Canadian courts have adopted the procedure: Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders ' Damages in Canada' 
487-8. 
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be introduced in South Africa by way of legislation. 91 
The recording of names in the judicial record may well enhance the willingness of many to 
assist needy victims. The procedure would protect the victim from excessive claims by 
avaricious welldoers. It would also ensure that if the victim does not reimburse the welldoer 
the resulting double compensation has reduced utility because it has been labelled by the 
court as due to a person other than the victim. 
[11.3.3] A general rule?: In the Byleveldt case the court considered the viability of a general 
rule of reimbursement: 92 
"n Oplossing van die hele probfoem sou wees om te vereis dat 'n benadeelde ... 
soveel... terugbetaal as wat hy van die ander bron ontvang het, maar nie meer as wat 
hy van die delikpleger ontvang het nie'. 
This general rule was rejected on the grounds that: 
'Gesien die eiesoortige aard van die verskillende bronne waaruit vergoeding ontvang 
kan word ... so 'n eenvoudige oplossing in die praktyk mees ingewikkelde probleme 
sou skep en in sekere gevalle strydig sou kan wees met wat in die belang van die 
gemeenskap beskou word'. 
It is most unfortunate that the court did not detail the perceived complicated problems and 
interests of the community. This would have facilitated discussion and solutions.93 There 
is little doubt that the general rule as stated would create problems. In the first place it fails 
to accommodate benefits for which deduction should be made without provision for 
reimbursement. In the second place it fails to consider the negative utility of an 
unenforceable court directive that orders certain amounts to be reimbursed on moral rather 
than legal grounds. 94 
[11.3.4] /nadequate compensation: By failing to highlight that there are welldoers to be 
compensated the court may fail to make an addition to the damages to permit onward 
payment to persons who provided benefits in kind. For instance a claimant's otherwise 
unemployed friend may have assisted with his nursing and thereby saved the expense of 
hiring a nurse. It would be proper that the award be increased to enable the claimant to give 
some expression of gratitude. The friend has suffered disutility by reason of the attendances. 
Bloembergen cites the example of the doctor who attends to his own wounds. 95 A fair 
91 General Acddent Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 616C 'Verder meen ek nie dat 'n onbevredigend 
bewoorde Hofreel genoegsame rede.is om te beslis dat die skadevergoedingsberekeningsmetode wat deur appellante 
voorgestaan word, aanvaar moet word nie'. 
w.santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 153A-B. 
930ne suspects that the major difficulty perceived by Rump.ff IA was the absence of a recognised legal procedure 
whereby a compensated victim could be ordered to reimburse welldoers (see Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 
1973 2 SA 146 (A) 151A 1510 151H 153C-D). 
94See 179. 
95Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 108. 
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measure of the utility loss would be the cost that the defendant has been spared.96 If a wife 
gave up her work and rendered such services in terms of her duty of support she has a right 
of action eo nomine to recover her financial loss. 97 The tendency of the South African 
courts to reimburse only proven cash disbursements98 suggests that claims concerning a pure 
loss of utility may well prove unsuccessful. 
[11.4] OVERLAPPING RIGHTS OF ACTION 
[11.4.1] 'Group action' de.fined:The modern Roman-Dutch law in South Africa allows more 
than one person to claim for the same financial loss. In addition to the claim by the 
individual injured victim, or dependant of a deceased victim, one finds allowance for a claim 
by the head of the family eo nomine in what is best described as a 'trustee capacity' flowing 
from his relationship to the victim. Van der Walt describes the claimant of a benefit subject 
to subrogation as being a trustee for his insurer. 99 I use the expression 'group action' to 
describe this trusteeship on behalf of others who have suffered loss. The phenomenon is 
implicit to the to the non-deduction of collateral benefits with a view to enabling the victim 
to reimburse his welldoers. Perhaps the most common form of such a group action is the 
injured breadwinner whose action for personal injury precludes a concurrent action by his 
dependants for the loss of support they have suffered by reason of the loss of their 
breadwinner's earnings. 100 The concept of a group action is Germanic rather than Roman. 
For this reason the phenomenon exists uneasily, and poorly analyzed in a legal milieu, such 
as South Africa, which subscribes to a Civil-law tradition. I do not purport in this thesis to 
fully analyze 'group actions' and their interaction with separate individual rights of action. 
My purpose is merely to observe that such duplication of actions does exist and to provide 
examples thereof. 
Dendy101 has noted the mixed group/individual nature of the right that a dependant has to 
claim for loss of support. This extends through to actions by breadwinners who have been 
injured and suffered a reduction in life expectancy. 102 This ambiguous state of affairs 
would seem to be the result of a shift in emphasis over the years: in the nineteenth century 
the dominant view was that of a head of household, usually the father, who claims in his own 
name for the losses suffered by family members. 103 The modern law has tended to 
96See Donnelly v Joyce [1973) 3 All ER 475 (CA) 479-80 quoted in Klaas v Union & SWA Insurance 1981 4 SA 
562 (A) 576-7. 
'11Schnellen v Rondalia Assurance 1969 1 SA 31 (W). In Bennett v Sun Insurance 1952 1 C&B 391 (E) 394 
compensation was awarded to a wife who gave up her employment to nurse her husband. Had the wife been a full-
time housewife without employment it is doubtful that her claim for compensation would have succeeded. 
98See, for instance, the emphasis placed by the court in Jones v Santam Insurance 1976 2 C&B 602 (E) 605-6 on 
the question of who had paid what. 
99See footnote 55. 
J0°See De Vaa/ v Messing 1938 TPD 34. 
101 1990 SAU 155. See too 1992 THRHR 480 and 283 below. 
102See 227, 347. 
103See, for instance, Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53 56 and its subsequent individualised interpretation in Erdmann 
v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C); Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331 and the emphasis there on the claim 
by the father having regard to his duty of support to others, a thread that is taken up again in De Vaa/ v Messing 
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emphasise the individual, 104 assisted, if needs be, by the father or husband. Despite its 
historical association with an all-powerful paterfamilias in the Victorian mould, it would be 
wrong to describe this group action as an anachronism, it still has a useful role to play in 
achieving a just result in a complex legal environment. 
[11.4.2] Single group action is preferable: When a wife or mother provides nursing or 
accommodation to an injured person this will generally be done in terms of a duty of support, 
in other words the benefit will not be gratuitous. Such a person has a right of action eo 
nomine to recover his loss. 105 It follows that the damage which he has personal! y suffered 
must be deducted from the claim of the injured person lest the defendant be called upon twice 
to pay the same damages. The creation of multiple rights of action does not simplify the 
compensation process. 106 The complexity gives rise to problems with prescription and 
pleading and the courts will, it seems, not be astute to enforce multiple actions: Thus in 
Klingman v Lowell1rn the mother of the victim provided him with free board and lodging, 
a benefit which the court refused to deduct on the grounds that it was 'gratuitous'. The court 
here seems to have overlooked the fact that the mother was obliged to provide the benefit in 
terms of her duty of support. In Mhlawuli's case108 the defendant consented to an approach 
along the lines of Klingman v Lowell. Bloembergen109 prefers that there be separate rights 
of action for each individual. There is much to be said, however, for a group action by 
the injured person who then receives monies in a trustee capacity for those associates 
who have suffered loss by reason of the injury. This group action would ideally be 
supported by a judicial directive as to the allocation of the award to the various welldoers. 
Rules of procedure appropriate to commercial law110 are not necessarily appropriate to the 
more personal and informal issues that arise with actions for damages for personal injury or 
death. 
An individual right of recovery can arise by reason of negotiorum gestio. 111 
[11.4.3] Circumstances where separate actions preferable: It will happen that multiple 
claimants are unable to work together for one reason or another. This will typically arise 
when a deceased breadwinner had been divorced and remarried and has left two families. 
It is thus desirable, as noted by Dendy, that claimants have the option of bringing either a 
1938 TPD 34 to deny dependants a right of action for loss of support during the lifetime of the breadwinner. 
104Constantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A); Schnellen v Rondalia Assurance 1969 1 SA 31 (W); Erdmann 
v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 409 . 
105Schnellen v Rondalia Assurance 1969 1 SA 31 (W); Erdmann v Sant am Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 409. 
106See, for instance, paragraph 13.2.12. 
1071913 WLD 186. 
108Mhlawuli v SA Mutual Fire & General Insurance 1976 2 C&B 597 (E) 598mid-page . 
1~loembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 292. 
110In which a meticulous regard is had for rights of action, prescription, contract wording, limitation of damages to 
that which was foreseeable, etc. 
111 Assistance provided without the knowledge of the beneficiary and with the intention of obtaining reimbursement: 
Standard Bank Financial Services v Tay/am 1979 2 SA 383 (C). 
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group action or separate individual actions. In order to avoid problems with res iu.dicata it 
is essential that judgment in respect of a group action indicate clearly the separate interests 
in the damages award of the separate parties. 
Motor-vehicle-accident claims are subject to limitation in certain circumstances. 112 This 
limitation is not applied to the overall group action but to the separate .claim of each 
dependant. 113 
[11.4.4] Collateral supporl after death: When a breadwinner is killed, only the dependants 
have a right of action, but only for what they have lost by way of support. This does not 
account for persons who have supported the dependants prior to the payment of 
compensation. Such persons do not have a right of action for their damages occasioned by 
providing support. Because they are compelled to act in terms of a duty of support they are 
not free to stipulate for reimbursement. The South African solution to this problem has been 
to rule such alternative sources of support as non-deductible. 114 This transfers the loss to 
the defendant and makes it feasible for the claimants to reimburse the duty-bound 
welldoers. 115 
[11.4.5] Expenses of an injured child: The future medical and related costs for an injured 
child have traditionally been awarded to the parent of the child eo nomine. The child 
himself, however, has a right of action for such expenses. 116 
[11.5] THE 'CONTRACT' OF EMPLOYMENT 
[11.5.1] Employers as loss bearers: Wages paid gratuitously and out of proportion to the 
services rendered are not to be taken into account when assessing damages. 117 In general 
employers are expected to meet from their own resources a greater or lesser part of the loss 
occasioned by an injury. They have no right of action for the damage or inconvenience 
which they suffer. 118 Munkman maintains that an employer should not be a bearer of 
loss. 119 Atiyah, on the other hand, perceives employers and insurers as comparable 
112Article 46 ofMMF agreement ito Act 93of1989. 
mconstantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A). 
114Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. The principle is sound but misplaced in the context of 
Groenewald v Snyders where the defendant only sought to off-set support derived from surplus life insurance money. 
Later in the same judgment the court, somewhat inconsistently, went on to say that life insurance is generally 
intended for the provision of ongoing support after the breadwinner's death (248A). In Pitt v Economic Insurance 
1957 3 SA 284 (D) 286G-inf Holmes I held that one should look at 'substance more than form', a directive that he 
did not follow in Groenewald v Snyders. 
115The dependants' action retains vestiges of its origin as a Germanic group action (see Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 
AD 322 331). 
116See section 12.14. 
117Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A). 
118Union Government v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp 1956 1 SA 577 (A). 
119Munkman 'Damages' 4ed 67n(p). 
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channels for loss distribution to the community at large. 120 It is of note that an employer 
is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of his employee. 121 There seems to be no major 
objection to expecting an employer of financial substance to meet part of the cost of 
compensating an injured employee. Munkman' s view has validity for the smaller employer 
of limited financial resources and loss-distribution powers. This consideration is given some, 
albeit inadequate, recognition by the employer's right of action for injury to a 'diensknecht', 
a private or household servant. 122 The lesser ability of a small employer to pay would also 
be relevant to the deductibility or otherwise of gratuitous employment benefits. 123 Large 
institutions will generally have met the problem before and act in accordance with policy or 
practice. 124 Many small employers may never have encountered the problems of coping 
with the death or injury of an employee and may well, out of ignorance, act contrary to the 
best interests of themselves and the claimant. Judicial intervention and guidance is then 
highly desirable. 125 
[11.5.2] Employment benefits: The employer's liability may be limited to the statutory period 
of sick pay alone. 126 Other employers may provide a substantial pension, a lump sum 
accident insurance benefit, and continuing membership of the medical aid fund. When an 
employer goes beyond the normal contractual framework in order to assist an injured 
employee there is good reason to facilitate reimbursement. After injury many employers 
continue to pay salary subject to a stipulation for reimbursement in the event of a successful 
damages claim. In theory such stipulations are readily brought into account. In practice 
difficulties arise: The repayable salary payments will normally be compensated net of 
taxation whereas the employer will seek to recover the cost to himself before deduction of 
taxation. If care is not taken this can turn out to be more than the claimant has been awarded 
by way of damages. The solution to this problem is to treat all salary payments as deductible 
and then to add back to the damages the specific amount that the employer seeks to recover. 
Most employers provide a certificate in this regard. A similar problem arises when there has 
been an apportionment of the damages but in this instance the claimant has been the author 
of part of his own loss and it seems correct that the defendant should not be liable for more 
than a pro-rata proportion of what the employer seeks to recover. 
Apart from the difficulties with quantum just listed there are other problems: The claimant's 
legal representatives will not always be aware of the contractual arrangement to reimburse 
the employer. Disputes arise with 'gratuitous' salary payments which are not subject to a 
120 Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' 3ed 245. 
121See, for instance, Gibbins v Williams Muller Wright & Mostert 1987 2 SA 82 (f) 82 90. 
122Union Government v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp 1956 1 SA 577 (A) 586. 
123Such as were the subject of Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A). 
1241.evy 'Rights at work' 101 'When a practice becomes established, clear and recognized and has continued for a 
long time it becomes part of the contract of employment'. See too Levy 20. 
12ssee paragraph fl.3.2. 
126sl3 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983. 
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stipulation for reimbursement. It is not always easy to ascertain just what is gratuitous. 127 
Poor understanding by employers and claimant as to the composition of the award will 
usually have the consequence that a claimant will often retain his double compensation 
without the knowledge and consent of the employer. This latter problem is best dealt with, 
as already discussed, 128 by an express stipulation in the judgment that the value of the 
gratuitous wages should at least be offered to the employer. 129 The problem of just what 
constitutes a 'gratuitous benefit' becomes entangled with the interpretation of the contract of 
employment, an issue which also influences the deductibility of insurance and pension 
benefits. 130 
[11.5.3] Reasonable expectations: The relationship of an employee with his employer is 
generally defined by a formal contract of employment, what one might conveniently term the 
contract stricti iuris, 131 and an informal understanding based on the reasonable expectations 
of the employee, the contract in equity. 132 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act133 
ensures that all employees to which it applies are subject to certain minimum entitlements of 
leave, sick pay and notice. The Transvaal courts have taken the view that if the provision 
of an employment benefit was likely then it is contractual. 134 This is substantially, although 
not entirely, what I have designated above to be a contract in equity. Cape courts have 
generally taken an approach stricti iuris to the problem. 135 The approach of the Transvaal 
courts is to be preferred, not the least because the calculation of future loss of earnings will 
include allowance for future discretionary benefits such as promotions and increases to offset 
the effects of inflation. An approach stricti iuris to 'discretionary benefits' would render 
such prospects res inter alios acta and outside the purview of the court. 136 
127This issue divided the court in Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A). Levy 'Rights at work' 
37 'Many of the additional benefits that management provide are regarded by them as being discretionary - that is, 
they may award them or withdraw them as they wish, but in fact this is not always the position'. 
128See paragraph 11.3.2. 
129If prior to the trial the employer has expressly indicated that reimbursement is not required (eg Santam 
Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 170E) then it is appropriate to make a deduction. 
130Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 920. 
min the genitive because it qualifies the noun 'contract'. Levy 'Rights at work' 22 details a number of sources 
which determine the terms of a contract of employment. 
132Mokoena v Administrator Transvaal 1988 4 SA 912 (W); Ludick v Samca Tiles 1993 2 SA 197 (B) (legitimate 
expectations of employees). 
1333of1983 (ssl2 13 14). 
134Serume/a v SA Eagle Insurance 1981 l SA 391 (f); Krugell v Shield Insurance 1982 4 SA 95 (f) 102-4. Gough 
1983 THRHR 474 prefers this approach. 
135Gehring v UNSBIC 1983 2 SA 266 (C) 273G. The decision was made without knowledge or consideration of the 
Transvaal decisions. The Gehring decision was concerned with future employment benefits. See too Dusterwa/d 
v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) A3-47-8 for a similar finding on past loss in respect of benefits paid 
in terms of the employer's policy. In Maroso v SA Eagle Insurance 1987 3 C&B 638 (W) 642-3 the court refused 
to deduct accident benefits provided in terms of the contract of employment because it was presumed that the 
claimant had the option to refuse to take such benefits. 
136This would be contrary to the ruling in Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 115-16 that explicit 
allowance may be made for future inflation. 
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[11.5.4] Sick pay and leave pay: The deduction or non-deduction of sick pay also requires 
careful attention. In general sick pay is properly deductible apart from some small allowance 
for the contingency that it may be needed in the future for some other illness. 137 Where 
the sick pay has been extended in terms of normal company practice it remains deductible 
although not claimable as of a right. 138 When sick leave is exhausted many claimant's 
utilise their annual or accumulated long service leave. Such leave pay, although claimable 
as of a right, should not be deducted. Annual leave is in the nature of savings in that if the 
employee leaves service the employer must pay out the commuted value of such leave. 
Gehring's case139 ruled that no deduction should be made for future sick pay available at 
the discretion of the employer. This ruling is clearly unsound in that it is not judicial policy 
to ignore the value of a chance when assessing damages. 140 A general application of a test 
of 'discretionary benefits' would require that no allowance be made for future increases in 
salary for inflation or promotion, nor for bonuses. The proper approach to uncertain benefits 
is to allow the value of the chance of those benefits. The Gehring decision is the result of 
a poorly considered obiter dictum in Dippenaar v Shield Insurance. 141 
[11.5.5] 'Gratuitous' benefits: The implications of an equitable approach to the contract of 
employment is that if salary or wages continue to be paid on a discretionary basis, but in 
accordance with normal practice, then the benefit is taken to be paid contractually and is 
deductible. It should be borne in mind that many employers adopt a discretionary approach 
to sick pay in order to weed out malingerers but with the intention to pay in the majority of 
cases. The adoption of a generous approach to injured employees is not always as gratuitous 
as might appear at first sight. Where the employer acts with an ulterior motive it is doubtful 
that the salary payments are gratuitous in the strict sense of the word. 142 An employer who 
projects a caring image has much to gain from a stable and contented workforce. 143 
[11.5.6] Contractual discretion: Consistent with the principle discussed above it has been 
held that the exercise of a discretion within a contractual framework is a benefit in terms of 
the contract of employment: 
'The fact that the employer in the present instance has a discretion does not mean that 
he does not have a contractual obligation towards the appellant. The rules of the 
pension fund are contractual terms to which the employer and the employee are 
bound. The discretion which the employer has in terms of those rules, therefore is 
137The value of this contingency was actuarially calculated in Bosch v Parity Insurance 1964 2 SA 449 <YI) 452D/E. 
138Serumela v SA Eagle Insurance 1981 1 SA 391 (f) 392-3. 
139Gehring v UNSBIC 1983 2 SA 266 (C) 2730. 
140See 71. 
141 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 92 ID. 
142See, for instance, Van Blerck v Van Blerck 1972 2 SA 799 (C) and the minority judgment of Trollip JA in Santam 
Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA l46 (A) 169-73). 
143Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 10 "n Werkgewer mag goeie bedryfspolitieke redes vir 'n dergelike voortgesette 
besoldiging he' . 
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not unfettered. He is contractually bound to exercise it in terms of the contract. He 
must furthermore exercise it properly, reasonably and in accordance with the rules 
of natural justice and fairness. If therefore the employer, exercising a proper 
discretion, will probably have to allow the appellant to retire on early pension, such 
pension must be taken into account'. 144 
[11.6] BENEFITS PAYABLE BY THE STATE 
199 
As a general rule benefits paid or provided by the State and related bodies are deducted when 
assessing compensation, for example: Reduced liability for taxation;145 accommodation free 
of charge in a State institution;146 hospital expenses; 147 and welfare grants. 148 This is 
in accordance with the macro-economic principle that the financial burden on the population 
at large should be minimized. It is also undesirable that government bodies should waste 
public funds by seeking to enforce rights of recovery between various departments. 149 It 
is highly unlikely that a compensated victim would feel morally bound to reimburse the State 
for benefits provided. In general, however, Parliament has displayed little concern that 
public funds may be wasted through double compensation. 150 It is clearly tempting for 
forensic opportunists to argue that State benefits are discretionary, gratuitous, in the nature 
of public charity, and should therefore be ignored. 151 Central to such an argument would 
be the issue of grants to needy dependants and disabled persons without income: 
Such grants are subject to a means test and will usually terminate when compensation is paid. 
The award of such a grant is subject to an administrative discretion152 exercised within the 
framework of laid down criteria. 153 Once such criteria are met the claimant has a right to 
144Poo v President Insurance Co Ltd 1992 4 C&B A3-96 (f) A3-102. 
14
'Pitt v Economic Insurance 1957 3 SA 284 (D) 287sup-C; Dorjling v Baze/ey 1961 1 C&B 128 (E) 132inf; 
Oberholzer v Santam Insurance 1970 1 SA 337 (N) 342E. 
146Roberts v Northern Assurance 1964 4 SA 531 (D) 5370-H; Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C) 
1086A-G. 
141Barnard v Union & SWA Insurance 1971 1 SA 537 (EC) 5380; Williams v Oosthuizen 1981 4 SA 182 (C) 185. 
148lndrani v African Guarantee & Indemnity Co 1968 4 SA 606 (D) 6090 610A-D. 
149Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 382; Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 217-20 236. 
1
'°See discussion of Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 reported 17.02.69 Hansard 841 844-6. Also note in 
particular the comments concerning the non-deduction of benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 
1941. 
"
1Such opportunism has been rewarded in England. McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 828 caustically observes that the 
English courts when faced with the issue have 'predictably' ruled that State welfare benefits are gratuitous and thus 
non-deductible. With the ruling in Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) South African law moved away 
from the English approach as recorded in Parry v Geaver [1969] 1 All ER 555 (HL). 
•nsee footnote 144 and quotation. 
"
3Disability Grants Act 27 of 1968 (coloureds only) s3 lays down FOnditions for 'Persons qualifying for disability 
grants'. Social Aid Act 37 of 1989 (whites only) s5 lays down conditions for 'Persons entitled to social grants'. 
Social Pensions Act 37 of 1973 (persons other than whites and coloureds) s3 lays down conditions for 'Persons 
entitled to social pensions'. The word 'qualifying for' in s3 of Act 27 of 1968 is used in the sense of 'entitled to' 
(s7 of same Act uses words 'entitled' and 'pension due', slO uses the word 'entitled'). Children's Act 33 of 1960 
s90 refers to benefits (in terms of s89) to which beneficiary 'was not entitled'; Child Care Act 74 of 1983 refers to 
benefits in terms of s56 to· which beneficiary 'was not entitled'. 
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such pension 154 and may, it seems, compel payment thereof by legal process. These 
considerations suggest that disability and dependency grants should be deducted from past 
loss of earnings or support, but not from future loss. However, if the court has reason to 
believe that the claimant will rapidly squander the damages award then there may be some 
justification for making a deduction from future loss for the chance that the grant may revive 
in years to come. 
A pension will not be awarded to a claimant who does not make application. A claimant 
who has failed to apply for such a pension during the pre-trial period has, strictly speaking, 
failed to properly mitigate his damages and should, it may be argued, be compensated as 
though he has had the benefit of such a grant. In practice grants are sometimes not paid due 
to inadequate administrative procedures. 
[11. 7] PUBLIC SUBSCRIPTIONS 
It does happen that benefits are provided to accident victims by way of public subscription. 
The contributing persons may be so widespread and numerous that reimbursement is not a 
practical proposition. 155 But is it morally desirable that the claimant should retain double 
compensation? There will usually be no privity between the welldoers and the victim, except 
if the welldoer is an employer or family member. It would thus be unreasonable to presume 
that the benefits were provided with a view to subsequent double compensation. The court 
then has the choice of deducting the benefit as a form of insurance payment or declining to 
deduct subject to a direction to the claimant to pay the funds to a suitable welfare 
organization. 
[11.8] PIGEONHOLING 
[11.8.1] Pigeonholing: Associated with the focus upon a damaged object156 is the 
phenomenon of 'pigeonholing'. Orderly systematic thought demands that losses are classified 
according to rules and procedures governing the different types of loss. Past earnings, future 
earnings, future loss of support, past and future medical expenditure, etc. The phenomenon 
of 'pigeonholing' arises when thought becomes locked into the classification as a closed 
microcosm. Typical examples o_f 'pigeonholing' are: 
[11.8.1.1] Past gains: Consider an injured victim who loses past and future earnings 
of R600000 but who, in terms of his contract of employment, is granted a lump sum 
and a pension worth R700000. In so far as earning capacity is concerned there is a net 
gain RlOOOOO. May this be offset against future medical costs? A universalist would 
say yes. A 'pigeonholer' would say no. 
[11.8.1.2] Loss of supporl by reason· of personal injury: The appellate division has 
154 All legislation providing for disability pensions and welfare grants (see previous footnote) is characterized by a 
ministerial discretion, usually in consultation with another minister, as to availability of funds. This discretion is 
concerned with needy persons as a group, not individuals. Once the ministerial discretion has been exercised then 
those qualifying in terms of the laid down conditions become entitled to benefits. 
15$Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 384. 
1$6See paragraph 3.3.8. 
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awarded to an injured young woman compensation for loss of the financial benefits of 
marriage, loss of support from a notional future husband who due to the injury she will 
never have. 157 Popular juristic perceptions dictate that compensation for injury is for 
loss of earnings. Loss of support claims are perceived as being restricted to the death 
of a breadwinner. This 'pigeonhole' outlook has given rise to at least one theoretical 
attempt to rationalize the 'loss of financial benefits of marriage' within a 'loss-of-
earnings' pigeonhole. 158 
[11.8.1.3] Support in old age: A young working woman married to a: very much older 
man will have a substantial prospect of supporting him for 10 to 20 years after he 
retires, particularly if he has poor pension prospects·. Until he retires he is the main 
breadwinner. Can support lost by the widow during the deceased's pre-retirement years 
be offset against the support which would have been provided to the deceased after his 
retirement? A 'pigeonholer' would say no and terminate the calculation at the time of 
the deceased's notional retirement. A universalist would offset the widow's long-term 
gain against her short-term loss. 
[11.8.1.4] Like deducted from like: One finds it said that only like should be deducted 
from like. 159 The inequity which this application of 'pigeonholing' sought to address 
was the claimant who had failed to claim for medical expenses which had been paid by 
the workmen's compensation commissioner. 160 The recovery sought by the 
commissioner included the amounts paid by way of medical expenses. 'Pigeonholing' 
ensured that the commissioner's medical disbursements would only be deducted from 
the claimant's damages to the extent that such damages included an award for medical 
expenses. In this circumstance 'pigeonholing' achieved an equitable result. 
The like-from-like criterion is not a general principle of assessment and if used as such 
does not always produce justice. Thus, for example, the reduced earnings after an 
injury have been viewed, not as a deductible compensating advantage, but as the 
residue of an asset that was previously worth more. In English law such a 
pigeonholing approach has led to a ruling that a disability pension should not be 
deducted from the earnings which it replaces. 161 
[11.8.2) Overlapping heads: From a utilitarian point of view the different heads of damage 
interact and overlap. To arrive at the true net financial effect of the wrongful act, gains from 
mcommerdal Union Assurance v Stanley 1973 1 SA 699 (A). 
158Boberg 'Delict' 576-7. 
tS9K/aas v Union & SWA Insurance 19814SA562 (A) 581B 591-2; Senator Versekeringsmpy v Bezuidenhout 1987 
2 SA 361 (A). For commentary see Koch 1987 THRHR 475-480. 
1
«iK/aas v Union & SWA Insurance 1981 4 SA 562 (A) 581B 591-2. 
161 Parry v Geaver [1969) 1 All ER 555 (HL) 564A2 582E-G. South African law is different. In Dippenaar v Shield 
Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) it was held that a disability pension should be deducted. For discussion of this latter 
judgment see 183 below. 
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one 'pigeonhole' need to be . offset against losses from other 'pigeonholes' .162 The 
arithmetical sum of the individual heads will usually exceed the true value of the whole loss. 
The most obvious manifestation of this aspect of the assessment of damages is the deduction 
made for general contingencies. The courts have cautioned against overlapping heads. 163 
The effect of bringing together different heads of gains and losses is to treat the claimant's 
overall patrimonium, his rights and .duties, his past and future prospects good and bad, as a 
unit, a single asset which is reduced in value by the wrongful act. 
Thus, for example, in Kriel's case 164 the trial court held that the assessment of general 
damages is separate and distinct from what is awarded under patrimonial loss. This approach 
was subsequently rejected by the appellate division which found 'an appreciable ... improper 
duplication of damages' .165 This latter finding was motivated by the extensive range of 
devices for which allowance had been made in the award for future expenses. What can be 
done with the award for general damages is not the sole factor governing its assessment. 166 
Van der Walt and Bloembergen are both in agreement that pigeonholing is undesirable. 167 
More generally it has been said that: 
'In making separate awards, the Court must of course guard against any overlapping 
and a resulting duplication' .168 
"n Beoordelaar horn by die vasstelling van die eiser se skade aan die konkrete 
omstandighede moet orienteer, en nie aan 'n min of meer onbuigbare skematiese 
onderskeid tussen verskillende skadesoorte nie'. 169 
'One must be careful not to elevate what may be no more than a convenient 
classification into a source of legal rules' .170 
'I fear ... the rigidity which such classification and labelling may induce. I appreciate 
the value, in its proper sphere, of a scientific analysis and sub-division under proper 
nomenclature of the applications in practice of a legal principle. I think, however, 
it is possible that. .. an undue limitation may be placed upon its scope by an attempt 
162Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 9200 (the 'contract of employment' criterion here created is 
effectively a large pigeonhole). 
163Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 113F. 
164Kriel v Administrator-General SWA 1986 3 C&B 539 (SWA) 548mid-page. 
165Administrator-General, SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A) 289E. 
166Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 117-20; Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 (W). See 
paragraph 12.15.6. 
167Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 204-5; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 117-22. 
161Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 113F. See too Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in 
Canada' 275-91; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed para 5.2.09. 
169Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 205n27. This passage read together with 425-48 would suggest that Van der Walt 
would separate damages for patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss but would nonetheless allow a gain under one head 
to be offset against a loss under another head. See too 110 204-5 and 1980 THRHR 1 16 25. 
170Pretoria North Town Council v Al Electric Ice Cream Factory 1953 3 SA 1 (A) 11B3. 
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to define its applicability entirely by means of type or class tests' .171 
The latter two quotes are concerned with the exercise of an administrative decision. The 
assessment of damages involves the exercise of a wide judicial discretion. These statements 
of principle would thus seem to be relevant. 
[11.8.3] 'Pigeonholing' general damages: In Bezuidenhout's case172 the claimant had 
suffered no loss by way of earnings but had nonetheless been awarded a pension by the 
workmen's compensation commissioner. Defendant sought to deduct the value of this 
pension from the claimant's award for general damages for pain and suffering and loss of the 
amenities of life. Defendant's approach was rejected on the grounds that benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act are patrimonial. 173 The court also pointed out that, for the 
same reason, the commissioner could not recover from the defendant. 174 The fairness of 
this decision is not all that obvious. Even after deduction the victim would have retained 
financial benefits with a value at least equal to the common-law damages. The rule against 
double compensation suggests that the value of the pension should have been offset against 
the award for general damages. From the claimant's point of view the utility of money, its 
buying power, is exactly the same regardless of whether the lawyers have labelled it 'general 
damages' or 'patrimonial damages'. From the lawyer's point of view there is no clear 
dividing line between general damages and patrimonial loss. 175 Thus it is common that 
when no explicit award has been made for loss of earnings, the award for general damages 
has been increased to allow for the value of the chance of loss of earnings.176 An award 
of general damages will also be increased to allow for the prospect of uncertain future 
expenditure. 177 
[11.8.4] Effect of supervening death: The action for general damages, that is for pain and 
suffering and loss of the amenities of life, is not Aquilian.178 The substantive law 
nonetheless awards as compensation a single undivided lump sum incorporating both 
patrimonial and non-patrimonial elements. 179 The claim for general damages is not 
171SA Defence & Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 1 SA 263 (A) 278C-D. 
-172Senator Versekeringsmpy v Bezuidenhout 1987 2 SA 361 (A). 
173Senator Versekeringsmpy v Bezuidenhout 1987 2 SA 361 (A) 368. 
114Senator Versekeringsmpy v Bezuidenhout 1987 2 SA 361 (A) 368E. 
mD/amini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 CVV) 587 ' ... there must be some interaction between awards for 
patrimonial loss on the one hand and the award for non-patrimonial loss on the other .. . I cannot ignore . .. what is 
a different head of damage but forms part of one and the same award'. 
176Mashini v Senator Insurance 1979 3 C&B 82 CVV) ; Assur v Protea Assurance 1981 3 C&B 196 (C); Dysse/ v Shield 
Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C); Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 112-13 'A Court is entitled ... to 
award a globular amount in respect of general damages including loss of earning capacity'. 
177See, for instance, Cel/iers v SAR&H 1961 1 C&B 160 (T) 165; Mashao v President Insurance 1993 (T) 
(unreported 1.6.93 case 8370/92). 
171Government of RSA v Ngubane 1972 2 SA 601 (A) 606-7. 
179Casely v Minister of Defence 1973 1 SA 630 (A) 642D-E. Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 425-48 would rather 
that a clear division was made between general damages and patrimonial Joss. 
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transmissible to the estate of the claimant should he die before litis contestatio. 180 Should 
he die after litis contestatio the claim for general damages becomes an asset in the deceased' s 
estate. 181 One would expect that the basis upon which general damages are assessed for 
a dead victim is much the same as for an unconscious victim .182 The ability of the claimant 
to benefit from the award is not the sole criterion governing assessment. 183 These 
considerations all suggest that general damages has a patrimonial quality in the sense of 
permanence and transmissibility to one's heirs. 
With loss of earnings the claim for past loss will persist even if the victim dies before litis 
contestatio. The claim for future loss of earnings falls away. 184 The rule that no 
compensation is awarded for earnings foregone during the 'lost years' derives from the 
observation that after a claimant's death there is no more need for the living expenses which 
would have been met from earnings. 185 This ephemeral aspect of the claim for loss of 
earnings points to a non-patrimonial quality for this category of loss. 
[11.8.5] Overlap between patrimonial and non-patrimonial: General damages are awarded 
for loss of utility of bodily function. Patrimonial loss is awarded for goods and services 
which can be directly valued in monetary terms. The difference between patrimonial and 
general damages becomes distinctly blurred when one considers that part of earnings which 
would have been expended on activities promoting physical or psychological well-being, such 
as travel, eating, drinking, entertainment and medical care. An award of general damages 
may include allowance for loss of earning capacity186 and future damnum emergens. 187 
The availability of comprehensive case reports of past awards for general damages188 has 
the consequence that placing a monetary value on pain and suffering and loss of the amenities 
of life is often easier than assessing the value of lost future earnings or expected future 
medical costs. 189 Comparable awards are adjusted for inflation to present value190 subject 
11KJGovernment of RSA v Ngubane 1972 2 SA 601 (A) 606-8; Santam Versekeringsmpy v Roux 1978 2 SA 856 (A) 
866. 
181Potgieter v Rondalia Assurance 1970 1 SA 705 (N); Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 (T). 
1riGerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 <YI); Reynecke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 412 <YI). More 
generally see Boberg 'Delict' 567-70. 
183Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 119-20; Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 <YI). 
1
'4Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A). 
185Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 306A. 
186See footnote 178 at 63. 
187See footnote 179 at 63. 
118The creation of the courts by precedent of a pricing system for general damages casts this head of damages 
increasingly into a patrimonial mould (Visser 1988 THRHR 468 484). Boberg 'Delict' 573 observes that 'Awards 
are not made in a vacuum' . 
189
' ••• die reg we! 'n tipe markwaarde aan bepaalde nadeel kan toevoeg' Visser 1986 De Jure 207 213. 
l'J(>sA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 841E-F. 
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to a large discretion to award what is considered right. 191 The prevailing practice in South 
Africa is fairly accurately described by the following statement of English practice: 
'As regards assessment of damages for non-economic loss in personal injury cases, 
the Court of Appeal creates the guidelines as to the appropriate conventional figure 
by increasing or reducing awards of damages made by judges in individual cases for 
various common kinds of injuries . Thus so-called "brackets" are established, broad 
enough to make allowance for circumstances which make the deprivation suffered by 
an individual plaintiff in consequence of the particular kind of injury greater or less 
than in the general run of cases, yet clear enough to reduce the unpredictability of 
what is likely to be the most important factor in arriving at settlement of claims. 
"Brackets" may call for alteration not only to take account of inflation, for which 
they ought automatically to be raised, but also it may be to take account of 
advances in medical science which may make particular kinds of injuries less 
disabling or advances in medical knowledge which disclose hitherto unsuspected long 
term effects of some kinds of injuries or industrial diseases' .192 
The claim for general damages cannot be ceded prior to Uris contestatio. The practical effect 
of this restriction is that neither of the claims for general damages nor patrimonial loss can 
be ceded. 193 This is so because the dividing line between the two classes of damages is by 
no means clear. A further reason is the interaction between the two classes of damages as 
in Kriel's case194 where the award for general damages was reduced by reason of the 
extensive equipment allowed for under patrimonial loss. A separation of general damages 
from patrimonial damages by way of cession would render embarrassing, if not impossible, 
the task of the court if these claims had then to be assessed at different times in different 
actions. In Rom's case195 the notional separation of the claim for general damages from 
the claim for patrimonial damages was feasible within the intimate confines of marriage, 
although not without risks of judicial embarrassment at having to assess general damages 
without details of what has, or will, be awarded by way of patrimonial loss. 
[11.8.6] Statutory 'pigeonholing' of general damages: Notwithstanding the difficulties 
inherent to a separation of general damages from patrimonial loss, such separation has been 
given statutory recognition. 196 It has also been suggested that to reduce the cost to the 
191 Capital Insurance v Richter 1963 4 SA 901 (A) 906-7 (the Corbett & Buchanan series was then, it seems, not 
available); Marine & Trade Insurance v Goliath 1968 4 SA 329 (A) 334; Protea Assurance v Lamb 1971 1 SA 530 
(A) 535-6 'Such assistance as could be derived from the general pattern of previous awards, and allowing for the 
decrease in the value of money ... the process (should not) be allowed so to dominate the inquiry as to become a 
fetter upon the Court's general discretion'. In AA Onderlinge Assuransie v Sodoms 1980 3 SA 134 (A) 140-2 the 
remarks concerning the adjustment for inflation are directed at an error in the trial judge's arithmetic and do not 
mean that no adjustment should be made for inflation. 
1
'12Wright v British Railways Board (1983] 2 Ali° ER 698 (HL) 706a-b (emphasis supplied) referred to with approval 
in SA Eagle v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 841. See too Protea Assurance v Lamb 1971 1 SA 530 (A) 534-6. 
193Government of RSA v Ngubane 1972 2 SA 601 (A). More generally see Boberg 'Delict' 485 530. 
194Kriel v Administrator-Genera/, SWA 1986 3 C&B 539 (SWA) 548mid-page. 
19~Santam Versekenngsmpy v Roux 1978 2 SA 856 (A) 867-8. 
196Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 s17(1)(b); article 47(a) ofMMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989. 
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public of damages for personal injury compensation should be restricted to patrimonial 
loss. 197 Certainly the development of a guideline which clearly separates general damages 
from patrimonial loss would greatly facilitate the removal of general damages as a head of 
damages. There is also little doubt that if the courts persistently failed to adjust awards for 
general damages adequately for inflation they would in time reduce such awards to a 
negligible aspect of claims for personal injury. It has been suggested that this process is 
already well under way .198 
[11.8.7] Military pensions: Swanepoel's case199 considered 'pigeonholing' of general 
damages outside the ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.200 The benefit in question 
was a pension paid in terms of the Military Pensions Act2°1 to a national serviceman injured 
while undergoing training. The Act specified that when assessing the pension to be paid no 
regard should be had to the earning capacity of the claimant in any particular occupation.202 
The schedule to the Act then specifies disablement percentages for different types of injury. 
After consideration of the Act the court came to the conclusion that the benefits provided 
thereunder were 'rather in the nature of a solarium for the totality of the consequences of the 
disablement, and particular I y those that cannot readily be measured in monetary terms'. 203 
It was accordingly held that the value of the pension should not be deducted from the claim 
for loss of earning capacity. The court then observed that 'there is indeed no norm for 
determining in monetary terms the extent of such general damages' .204 It was then ruled 
that not even the claimant's general damages were to be reduced by reason of the 
pension. 205 
[11.8.8] Contradicted principles: The Swanepoel decision is to be regretted for a number of 
reasons. 206 Firstly it is difficult to reconcile with an earlier ruling by the appellate division 
197Grosskopf Commission Report 1981 14. 
198Newdigate & Honey 'The MVA Handbook' 150 suggest a method for predicting general damages awards from 
past awards. · Their basis is a flat, ie non-compound rate, of 5% per year up to 1972 and 10% per year from 1973 
onwards. The average flat rate of inflation between 1947 and 1973 was 6% per year (3,8% per year compound); 
between 1973 and 1989 the average flat rate has been 42% per year (13,6% per year compound). If the suggested 
basis is correct then awards for general damages are declining rapidly in terms of real buying power and doubt may 
be expressed as to the long-term validity of such a scheme. 
199Mutual & Federal Insurance v Swanepoe/ 1988 2 SA 1 (A). 
200Act 30 of 1941. 
201 Act 84 of 1976. 
202s7(6)(e). 
203Mutual & Federal Insurance v Swanepoel 1988 2 SA 1 (A) l lH. 
20-4Mutual & Federal Insurance v Swanepoel 1988 2 SA 1 (A) 111-J. 
205The Swanepoel judgment makes the distinction urged by Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 425-48 but with 
consequences which Van der Walt certainly did not contemplate (see 'Sommeskadeleer' 204-5 205n27 quoted at 202). 
Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 241n315 express reservations with the proposition that collateral 
benefits should not be deducted from general damages. 
' 206 Article 47 A of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989 provides for the deduction of the present value of a military 
pension for all claims made in terms of this Act. For claims under the earlier acts a military pension remains non-
deductible. 
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concerning similar legislation. w7 Secondly the classification of the pension as pure general 
damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life seems misplaced. The 
pension208 was more in the nature of the general damages that one finds awarded to an 
injured child,209 a mixture of patrimonial and non-patrimonial.210 Thirdly to state that 
there is no norm for the determination of general damages is to deny the normative value of 
the many reported cases reflecting the considered opinions of the courts in the past as to fair 
value in this regard. 211 If the awards for general damages which the courts have been 
making reflect fair compensation for the injuries suffered then any amount significantly out 
of line with such awards, after due allowance for currency depreciation, must be excessive 
and unfair. 
(11.9] CAUSATION BY FACILITATION 
If the chance of an event is increased or decreased by the wrongful act then this increase, or 
decrease, in the chance of the event is caused by the wrongful act. In other words the 
wrongful conduct facilitates the subsequent event.212 The courts have not always been 
astute to take this view of causation: 
[11.9.1] Narrow causal reasoning: It has been suggested that remarriage by a widow should 
be ignored when assessing her damages because it is not 'caused' by the original wrongful 
act. 213 If such causal reasoning is correct then it follows that for personal injury a victim 
may argue that his prospects of finding alternative employment after the injury should be 
ignored because the taking of the new employment is not 'caused' by the injury. Such an 
approach to compensation for personal injury or death may be likened to assessing damage 
to a motor car without regard for the scrap value of the vehicle. 214 The remarriage is 
207The same wording in the War Pensions Act 82 of 1967 was held to cover both patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
loss: Casely v Minister of Defence 1973 1 SA 630 (A) 642 'Even though ... the claim ... for non-economic loss for 
pain, suffering, shock, disfigurement, and loss of amenities is anomalous and regarded as a kind of solarium... it 
nevertheless still is an indivisible part of that single cause of action of the disabled person'. 
208s20 of the Military Pensions Act 84 of 1976 states that compensation under the Act shall be in substitution for any 
claim for damages which may arise against the state. 
209Mashini v Senator Insurance 1979 3 C&B 82 (W); Assur v Protea Assurance 1981 3 C&B 196 (C); Dyssel v Shield 
Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C) 1085. 
210Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 112-13 'A Court is entitled ... to award a globular amount in respect 
of general damages including loss of earning capacity'. Casely v Minister of Defence 1973 1 SA 630 (A) 642 
211 See the cases reported in Corbett & Buchanan; Visser 1988 THRHR 468 484. The medical ability to transplant 
organs of the body has given rise to a form of market in such parts with prices being paid (Time Magazine March 
13 1989 88; February 20 1989 16; June 17 1991 52). 
212See 20. 
213
'Die hertroue van 'n weduwee ... is egter nie gevolge wat uit die dood van die betrokke eggenoot ... voortvloei nie, 
en dus nie ju is op logiese gronde gesien word as faktore wat by die bepaling van 'n weduwee ... se vergoeding in 
aanmerking geneem moet word nie' Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 614B-C. 
2141t seems that in the classical Roman law partial loss may have been compensated in some cases as though there 
had been total destruction (Kaser 'Roman Private Law' 214; Lee 'Roman Law' 4ed 395-6; Leage 'Roman Private 
Law' Jed 410-11). The last two sources conclude on grounds of common sense that the Roman law could not 
possibly have been so harsh as to award the full value of the res when a residual value remained. If one bears in 
mind that damages during this period were viewed as composition rather than compensation the conclusions drawn 
by Lee and Leage are by no means necessary. The modern practice to ignore insurance payments may well be 
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'caused' by the wrongful killing in the sense of being facilitated. Remarriage is in this 
contingent sense a normal foreseeable event215 that follows upon the death of a spouse. 
It has also been ruled that the adoption of a child after the deaths of both parents is not 
caused by the death and must thus be ignored when assessing the child's damages for loss 
of support. 216 In general the reasonable man would consider adoption to be a normal 
consequence of the death of both parents. 
Similarly narrow causal reasoning has been used to justify the non-deduction of accident 
insurance benefits, it being held that the payment of the benefits was not caused by the 
accident but by ·the taking out of the insurance.217 The payment of insurance benefits is 
a normal and foreseeable consequence of an injury or death. The Assessment of Damages 
Act218 states that pension and life insurance benefits 'payable as a result of the death' are 
to be ignored when assessing damages for loss of support. The words 'payable as a result 
of the death' imply payable as a normal and foreseeable consequence of the death.219 If 
the taking out of the insurance were to be viewed as the cause of the payments then the 
intention of the legislature would be subverted. 
The question of causation by death also arises in a non-damages context. An estate duty 
statute rendered dutiable 'Any lump sum benefit which becomes recoverable in consequence 
of or following upon the death of a member' .220 The rules of a pension fund provided that 
'The committee may in its discretion commute the whole or any part of any pension ... for 
a single lump sum'. 221 The court ruled that: 
'Upon the grant of a pension to the dependant, the death of the member ceases to 
have any operative effect. The decision of the committee is "the intervention of an 
independent, unconnected and extraneous causative factor or event" which isolates the 
death from the final result' .m 
The statute clearly seeks to define causation in the broad sense of the normal foreseeable 
consequences of the state of death. The court does not seem to have considered this 
interpretation at all and busied itself with a choice between the patent absurdities of the 
conditio sine qua non test and a narrow interpretation of causation. It is notable that the 
viewed with equal disbelief by a commentator 1000 years from now. 
min the sense of a 'reasonable possibility' (see Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) 165F). 
216Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A). 
211Bradburn v Great Western Railway Co [1874-80) All ER 195 (Exch D). 
21 89 of 1969. 
219In Du Toit v General Accident Insurance 1988 3 SA 75 (D) the court did not consider wh~ther the payment of the 
widow's pension had been caused by the deceased's original contract of employment. 
120C/R v Shell SA Pension Fund 1984 1 SA 672 (A) 676C-D. 
221 C/R v Shell SA Pension Fund 1984 1 SA 672 (A) 676H. 
mc/R v Shell SA Pension Fund 1984 1 SA 672 (A) 679G. 
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court did not investigate what decision the committee usually made following a death. Such 
an inquiry would have revealed that the committee almost invariably exercised its discretion 
in favour of the payment of a lump sum. The reasonable man would certainly have viewed 
the resulting payment to be one of the normal and foreseeable consequences of the death.223 
[11.10] SUBLIMINAL WRATH 
[11.10.1] Damages are not punishment: An award for 'punitive damages' is contrary to the 
Roman-Dutch law. 224 Modem jurisprudence has rationalized the award for general 
damages as compensatory, but one may speculate with some confidence that subliminal 
punitive considerations of revenge or punishment attended the introduction of this aspect of 
compensation for personal injury. 225 It is notable that some of the Roman-Dutch texts state 
that the award for general damages is only to be ordered if expressly demanded.226 This 
suggests an ethic that general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities was a 
form of palliative ('troosgeld') directed at satisfying a felt need by the claimant for revenge 
or punishment. 
[11.10.2] Indications of irrationality: It has been said of the prevailing collateral-benefit 
rules that: With collateral benefits logic is conspicuous by its absence. 227 The complexity 
of collateral benefits cannot be resolved by a general concept of damages. 228 Such an 
analysis serves only to highlight the irrationality of ignoring certain benefits in the assessment 
process. 229 The subject is characterized by ex post rationalisations230 and primitive 
thoughts of revenge. 231 The expression res inter alios acta suggests that some guidance 
223ln this instance the chances of payment would have been better than a mere 'reasonable possibility' (see Smit v 
Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) 165F 178C). 
224Erasmus 1975 THRHR 362 364-6; Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 171E-F 'The claim 
under the Lex Aquilia for economic loss ... is wholly compensatory ... and it embodies no punitive element'. See too 
LAWSA vol 7 paras 5 13. 
:m-rhe Roman-law rule that the body of a free man has no patrimonial value (Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 7-9) prevails 
in our modern law with the prohibition on an award for general damages in the event of death (Union Government 
v Warneke 1911AD657 667; Hulley v Cox 1923 AD 234 243). The fact of the no-value rule renders it highly likely 
that the award for general damages has its origin in considerations of punishment and solace rather than notions of 
a commercial value for pain and suffering and the loss of amenities, as we find in our modern law (Southern 
Insurance v Bailey 1984 l SA 98 (A) 117-18; Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 (W)). 
226Grotius lnleiding 3.34.2 'De smert ende ontciering van 't lichaem ... werden op geld geschat, soo wanneer sulcks 
versocht werd'. The same proviso is recorded by Voet Ad Pandectas 9.2.11. 
227Van der Walt 1980 THRHR l 2 'logika glo skitter deur sy afwesigheid'; Boberg 'Delict' 491 'None of the 
explanations is entirely satisfactory'; Reinecke 1988 De Jure 221 223 . 
228Van der Walt 1980 THRHR l 4. 
229There has been general criticism of the paradox of double compensation: Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 
2 SA 146 (A) 150-1. 
230Van der Walt 1980 THRHR l 5. 
231 Van der Walt 1980 THRHR l 26 'Allerlei primitiewe wraakgedagtes agter 'n eenvoudige billikheidsoordeel mag 
skuil'. Boberg 'Delict' 570 writes of 'society's sense of outrage' in relation to general damages. Mundell 1987 
THRHR 379 384 writes of ' legalised vengeance' . The punitive overtone is notable. Group feelings, the feelings 
of the sib, were markedly relevant under the Germanic law. Their relevance today is not quite so obvious with State 
managed criminal sanctions and a judiciary of sufficient independence to stand above mob justice. 
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may be found in the rules of evidence, but this is not necessarily so. 232 Causation is a 
popular but fallacious ex post rationalization. 233 Van der Walt finds a common thread in 
an irrational desire for punishment and revenge. 234 Judicial suspicions of a possible235 
popular sense of public outrage236 may be allowed to override reason. 237 McKerron238 
justifies the non-deduction of collateral benefits on the ground that 'the law of delict plays 
an important part in supplementing the criminal law in enforcing adherence to standards of 
conduct'. 
[11.10.3] Judicial discretion: Under circumstances of catastrophic injury or death it is by 
no means clear to what extent the courts are able to maintain an objective attitude towards 
patrimo,!1ial loss. On one hand it has been said that 'We cannot allow our sympathy for the 
claimants in this very distressing case to influence our judgment'. 239 On the other hand 
'the trial judge has a large discretion to award what under the circumstances he considers 
right'. 240 · An objective standard of value for general damages has been encouraged.241 
Corbett & Buchanan, however, express doubts that such an objective standard has been 
maintained by the courts. 242 Although a judicial discretion is undoubtedly desirable it does 
leave the way open to decisions based upon prejudice or an intuitive sense of outrage, rather 
than objective and rational considerations. 243 The shadow of versari in re illicita may be 
232Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 9. 
233Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 197J 2 SA 146 (A) 151F; Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 21. 
I 
234Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 12 2J 24 25 26; Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 197J 2 SA 146 (A) 151F 
152E. 
235Luntz 'Damages' 2ed para 8.1.02 'In the United States, where the collateral source rule applies even more widely 
than in Anglo-Australian law, juries are said to be as much opposed to it as academic writers; their notorious 
sympathy for plaintiffs does not extend to compensating for losses already made good'; (see too Cooper-Stephenson 
& Saunders '.Damages in Canada' 498-500). Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 215 notes that a jury 
verdict is as close as one can hope to come to a deed poll. These considerations suggest that judicial presumptions 
as to popular opinion may not be borne out by proper inquiry. 
236For instance 'It would not be in the public interest to allow a wrongdoer to benefit' Victor v Constantia Insurance 
1985 1 SA 118 (C) 125A3; 'It would be revolting to the ordinary man's sense of justice ... that the only gainer would 
be the wrongdoer' Parry v Qeaver [1969) 1 All ER 555 (HL) 558C-D. 
237Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 24n65 'Die gevoel van onbehaaglikheid wat soms spontaan ervaar word moet dus 
buitengewoon noukeurig getoets word'; Mundell 1987 THRHR J79 J84 'The fault system reveals ... a marked failure 
to correlate the fault and the punishment'. 
238McKerron 1951 SAL! J7J. 
239Hulley v Cox 192J AD 2J4 246. Atiyah 'Accidents compensation & the law' Jed 550 states that punitive desires 
are to be resisted. 
240Legal Insurance v Botes 196J 1 SA 608 (A) 614£-G. 
241 Radebe v Hough 1949 1 SA J80 (A) 'The amount of damages to be awarded for pain and suffering should not vary 
according to the standing of the person injured'. 
242Corbett & Buchanan Jed 8n64. 
243Van der Walt 1980 THRHR 1 24n65 26; Mundell 1987 THRHR J79 J84; Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the 
Law' Jed 550; Hahlo & Kahn 'The SA Legal System' 65 'The notion that legal problems can be solved by an 
unaided enlightened discretion is "a horrible abomination, more to be feared than a dog or a serpent"'. 
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detected in some dicta concerning collateral benefits. 244 
[11.10.4] Policy decisions: There is little doubt that a court is not obliged to rely on logic 
and reason if there are sound policy considerations for taking a different view.245 One may 
question, however, whether a judge's unconfirmed suspicion246 of a popular sense of 
outrage247 really justifies an irrational policy decision. 248 Logic and reason provide 
safeguards against errors of judgment prompted by emotional considerations. 249 
The opinion has been expressed that policy decisions by the courts 'are rather vague and 
unspecific, not pertinently indicating or fully discussing the actual policy considerations 
motivating the decision'. 250 The forensic mysticism that so often attaches to the treatment 
of collateral benefits provides further evidence in support of this opinion. 
[11.10.5] The morality of logic: It has been said of a rule for the non-deduction of collateral 
benefits that because it is a rule of law it must be fair. 251 Such an argument is clearly 
fallacious252 The assessment of damages for financial loss lends itself to the structured, as 
distinct from intuitive, reasoning. As I have noted previously there is a morality in logic and 
reason. 253 The greatest danger with the doctrine of the non-punitive nature of damages is 
that vengeful elements in the assessment process may be denied their true nature in order to 
render the doctrine valid. 
244See footnote 236. 
245Friedmann 'Legal Theory' 342-44 describes the 'free law theories' which reflect the extreme effect of providing 
a judge with a wide discretion to award what he considers right. Boberg Nov 1981 BML 25 27 states that 'Our 
courts ... are entitled to prefer equity and convenience to the dictates of logic'. 
2~he courts do not rely on objective public opinion surveys when handing down decisions based on what is thought 
to be offensive to the public. In general a court will take judicial notice of what is perceived by the public to be 
good morals (see, for instance, Van Zyl 1988 SAIJ 272 284-7). 
247See footnote 243. 
241Friedmann 'Legal Theory' 477-8. 
249See, inter alia, Mullineux 1993 De Rebus 721. 
2
'°Van Aswegen 'Policy considerations in the law of delict' 1993 THRHR 171 191. 
251 There is a presumption that if it is law then it must be fair: 'There is nothing punitive in calling on a defendant 
to pay that which the law says is a just recompense for the injury the plaintiff has caused' Parry v aeaver [1969] 
1 All ER 555 (HL) 574H-I; see too Munk.man 'Damages' 4ed 85n(a); Santam Versekeringsmpy v By/eve/dt 1973 2 
SA 146 (A) 152H. It would be most disturbing, however, if such an attitude were to place rules of law above 
criticism or revision (see McGregor Nov 1965 MLR 629-41). 
mone may point, for instance, to the ruling in SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) where the court 
recorded that its finding on the law produced an unfair result. 
m'Logic ... is concerned not with what men actually believe, but with what they ought to believe, or what it would 
be reasonable to believe' provided the underlying premises are valid: Ramsey 'Foundations of Mathematics' 193. 
By this one must understand sound logic, not clumsy dabbling ("n Mens kan met syfers goel' AA Onderlinge 
Assuransie v Sodoms 1980 3 SA 134 (A) 142C). There is logic in consistency; Ramsey 184-6. 'While the result 
of a actuarial computation may be no more than an "informed guess", it has the advantage of an attempt to ascertain 
the value of what was lost on a logical basis' Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) l 14D. 
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, (11.11] CONCLUSIONS 
Considerations of comprehensive compensation254 and macro-economics suggest that there 
should be a general rule that all collateral benefits be deducted save where a third party has 
stipulated for reimbursement, or is otherwise entitled thereto. In those instances where the 
court has had regard to the interests of third parties the amounts involved should be listed 
in the judgment together with the overall award. The practice of allowing separate rights of 
action introduces procedural difficulties which are best avoided by allowing a single group 
action. The expression 'contract of employment' should be interpreted equitably to include 
all benefits for which the employee had a reasonable expectation. 
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CHAPTER 12 
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
Summary: The expression 'loss of earning capacity' embraces both 
earnings and living expenses. 'Loss of earnings' and 'loss of earning 
capacity' should not be distinguished. Just as increased living 
expenses, damnum emergens, increase the compensation payable so 
too saved living expenses reduce damage suffered and thus the 
defendant's liability. General damages has a patrimonial aspect and 
awards must have some regard to the cost of goods and services in 
the community at large. Likely earnings and likely expenses are the 
criteria by which to measure earning capacity and junher spending 
needs. The earning capacity of business capital should be 
distinguished.from the earning capacity of the victim. Compensation 
for 'loss of earning capacity' includes loss of support for the victim's 
family. Illegal earnings are best dealt with by basing compensation 
on what would have been earned had the victim acted legally. 
[12.1] 'LOSS OF EARNINGS' 
213 
[12.1.1] All-embracing: A claim for damages for personal injury is often loosely described 
as a claim for 'loss of earnings' or 'loss of earning capacity'. The usual consequence of a 
bodily injury is a loss of earnings, past or future, plus a loss by way of damnum emergens 
in the form of medical expenses, equipment costs and, possibly, the need for an attendant. 1 
For an injured woman the damage may take the form of a loss of home-making capacity2 
or a loss of the financial benefits of a notional future marriage. 3 The description of damages 
for bodily injury as a 'loss of earning capacity' focuses upon the usual, the most obvious 
form of the damage. With paraplegic and quadriplegic cases, however, the costs of 
medication, appliances and attendants will frequently constitute the major component of the 
claim. For other forms of injury, such a1) a broken hip, there may be substantial future 
medical costs by way of hip replacements and analgesics but, due to generous sick pay 
provisions, no loss of earnings. · 
[12.1.2] 'Pigeonholing': Some legal analysts have interpreted the expressions 'loss of 
earnings' and 'loss of earning capacity' in a 'pigeonholing'4 sense to limit the extent of the 
1eg Administrator-General SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A); Dhlamini v Government RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W); 
Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C). 
2Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 406-9. 
3Commercial Union Assurance v Stanley 1973 1 SA 699 (A) 704 705. 
•see 200. 
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items which may be brought into account when assessing damages for bodily injury.5 The 
rigorous application of such reasoning would preclude a claim for damnum emergens. This 
is clearly an absurd result. One may thus conclude that the expressions 'loss of earnings' 
and 'loss of earning capacity' are just convenient labels for a wide range of losses flowing 
from a bodily injury and claimable under the Aquilian action. The physical injury is the 
primary damage, the financial losses are consequential damage. One should not attempt to 
read too much meaning into the expressions 'loss of earnings' and 'loss of earning capacity'. 
It is otherwise with the expression 'loss of support' used to describe damages claimable in 
consequence of a death wrongfully caused. This does reflect limits to the range of losses 
which may be claimed under the dependants' action. 6 
[12.1.3] The three elements: The expression 'earning capacity' embodies a number of 
different concepts: 
[12.1.3.1] Work capacity: This expression is to be preferred for describing the 
personality aspect of 'earning capacity' because it avoids reference to the patrimonial 
element of earnings. The capacity to work is not always exercised with a view to 
generating earnings, as in the case of the unsalaried social worker or the recreational 
woodworker. The capacity to work is undoubtedly an important amenity of life which 
is harmed or removed by serious physical injury. 7 
[12.1.3.2] Earnings: Work capacity is commonly utilised to generate earnings. Work 
capacity is not necessarily co-extensive with earning capacity because a variety of 
personality skills combine to generate earnings. 8 A loss of work capacity may give 
rise to a loss of earnings. In this sense the loss of work capacity is the primary loss 
suffered with bodily injury, the loss of earnings is a consequential loss. Earnings 
usually take the form of weekly or monthly payments of money. This is the measure 
of the utility of the victim's work capacity to the community at large. Work capacity 
is also exercised to save on expenditure: For example growing one's own vegetables 
or repairing one's own car. Such savings are patrimonial in nature and, if proven, will 
generally be compensated at a level · commensurate with what it would have cost to 
acquire such goods or services in the open market. 9 
5See for instance Boberg 'Delict' 530-1 538-40 575-7 588 610-11; Van Heerden 'Skadevergoeding en 
Belastingpligtigheid' JC Noster 1 8-9; General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 617. Narrow 
reasoning of this nature has led to a ruling in Canada that tax should not be deducted when assessing loss of earnings 
(Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 181-95). 
6Legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614E 'It aims at placing them in as good a position, as regards 
maintenance, as they would have been in if the deceased had not been killed' (emphasis supplied). The ruling in 
Evins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 (A) implies that if the death of a husband has caused the widow a loss of 
earnings such loss cannot be claimed under the dependants' action. See 273 below. 
7Capacity to work is not listed as an amenity of life in Administrator-General SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A) 288 
but is clearly implicit to the factors therein mentioned. 
8Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 289; 1990 THRHR 140 141-2 ('persoonlikheidsaspekte'). See comments by 
Neethling 1990 THRHR 101 104. 
9See, for example, Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C). 
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[12.1.3.3) Present value: The earnings, or savings in expenditure, generated by the use 
of a capacity to work will usually occur in relatively small amounts over an extended 
period. For purposes of lump-sum compensation it is necessary to agglomerate these 
amounts into a single lump-sum present value. In certain contexts the expression 
'earning capacity' includes the notion of the discounted lump-sum present value of 
expected earnings, the capitalized value. 10 
The above analysis reveals that 'earning capacity' is neither personal nor patrimonial but a 
concurrence of both. Neethling has proposed that earning capacity be included under a fifth 
class of legal objects.11 It needs to be borne in mind, however, that the expression 'earning 
capacity' is capable of a diversity of meanings depending on context. Usage of the 
expression in this text generally contemplates a compination of 'work capacity', 'earnings' 
and 'present value'. 
[12.1.4) Capital and income: The present value of future earnings will take account not only 
of the sum total of the earnings but also of the remoteness in time of such amounts, the 
discount for interest, and the uncertainty attaching to such amounts, the discount for risk. 12 
The 'present value' of such future earnings is then something separate and distinct from the 
cash flow which it represents: 13 
'The assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity is in truth an exercise in 
valuation. It is quite true to say that what that capacity may reasonably be expected 
to produce is a factor, indeed a major factor, in the process of valuation . .. If a rental 
property has to be valued, the rent it might be expected to produce might well be a 
factor, indeed a prime factor, in assessing its value. But the value assigned would 
not in any sense be a replacement of those rents, though the only utility of the 
property may be the production of rent. That the property was currently vacant 
would not deny its value, nor would its current rental income necessarily reflect its 
maximum productivity' .14 
'Skade is die ongunstige verskil wat deur die onregmatige daad ontstaan het. Die 
vermoensvermindering moet wees ten opsigte van iets wat op geld waardeerbaar is 
en sou insluit die vermindering veroorsaak deur 'n besering as gevolg waarvan die 
benadeelde nie meer enige inkomste kan verdien nie of alleen maar 'n laer inkomste 
verdien. Die verlies van geskiktheid om inkomste te verdien, hoewel gewoonlik 
gemeet aan die standaard van verwagte inkomste, is· 'n verlies van geskiktheid en nie 
'n verlies van inkomste nie. 'is 
10See, for instance, Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 150A-C; Southern Insurance v Bailey 
1984 1 SA 98 (A) 1 llD (see quotation at 215 below). See too paragraph 3.5.5. 
11 Neethling 1990 THRHR 101 104-5. 
12Grotius lnleiding 3.32.16 'dat onzeecker ende toekomend goed niet soo veel waerd en is, als het zekere ende 
tegenwoordige'. 
13A mere shadow of a life plan (see 68). 
"Atlas Tiles v Briars (1978) 21 ALR 129 (HC) 135-6 (emphasis supplied). 
"Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 150A-C; Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 
lllD. 
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'The capacity to earn money is considered to be part of a person's estate and the loss 
or impairment of that capacity constitutes a loss, if such loss diminishes the estate'. 16 
'The object of the award under the present head is to provide plaintiff with a one-off 
lump sum representing the assessed present value of his lost future after-tax income 
stream, but subject to the qualification that the award is not simply restitution of the 
lost income but a sum of money representing compensation for the actuarially 
determined chance that the plaintiff would have earned such income. What is 
necessitated is an exercise involving the various future possibilities being expressed 
as percentage chances, or averages, and subject to contingency allowances .. .' .17 
General damages will at times include allowance for loss of earning capacity .18 General 
damages are valued in the same way as, for example, a farm, by reference to prevailing 
currency values. 19 It follows that the value of earning capacity and the value of the farm 
are of a similar nature. They both reflect a price at which a future expectation, the utility 
o a <life plan, is exchanged for a single monetary amount. 20 
The quotations above proceed from the view that earning capacity is an asset in the 
claimant's patrimonium the value of which is reduced by the injury. The value of that asset 
is usually determined by reference to expected income. 21 Work capacity is non-patrimonial. 
It is an amenity of life. The asset in the claimant's patrimonium is not work capacity but the 
present discounted value of the income expected from the use of work capacity. A major 
objection to viewing the present value of earnings as a tangible asset in the victim's estate 
is that in the event of insolvency or divorce, it is not standard commercial practice to treat 
such an asset as forming a part of the estate. One cannot under normal economic conditions 
buy or sell an 'earning capacity' for a single lump sum. 22 The absence of a commercial 
market does not mean, however, that a value for the res cannot be determined. 23 The 
16Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917C 920; Boberg 'Delict' 610sup. 
17Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 61 (emphasis supplied). 
"Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1SA98 (A) 112-13. See too Dlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 
<YI) 587 ' ... there must be some interaction between awards for patrimonial loss on the one hand and the award for 
non-patrimonial loss on the other . . . I cannot ignore ... what is a different head of damage but forms part of one and 
the same award'. 
19SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 841 'In assessing general damages one is dealing, not with a 
monetary debt, but with the valuation of a non-monetary loss Gust as) a valuer determining the present value of a 
farm would not use the currency values of the past'. 
20J31oembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 47, notes that a market includes allowance for all the possible uses to which the 
goods may be put (see quotation in footnote 22 at 8) . 
21
' Verwagte inkomste' (see quotation above). 
220ne can, however, purchase for a lump sum the right to an increasing series of future payments contingent on 
human life, ie an immediate increasing life annuity. In Santam Insurance v Fick 1982 (A) (unreported 24.5.82 case 
282179/ AV) the claimant had contrived a tax avoidance scheme which included selling his earning capacity to one 
of his companies. · 
23See paragraph 2.10.1 (surrogate markets). 
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capacity to work is a right of personality and thus not transferable. Reinecke24 has 
concluded that the absence of transferability does not mean that the res cannot be an asset 
in the estate or have a realistic value. 
[12.2) DIFFERENCING METHODOLOGY 
[12.2.1] Capitalize first: The view of earning capacity as a capital asset with a value equal 
to the present value of expected income is consistent with an assessment methodology which 
capitalizes first and differences afterwards. This methodology hypothesizes a patrimonium 
in which the present value of expected earnings is a capital asset. So too is the value of the 
chance of all other past and future gains and outgoes. 
[12.2.2] Difference first: The artificiality of a notional patrimonium is avoided by restricting 
the analysis to the more familiar form of patrimonium which is encountered in deceased and 
insolvent estates. Such an approach reflects an assessment methodology which differences 
first and capitalizes afterwards. 25 The notion of a capital value for earning capacity is alien 
to such a methodology as too is the value of the chance of a loss. The lump sum is viewed 
as no more than a financial device to generate the payments of loss as and when required. 
Capitalization is thus not intrinsic to the assessment process but a procedural adjunct thereto 
dictated by the once-and-for-all lump-sum rule. 26 
[12.2.3] Damages as a series of debts: In Hartley's case27 the concept of a continuing loss 
was viewed as a continuing series of debts owing by the wrongdoer. This model may be 
criticized on a number of grounds: Firstly it implies that prescription should run separately 
on each individual item of loss as and when it falls due. Prescription for damages for 
personal injury or death generally runs from the date of the injury or death in respect of all 
items of loss, past andfature. The debt that is claimed in the summons is an aggregation of 
numerous separate items. The itemization making up the overall lump-sum award reflects 
no more than the court's reasoning in arriving at the relevant lump sum. 28 The concept of 
separate debts is difficult to reconcile with an award for the value of the chance of an 
uncertain loss of earnings29 or a deduction for general contingencies. As a general rule the 
concept of continuing loss tends to promote injustice. In one instance an injured claimant 
24Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 31 'Oordraagbaarheid is dus nie die essensiele eienskap wat vermoensregte tot 
vermoensbestanddele verhef nie. Die gevolgtrekking is daarom onvermydelik dat vermoensverwagtinge ook as 
vermoensbestanddele kwalifiseer ... Die eindresultaat is egter elke keer niks anders nie as dat gepoog is om 'n 
realistiese indien subjektiewe waarde vir die betrokke vermoensverwagting te vind'. 
25eg General Accident Insurance vSummers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613E-G 'voortdurende schade', ie 'continuing loss'. 
26Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 280-315. 
27SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 838-9. 
21Rondalia Assurance v Gonya 1973 2 SA 550 (A) 557-8; Van der Plaats v SA Mutual Fire & General Insurance 
1980 3 SA 105 (A) 118G. 
290iaplin v Hicks [1911-13] All ER 224 (CA); Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd 1941 AD 194 198; more 
generally see Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 225-6; Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 207 
208inf. 
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has been denied a right of action. 30 More recently the notion of separate debts has led to 
a refusal to allow loss of buying power on past losses. 31 It has been observed that the 
practice of damages assessment now tries to sit on two different stools.32 
[12.2.4] Eclectic methodology: Damages assessment is an eclectic activity characterized by 
the absence of any one dominant methodology or theory. In practice assessments involve a 
hotch-potch of capitalize first and difference afterwards, and vice-versa. Once actuaries 
become involved there is a tendency for the capitalize first methodology to prevail. 
[12.2.5] Superficial distinctions: A distinction is often drawn between the expressions 'loss 
of earnings' and 'loss of earning capacity'. The expression 'loss of earnings' usually arises 
when assessment is by way of an actuarial calculation whereas 'loss of earning capacity' 
arises when assessment is by way of gut-feel, a robust jury approach. 33 The distinction is 
more apparent than real. Thus the damages for an injury to a child may be assessed on 
either an actuarial basis or by using a robust unscientific jury approach. 34 Notwithstanding 
the different methodologies used for assessment, the resulting lump-sum awards have the 
same character in the sense of being something akin to the award for general damages.35 
[12.2.6] Differential contingencies: In its original form the adjustment for general 
contingencies was something that was applied to the overall assessment after the necessary 
differencing had been completed. This approach failed to recognise that different risk 
profiles, that is to say contingencies, may apply to the two different earnings scenarios, 
injured and uninjured. 36 The technique is illustrated in table 13. 
One is here dealing very much with the reduction in the value of an asset, as distinct from 
a reduction in the income which that asset represents. It will be noted that the net effect of 
the differential contingencies is an add-on contingency adjustment of R61909. For this 
reason the use of differential contingencies is sometimes described as 'reverse contingencies. 
It sometimes happens that an injured victim is provided with a guaranteed disability pension 
30Coetzee v SAR&H 1933 CPD 565 576 ' I know of no case which goes so far as to say that a person who has as yet 
sustained no damage, can sue for damages which may possibly be sustained in the future ' (a right of action was 
denied because the claimant had continued to receive his full salary from the railways); Coetzee v SAR&H 1934 CPD 
221 (same claimant now dismissed from railways but denied compensation because prescription held to have run 
from date of injury when loss arose). 
31 
'The result which I have thus reached is not satisfactory . . . it seems unfair that he should be paid in depreciated 
currency' SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 8410. 
32Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 233n247 'Dit wil lyk of die praktyk op twee stoele probeer sit en 
verdienvermoe beide as 'n afsonderlike bate en as toekomstige skade sien'. 
33Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 114D3; Boberg 1964 SAU 194 204-5; Koch 'Damages' 48. 
34Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) lllD 113-14. 
HSee 68 and 215. See too Nanile v Minister of Posts & Telegraphs 1990 4 C&B A4-30 (E) A4-37 ' It is a useful 
safeguard to have regard to both arithmetical and lump sum approaches'. 
36See, for example, Brijlal/ v Naidoo 1961 1 C&B 266 (D) 271 'These risks which would have attached to the 
plaintiff in any event are ... more likely to affect him in the future because of his disability'; Hutchings v General 
Accident Insurance 1986 3 C&B 737 (C) 744 (10% and 20 %); Venrer v Mutual & Federal Versekeringsmpy 1988 
3 C&B 749 (T) 759 (10% and 25% - see table 13 at 219). Differential contingencies were rejected in Shield 
Insurance v Hall 1976 4 SA 431 (A) 443-5 but due to h'igh risks attaching to pre-injury occupation. 
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TABLE 13 - DIFFERENTIAL CONTINGENCIES 
Uninjured Injured Net loss 
R R R 
Earnings 548317 466960 81357 
Contingencies (10% & 25%) (54831) (116740) 61909 
Net earning capacities 493486 350220 143266 
by his employer. 37 The contingencies attaching to the pension are usually far less than 
those attaching to earnings. 38 In such instances the percentage deducted for the uninjured 
condition may be substantially greater then the deduction for the injured condition. 
[12.2.7] Earning capacity as an asset: Under circumstances where a clearly quantifiable loss 
of earnings cannot be identified it is often appropriate to assess a present value for earning 
capacity in the uninjured condition, after a suitable deduction for general contingencies, 
and then debate what proportion thereof has been lost. 39 This is a clear case where a 
standard actuarial calculation is used in the assessment of what is popularly described as a 
'loss of earning capacity' . The actuarial calculation determines a fair overall lump-sum value 
for the earning capacity pre-injury, but not for the associated loss. In other words there is 
no explicit series of monthly or weekly losses that are capitalized by the actuarial 
calculation. 40 
[12.3] PAST LOSS OF EARNINGS 
[12.3.1] Complicating factors: Boberg states that 'Past loss of earnings is simply a matter 
of proof .41 This statement rather oversimplifies the realities of assessment:42 
37See 183. 
38The major uncertainty with a pension is the rate at which it will be escalated in future years (see 155). 
39See for instance Hutchings v General Acddent Insurance 1986 3 C&B 737 (C) 744 where there was virtually no 
explicit loss of earnings but a substantial loss by way of diminished 'earning capacity'. 
40-J'his point is of relevance if one bears in mind the unduly narrow view of continuing loss that has been taken by 
the appellate division (see paragraph 12.2.3). 
41Boberg 'Delict' 531. The learned author clearly knows better for he has written in 1963 SALi 538 548 'It is ... 
true that the amount of income which he would have received during the period intervening between the accident 
and the trial is no more a sum certain and capable of exact arithmetical calculation than the income which he would 
have received after the trial, for both are subject to contingencies'. 
42Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 557-8 . 





DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
When a self-employed person is injured one can only speculate as to subsequent 
earnings on the basis of past performance. This can be a highly contentious issue when 
the victim had been self-employed for only a few months.43 
During times of economic depression there is a high incidence of injuries to 
unemployed adults. One is then regularly concerned with assessing the value of the 
chance of obtaining employment during and after the pre-trial period. 
A variation of the previous problem is the employer who has gone out of business since 
the time of the injury or has been the subject of strike action and/or retrenchments. · 
On the whole the analysis of damages has tended to focus on past losses alone44 with the 
assessment of future loss being viewed as an awkward, if perhaps embarrassing, judicial duty 
largely devoid of principles or adequate proof.45 It is preferable, however, to view past loss 
as a special case in an overall assessment of hypothetical events.46 Litigation tends to 
extend over many years. As the date for assessment is moved forward in time that which 
was future loss yesterday becomes past loss tomorrow. 
Gratuitous payments of salary after the injury will generally be ignored when assessing the 
damages. The determination of what is 'gratuitous' is by no means a simple matter. 47 
If the claimant has been party to a partnership, or a company with several shareholders, then 
the losses caused by his injury will often not be suffered by him alone, but jointly with his 
partners or other shareholders. Only the claimant has a right of action for damages. It 
seems that the claim will be for that part of the loss that affects the claimant's share of the 
profits. The other partners, or shareholders, will suffer loss but not have a right of action 
for this loss. In this sense they are loss bearers in the same way that employer bears part 
of the loss by the payment of sick pay to a disabled employee.48 
Loss of employment due to an injury will deprive the victim of an income on which to live 
during the period until which compensation is paid. During such times family members may 
be obliged to provide support by reason of the duty to do so. The value of such support 
should be deducted from the past loss because the person providing the support has his own 
right of action for the cost of providing support during the pre-trial period.49 This 
deduction will also arise when a married person is injured and then supported by the other 
spouse. It will also be appropriate when an injured child, even a married child, returns to 
the parental home pending the payment of compensation. 
43In such circumstances one generally falls back on evidence of what was earned by the victim when last in formal 
employment. 
44Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 18n3 for instance states that he does not deal in his thesis with future loss and 
the problems of evidence. 
45Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) l 14B-C. 
46Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 557-8. 
47See paragraph 11.5 .1. 
48See paragraph 11.5 .1. 
49See 193. 
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[12.3.2] Foregone utility: The assessment of past loss takes no cognizance of the reality of 
the victim's living expenses during the pre-trial period. If the family has been able to come 
out on a lesser income there will no financial loss by the time of the trial,50 only the 
inconvenience of a lower standard of living. The loss suffered is thus a loss of utility not 
a loss of money. 51 For a married man the loss of utility is not suffered by him alone but 
also by his family. 52 In terms of utility theory it is quite correct to ignore the fact of the 
saved living expenses. The award made is, however, more in the nature of general 
damages than patrimonial loss. The award that is ultimately made may be needed to pay 
off debts, but more importantly there will usually be a saved element that is then available 
for discretionary spending on a luxury item, something that would not otherwise have been 
purchased, something hedonistic.53 Capital expenditure can generally be deferred during 
the pre-trial period. The adjustment for past loss of buying power provides the victim with 
the same utility in terms of buying power as has been foregone during the pre-trial period.54 
This is not to say that the victim will now go out and purchase precisely those goods and 
services which he would have purchased had there been no injury55 
[12.3.3] Claims by deceased estates: If the victim has died by the time of the trial the estate 
tetains a right to compensation for past loss accrued to the date of death. Such an award will 
cover past medical and living expenses which have served to decrease the estate in the direct 
sense, that is to say, have rendered the estate available for distribution less than it would 
have been had there been no injury. The deceased victim may, of course, have adopted a 
cheaper style of living during the pre-trial period and thereby prevented any diminution in 
his estate. If one accepts that the award for past loss may include a hedonistic element, that 
is the difference between notional net income but for the injury and actual reduced living 
costs, then it follows that a deceased estate should not benefit from an award of money which 
would in any event not have been saved. 56 The justification for the award for past loss of 
50ln the sense that the family will not be any poorer in terms of rands and cents than if the injury had not occurred. 
''Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 85 'Er kan ook schade zijn, al gaat er geen #money out of pocket#'. See too 
Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 17. In general a victim is expected to mitigate his loss of utility by immediately 
purchasing a substitute mug of beer (General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613C). The loss 
is then only a loss of money and not utility (see Bloem bergen 55). For a financially destitute family the mitigation 
of living standards from borrowings or capital is not a viable option. 
52De Vaa/ v Messing 1938 TPD 34 310; Lock/rat's Estate v North B1itish & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 
(A) 305H; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 79. 
'JVan der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 286 'Die gangbare wyse van skadevergoeding is deur die toekenning van geld. 
Slegs op hierdie wyse kan daar werklik met terugwerkende krag 'n ekwivalent verskaf word vir die eiser se verlore 
of verminderde vermoenswaarde. Daadwerklike herstel kan hoogstens daartoe dien om die verdere ontwikkeling 
van skadelike gevolge ... te beperk - 'n ekwivalent vir vergane of verlore vermoenswaarde kan dit nooit wees nie'. 
See too Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 48. The word 'hedonistic' is here used not in the ephemeral sense of 
'happiness' criticized by Visser 1983 THRHR 43 53 but in the sense of freedom of choice of life-plan. The selected 
life-plan may not lead to happiness but the sorrows will then at least have been self-imposed. 
54See 171. 
"Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 48 'De benadeelde zich bijna altijd met de hem aldus toegekende vergoeding in 
onze op ruilverkeer gebaseerde maatschappij zo niet een soortgelijke zaak, dan toch we/ iets gelijkwaardigs kan 
verschajfen... Die ge/ijkwaardige zaak za/ hem dan ook weer gelijkwaardige mogelijkheden verschajfen... Het 
verschaffen van zu/ke gelijkwaardige mogelijkheden is een reeel uirgangspunt voor de schadevasresrelling'. 
~Lockhat's Estate v North B1itish & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 304-5. 
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utility is that the victim will be able to indulge in additional expenditure with comparable 
utility to that by which the victim was short during the pre-trial period. If he is dead or 
permanently unconscious the justification for an award for past loss of utility falls away. If 
he has benefited by charitable assistance will the heirs be prepared to pass on part of the 
compensation money to the benefactor?57 If the heirs are the wife or children of the 
deceased, as is usually the case, they will have shared with him the hardship and deprivation 
and it seems right that they should be provided with the full value of their past loss of utility, 
possibly with a deduction to allow for the deceased's share thereof. For the victim who dies 
without dependants there is much to be said for making no award for the hedonistic element 
of past loss. It is rare to find account being taken of past savings in living expenses. 58 For 
the totally unemployed victim it will often be appropriate to make a deduction for the saved 
costs of work clothes and travelling to and from work. 59 
[12.4] HOME-MAKING CAPACITY 
[12.4.1] Who claims what?: Injury to a married woman may impair her ability to perform 
her household duties. Damages will be awarded for the cost of acquiring suitable substitute 
services. Historically this loss, both past and future, has been perceived as suffered by .the 
husband. 60 The preferable view, however, is that the wife herself suffers a loss of work 
capacity and should be compensated for at least the future cost to herself of hiring substitute 
services. 61 If the husband has met part or all of the cost in the past then he has a right to 
recover this expense from the defendant. 62 The desirability of allowing._the claim for future 
loss to the wife is particularly evident if one considers the risk of divorce, an event which 
may well be rendered more likely as a result of her reduced abilities as a marriage partner. 
Injury to a husband may give rise not only to a loss of earning capacity but also to his ability 
to perform· valuable duties in and about the home, such as gardening. The cost of replacing 
these services is a proper subject for compensation.63 
[12.4.2] Compensation for notional expenditure: The incurred cost of providing substitute 
services is generally accepted as an adequate measure of the damages suffered. However, 
if utility is to be the basis for compensation then it would be proper to award compensation 
for inability to render the services even if the cost of substitute services has not been 
incurred. However, the services may for instance, have been provided free of charge by 
another member of the family or the family may just have made do under 
less-than-satisfactory conditions. Past loss of earnings, as I have observed, is usually 
S7See 191. 
58ln Marine & Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) the 50% contingency deduction included allowance for 
saved living expenses (979int). This percentage was reduced in respect of past loss of earnings (977G). The court 
record does not disclose whether savings in past living expenses were brought into account. 
59See paragraph 12.5.2. 
60Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53; Plotkin v Western Assurance 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394E 395D. 
61 Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 406-9. 
62Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 409F-G. 
63See, for instance, Hutchings v General Acci</ent Insurance 1986 3 C&B 737 (C) 745 . 
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assessed without regard for the fact that the family may have lived on very little and/or 
charity during the pre-trial period. If proper evidence has been provided there seems to be 
no good reason why an analogous claim for the utility of lost services in the home should not 
be allowed even if no cash outlay has been incurred.~ The pre-trial impecuniosity of many 
victims generally ensures that such expenditure is not a practical proposition. 
[12.4.3] Loss of marriage prospects: Inextricably linked with homemaking capacity is the 
capacity to marry and manage a family. The ability to render services in the home is part 
of the quid-pro-quo that renders a marriage relationship viable. An injured woman is entitled 
to compensation for loss of the financial benefits of marriage. 65 
Injury to a young unmarried woman may destroy her prospects of marriage. The indications 
are that about 35 % of married women go out to work. 66 Even if a married woman does 
work her income net of tax will usually be less than that of her husband, quite apart from 
periods of unemployment while bringing up children. It follows that for most women a loss 
of marriage prospects will involve a loss of the financial benefits of marriage, in the form 
of a loss of the support which would have been provided by a notional husband. The 
chances of marriage may not be eliminated but may be reduced. The likely financial 
standing of the notional marriage partner may be reduced. The risk of an unstable marriage 
may be increased. All these factors may be expressed as a loss of the chance of enjoying 
the financial benefits of marriage. 
A woman who has lost all prospects of marriage cannot claim for the value of the services 
which she would have rendered in the notional home. The award of the value of her services 
presumes that there is a home in which to render such services. The more seriously injured 
woman may need an attendant for her personal care. 
[12.4.4] Quantifying the loss: The problems of assessing a value for lost marriage prospects 
are much the same as arise with loss of support claims when a deduction is made for 
remarriage prospects. 67 One first estimates the likely level of support from a notional 
husband assuming marriage as a certainty. This calculation would include suitable allowance 
for notional children68 and the chance that the claimant would have worked and partially 
supported herself. One then reduces the capitalized value of this prospect to allow for 
contingencies such as the chance that having regard to the injury she still has a small chance 
of marrying. 
64Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 107-8 maintains that when a medical doctor has treated his own wounds he should 
be compensated as though he had paid for the services from another. The victim has suffered the disutility of 
treating his own wounds and there seems to be no good reason why he should not be so compensated. 
65Commerdal Union Assurance v Stanley 1973 1 SA 699 (A). 
66HSRC 'Marriage & Family Life' 318. The figure of 35% relates to 1980 and is up from the 20% observed in 
1960. For graduate women the percentage is much higher, about 70%. 
67See, for instance , Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 614-15. This is an aspect of damages 
assessment which is generally unpopular with the judiciary, but it reflects an unambiguous application of the principle 
of valuation of a chance. 
68See Kemp 'Damages' Jed 95-6 for a discussion of the calculation of the costs of keeping a notional family. 
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Where an injured woman has lost both earning capacity and marriage prospects it will 
generally be appropriate to make awards under both heads, particularly where evidence 
indicates that the notional husband would have earned more than she would have done. 
It is common to reduce an injured woman's loss of earning capacity for the contingency that 
she would have been unemployed during periods of childbearing. It needs to be borne in 
mind, however, that while unemployed she would receive increased support from her 
notional husband. For career women69 and families with relatively low incomes one can 
expect very short absences from work due to pregnancy. 70 
The are no reported judgments concerning a married woman who by reason of her injuries 
has lost her husband and the support that he was providing. This probably reflects a general 
misconception that loss of support cannot be claimed under the action · for 'loss of earning 
capacity' .71 There will also be problems with proving causation and it will at times be 
necessary to make a deduction for the chance that divorce would have supervened in any 
event. There would then be the loss of the chance of contracting a subsequent remarriage. 
In general the approach to assessing the value of lost marriage prospects is to equate the 
claimant's earning capacity to the support she would have received from a notional 
husband.72 Boberg73 motivates this approach on the grounds that by reason of being 
unable to marry the claimant must now go out and work to support herself, but is unable to 
do so. The danger of this approach is the secretary who can prove that she would probably 
have married a surgeon. She would assuredly be undercompensated if her claim were based 
on her earning capacity alone. 
For an injured woman the loss of the financial benefits of marriage will generally give rise 
to an increased award. On the other hand for a man who suffers reduced marriage prospects 
there is an associated saving in living expenses, the financial benefits that a notional wife and 
children would have enjoyed. Even handed justice suggests that if one is to make an add-on 
for the woman one should make a deduction from the man's damages and there are 
judgments where such a deduction has been made.74 The one instance where an attempt has 
been made to use an actuarial calculation to assess the value of future marriage prospects did 
not get a favourable reception: 
'The various matters assumed are too speculative to allow for any accurate 
quantification. Whatever statistics are available can at best indicate average figures, 
69HSRC Marriage & family life 319-20. 
70HSRC Marriage & family life (at 328) records the advantages in South Africa of cheap domestic labour and (at 
330) the increasing tendency for employers to provide maternity benefits to working women. 
71The women with the largest claims for loss of support will be those who were unemployed at the time of the injury. 
72Commercial Union Assurance v Stanley 1973 1SA699 (A) 704(H); see too Marine & Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 
4 SA 961 (A) 980A-B. 
73Boberg 'Delict' 575-7. 
74Reid v SAR&H 1965 2 SA 181 (D) 190F-H; Carsrens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1024. 
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and there is no basis upon which to determine how Clive's position would have 
compared with the statistical average' .75 
225 
In the circumstances the court merely increased the deduction for general contingencies to 
allow for the relevant saving. 76 The court's rejection of the statistical average as a basis 
for assessment is to be regretted. Allowance for future marriage prospects is an everyday 
occurrence with damages for loss of support.77 Statistical averages concerning general 
population mortality for coloureds were used by the court without demur.78 Family 
statistics are also population averages and thus indicative of the likelihood of the relevant 
events such as average number of children and proportion of married women who work.79 
It has been said that an actuarial calculation is to be preferred to the court's 'gut feel'. 80 
The emphasis by the court on particularity, that is to say concretization, has the effect of 
creating an insurmountable burden of proof for the defendant. 81 One can only express the 
hope that in future matters the courts will be less hostile to statistical averages as a means 
for filling evidential gaps. 82 
[12.5] LIVING EXPENSES 
[12.5.1] Savings deducted: The expression 'loss of earning capacity', it has been noted, is 
a convenient label for a wide range of losses flowing from bodily injury. Not only does the 
award include allowance for loss of earnings but also for the present value of past and future 
expenditure on medication, appliances, and attendants. Just as increased expenditure will 
lead to an increase in the damages payable so too will savings in living expenses justify a 
reduction. 83 
It needs to be borne in mind that although the claimant's damages for patrimonial loss 
may be reduced by reason of saved living expenses, the same consideration may justify 
an increase to the award for general damages. 
15Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1024D-E. 
76Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA ·1010 (C) 10271-J. See too Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B 
A3-45 (C) 66 69. 
77Legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1SA608 (A) 617-18; Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 1SA601 (A) 614-
15. 
71Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1024-7. 
791n general see HSRC 'Marriage & family life'. More particularly regard could be had to the circumstances of the 
claimant's family as a guide to what is usual. In Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 115-15 the court 
relied on the earnings of the mother of the claimant as evidence of what the child could expect to earn. 
f!IJSouthern Insurance v Bailey 1984 l SA 98 (A) 99D. 
11See 31. 
12See 15. 
830r as Boberg describes it in 1960 SAIJ 438 445 'A wrongful act may affect a person 's capacity to suffer loss'. 
See too Luntz 'Damages' 2ed paras 5.2.09 5.4.04 5.5.02; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 
283-91; Luntz 1965 SAIJ 6; Buchanan 1965 SAIJ 457. 
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[12.5.2] Saved travel costs: Perhaps one of the most common and obvious of savings is the 
cost of work clothes and travelling to and from work. This justifies a deduction from both 
past and future loss of earnings or support of about 8 % . 84 Allowance for this consideration 
may be included in the overall deduction for general contingencies.85 The deduction will 
not be appropriate if the victim lived at his place of work86 or continues to travel to and 
from work or, as often happens with domestic servants, was receiving additional payments 
to cover travelling costs. One may expect persons of higher income to use more expensive 
forms of transport. 
Many employees are provided with a car for business purposes but permitted to use it for 
private purposes, sometimes subject to restrictions. The determination of a value to be 
placed on such a benefit is not without difficulties: In the first instance there is the total cost 
of the vehicle to the employer; in the second instance there is the saving that the employee 
enjoys by being spared the cost of providing his own vehicle. The cost to the employer is 
not generally a correct measure of the value of the vehicle to the employee: Quite apart 
from the question of mileage, an employer may provide a new vehicle whereas the employee 
may have made do with a second-hand vehicle, or made greater use of a vehicle already 
owned by him. Where an employee, such as a salesman or managing director, is provided 
with a status vehicle it would not always be correct to assume that such a status vehicle 
would have been purchased had the employee been looking to his private needs alone. · On 
the other hand the benefit of a status vehicle would generally have a higher utility value than 
more economical transport, but the loss of this would seem to be more a question of general 
damages, the loss of an amenity, than financial loss. The values placed by the Receiver of 
Revenue on the use of company cars generally seem to provide a fair basis for resolving the 
issue, provided it is borne in mind that the value used for tax purposes has hitherto been less 
than full value of the benefit. 87 
The need for medical care and the purchase of household necessities may entail a continuing 
need to travel. In one instance it was held that the claimant should take care to arrange 
accommodation close to the necessary facilities. 88 In Bennie's case89 an award was made 
for the additional costs of travelling to the family holiday flat. 
s.Deductions for travel costs were made in Sumesur v Dominion Insurance 1960 1 C&B 228 (D) 232-3 (7,5% 
deducted); Maasberg v Hunt Leuchars & Hepburn 1944 WLD 2 12 (9%). Street 'Damages' 110 argues that the 
deduction should not be made because where one lives reflects a chosen lifestyle rather than a necessity. The fact 
remains that a victim who no longer has to travel to and from work is spared those costs. There may of course be 
alternative costs with travelling for medical care. · 
"See Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 66 et seq; Kontos v General Accident Insurance 1989 4 C&B A2-1 (T). 
86A lesser deduction may be made for the saved costs of occasional visits to a far-away home. 
87The income tax values for the 1993/94 tax year would seem to have been about 75 % of the true values. A suitable 
allowance for private use would then be 1,33 times the income tax value. 
88Shasha v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A2-8 (W) 'The provision of a motorised wheelchair goes a long way 
towards restoring the plaintiff to mobility in situations where previously she had been a pedestrian. Where 
previously she had walked to the shops or to visit friends now she may do the same by wheelchair, provided the 
shops and friends are reasonably close to her own proposed home in Umtata. It is her business to select the site of 
her home with that factor in mind'. 
89Bennie v Guardian National Insurance 1989 4 C&B A3-34 (W) A3-43. 
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[12.5.3) Savings in the 'lost years': Most prominent amongst allowances for saved living 
expenses is the rule governing reduced expectation of life. Had the claimant not been injured 
the value of his earning capacity would have been assessed according to normal mortality 
rates. However, if the injury has reduced his expectation of life, then for compensation 
purposes the assessment is done on the basis of reduced life expectancy and no allowance is 
made for earnings foregone during the so-called 'lost-years' ,90 that is to say the additional 
years that would notionally have been lived had there been no injury .91 The rationale for 
this approach is that once a man is dead he has no further living expenses and his dependants · 
have their own right of action by which to recover the loss.92 In effect it is assumed that 
all income is consumed with the cost of living either by way of support for oneself or support 
for one's dependants. 93 Whatever might have been saved is treated as expenditure. This 
latter assumption is not all that unreasonable if one bears in mind that earnings tend to stop 
at about age 65 and living expenses must thereafter be met out of savings. Savings may also 
be temporary pending some major expense such as overseas trip or a new car. 
[12.5.4) Yearly packets of loss: The approach of the courts to the 'lost years' appears at first 
blush to be somewhat anomalous in terms of utility theory. If the court is to restore the 
present utility of claimant's pre-injury life plan then one would expect the same total life 
utility to be crammed into a shorter lifespan, a short life but a merry one. This concept 
implies an increase in the yearly spending capacity over and above what would have been 
the case but for the injury. This increased discretionary spending probably gives very much 
greater satisfaction than expenditure on basic necessities and has essentially the same quality 
as an award for general damages for loss of the amenities of life. The practical effect of 
limiting compensation for patrimonial loss to the shorter lifespan of the claimant implies that 
utility is parcelled out in yearly quanta at the same level as had there been no injury. 
90Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 306F 'When a man is injured and as 
a result of that injury his expectation of life is shortened, his claim for compensation is ... limited to the period during 
which it is expected that he will continue to live, and he has no claim for loss of savings beyond that date; he is not, 
notionally, kept alive until the date when bu_t for ~he accident he would, actuarially, have died'. 
911 use here the popular terminology whereby the claimant is assumed to die at the expiry of his expectation of life. 
In practice the standard actuarial calculation would have regard to the increased risk of death in each separate year 
(see 87). 
92Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 306F 'A man who has been killed 
has no claim for compensation after his death; after that event he needs no support for himself and is under no duty 
to support his family. His dependants have their own action against the wrongdoer for the loss that they have 
sustained. If the wrongdoer is unable to pay, they may be able to claim support from the estate of the deceased, but 
that does not give the executor a right to claim from the wrongdoer earnings or savings that have been lost through 
the death of the deceased'. See too Goldie v City Council of Johannesburg 1948 2 SA 913 (W) 921-2. 
93The presumption that all income is consumed with living expenses or savings is the norm for dependency claims: 
see Jameson's Minors v CSAR 1908 TS 575 605; Smart v SAR&H 1928 NPD 361 364-5; Yorkshire Insurance v 
Porobic 1957 1 C&B 90 (A) 93-4; Nochomowitz v Sanlam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 725-6; Marine & Trade 
Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) 488-9. Contra Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 849; 
Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 110. The Roberts judgment was handed down prior to the Lock/wt decision at a time when 
it was thought proper to compensate for loss of savings during the 'lost years' (Goldie v City Coundl of 
Johannesburg 1948 2 SA 913 (W) 922). As a general rule savings may be equated with hedonistic expenditure. 
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The disutility suffered by reason of the 'lost years' is then compensated through the award 
for general damages. 94 The reported cases in South Africa do not record an explicit 
separate award for loss of expectation of life. 
[12.5.5] General damages/or the 'lost years': It has been held that the general damages paid 
for loss of an amenity of life should be the same regardless of the financial standing of the 
claimant, rich or poor. 95 The same egalitarian reasoning suggests that the general damages 
awarded for the 'lost years' should be determined without regard to the victim's lost 
earnings,96 or the savings that would notionally have been accumulated. There is little 
doubt that blind reliance on an actuarial calculation of savings during the 'lost years'97 will 
produce absurd results when the claimant is unconscious or with very few years to live, and 
even more so if the claimant has died. 98 In such cases the award for general damages and 
for patrimonial loss should include little if anything by way of discretionary spending money. 
In many instances loss of the capacity to work will commonly be accompanied by loss of the 
capacity to enjoy discretionary spending to the full. Conversely the injured claimant who has 
been freed from the burden of working for a living will have far more leisure time to indulge 
in hedonistic activities, that is to say time to follow personal whims. This latter 
consideration suggests that in certain instances general damages for the 'lost years' should 
be assessed with some regard for the discretionary spending capacity which would have been 
available during those 'lost years'. The extent of this spending capacity, that is to say 
earnings not required for the necessaries of living, would give some indication of the degree 
of pleasure that has been foregone. This is, however, to allow patrimonial considerations 
to intrude into the assessment. 99 
[12.5.6] Institutionalization: Confinement to an institution at state expense will eliminate 
many of the usual costs of living. It is then appropriate to reduce the award for loss of 
94 Venter v Federated Employers Assuransiempy 1978 2 C&B 756 (f) 759para2; see too Neethling Potgieter & Visser 
'Deliktereg' 2ed 244. 
95Radebe v Hough 1949 1 SA 380 (A). Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 8n64 'Despite this authoritative pronouncement, 
a study of awards made since Radebe v Hough raises doubts as to whether the courts have in fact adhered to the 
principle'. 
96-fhis is the approach in England: Benham v Gambling [1941] 1 All ER 7 (CA) (£200); Oliver v Ashman [1961) 3 
All ER 323 (CA) (£200); Pickett v British Rail Engineering [ 1979] 1 All ER 774 {HL) (£750). South African cases 
on the subject, such as there are, do not identify an explicit amount for loss of expectation of life (see for instance 
Venter v Federated Employers Assuransiempy 1978 2 C&B 756 (f) 759p2). 
97For an example of the approach to such calculations see Kemp 'Damages' 3ed 95-6. 
91In Pickett v British Rail Engineering [1979) 1 All ER 774 (HL) the House of Lords awarded 'loss of savings' 
during the 'lost years' in addition to general damages , this being a reversal of the earlier ruling in Oliver v Ashman 
[1961] 3 All ER 323 (CA). Subsequent embarrassment for the House of Lords in Gammell v Wilson [1981] 1 All 
ER 557 (HL) led to the House requesting reforming legislation. The Law Reform Act was then amended by the 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 ss 4(2) 73(3) 73(4) thereby restoring the position as stated in Oliver v Ashman 
(and Lock/rat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A)). 
99Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 117-20 rejected the contention that a functional approach should 
be applied to the determination of conventional damages. l l 9H 'This does not mean, of course, that the function 
to be served by an award of damages should be excluded from consideration. That is something which may be taken 
into account together with all the other circumstances'. See too Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 
412 (W) 428-9. 
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earning capacity to allow for this saving of the 'domestic element', 100 that portion of the 
claimant's income that would have been expended on housing, food, transport, recreation, 
etc. If the victim is married then the reduction may take account of the saved costs of 
supporting a wife and children, 101 presumably with due regard for the likelihood of a 
divorce and maintenance payments and remarriage by the wife. An unmarried unconscious 
victim will have no need for living costs .other than what is provided by the institution. In 
such cases compensation may be restricted to the value of the costs of accommodation at the 
relevant institution, if any. If the accommodation costs exceed the victim's 'domestic 
element' then the award might be structured as one for loss of earning capacity plus an 
additional amount being the value of the costs of institutionalization less the 'domestic 
element' of the earnings. 102 Institutionalization may thus bring about either a deduction or 
an addition to the value of earning capacity, depending on circumstances. 103 It may even 
justify no explicit award at all for loss of earning capacity .104 
[12.5. 7] Expensive hobbies: A person with substantial income may have indulged in an 
expensive hobby, for example yachting or flying. His injury may now prevent him from 
continuing this hobby. It can be argued that his compensation for loss of earning capacity 
should be reduced for the savings that he now enjoys from no longer pursuing the expensive 
hobby. 105 This problem is really much the same as that relating to the problem of the 'lost 
years'. If the claimant retains sufficient work capacity after his injury to beneficially utilise 
the discretionary spending power in other hedonistic activities then no deduction should be 
made. However, the severely disabled, unconscious or mentally retarded victim will not be 
able to take advantage of the discretionary spending power and his compensation for loss of 
earning capacity may for this reason be reduced by eliminating part or all of the discretionary 
element. Allowance would probably be made for the contingency that had there been no 
injury the expensive pastime may have been discontinued in any event. 
[12.5.8] Loss a/marriage prospects: The injuries may prevent a young man from marrying, 
or at least greatly reduce his marriage prospects. For a married victim the injury may 
precipitate divorce proceedings. The victim will then have the prospect of being spared in 
100Sheannan v Folland (1950] l All ER 976 (CA); Lim Poli Choo v C&IAHA (1979) 2 All ER 910 (HL) 921; Roberts 
v Northern Assurance 1964 4 SA 531 (D) 537G-H; Marine & Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 979inf 
(the 50% contingency deduction included allowance for a 'domestic element'); Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 
1084 (C) 1086A-G; Kontos v General Accident Insurance 1989 4 C&B A2-l (T) (50% by agreement between the 
parties). Contra Bobape v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A4-43 CW) but the substantial 40% deduction for 
general contingencies (unexplained) gave rise to much the same end result as had explicit allowance been made for 
saved living expenses. 
101Fletcher v Autocar & Transporters [1968] l All ER 726 (CA) 734H-I. 
102In Lim Poli Owo v C&IAHA (1979] 2 All ER 910 (HL) 92lg it was the estimated cost of future care which was 
reduced for the 'domestic element' and not the award for loss of earnings. Dr Lim was unconscious. There was 
thus no justification for a hedonistic element to the award. See too Uijs v General Accident Versekeringsmpy 1991 
4 C&B A4-88 (C); General Accident Versekeringsmpy v Uijs 1993 4 SA 228 (A). 
103An addition was made in Lim Poh Owo v C&IAHA [1979) 2 All ER 910 (HL). 
104eg Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C) 1086A-G. 
10
'Fletcher v Autocar & Transporters [1968) 1 All ER 726 (CA) 734. 
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part or whole the expense of supporting a wife and family .106 The damages payable have, 
on this account, been reduced by the courts. 107 The general principle here seems to be the 
same as with reduced expectation of life. A deduction is to be made for the value of the 
chance of .saved living expenses. 108 Allowance for the disutility 109 or utility of being 
deprived of the joys or tedium of family life is then a factor to be brought into account when 
assessing general damages. 
A serious injury may give rise to the need for an attendant who will provide some of the care 
and companionship benefits that would otherwise have arisen in marriage. The saving from 
not having to support a wife and family may then be offset against the cost of the attendant 
rather than against earnings. 
Injury to a married man may well be followed by his divorce and bleak prospects for 
remarriage. For a compensated victim this will not relieve him of the duty to support his 
children although it would be unusual for him to be burdened with paying maintenance to his 
ex-wife. 
[12.5.9) Divergent opinions: Judicial views are divided on the proper treatment of saved 
living expenses. 110 On the one hand one finds typical pigeonhole thinking based on the 
notion that the claim for personal injury is a claim for loss of earnings. 111 On the other 
hand one finds a broad approach based on overall impression giving effect to the balance-
sheet-of-life form of analysis. 112 In the Lockhat's Estate case113 the appellate division 
opted for the broad approach and a deduction for saved living expenses. More recently in 
the Summers appeal114 the court indicated its reluctance to make a deduction for saved 
106HSRC 'Marriage & Family Life' 318 indicates that about 35 % of married women work and thus partly or wholly 
support themselves (for graduate wives the percentage is 70%). Children would generally be a financial liability to 
a husband unless the wife earns unusually well. 
irnReid v SAR&H 1965 2 SA 181 (D) 190F-H; Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1023-4 10271-J 
confirmed in General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 617; Dustenvald v Santam Insurance 1990 
4 C&B A3-45 (C) '. .. the strong probability that plaintiff would have married and had a family had he not been 
injured and, with a family to support,, and even after paying less tax as a married person, would not himself have 
had the full benefit of his after-tax income' (At 60 the court ordered that the calculation for earnings but for the 
injury assume that the claimant would have married at age 30. At 69 the court notes that claimant had but a small 
chance of marriage now that he was injured). 
108See 224. 
109In Bobape v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A4-43 (yl) A4-54 the wife and family are viewed as a benefit. This 
benefit may, of course, be substituted by a hired attendant. 
11
°Kontos v General Accident Insurance 1989 4 C&B A2-l (f) (deduction approved); Bobape v President Insurance 
1990 4 C&B A4-43 (yl) A4-54 (deduction disapproved). 
111See, for instance, Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 (yl) 495B 'If a man remains unconscious for ten years 
after the injury his claim for total loss of earnings cannot be disputed'. 
112Roberts v Northern Assurance 1964 4 SA 531 (D) 537B-H; Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C) 1086 
A-G; Reid v SAR&H 1965 2 SA 181 (D) 190F-H. 
113Lockat 's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 305-6. 
114General Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 617. 
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living expenses but then declined to upset the finding of the trial court that a deduction 
should be made. 
[12.6] INCOME TAX 
[12.6.1] Tax status of award: The general principle governing taxation in the assessment of 
loss of earning capacity is that a deduction will be made provided the damages award itself 
will be free of tax in the hands of the claimant. 115 If the award is to be treated as taxable 
income in the claimant's hands then no deduction should be made for taxation when assessing 
the damages. 116 
[12.6.2] Tax on investment income: A corollary of this principle in relation to future loss 
of earnings is that allowance must be made for the notional tax which may accrue in respect 
of investment income earned on the award. 117 The cost of medical and prosthetic expenses 
will generally be tax deductible in the hands of the claimant. 118 Due to the general 
availability of investments subject to little or no taxation119 the discount rate of return is 
in practice not explicitly adjusted for taxation. 120 
[12.6.3] Tax on notional earnings: It has been said that the approach of the courts to 
taxation in relation to lost earning capacity has not yet been finally settled by the appellate 
division . 121 In practice notional taxation will usually be deducted when assessing loss of 
earnings. 122 Discussions of taxation generally omit reference to one early ruling by the 
appellate division that tax should be deducted. 123 
•is A lump-sum award for lost future profits is capital and thus not taxable (CIR v African Oxygen 1963 1 SA 681 
(A); Taeuber & Corssen v SIR 1975 3 SA 649 (A). A lump-sum award for loss of earning capacity is likewise not 
taxable (Boberg 1981 BML 25; Boberg 'Delict' 543). 
1160mega Africa Plastics v Swisstool Manufacturing 1978 3 SA 465-(A) 475-6. When compensation is paid by 
instalments these payments constitute an annuity and are taxable (KB/ & MMF v Hogan 1993 (A) (unreported 28.5.93 
cases 663/91 & 683/91)). It follows that instalment payments should be assessed gross of liability for taxation. 
Revenue practice is not to tax instalments directed at meeting medical and prosthetic expenditure. 
117Pitt v Economic Insurance 1957 3 SA 284 (D) 287; D01jling v Bazeley 1961 1 C&B 128 (E) 132inf; Oberholzer 
v Santam Insurance 1970 1 SA 337 (N) 342E. This is a consideration more talked about than applied. In practice 
the diversity of possible investment opportunities, particularly growth investments, dictates an objective approach, 
the same discount rate of interest is used throughout: See for instance Todorovic v Waller (1981) 37 ALR 481 (HC). 
111s18 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as amended. 
119eg Share market equities, capital growth, owner occupied homes, inter alia. 
120See 104 and 134. 
121 Van Heerden JC Noster 1 6-7; Van der Spuy 1991 Consultus 40 41-2 with regard to Whitfield v Phillips 1957 
3 SA 318 (A) 345-7 and Sigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 568. 
122Boberg 'Delict' 545 mid-page 'The preponderance of academic opinion seems to favour the Gourley approach (ie 
basing the award on the plaintiffs net, after-tax earnings)'; at 544inf 'Actuaries make a practice of deducting tax 
from estimates of future earnings, trial courts generally accept this, and the issue is seldom raised on appeal'. BTC 
v Gourley [1955) 3 All ER 796 (HL) was concerned with past loss of earnings only, a consideration that seems of 
little consequence. In Oosthuize.n v Homegas 1989 (0) (unreported 13.7.89 case 539/86) the court, citing only Van 
Heerden JC Noster 1, refused to allow a deduction for taxation. 
123 Victoria Falls &.Transvaal Power v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines 1915 AD 129 'The defendant cannot be called 
upon to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of such share of its profits as would in any event have been appropriated 
by the State'. Such a ruling presumes that the lump-sum award is tax-free in the hands of the claimant. More 
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The loss of earning capacity of a victim will sometimes be measured by the cost of 
employing a suitable assistant. This cost would often be tax deductible and should then be 
reduced for the associated reduction in tax liability. 124 
[12.6.4] Estimation of future taxation: It has been said that no allowance should be made 
for notional tax on expected future earnings because any deduction made may be widely 
wrong. 125 This focus upon remote possibilities is typical of an assessment philosophy 
which sees its function as being to 'predict' the future. The practical effect is an 
overemphasis on concretization. 126 In general the determination of compensation has 
regard to the value of the chance of an event. 127 A loss, and presumably a gain, will not 
be ignored just because of paucity of evidence. 128 Problems of jurisdiction no longer 
apply, 129 and were in any ·event of questionable relevance bearing in mind that a court may 
have regard to the value of the chance. Boberg records the actuarial practice to deduct 
taxation from estimated future earnings. 130 This is done on the assumption that prevailing 
tax rates will continue in future, subject to regular revisions to offset the effects of inflation, 
the so-called 'fiscal drag' .1.31 An examination of table 14 suggests that this assumption may 
be unduly optimistic and that the deduction for general contingencies should be adjusted 
upwards for the risk that tax rates will in future not be regularly adjusted to offset inflation. 
[12.6.5] 'Pigeonholing': It has been argued that no deduction should be made for taxation 
because the claim is for 'loss of earning capacity' and not for financial loss in general. This 
reasoning has been adopted in Canada but not without criticism. 132 I have already made 
the point that the strict application of 'pigeonholing' reasoning would require that no 
compensation be awarded for medical expenses and other damnum emergens. 133 
recently in Minister of Defence v]ackson 1991 4 SA 23 (ZS) it has also been ruled that a deduction should be made 
for taxation. 
124ln Muller v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1993 4 C&B 12-56 (C) the evidence was that the claimant would have 
had a substantial tax loss even if she had not been injured. The cost of the assistant was thus awarded without 
deduction for any tax advantage. 
1
-zjSigournay v Gillbanks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 568inf 'If such an adjustment were made it might well be widely 
wrong'. However, it has also been said that 'But in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and 
taxes' (Benjamin Franklin 1789). To make no adjustment for taxation is to ensure that the allowance is wrong. 
126See 31. 
127Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 225-6. 
128Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers 1941 AD 194 198; Whitfield v Phillips 1957 3 SA 318 (A) 345inf 'At the 
most, (the court) can endeavour to assess, as best it may, the probabilities of what the decision of the Commissioner 
or the Special Court will be'. 
129 An appeal to the supreme court is now possible from a decision by the special court (s86 s86A Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962). The problem of conflicting jurisdictions which daunted the court in Whitfield v Phillips 1957 3 SA 318 
(A) 345inf has now fallen away. 
130J3oberg 'Delict' 544inf. 
131 Based on inspection of several hundred actuarial reports prepared for purposes of trial and examined by my office. 
132Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 181-95. 
133See 213. 
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TABLE 14 - HISTORY OF TAX RATES FOR CONSTANT REAL INCOME 
Max 
Year Nom Average Nom Average Nom Average Tax 
Earnings Tax Earnings Tax Earnings Tax Rate 
Rpy % Rpy % Rpy % % 
1968 3314 9,0 6628 16,5 13256 35,2 73,5 
1969 3423 9,4 6846 17,5 13692 36,2 74,0 
1970 3485 7,7 6970 11, l 13940 18,4 64,4 
1971 3586 8,1 7172 11, 7 14344 19,5 66,6 
1972 3762 8,7 7524 13,4 15048 24,4 78,0 
1973 4003 8,7 8006 14,8 16012 23,7 72,0 
1974 4263 8,2 8526 13,5 17052 22,8 66,0 
1975 4668 7,7 9336 13,5 18672 23,4 63,0 
1976 5209 8,2 10418 15,0 20836 25,6 63,0 
1977 5912 10,3 11824 19,0 23648 27,2 72,0 
1978 6574 11,2 13148 20,5 26296 35,7 72,0 
1979 7298 11,3 14596 20,3 29192 35,9 66,0 
1980 8093 10,l 16186 20,l 32372 35,6 60,5 
1981 9161 7,3 18322 15,7 36644 28,0 50,0 
1982 10426 8,4 20852 17,8 41704 30,6 50,0 
1983 
I 
12000 10,3 24000 21, l 48000 34,8 52,5 
1984 13481 11,8 26962 23,3 53924 36,8 52,5 
1985 15053 12,2 30106 23,7 60212 36,3 50,0 
1986 17497 13,l 34994 25,2 69988 38,0 50,0 
1987 20777 14,2 41554 25,6 83108 36,l 50,0 
1988 24111 15,5 48222 27,2 96444 35,9 45,0 
1989 27236 16,2 54472 27,8 108944 37,0 45,0 
1990 31251 18,2 62502 29,4 125004 37,0 45,0 
1991 35730 16,8 71460 28,0 142920 36,0 44,0 
1992 41199 18,3 82398 29,2 164796 36,l 43,0 
.1993 47379 19,3 94758 30,6 189515 36,8 43,0 
Average 11,5 20,4 31,6 
Based on rates for a married person with no dependants. 
Source 'The Quantum Yearbook' 1993 53 
[12.7] THE BALANCE SHEET OF LIFE 
[12.7.1] Male . victim: It is often useful to analyze a victim's life plan by analogy with a 
balance sheet reflecting the present capitalized values of each of the relevant financial 
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elements. The schematic in table 15 below contemplates a male victim prior to injury. In 
TABLE 15 - MALE VICTIM NOTIONALLY UNINJURED 
ASSETS RlOOO's LIABILITIES RlOOO's 
Gross earnings 900 Taxation 180 
Services of wife 150 Own services in home 40 
Chance of inheritance 50 Support self 350 
House 200 Support for wife 230 
Car 30 Support for children 270 
Bond on house 90 
Net patrimonium 170 
Total 1330 Total 1330 
order to assess the loss suffered the court must then construct a second similar balance sheet 
having regard to the effect of the injury on each of the individual components. The 
difference between R 170000 and the net patrimonium having regard to the injury gives a first 
estimate of the damage suffered. 134 The court should then have regard to the effect of the 
award upon the patrimonium having regard to the injury and consider whether to modify the 
first estimate. 135 
The support required by the family may remain unchanged. The value of earnings may 
reduce but so too will the liability for taxation. The reduction in the value of earnings will 
be replaced by the lump-sum award of damages. A wise first investment would usually be 
to pay off the mortgage bond on the house. Any amount which is awarded for pain and 
s1:1ffering and loss of the amenities of life will, once compensation has been paid, become 
part of the victim's patrimony and indistinguishable, for investment purposes, from money 
paid for patrimonial loss. 
If the victim will require expensive medical care and equipment the value of the cost of 
supporting himself would increase. If his wife has left him the value of the cost of 
supporting her, and perhaps the children, will decrease. Her departure will deprive the 
victim of, amongst other things, the benefit of her services in the home. These must then 
be compensated with the value of the cost of employing a housekeeper or attendant. 
Modifications to the home necessitated by the injury, such as airconditioning, may enhance 
the value of the property .136 The loss is the cost of the airconditioning less the enhanced 
value of the home. Many victims would have owned a motor car even if they had not been 
134See formula A at 60. 
135Formula B at 60. 
136Paraplegics, for instance, suffer from poor thermal control and require air-conditioning in their home (Dustenvald 
v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 87-8. 
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injured. If they now require an automatic car with airconditioning compensation is for the 
increased capital and running costs. The basic cost of the vehicle is covered by the award 
for loss of earnings. For young victims the full cost of the first car might be awarded 
bearing in mind that but for the injury the first car would not have been purchased until 
several years later. There may be a deduction for the costs of public transport or a motor 
cycle. General damages will be reduced to allow for the enhanced status and standard of 
living which such enhancements provide. 137 
If there has been a reduction to the victim's expectation of life then the value of his earnings 
will reduce, but so too will the values for the cost to him of keeping himself and his family. 
[12.7.2] Female victim: The balance-sheet schematic for a woman's life plan might be as in 
TABLE 16 - FEMALE VICTIM NOTIONALLY UNINJURED 
ASSETS RlOOO's LIABILITIES RlOOO's 
Gross earnings 320 Taxation 70 
Services of husband 40 Own services in home 150 
Chance of inheritance 5 Support self 350 
Support from husband 230 Support for husband 0 
Chance of 2nd husband 60 Support for children 30 
Car 15 Net patrimonium 70 
Total 670 Total 670 
table 16. Some liabilities for a husband appear as assets for his wife, and vice-versa. The 
above schematic would be equally relevant for a young unmarried woman with good 
marriage prospects. The present values shown in the schematic would then be reduced for 
the chance that marriage may not come about. Most married women are faced with a small 
but real chance of having to support their children in the event of their husband's untimely 
death. The death, or a divorce, would give rise to a chance of support from a second 
notional husband. There might be a chance of inheriting from parents. 
[12.8] LIKELY EARNINGS 
[12.8.1] Expected earnings: The value of lost earning capacity is generally measured 
according to the standard of expected earnings. 138 For compensation purposes an 
'expectation' 139 is best described as a 'personalized average', 140 that is to say an average 
which is modified, usually subjectively, to take account of all known information concerning 
131Administrator General SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A); Ngubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 786. 
138
'Verwagte inkomste', see Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 150A-C; Southern Insurance 
v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) lllD; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 105. 
139See 15. 
140Classical statisticians would object to this view of an expectation, but not Bayesians. 
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the individual and the likely usage of his work capacity. 141 The use of general statistical 
averages permits the court to fill in gaps where explicit evidence is lacking. The use of 
averages is consistent with the principle of damages assessment that a court must do the best 
it can with the information available. 142 The relevance of a statistical average depends on 
the extent to which it would influence a reasonable man in formulating his expectations of 
what is likely in the future. 143 
As a rule the best evidence as regards future earnings is that of the erstwhile employer of the 
victim. This is not always so, however, because some employers refuse to express an 
opinion as to the victim's future prospects while other employers paint an unduly rosy picture 
in the knowledge that they will never be called upon to 'put their money where their mouth 
is'. It is often useful to double check the opinion of an employer by reference to an 
industrial psychologist. The evidence of industrial psychologists, however, needs to be 
received with some care because their tests indicate potential earnings rather than likely 
earnings. 144 The more thorough industrial psychologists have close regard for the earnings 
of the victim's parents, uncles, aunts and siblings. The 'family culture' as regards 
employment will be indicative of the genetic and cultural background of the victim including 
family and peer-group pressures to succeed or to remain non-competitive. 145 For an 
injured child it will often be adequate to base compensation upon the earnings of the 
father146 or mother147 or a close mentor figure of the same sex. 
In the modem South Africa there will for some years to come be substantial upward social 
mobility for the non-white classes. That justifies an optimistic approach to rising above the 
family background. One needs nonetheless to bear in mind that in Europe there is a surfeit 
of education and a shortage of job opportunities and that in time similar problems can be 
expected in South Africa. Qualified teachers and lawyers may well in time need to take jobs 
as bus drivers and bank clerks merely to earn a living. The greatest continuing demand for 
skills may well be in the trades such as plumbers, motor mechanics, welders, etc. 
141 Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1020G 'In some cases it is proper for the Court to take into 
account not merely the plaintiffs lost capacity (what he could have earned had he not been injured), but rather the 
question of what use he would probably have made of his earning capacity (what he would probably have earned)'. 
See too Wege v Elphick (1947) 49 WALR 83. 
142See footnote 126 at 24. 
143Evidence may be admissible but its probative value may be reduced by its deficiencies (Hoffman & Zeffert 
'Evidence' 4ed 116). 
144See 30 and 152. 
•Hit is easy to cite examples of persons who have achieved mightily despite a humble family background, and vice-
versa. Such achievements indicate, however, only remote possibilities, not likelihoods. The fact that such 
achievements stand out for comment is itself indicative of their unusual nature. 
146Bopane v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A4-43 (W) A4-53 'There seems to me to be every reason to assume 
that Lawrence in all probability would have been able at least to achieve the level of advancement of his father but 
subject of course to the numerous hazards that beset the path both in life and education generally of all young 
persons'. 
147In Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 115 the claim for loss of earnings was based upon the earnings 
of the mother of the injured child. 
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[12.8.2] Retirement age: The normal retirement age for the civil service in South Africa is 
age 65 for both men and women. For the armed services the normal retirement age is 60, 
and for the judiciary age 70. Pension funds generally focus on a 'normal retirement age' and 
then include rules governing the effect on pension benefits of earlier or later retirement. The 
state pension in South Africa is payable to men from age 65 and to women from age 60. 148 
Morbidity rates, absences from work due to illness, have been observed to be higher for 
older men approaching retirement than for women of the same age. 149 The extent to which 
a person will continue working after normal retirement age will be strongly influenced by the 
extent to which there is adequate financial provision for retirement and the pleasantness of 
available work. Hall records in this regard: 150 
'The occupational career may be said to terminate with retirement, now mandatory 
only at age 70 (in the USA) but in fact often voluntary in the mid-sixties. But 
retirement, like entry, is for many a slow transition involving tapering off before or 
after official retirement and, in some instances, continuing to work in a more focused 
or specialized way or on a part-time basis. This is particularly likely to be the case 
when people have special knowledge or skills, as in the case of higher-level 
professions such as those of physicist, psychologist, lawyer, historian, and writer. 
The roles of worker and of pensioner thus also often merge during the retirement 
transition in a postoccupational career'. 
[12.8.3] Loss of capaci.ty to work: The capacity to work is a right of personality. Loss of 
work capacity is a factor to be taken into account when assessing general damages for loss 
of the amenities of life. 151 The present value of lost earnings, on the other hand, is a 
patrimonial loss. A millionaire may have chosen a life-plan of leisure, never to work. If 
he is seriously injured and suffers a loss of work capacity there is no loss of earnings, he 
suffers no patrimonial loss by reason of the impairment of his work capacity .152 This does 
not mean, however, that his general damages will not be increased to allow for the loss of 
this amenity. As a rule, however, compensation for loss of work capacity and compensation 
for loss of earnings tend to be agglomerated without distinction being made. 153 
[12.8.4] Percentage disablements: An employed man may be injured. According to the 
tables used by the workmen's compensation commissioner154 he may, for example, be 30% 
disabled. In practice he may be retained in his job and be 100% employed. Conversely a 
148R4440 per year since August 1993. There are proposals to increase the entitlement age for women to 65. 
149Courant 1977 TASSA 108 112-17. 
150Hall 'Career development in organizations' 98 . 
151
'Work capacity' is not listed as an amenity of life in Administrator-Genera/ SWA v Krie/ 1988 3 SA 275 (A) 288F. 
The amenities listed clearly imply work capacity. 
inBloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 105-6. 
meg 'Die verlies van geskiktheid om inkomste te verdien, hoewel gewoonlik gemeet aan die standaard van verwagte 
inkomste, is 'n verlies van geskiktheid en nie 'n verlies van inkomste nie' Santam Versekeringsmpy v By/eve/dt 1973 
2 SA 146 (A) 150A-C; Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 111 D. Van der Walt 1990 THRHR 140 142 
emphasises that earning capacity is the product of a variety of personality traits ('persoonlikheidsaspekte '). 
1 ~In terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
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man with a 30% disability may lose his job and be 100% unemployed. There is no 
necessary correlation between work capacity and earning capacity. 155 However, in the 
absence of further information a fair approach to the above situations might be to assume 
some degree of correlation and allow the employed victim compensation of one halt156 of 
the degree of disability of, say, 30%, giving 15 % of his earning capacity uninjured as the 
measure of the loss. 157 This recognizes that he is still in employment but that there is a 
50% chance that his employer may give him lower increases in future years or that he may 
lose his job and have to work for 30% less than he is getting. For the victim who has lost 
his employment one might allow for a residual earning capacity of one half of 70% of 
earning capacity uninjured, that is to say 35 % . This allows for a 50% chance that he will 
again find employment at a rate of pay 30% less than he would have earned but for the 
injury. The evidence of medical experts and the employer may permit one to assess chances 
different from 50 % for the alternatives. 
The extent of a partial loss of earning capacity may also be proved by evidence as to the cost 
of hiring an assistant. 158 This cost will usually be tax deductible and should then be 
reduced for the advantage of paying less tax. 
The percentage partial disablement may include allowance for early retirement, although 
express allowance for this consideration may be made in the actuarial calculation. 159 
[12.8.5] Onus of proof: The claimant bears the onus of proof both as to the general fact of 
disablement and as to the extent thereof. 160 In Van Alme/o's case161 the court stated that 
the degree of disablement must be proved by the defendant. In this instance, however, the 
claimant had already led evidence as to his preferred post-injury career path, that is to say 
had already discharged his onus. The defendant then had the right to bring evidence to refute 
claimant's evidence. The reference to onus in the Van Almelo case was thus misplaced. The 
defendant did -not so much have an onus to lead evidence but rather a right to do so. 162 
155
"n Bepaalde liggaamlike gebrek bring egter nie noodwendig 'n vermindering van verdienvermoe mee nie of altyd 
'n vermindering van gelyke omvang nie - dit hang o.a. af van die soort werk waarteen die gebrek beoordeel word' 
Union &: National Insurance v Coetzee 1970 1 SA 295 (A) 300A; Jones v Fletcher 1948 I C&B 234 (SR) 235; Pitt 
v Economic Insurance 1957 3 SA 284 (D) 288B. 
1560ne half, ie 50%, implies that there is no evidence to sway judgment for or against the two alternatives of being 
100% employed or 100% unemployed, or something inbetween. 
157See for instance, Boshojf v Motor Insurers 1969 2 C&B 105 (W) 110 111. 
158President Insurance v Mathews 1992 1 SA 1 (A) . 
159See 153. 
•«iKrugell v Shield Versekeringsmpy 1982 4 SA 95 (f) 98-9. 
161 Van Almelo v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 411 (C). 
162See paragraph 2.11.6. 
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Where suitable evidence is hard to come by the court will not non-suit the claimant. 163 
However, a claimant who fails to lead available evidence may be non-suited. 164 With loss 
of earnings there seems to be a heavier burden of proof on the claimant than is required for 
damnum emergens. 165 
[12.8.6] Partially gratuitous earnings: A mari may be 30% disabled but continue to work 
for the same wage as had he not been injured. It is possible to argue that part of the wage 
he now earns is gratuitous and should thus be ignored for purposes of assessing damages. 166 
Such reasoning should be received with caution. It is extremely difficult to establish a fixed 
relationship between work capacity and earnings. The employer may have been underpaying 
the employee in the first place. The skill with which one negotiates a contract of 
employment is an integral part of earning capacity, but not necessarily work capacity in 
relation to the job to be done. Where there has been a long-standing employer-employee 
relationship the employee's knowledge of the particular circumstances of his employer 
enhance his utility to that employer notwithstanding the reduced value of the employee's 
work capacity in the open market. 
[12.8.7] Mitigation of damages: A man who by reason of his injuries loses his job and his 
family 167 may have little motivation to return to work once he has received lump-sum 
compensation. The victim's likely earnings now injured may be nil notwithstanding modest 
injuries which leave him quite capable of gainful employment, albeit at a lower income than 
had he not been injured. 168 By adopting a cheaper lifestyle the victim is able to come out 
on less money than had he not been injured. Consideration of likely earnings now injured 
would suggest that this victim should be compensated for the full value of his earning 
capacity uninjured. In order to avoid the obvious element of overcompensation the victim 
is deemed to take up the employment of which he is capable and in this notional manner to 
mitigate his damages. 169 On a utility level one would say that by reason of choosing a 
cheaper lifestyle the victim has reduced his capacity to suffer loss, he has elected to forego 
hedonistic expenditure in favour of a more leisurely but frugal lifestyle. His balance sheet 
of life after the injury shows a nil value for the asset 'earning capacity' but a substantially 
reduced value for the liability 'living expenses'. 17° From a pragmatic point of view the 
163See footnote 126 at 24. 
164SA Eagle Insurance v Cil/iers 1987 3 C&B 716 (A) 728. 
16
'See 242. 
166Santam Versekeringsmpy v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A). See 190 above. 
167Usually through divorce but possibly killed in th7 accident. 
161eg a successful dental surgeon may be reduced to employment as a university lecturer. 
169See De Harde v Protea Assurance 1974 2 SA 109 (E); Van Almelo v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 411 (C); Boberg 
'Delict' 479 622; LAWSA vol 7 para 32n2. 
170See table 15 at 234. 
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victim who has been awarded 100% of his loss of earnings has little motivation to thereafter 
seek employment. 171 
If an injured wife gives up her employment to nurse her injured husband her damages will 
be limited to the lesser of her loss of earnings or the cost of employing a nurse. 172 If the 
wife's loss of earnings exceeds the cost of employing a nurse then the excess will not be 
compensated. 173 This may be rationalized either on the grounds that the damages should 
have been mitigated by employing a nurse or, alternatively, by observing that by foregoing 
the wife's additional income the family has elected of its own free will to adopt a cheaper 
standard of living. The quality of nursing services by a wife will usually be superior to that 
of a hired stranger. 
[12.9] ADDITIONAL LIVING EXPENSES 
[12.9.1] Likely expenditure: The previous section has focused on the question of likely 
earnings, the likely application of the victim's work capacity. The problem of the likely 
application of a capacity also arises in connection with future damnum emergens which is 
compensated by way of a lump-sum. 174 The victim has the capacity to incur future expense 
and by reason of the injuries, will in many cases be likely to incur such expense subject, of 
course, to various contingencies such as supervening death or other developments which may 
render the expense unnecessary. 175 An important contingency is that the expense may 
have been incurred in any event, even if the victim had not been injured. 176 Only 
171Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' 3ed 598. For this reason disability-income insurance contracts 
seldom pay more than 75 % of the earnings lost (except for up to 24 months immediately following commencement 
of payments). 
172Bennett v 171e Sun /nsu~ance 1952 1 C&B 391 (E) 394 'She took the place of a nurse whose services would have 
cost at least the amount claimed'. 
173De Harde v Protea Assurance 1974 2 SA 109 (E). 
174
'The claim for future loss of earnings is basically a claim for general damages ... Not so, future medical treatment. 
This is a claim for special damages, which like past treatment, must be exactly quantified on the basis of what will 
probably be required' Klwza v Minister of Law & Order 1983 (W) (unreported 19 .10. 83 case 16967 /82) (emphasis 
supplied). The distinction made here is really one between lucrum cessans and damnum emergens (see 46 above). 
With lump-sum compensation the present values of future expenses and future earnings are both in the nature of 
general damages (see 255 below). Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 36 states that 'die verwagting onvermydelik (die feitlike 
aspek) en regtens geregverdig (die juridiese aspek) moet wees'. This seems to be a rather more strict requirement 
than the criterion of 'likely expenditure'. 
115Dlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 581-3 discusses the criteria for an award for future 
expenditure. The court's analysis fails to take account of the value of the chance that expenditure will be incurred 
and works instead with the all-or-nothing reasoning of balance of probabilities. The likelihood that expenditure will 
be incurred is then said to impact upon reasonableness (at 583). It is clear that the court is here labouring under the 
fallacy that the compensation money if properly invested can actually be utilised to meet the relevant expenditures. 
There is not the faintest suggestion of a perception of present value in the sense of a present utility modified to take 
account of the uncertainties. 
176eg a servant or attendant may be needed in old age: Page v Randalia Assurance 1974 2 C&B 524 (E) 532. 
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reasonable expenses will be allowed, not every item recommended by the experts. 177 There 
seems to be a close correlation between ' reasonable expenses' and 'likely expenses': 
'(The experts') approach is indeed laudable, but regard should be had to the plaintiffs 
own evidence and all the surrounding circumstances. I have the distinct impression 
that it is not the plaintiffs own desire to own and drive a motor-car, he is not a very 
sociable person. He shops and does other business only occasionally. It has not been 
proved to my satisfaction that a motor-car is a necessity or reasonably required or 
that the plaintiff is entitled to a motor car on any other basis . At the best it can 
probably be said that the use of a motor car adapted to his needs would be 
commendable. I do not regard that to be the test'. 178 
Reinecke179 makes the point that one can only have the capacity to incur expenses if one 
has an adequate patrimony. In general the award of compensation will ensure that there is 
a patrimony. When damages have been apportioned due to the contributory negligence of 
the claimant it is conceivable that the patrimony will be inadequate to meet all the 
hypothesized expenses. The same problem arises with the deduction for general 
contingencies and the value of the chance of an expense. 180 Damages awarded under these 
circumstances are very much in the nature of general damages calculated by reference to 
patrimonial considerations. 181 In Ncubu's case182 it was held that the mother of an 
injured child had no right to claim damages because she did not have the means with which 
to incur the substantial expenses. 
[12.9.2] Likely medical costs: It has been said that if adequate medical care is available then 
a victim is obliged to mitigate his damages by obtaining treatment at a state institution and 
thereby transferring the cost to the tax-payer. 183 On the other hand it has been said that 
a claimant is entitled to medical attention from a private practitioner. 184 It is sufficient for 
177Ndlovu v Swaziland Royal Insurance 1989 4 C&B E2-1 (Swazi) E2-6 'Her recommendations concerning the 
services and appliances required by the plaintiff are, I think, to some extent in the nature of counsels of perfection 
and I must remind myself that the Court is bound by the test of reasonableness in determining whether a particular 
type of expenditure is required'; Wessels v AA Onderlinge Assuransiempy 1989 4 C&B A3-19 (f) A3-22 'Ek kon 
egter nie die gevoel afgeskud kry nie dat mev Thompson ietwat oor-entoesiasties in haar algemene benadering tot 
hulpmiddels vir eiser is en dat redelikheid by haar aanbevelings vir verskeie sodanige hulpmiddels nie 'n rol gespeel 
het nie ... Dr du Toit is insgelyks 'n deskundige op sy terrein met jarelange ondervinding maar ook hy het my die 
indruk gelaat dat hy nie altyd suiwer objektief was nie'; Shasha v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A2-8 (W) ' ... the 
experts and, in particular, the architect have lost sight of the fact that what is required is reasonable compensation 
and not indulgence'. 
111Hughes v Santam Insurance 1988 (W) (unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86). See too quotations with footnote 196. 
179Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 36. 
•M>see, for instance, Pallas v Lesotho National Insurance 1987 3 C&B 705 (ECO) 713 . 
'"See 244. 
'~Ncubu v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N). 
113Williams v Oosthuizen 1981 4 SA 182 (C) 1850-E 'He cannot indulge in expensive private treatment at the 
expense of defendant, provided he can get as good treatment in a public institution at the taxpayer's expense'. 
'"'Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 586 'He is reasonably entitled ... to consult medical 
specialists of his own choice'; Maja v SA Eagle Insurance 1987 4 C&B B2-1 (W) held that a claimant is not obliged 
to accept a certificate guaranteeing free treatment at a state hospital. See too Munro v NEG Insurance 1988 4 C&B 
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claimant to lead evidence of the costs according to private medical tariffs. The defendant 
then has the onus of leading evidence as to alternative cheaper sources. 185 But what of the 
victim who is prima facie entitled to consult a private practitioner but who prefers to 
conserve his funds by attending at a state institution? This circumstance would suggest that 
· the services rendered by the state institution are perceived by the claimant as being adequate 
and thus that compensation should be awarded accordingly. It can be argued that a claimant 
cannot demand private care as a right if in the normal course of events he would have used 
state institutions. 186 
A victim who no longer has to spend time at work cannot complain if instead he has to spend 
time waiting for attention at a state hospital, thereby utilising his free time to reduce 
expenditure. It is, of course, quite different for the victim who continues to hold down some 
form of employment. The need for regular hospital attendances may greatly reduce the 
chances that such a victim will remain employed. Such a victim is far more likely to make 
use of private medical care. 
An approach to capitalizing medical expenses, fair to both claimant and defendant, would be 
to mak~ an actuarial calculation on the basis .of the cost of private care and then to make a 
greater or lesser contingency deduction depending on the perceived likelihood that cheaper 
services will be obtained. 187 
[12.9.3] Comparable social standing: The injury to a victim disturbs his life plan. Money 
has greatest utility to persons who aspire to moving up on the social scale. 188 The purpose 
of compensation money is not to render the victim upwardly mobile in the social sense, 
although in practice the lure of social status may well lead to the purchase of, for example, 
a prestigious motor car by a claimant who would otherwise have elected to make do with a 
purely functional vehicle. The victim is entitled to do with his compensation money as he 
pleases, and is not obliged to utilise it in the manner envisaged by the court. 189 The nature 
of a lump sum reduced for contingencies is such that even if the victim did meticulously 
follow the pattern of expenditure drawn up by the court the mere fact of above-average 
longevity would ensure inadequate funds. The determination of an award . for future 
expenditure is essentially a costing exercise done in the knowledge that the reality will be 
F2-1 (D). 
18Wgubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 784. See too Mago/a v SA Eagle Insurance 1987 (f) (unreported 10.4.87 
case 8584/85). With Joss of earnings, by way of contrast, the claimant must prove not only his residual earning 
capacity but also the reasonableness thereof (see 239 above). 
186Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 212 records that the standard of medical care after injury should have regard 
to the type of medical insurance carried by the victim prior to the injury. See discussion in paragraph 12.9.3 of 
social status. 
187ln Mitchell v Mulholland (2) [1971) 2 All ER 1205 (CA) account was taken of the chance that free treatment would 
in time to come be obtained from a state institution. More generally see Lim Poh Owo v C&IAHA [1979) 2 All ER 
910 (HL) 918b-d. 
188Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 298-9. 
189Malgas v Guardian Assurance 1960 1 C&B 158 (A); Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 583. 
See 245. 
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substantially different. The costs for which allowance is made in the calculations have to be 
based on some reasonable model for the victim's life plan as regards expenditure. The 
victim may personally have grandiose plans as to his future lifestyle once compensated. The 
court, however, is only obliged to concern itself with a life plan of similar social standing 
to that which would have prevailed but for the injury: 190 
'The choice offered has to be reasonable and realistic but relative to at least that to 
which the plaintiff was accustomed to and would have chosen, given his other means 
and limited needs'. 191 
Thus the costs of a motor vehicle for a paraplegic have been refused on the grounds that such 
person would in the normal course of events not have purchased a motor vehicle. 192 This 
is consistent with the principle that compensation for loss of earning capacity will have 
regard to the victim's likely earnings, and accordingly normal standard of living. 
[12.9.4] Notional expenditure: The measure of damnum emergens is the cost incurred by the 
victim. Such costs, I have argued, must be reasonable having regard to the victim's injuries, 
life plan and social standing. It is common that prior to the trial the victim has not the 
means to incur necessary expenditure such as an attendant. This circumstance is analogous 
to the victim who has reduced his standard of living in order to come out on the reduced 
income to which he has been confined by his injury. A saving in living expenses will be 
ignored by the court when assessing past loss of earnings. However, a similar saving in 
damnum emergens will, as a rule, not be compensated. 193 The award for general damages 
would justifiably be increased to allow for the additional inconvenience, pain and suffering 
occasioned by not incurring necessary expenditure. 194 There is a general interaction 
between damnum emergens and general damages. 195 Thus, for instance, where an expense 
190See footnote 186. See too Williams v Oostlruizen 1981 4 SA 182 (C) 185C; Slraslra v President Insurance 1990 
4 C&B A2-8 (W). 
191 Hughes v Santam Insurance 1988 (W) (unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86). 
itnDhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 587inf. The personality of the claimant in this matter was 
such that even ifthe value of motoring costs had been awarded.it was unlikely that he would have acquired a vehicle. 
In Ngubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 782-3 the costs of a car were awarded to a low-income man who lived in 
remote parts to enable him to obtain medical attention. In Slrasha v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A2-8 (W) for 
an unlettered woman of lowly background the court refused to allow the costs of, inter alia, a computer and an 
architect designed home ' ... the experts and, in particular, the architect have lost sight of the fact that what is 
required is reasonable compensation and not indulgence•. See too Hughes v Santam lnsurtmce 1988 (W) (unreported 
29.9.88 case 20704/86) 'He has never shown a desire to own or drive a motor-car, and disabled as he is now, I 
consider him a poor candidate and a poor prospect for a driver's licence'. 
193Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 111. However, at 108 Bloembergen states that where a medical doctor has 
treated his own wounds he should be compensated as though he had paid another for the services. The victim has 
suffered the disutility of treating his own wounds and there seems to be no good reason why he should not be so 
compensated, just as compensation should be awarded to the full-time housewife whose household chores have been 
increased by the burden of caring for her injured husband (provided nursing services were necessary). 
194 A good example of such expenditure is the purchase of medication to prevent the muscular spasms common in 
spinal injury cases'. Anti-spasmodic drugs, such as lioresal, are extraordinarily expensive. 
19
'See paragraph 12.15.6. 
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is large and dispensable, such as plastic surgery, compensation may be confined to the lesser 
amount of the general damages. 
'But if the cost of operative treatment and incidental expenses or loss is such that it 
considerably exceeds the sum which would otherwise be awarded I do not think that 
a plaintiff can claim to be awarded the cost of the operation. The disfigurement, or 
disablement, or disability, might be slight while the cost of undergoing an operation 
with an incidental loss of earnings might be very considerable. If the cost of the 
operation and incidental loss were awarded, plaintiff might well abstain from 
undergoing the operation and might in that way recover a much greater sum for loss 
of amenities of life than he would have done if his condition had not been 
curable'. 196 
'There is a "reciprocal relationship between patrimonial and non-patrimonial elements 
in the total award of damages" .197 In determining whether a claimant reasonably 
requires an adaptive aid, this reciprocal relationship should not be lost sight of. 
Especially where the cost of the adaptive aid is disproportionately high in relation to 
the amelioration it would provide' . 198 
[12.9.5] Victim's stated intentions: If a victim indicates a flat refusal to undergo a necessary 
operation, such as a spinal fusion or amputation of an arm or leg, should the court refuse to 
award compensation for the cost of the operation or should the court allow for the possibility 
that the victim may in time change his or her view on the matter? The latter approach seems 
preferable, subject to a deduction for the value of the chance that the victim will persist in 
the present attitude. 199 However, what of the victim who insists on receiving treatment 
from medical experts in the United States of America when adequate treatment is available 
in South Africa? On one hand one might say he is obliged to mitigate his damages and be 
content with damages on the basis of South African treatment. On the other hand one might 
consider that after compensation has been awarded he may be so serious as to his intentions 
that he is prepared to incur the costs using his own money. It seems likely that South 
African a court will, in such circumstances, award compensation on the basis of treatment 
in South Africa. 
196Light v Conroy 1948 1 C&B 444 (T) 445; see too Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 582inf; 
Nanile v Minister of Posts&. Telecommunications 1990 4 C&B A4-30 (E) A4-33; Administrator-General SWA v Krie/ 
1988 3 SA 275 (A) 2890; Visser 1983 lliRHR 43 52-3. 
197 Administrator-General of SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A) 287F. 
198Poo v President Insurance 1992 4 C&B A3-96 (f) A3-107-8. In this matter the parties had agreed that the criterion 
to be used for allowable expenses was that 'the particular item of expenditure is reasonably required to remedy a 
condition or to ameliorate it' (Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 552). 
199ln England s2(4) Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948 provides that when deciding upon the reasonableness 
of expenses the court shall ignore the possibility of free treatment in the national health services. This provision has 
been narrowly interpreted: Harris v Brights Asphalt Contractors [ 1953] 1 All ER 395 (QB) 'I do not understand 
section 2(4) to enact that a plaintiff shall be deemed to be entitled to recover expenses which in fact he will never 
incur'; Lim Poli 0100 v C&IAHA (1979] 2 All ER 910 (HL) 918b-d. 
• 
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In Dusterwald's case200 th~ claimant had by the time of the trial purchased a fairly 
expensive motor car. The award for future travelling costs was based on this type of vehicle. 
Conversely by the time of the trial the claimant had made little effort to take exercise in a 
swimming pool. The claim for the cost of a private pool was disallowed. In Khuduge's 
case201 the experts recommended that allowance be made for 12 visits per year to a general 
practitioner. The evidence indicated that claimant had been making only 4 visits per year. 
The court, having regard to the potential for complications, allowed 6 visits per year. 
Bobape's case202 was concerned with whether or not the child victim should be placed in 
an institution. The parents indicated their wish that the child should remain at home. Both 
parents were away at work all day. The court ordered that the child be institutionalised. 
[12.9.6) Taxation: Medical and prosthetic costs will, in certain circumstances, be allowed 
as a deduction against taxable income. 203 Allowance for the chance of this advantage 
would probably be by way of a deduction for general contingencies, or an increase to the 
discount rate of interest. 
[12.9. 7) Freedom of action: It is said that a victim is entitled to do what he pleases with the 
compensation money. 204 That is to say that once compensation has been awarded a court 
has no power to interfere with the manner in which an adult victim, of sound and sober 
mind, spends or saves his money. 205 This is not to say that when assessing compensation 
the court may disregard what the victim is likely to do with the money having regard to what 
a reasonable person from that social and educational background is likely to do. Only 
reasonable expenses will be allowed, not every item recommended by the experts. 206 The 
concept of damnum emergens has no meaning without a model of expenditure for the future. 
Such a model, if meaningfully constructed, would include allowance for perceptions as to the 
likelihood, or otherwise, of various forms of expenditure. Consideration of the balance of 
probabilities tends to introduce an all-or-nothing approach to compensation. Consideration 
200Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 78-82. 
'20I Khuduge v Sant am Insurance 1991 (W) (unreported 23 .5. 91 case 4637 /90). 
=Bobape v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A4-43 (W). The court considered a contrary ruling in Hughes v 
Santam Insurance 1988 (W) (unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86). 
'203See footnote 118. 
204Malgas v Guardian Assurance 1960 1 C&B 158 (A); Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 583; 
Bobape v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A4-43 (W) A4-54 'How Lawrence would have spent his money when 
he would have earned it is his choice and decision'; Lim Poh 0100 v C&IAHA [1979) 2 All ER 910 (HL) 92lg 'The 
courts in assessing compensation for loss are not concerned either with how the plaintiff would have used the moneys 
lost or how she (or he) will use the compensation received' . Bearing in mind that the court in Lim's case then made 
a deduction for the 'domestic element' of earnings this passage states no more than that the existence of discretionary 
expenditure will be recognized. 
'20ssee Ma/gas v Guardian Assurance 1960 1 C&B 158 (A) where the court refused to make an order for curatorship 
without an application in proper form (rule 57 of the Uniform Rules of Court) . It is otherwise with a minor: see 
Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA .1084 (C) 10880-H. Once a minor has attained majority it seems that the 
requirements of the Rules of Court must be followed if the monies are to remain under the control of a curator. 
206See footnote 177. 
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of the value of the chance of expenditure provides a more flexible and sensitive means for 
dealing with the issues. W7 
If one were to take the view that a claimant should be compensated for future expenses 
recommended by the experts, but without regard for whether the claimant is likely to 
incur such expenditure,208 then the notional expenditure would become the monetary 
measure of the disutility of the injuries. There is nothing particularly undesirable about such 
an approach provided it is born in mind that the award of general damages is the primary 
measure of the disutility of the injuries. Disregard for the likelihood, the chances, that the 
claimant will actually incur the expenditure may then lead to the claimant being twice 
compensated for the disutility of his injuries. This would be an improper duplication of 
damages. 209 
[12.10] INSURANCE COSTS 
[12.10.1] Life insurance: Serious injuries often bring about a reduction in the victim's life 
expectancy, that is to say that the risk of early death is increased.210 If the victim now 
wishes to acquire life insurance cover this will cost more because of the increased risk of 
death. In theory this seems to be a legitimate claim but there are a number of complicating 
factors: 
An important purpose of life insurance is to enable a breadwinner to provide for his 
dependants should his life be cut short. A victim who has been awarded a large sum of 
money by way of compensation has no need for life insurance because his dependants have 
the prospect of inheriting a large sum of money, the damages award, or at least what is left 
of it, in lieu of life insurance cover.211 A victim who has no dependants has no need for 
life insurance in the sense of benefits payable on death. The dependants for their part have 
their own right of action for loss of support in those instances where the early death of the 
breadwinner has been caused by the wrongful act.212 When assessing such damages life 
insurance and pension benefits are disregarded if they are payable as a result of the 
death. 213 
A second important function of life insurance is as a means of saving for retirement. Pure 
savings do not increase in cost because of an increased chance of early death. A victim who 
has a reduced life expectancy has less chance than a normal person of long life after 
retirement age, and thus needs to make less provision for retirement. 
207See chapter 4. 
208For example the claimant may choose to use subsidised state hospital services despite having been compensated 
at the level of the cost of private medical care. 
209See quotations with footnote 196. 
210See 81. 
211See 60. 
212See 227, 347. 
213 Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
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Quite apart from the availability of the (,!.ward to reduce the need for life insurance, any extra 
costs of life cover are substantially-· offset by the reduced costs of funding retirement. 'In 
Wessels' case214 a claim for additional life insurance costs was disallowed on the grounds 
that it was unduly speculative. 
[12.10.2] Disability insurance: The term 'life insurance' generally includes insurance against 
disablement. This benefit is normally provided by employers or life insurance offices along 
with life cover. Where a victim has beei;i totally disabled from ever working again, and fully 
compensated, he clearly has no need for disability insurance. Where the victim is subject 
to partial disablement he will still need insurance cover to protect his residual earning 
capacity. This will often be provided by the employer who will also meet any additional 
costs. Where the victim privately insures himself some doubt may be expressed that this can 
be taken into account by the court, bearing in mind that privately negotiated insurances are 
generally viewed as res inter alios acta. 215 Even if an award is to be made for the 
additional costs of disability cover this would be subject to a substantial deduction for the 
contingency that the victim may not keep up paying his premiums. The more usual manner 
of dealing with this problem would be by way of an increased deduction for general 
contingencies in respect of earnings in the injured condition.216 
[12.10.3] Accident insurance: This type of benefit is provided by both life offices and short-
term insurers. It is a form of disability benefit popular with blue-collar workers subject to 
high accident rates. The benefit usually takes the form of a so-called 'meat list' ,217 that 
is to say so many rands if there is loss of use of an arm, so much for a leg, etc. The 
benefits, unlike many white collar disability benefits, are unrelated to earnings and have more 
the quality of gambling than insurance against loss. 218 Accident benefits issued by life 
offices often include a 'double death benefit', that is to say a double payment if death is 
caused by accident. Many injuries render a victim more accident prone and thus liable to 
additional costs for taking out accident benefits. Although the victim may be required to pay 
more for the benefit, he also has a better prospect than a normal person for being paid out. 
Considering the complexities it seems unlikely that a court would make an explicit award for 
the additional costs in this regard. An adjustment by way of general contingencies or general 
damages might be appropriate, but even this seems unlikely. 
[12.10.4] Shorl-tenn insurance: It is conceivable that the disabled person who drives a car 
may be subject to an increased premium to cover the additional risk of damage to others. 
More likely such a victim, typically an epileptic, will be deprived of a driving licence and 
compelled to hire a driver. Claims for increased insurance costs arise most commonly for 
the costs of insuring expensive equipment such as wheelchairs. This additional insurance 
cost reflects part of the general contingencies, namely that replacement equipment may need 
214Wesse/s v AA Onderlinge Assuransiempy 1989 4 C&B AJ-19 (f) AJ-27-28_ 
215See 186. 
216See table 13 at 219. 
217Slang expression used by persons frequently engaged in the assessment of damages for personal injury. 
218See 188 . 
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to be acquired sooner than anticipated due to theft or accidental damage. These 
considerations are often built into the replacement frequencies estimated by the experts and 
care needs to be taken that there is not a double counting of the risk, that is to say shortening 
of the replacement period and an explicit allowance for insurance costs. Insurance premiums 
include a substantial component for the commissions and administrative costs of the insurer. 
Persons with extensive capital, such as a compensated victim, can achieve substantial cost 
savings by acting as self-insurers, that is to say by meeting the costs of replacing damaged 
or stolen equipment out of capital. For this reason it will usually be inappropriate to allow 
the full actuarial value of taking out comprehensive cover. 
[12.11] MOTOR-CAR EXPENSES 
[12.11.1] Luxury or necessity?: If a person would have owned a car in the normal course 
of events he may after injury be awarded the additional motoring costs necessitated by the 
injury. 
In Dusterwald's case219 such costs included the difference between the purchase of a small 
manual gear-shift Volkswagen and a large automatic gear-shift Toyota Cressida with 
airconditioning. The larger car was substantially more expensive to run. The value of these 
additional costs was included in the compensation. 
In Ngubane v SATS220 the appellate division confirmed the award of the costs of a microbus 
to a claimant who lived in remote parts and needed special transport to obtain medical 
attention'. In the normal course of events the claimant would probably never have owned a 
motor vehicle. No allowance was made for the advantages that family and friends might 
derive from the vehicle or the possibility that it might be put into service as a taxi with a 
hired driver. These considerations suggest a substantial deduction for general contingencies 
quite apart from a downward adjustment to the award for general damages. 
By way of contrast in Dh/amini's case221 the court refused to allow the value of the costs 
of providing the victim with a motor car because 'he lived a simple life' and would not in 
the normal course of events have owned a motor car. The Dhlamini reasoning suggests that 
in Dusterwald's case the cost of the bigger car should have been refused because the victim 
was likely never to have enjoyed the status of such a vehicle had he not been injured. 
Alternatively the fact of the· purchase of the bigger vehicle would suggest an increased 
likelihood that such a vehicle would have been purchased in any event. The questions of 
peer pressure and family background do not seem to have been investigated. 
219Dustenvald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 78-82. The court curtly distinguished Dlamini's case (at 
79) but it is by no means clear why the test of normal lifestyle should not' have influenced the type of car which 
claimant was to be allowed. 
220 1991 1 SA 756 (A). 
221 Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 C'N) 587. See too Hughes v Santam Insurance 1988 (W) 
(unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86). 
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In Ndlovu's case222 the victim would in the normal course of events have owned a motor 
car. The cost of a more expensive vehicle was disallowed. 
In Shasha's case223 the court declined to award extra transport costs on the grounds that 
compensation was to be awarded for modifying claimant's home and that she was expected 
to relocate to a position close to the facilities which she needed. 
The money expended on a motor car is partly necessary and partly discretionary. A modest 
functional vehicle is generally quite adequate for most transport purposes. Anything more 
expensive may reflect considerations of status and/or luxury spending and is prima fade 
hedonistic. On the other hand some may say that to have a car at all is a luxury . Public 
transport and taxis are not generally available to persons who cannot walk. 224 
If a claimant is to be provided with more luxurious transport facilities then the award for 
general damages should be adjusted downwards. 225 
The injuries may justify the purchase of a car earlier than might otherwise have been the 
case.226 
[12.11.2] Unlikely expenditure: Allowance was made in the Dhlamini case for the costs of 
an attendant notwithstanding that the claimant 'could not really grasp anything so remote and, 
to him undreamt of, as a personal attendant' .227 This observation suggests that despite the 
award of compensation an attendant was highly unlikely ever to have been employed. No 
deduction was made for this contingency. A different set of reasoning might have allowed 
the cost of an attendant and a motor car and then made a substantial deduction for the 
substantial probability of non-use. The over-all compensation may then have been 
substantially the same. 
[12.12] MODIFICATIONS TO THE HOME 
[12.12.1] Leased premises: In Dusterwa/d's case228 a substantial sum was awarded for the 
costs of modifying the claimant's future residence to accommodate his disability and the 
installation and running of airconditioning. The costs of a heated swimming pool would also 
mNdlovu v Swaziland Royal Insurance 1989 4 C&B E2-1 (Swazi) E2-9-l0. 
123Shasha v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A2-8 (W). 
124Amongst the lower-income groups where one taxi carries a number of persons the disabled are generally 
unwelcome due to the extra space and trouble required for their transport, particularly if they have a wheelchair. 
A telephone taxi service for disabled persons has been introduced in certain areas. 
12
'Ngubane v SATS 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 786; Ad~nistrator-General SWA v Kriel 1988 3 SA 275 (A). 
126Hutchings v General Accident Insurance 1986 3 C&B 737 (C); Dustenvald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-
45 (C) 79. 
mDhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 578 . 
121Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 86-9; in Ndlovu v Swazi Royal Insurance 1989 4 C&B 
E2-l (Swazi) modifications were restricted to the bathroom only; in Wessels v AA Onderlinge Assuransiempy 1989 
4 C&B A3-19 (T) a number of recommended modifications were disallowed; in Bennie v Guardian National 
Insurance 1989 4 C&B A3-34 (W) the costs of altering the family holiday flat were allowed . 
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have been awarded save that the evidence indicated that claimant had by the time of the trial 
not engaged much in swimming. In Dhlamini's case229 the court refused to award 
compensation for the costs of modifying the claimant's residence. The reason given was that 
claimant would not in the normal course of events have owned a home of his own. This 
reasoning is most unfortunate. The primary benefit of ownership is a right of occupation. 
That same right can be obtained by leasing premises. It is difficult to appreciate why a 
tenant should not be compensated for the costs of adapting the leased premises to his 
disability.230 It would be going too far, however, to suggest that the costs should be 
allowed again and again every time the victim changed address. It is not unreasonable to 
expect a tenant who wishes to make expensive modifications to negotiate a lease which 
ensures a reasonably long-term tenure. 231 Alternatively one. may observe that once 
endowed with lump-sum compensation money the victim is well able, and well advised, to 
purchase a home of his own, even if in the uninjured condition such ownership was unlikely. 
This latter consideration reflects an approach to assessment whereby regard is had for the 
effect of the award on the claimant's life plan.232 
[12.12.2] lnvestment of award in a home: The application of compensation money to the 
purchase of a home may be criticised by those who insist that the victim must entirely 
consume interest and capital over a certain number of years. Such persons will point out that 
at the end of the victim's life the value of the home will not have been consumed. Such a 
view ignores the fact that the victim's actual date of demise is in no way determined by 
actuarial tables and that the prudent victim should save for a ripe old age just like every other 
prudent person.233 For those who would in the normal course of events have applied 
earnings to purchase a home the application of compensation money to that purpose is merely 
fulfilling the normal life plan without the expense of bond repayments. For the victim who 
would not normally have purchased such a home one may point to the present value of that 
part of his earnings which would otherwise have been applied to paying rent. Ownership of 
a home, particularly for the more gregarious members of our society, can provide income 
from letting out rooms or retaining importance and a sense of belonging within the family 
group by providing a home for himself and other family members who would normally have 
rented. 
[12.12.3] Compensating advantages: The claimant who effects expensive modifications to 
a home will usually at the same time enhance the value of his estate. Improvements such as 
large toilet areas and extra-wide passages are unlikely to enhance value, but airconditioning, 
tiling, electric garage doors, intercoms, security fences, flatlets for attendants, etc are of 
general value. For the higher-income victim such features may have been acquired even if 
there had been no injury. The enhanced value of the estate is a gain which is appropriately 
n 9Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 \'N) 587. 
Z»fhis was done in Hughes v Santam Insurance 1988 \'N) (unreported 29.9.88 case 20704/86). 
231 See Kerr 1991 SAU 9-13. 
232See formula B at 60. 
233Persons of low income are unlikely to be able to save and must thus rely on the State pension which from 
September 1993 has been R4440 per year regardless of race. 
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deducted from the overall cost. In Shasha's case234 the court dealt with this problem by 
awarding the cost of renting suitable premises rather than the capital cost of outright 
purchase. In general the present capitalized value of a right of use is less than the cost of 
outright purchase. This relationship can be upset ·by the incidence of running and 
maintenance expenses. Electrical devices, particularly airconditioning, consume substantial 
amounts of electricity apart from maintenance costs and the costs of replacement. It is usual 
that running and maintenance costs are claimed separately from the initial capital outlay for 
providing suitable accommodation. 
[12.13] ATTENDANTS 
[12.13.1] Remuneration: More than one attendant may be needed, one to attend to the 
victim's person and the other to perform domestic chores. The cost of a fulltime attendant 
will be allowed even though the claimant can make do without one from time to time.235 
For live-in attendants free board and lodging is a valuable fringe benefit. It follows that 
where board and lodging is provided the cash benefits for the attendant should be reduced. 
For higher paid attendants it may be appropriate to provide pension and medical aid benefits. 
For lower paid attendants it would usually be adequate to rely on the state pension scheme 
and state hospital services. Where round-the-clock attendance is needed provision must be 
made for substitute attendants during holidays and periods of illness. The rates of pay for 
free-lance nurse-aids will usually include full allowance for board and lodging, pension and 
medical aid, benefits which self-employed persons normally have to provide for themselves. 
[12.13.2] Regi.onal and social diversity: Some reservations must be expressed that a victim 
who was earning R8000 per year would employ an attendant charging Rl8000 per year. It 
is more likely that a cheaper attendant would be employed fulltime with the more advanced 
skills being provided by district nurses and social workers subsidised by government. The 
allowance for expenses should be consistent with the social status and expected normal 
income level and lifestyle of the victim. Employment bureaus will tend to cater for affluent 
urban communities. Cash starved townships and' rural communities, black and white, will 
be able to command domestic services at very much lower rates, particularly if travelling 
time to and from work is minimized.236 
234Shasha v President Insurance 1990 4 C&B A2-8 (W). 
·msigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 555sup-C; Van Rensburg v AA Mutual Insurance 1969 2 C&B 40 (E) 
44-5. In Ndlovu v Swazi Royal Insurance 1989 4 C&B E2-l (Swazi) the claim for the costs of an attendant was 
reduced because the attendant would only be needed on those occasions when claimant travelled away from his home. 
236 A survey of the cost of full time attendants for quadriplegics done by the occupational therapist Mrs M Fourie of 
Cape Town in August 1989 produced 15 replies. These indicated levels of remuneration ranging from R3360 per 
year to R9600 per year (R5000 to Rl5000 per year in 1992). These figures include benefits in kind such as board 
and lodging. It would be useful to have such statistics reported on a yearly basis. 
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The costs of employing an assistant in the work environment is of similar nature to the 
employment of an attendant237 save that the need will usually cease upon normal retirement 
and may be subject to a deduction for taxation238 because the expense is tax deductible. 
[12.13.3] Accommodation and travel: If the victim were to go on holiday there would be 
additional transport and accommodation costs for the attendant. By not going on holiday the 
victim would save these costs. The compensation may thus be limited to the lesser of the 
costs and the general damages appropriate to not being able to go on holiday .239 If the 
victim is to be awarded the costs of modifying his home to provide accommodation for the 
attendant then a deduction should be made for the associated enhancement to the value of the 
home.240 
[12.13.4] General contingencies: Compensation will not be denied because the victim can 
manage from time to time without assistance. 241 The costs of an attendant will be allowed 
even if the wife and children are able to provide the necessary assistance. 242 This is correct 
in terms of utility theory. Even-handed justice then suggests that a contingency deduction 
should be made if the attendant will be doing work that would otherwise have been done by 
a part-time maid or family members. The victim may have required an attendant in later 
years in any event. 243 If the victim will now not marry and be sp~red the costs of 
supporting a wife then the value of this advantage, or the chance thereof, should be offset 
against the cost of an attendant. If the costs of the attendant will rank as a business expense 
then a deduction should be made for the tax advantage. In one instance the court allowed 
for the uncertainty attaching to the needed 'care person' by making no deduction for general 
contingencies from the actuarial value of loss of earnings, but otherwise making no explicit 
award.244 
[12.13.5] Cars and wheelchairs: A driver-attendant may render unnecessary a specially 
modified car or a power attachment for a wheelchair. 245 Considerations of the victim's 
self-respect arising from maximum independence may suggest that he should nonetheless be 
awarded the cost of a special car and a power wheelchair. The general damages should then 
be suitably reduced and consideration should be given to whether the victim will refrain from 
237See, for instance, Blyth v Van den Reever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 226; President Insurance v Mathews 1992 1 SA 
1 (A) . 
238See 232. 
239See footnote 196. 
240See paragraph 12. 12.3. 
241 Sigournay v Gil/banks 1960 2 SA 552 (A) 555B ; Van Rensburg v AA Mutual Insurance 1969 2 C&B 40 (E) 44-5. 
2
'
2Fredericks v Union & SWA Insurance 1972 2 C&B 335 (E). 
241Page v Rondalia Assurance 1974 2 C&B 524 (E) 532. Contra Mostert v Shield Insurance 1978 2 C&B 751 (E) 
752. 
244Nkomo v President Insurance 1992 4 C&B A4-82 (W) A4-86inf. 
245Nd/ovu v Swazi Royal Insurance 1989 4 C&B E2-l (Swazi) . 
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incurring the expense. If the expense will not be incurred then it may be better to increase 
the general damages and abstain from explicitly awarding the costs. 246 
[12.13.6] Curator bonis: Brain damage may render a victim incapable of attending to his 
own financial affairs. For an adult victim the requirements of rule 57 of the Uniform Rules 
of Court must be satisfied. In such circumstances the ongoing costs of a curator bonis form 
part of the damages suffered.247 The fees for a curator bonis are 6% of income collected 
and 2 % of capital released. 248 If the award is assumed to be invested in interest-bearing 
rather than growth assets then the allowance for a curator bonis can be quite substantial, of 
the order of 10% to 20% of the award. In times of high inflation, however, it is reasonable 
to assume substantial investment in growth assets with little or no income accruals. 249 With 
growth assets the fees for a curator can amount to as little as 1 % of the award. In Carstens' 
case250 the award, including general damages, was increased by 5 ,63 % . This judgment 
was handed down in the days when the fee on capital was still 1/2 % . A modern court would 
probably award a higher percentage of the order of 7 % to 7 ,5 % . 
It can be argued that allowance should also be made for the costs of providing' security. 251 
This expense can normally be avoided by appointing a reputable organisation as curator. 252 
In some jurisdictions the master's office insists on the provision of security by all curatores. 
One may seriously question the reasonableness of such a procedure for curatores who have 
substantial assets of their own. The issue affects not only the direct cost of security but also 
the freedom with which the claimant can invest his funds and the resultant investment returns 
thereon. A low prospective investment return implies a substantial increase to the present 
capitalized value of future losses. 253 The combination of low rates of investment return 
coupled with costs for security and administration can increase an award by as much as 50% 
or more. A claim for the costs of security has been rejected. 254 
246See footnote 196. 
247Marine & Trade Insurance v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 985 ; Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 
10290-G; Arnold v Teno (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 609 (SCC) 635-6; Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1992 2 SA 
417 (f). 
248Prior to 1 July 1991 the rate on release of capital was 1.h % . Since that date the rate on release of capital has been 
increased to 2% (s3(b) ofR1602of1July1991 promulgated in terms ofsl03 of the Administration of Estates Act 
66 of 1965). 
249For example investment in a home for the victim would attract no income on which the curator may charge a fee. 
See 139. 
2YJCarstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 10290-G. 
251 A security bond normally insures against dishonesty and negligence but not against bad investment advice. 
252A life policy with a large investment component is acceptable to certain masters without the need for the provision 
of security, provided it is underwritten by an acceptable life office. 
:msee 127. 
254Nkonw v President Insurance 1992 4 C&B A4-82 (W) A4-87 'He is a senior and respected accountant and is 
clearly qualified for the task. The plaintiff has asked that the defendant be ordered to pay the costs relating to the 
furnishing of security by the curator. In the absence of the defendant's consent to such an order I am not prepared 
to grant it as I do not believe it proper and I can find no clear precedent for it ' . 
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The formal appointment of a curator bonis is n_ot something to be lightly undertaken. The 
curator will be subject to the scrutiny of the master's office with all the attendant 
frustrations255 and potential restraints on investment. It is usually preferable that by 
agreement between the parties the money is paid into a trust inter vivas with an increase of 
6% to the overall damages to allow for the present value of the future costs of 
administration. This procedure will also avert the need to provide expensive security. It can 
be argued that a claimant who refuses to agree to a trust and insists on the formal 
appointment of a curator bonis has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the damages. 
(12.14] EXPENSES FOR A CHILD 
[12.14.1] Future costs awarded to parent: When a father has paid for the medical or other 
expenses occasioned by an injury to his child he has his own right of action to recover these 
costs. 256 This is to be distinguished from the claim whereby he assists his child in bringing 
the child's right of action for damages.257 The general practice in South Africa has been 
to award to the father in his own right not only past costs that he has met but also the present 
value of future damnum emergens. In some cases the award to the parent has been for the 
entire life of the child. 258 In other cases the award covers only the period until the child 
would otherwise have become self-supporting. 259 In one matter the court made the award 
directly to the child on the grounds that the parent did not have the means to incur the 
expenditure. 260 In Kloppers' case261 the court expressed concern as to what would 
happen if the father died. In practice, provided there are assets, the child will have a right 
to claim support from the parent's estate. 262 
[12.14.2] Unjustifiable practice: The practice to make an award for future expenses to the 
parent is, strictly speaking, without justification. Once the child has received compensation 
the parent's duty to incur the expenses falls away. 263 - In general a child cannot be called 
upon to apply capital to meet the cost of support. This rule, however, does not apply to 
msuch as quotations in triplicate before money will be released and restrictions on the range of permissible 
investments. 
256Schnellen v Ronda/ia Assurance 1969 1 SA 31 (W) . 
257McKerron 'Delict' 7ed 83sup. 
258Rondalia Assurance v Gonya 1973 2 SA 550 (A) 553E-F 555-6. 
mK/oppers v Rondalia Assurance 1972 2 C&B 289 (W) 295-6. 
2&JNcubu v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N) (quite apart from low earnings the parent's claim had prescribed); 
see too Mashini v Senator Insurance 1979 3 C&B 82 (W) 91. 
261 K/oppers v Rondalia Assurance 1972 2 C&B 289 (W) 295-6. 
262G/azer v Glazer 1963 4 SA 694 (A) 699; Spiro 'Parent & Child' Jed 365-6; Boberg 'Persons & family' 279-89. 
163Mashini v Senator Insurance 1979 3 C&B 82 (W) 91 'It will be in the interests of the child to award the damages 
in respect of such items to the plaintiff in his capacity as father and natural guardian of the child. No injustice will 
be done to the father by such a course, because the expenses concerned will not have to be paid out of the father's 
pocket, but will be payable out of the child's funds - a child who has the means to support himself cannot require 
his parents to do so'. 
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compensation money. 264 In Van Goo/' s case265 it was emphasised that there is no rule 
that only the parent may claim for such expenses. It is to be hoped that in future there will 
be an increasing tendency to claim all future expenses in the child's name alone . 
[12.14.3] Apporti.onment of damages: If the child has been contributorily negligent and the 
award is for this reason reduced a parent will, in theory, need to meet the balance of the cost 
himself. There is some justification in such circumstances for allowing a claim to the parent 
for the future expenses of the child to the extent that these have been apportioned against the 
child. 266 
[12.15] GENERAL DAMAGES 
[12.15.1] Balancing item: Medical treatment, assisting devices and attendants serve to relieve 
the effects of a disability, to restore to some degree the lost bodily functions. Perfect 
restoration is not possible and it is thus appropriate to make an award for such pain and 
suffering and loss of the amenities of life which cannot be made good by the award for 
necessary expenditure. The award of general damages is, in this sense, a balancing item 
which serves to top up the victim's present utility to its pre-injury level.267 The notion of 
'topping up' calls to mind a bucket the contents of which have been diminished by the 
wrongful act. 268 The contents are not legal rights and duties, nor assets, nor money, but 
a bucket of utility. This topping up is done on an objective basis269 having regard to 
previous awards270 and sometimes to the overall state of the country's economy. 271 
Nonetheless it follows from the notion of topping up that the more comprehensive the range 
of devices and services for which explicit allowance has been made, the smaller should be 
the award for general damages. 272 
264Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 612-13; Mashini v Senator Insurance 1979 3 C&B 82 
(W) 91. In Kloppers v Ronda/ia Assurance 1972 2 C&B 289 (W) 296 the court indicated that R5000 of the child's 
general damages should be applied to relieving the burden of blindness during the years of dependency. See too 
Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 412 (W) 428-9 . 
265Van Goo/ v Guardian National Insurance 1992 1 SA 191 (W); 1992 THRHR 480. 
266In South British Insurance v Smit 1962 3 SA 826 (A) 838B the child's damages had been reduced for contributory 
negligence. The damages awarded to the father included allowance for future expenditure and were not reduced for 
contributory negligence. 
2157Visser 1983 THRHR 43 49 'Die kern van skadevergoeding is tog die invloed wat 'n geldbedrag op die skade het 
sodat die skade beperk of uitgewis word. Alhoewel dit nie dikwels so gestel word nie, is dit 'n logiese oogmerk 
van kompensasie dat die geld wat die eiser ontvang hom teoreties in staat moet stet om die aangetaste belang weer 
in sy oorspronklike potensiaal te herstel of te vervang'. 
268Bloembergen 'Scl1adevergoeding' 115 uses the analogy of topping up a bucket of water. Van der Walt 
'Sommeskadeleer' 145n61 'sy plastiese beeld'. 
269j3oberg 'Delict' 552; Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 8-9. 
270Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 7; Boberg 'Delict' 572-3 ; SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
271 Visser 1986 De Jure 291216-17; Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 6; Shephard v Zimnat Insurance 1984 3 C&B 532 (Z) 
535. 
272See footnote 196. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
256 DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
[12.15.2] Core element: General damages comprise a core element related to the nature of 
the injuries in general and a more subjective discretionary portion which serves to increase 
the victim's hedonistic spending capacity. One would expect that the discretionary element 
will not be awarded to persons who have not the capacity to take advantage of increased 
discretionary expenditure. 273 Where explicit allowance has been made for an extremely 
wide range of compensatory devices and services it is conceivable that the general damages 
will contain little or no hedonistic element, that is to say will be at much the same level as 
for an unconscious274 or dead275 victim. 
[12.15.3] Functional approach: If general damages were concerned solely with what the 
victim can do with the money, the so-called 'functional approach', then the award for general 
damages would be wholly displaced by a comprehensive award for the future costs of devices 
and services. We know that general damages are awarded to the unconscious276 and to the 
estate of the dead. 277 It follows that the level of general damages is not determined solely 
by functional considerations. 278 However, the court should at least have in mind a purpose 
when making the award. 279 In Du Bois's case280 the damages payable to the estate of a 
paraplegic claimant who died 5112 years after the accident had regard to the period that she 
had lived and borne her discomfort but not to her expectation of life. The award was 
conservatively assessed bearing in mind that only her heirs would actually benefit from the 
award. 
[12.15.4] Freedom from the need to work: A man who has chosen not to work or who 
works for no salary cannot expect to be compensated for a loss of earnings. His general 
mLockJ1at 's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 305-6; Roberts v Northern Assurance 
1964 4 SA 531 (D) 537G-H; Dyssel v Shield Insurance 1982 3 SA 1084 (C) 1086A-G. Contra Gerke v Parity 
Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 CVV) 495B 'If a man remains unconscious for ten years after the injury his claim for total 
Joss of earnings cannot be disputed . The fact that he is unaware of his loss is irrelevant and , by the same standard, 
unawareness of the loss of amenities should not be a bar to compensation' (the victim in the Gerke case was a 
married man who owed a duty of support to his family). In Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 412 
CVV) 428-9 the court considered what use could be made of general damages to alleviate the unconscious victim's 
condition. 
214Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 CVV); Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 412 CVV). 
mPotgieter v Rondalia Assurance 1970 1 SA 705 (N); Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 (f) . 
Tl6Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 CVV) ; Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 412 CVV). 
Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 28n26 is critical of the ruling in Gerke's case. 
mPotgieter v Rondalia Assurance 1970 1 SA 705 (N); Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 (T). 
msouthern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 117-20 rejected the contention that a functional approach should 
be applied to the determination of general damages 'This does not mean, of course , that the function to be served 
by an award of damages should be excluded from consideration. That is something which may be taken into account 
together with all the other circumstances' . 
Tl9Visser 1986 De Jure 207 212 'Vera! van belang is die doel waarmee 'n bepaalde bedrag toegeken word, 
byvoorbeeld die feit dat die bedrag as teen wig vir die ongelukkigheid wat die eiser ervaar het, moet di en, of dat dit ... 
as psigiese bevrediging (genoegdoening) moet dien vir die onreg wat horn aangedoen is'; Visser 1988 THRHR 468 
490inf ' Uit die praktyk in verband met die aksie weens pyn en lyding is dit baie duidelik dat dit geen primere 
genoegdoeningsfunksie het of behoort te he nie'; see too Visser 1983 THRHR 43 46 59-60. See too Reyneke v 
Mutual & Federaflnsurance 1991 3 SA 412 CVV) 428-9. 
2llODu Bois v Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1992 4 SA 368 (T). 
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damages may include a substantial amount for loss of work capacity, but that is not 
compensation for patrimonial loss. Typical of the non-worker would be the millionaire who 
has no need to work. Typical of the non-salaried worker would be a housewife who provides 
her services free of charge as a social-welfare worker. Many people in receipt of a lump 
sum provided by insurance or damages would be tempted to become non-workers or workers 
without financial gain. Wealth281 relieves the possessor from the drudgery of earning a 
living. 
The South African courts are remarkably silent about the non-patrimonial advantages of a· 
lump-sum award. The financial advantage is introduced by way of the discounts for interest 
and for risk. But what of the elimination of the need to work? A large award is the ultimate 
insurance against the hazards and stresses of earning a living. 282 The tragic condition of 
the victim cannot be overlooked. It is the price he pays for the lump-sum. But sudden 
wealth and all its attendant opportunities in terms of lifestyle cannot be ignored if the award 
is to be fair to both plaintiff and defendant. The matter has received judicial consideration 
in Australia in the following terms:283 
'The psychic gain, if any, from being relieved of the anxiety of obtaining and 
retaining employment is more than offset by the plaintiffs frustration at being unable 
to support himself by his own exertions and the loss of enjoyment of being a useful 
member of society'. 
Hall records that: 284 
'In a society that values work and that uses occupation as a source of identity as well 
as of support, not having a job is a stigma that symbolizes a loss of role, purpose and 
meaning. . . . Even when unemployment insurance or old-age pensions provide 
material security, as in some countries, this meeting of material needs has been found 
to be insufficient for self-esteem and public recognition' 
Luntz,285 however, remains of the view that some allowance should be made for the 
advantages of no longer having to work for a living. The following passage, unrelated to 
the assessment of damages, puts the case for the disutility of work: 
'Work, in more ways than one, is central to our existence. Very few people work 
for work's sake. It is only the fortunate few who find that the job is its own reward, 
2111ncluding compensation for a total loss of earnings (Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' 3ed 190). 
282The utility of a lump sum will vary widely for different claimants, depending on the previous wealth of the victim 
and his desire to change social status. See Friedman & Savage 1948 JPE 279 299. 
283Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 53-4. 
2114Hall 'Career development in organisations' 107 113. 
285See previous footnote. 
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and few who derive real satisfaction and pleasure from what they do. For many 
people, work is dull, repetitive, exhausting or downright unpleasant'. 286 
The crucial issue is the extent to which the award of a large sum of money will enable the 
victim to establish a new identity, a new and meaningful role in society. A relevant question 
in this regard is the extent to which uninjured persons continue to work after winning a large 
lottery prize, or inheriting a vast estate. 
The adjustments made for general contingencies tend to be deductions. 287 The psychic 
advantages of a lump sum are arguably one of the factors giving rise to this 
phenomenon. 288 
[12.15.5] Retributive awards: The award of general damages to the unconscious and the dead 
is difficult to distinguish from punitive damages. 289 The main beneficiaries will be the 
victim's family and heirs,290 what in the old germanic law were known as the sib.291 In 
older times the sib had the right to take revenge for the injury or the death. 292 The 
wrongdoer could 'buy off the spear or bear it'. 293 The award for damages, general and 
patrimonial, served to buy off the spear. In modem times the sib no longer has this right, 
the criminal law now fulfils this function. 294 The award of general damages to the 
unconscious or deceased victim is thus today something of an anachronism, a legal dinosaur 
that has survived despite the demise of its original purpose.295 To describe it as punitive 
is generally incorrect because it will only effect punishment if the wrongdoer is not insured 
and is personally liable for the damages. If the award achieves anything at all it enriches the 
victim's sib and makes good their sense of a need for revenge. In this sense the award is 
2861.evy 'Rights at work' 1. Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 'Unless he happens to be one of the fortunate few who 
can support their families adequately out of capital he has to submit to the painful necessity of having to work for 
a Jiving'. 
287See 157. 
288Boberg 'Delict' 599 quotes Fleming's observation as to the 'unspecified extra satisfaction' that derives from 
receiving a large sum of money. 
289J3oberg 'Delict' 570 echoes the punitive tone when he writes 'This solution ... enables the Jaw to express society's 
sympathy with the victim and its sense of outrage at his grievous Joss'. The 'solution', however, does nothing to 
relieve the victim's condition'. 
290Gerke v Parity Insurance 1966 3 SA 484 (Jt/) 495H 'The artificial nature of such a claim, which bestows a benefit_ 
upon an heir for something which could never have belonged to him even by inheritance, and that is the enjoyment 
of his personal life by another'. The court is here clearly uneasy about the award to be made. The unsoundness 
of the English line of reasoning was subsequently demonstrated when the House of Lords requested legislation to 
remedy an impasse of their own making (Gammell v Wilson [ 1981] 1 All ER 557 (HL) 574). 
291The sib comprised the victim's close family as well as more distant blood relatives. Up to seven divisions were 
recognized (Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 17-18). 
292The sib also had the right to receive compensation. This right was matched with an obligation to meet the cost 
of compensation for the wrong of a fellow sibling (Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 16-17). 
293Hahlo & Kahn 'SA Legal System' 352-3; Davel 'Broodwinner' 46-55. 
2!UDavel 'Skadevergoeding' 19. 
295Visser 1986 De Jure 207 208 'Toekennings vir pyn en leed is aanvanklik as geldboetes ingeklee'. 
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neither compensation nor punishment but retribution. It is difficult to reconcile such awards, 
based on a technical point of law, with the non-award of general damages to the family of 
a victim who is killed instantly. 296 
[12.15. 6] Financially relevant awards: The victim is always free to refrain from incurring 
an expenditure for which the court has made allowance in its calculations. If the 
compensation related to that expenditure has exceeded the general damages which would 
otherwise be awarded then by avoiding the expenditure the victim will succeed in increasing 
his compensation above that which would have been awarded had there been an award for 
general damages alone.297 The lower amount by way of general damages is appropriately 
viewed as the value of the chance that the expense will be incurred. Where expenses are so 
necessary that the victim is unlikely to forego the benefit thereof then this problem does not 
arise and it remains appropriate to award to the victim the value of the expected expenditure 
even if this does exceed the general damages otherwise payable. 298 An example of the 
former is when a man chooses to live with his scarring and keeps the money allowed for the 
cost of a plastic surgeon. 299 Likewise, a victim may take advantage of low-cost state 
medical services and keep the money allowed for private medical care. Should the damages 
be limited to the relevant general damages?300 Reasoning along these lines will not produce 
workable results if the awards for general damages are too low. 301 This consideration 
suggests that awards for general damages cannot be determined without some regard for 
general price levels and available skills and technology. This double-check on the level of 
awards would be additional to that of comparing awards in comparable earlier cases, if such 
can be found. However imprecise such bench-marks might be they are not wholly 
indeterminate. Awards of general damages 'are not made in a vacuum' .302 
296See 273. Modern concepts of justice would seem to favour the introduction of a statutory dependants' solatium 
(see footnote 5 at 274). There is much to be said for replacing the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 with a 
Dependants' Solatium Act (see footnote 5 at 345). 
297Light v Conroy 1948 l C&B 444 (T) 445 (quoted in footnote 196). With loss of earnings compensation for the 
'lost years' is likewise limited to general damages (Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 
3 SA 295 (A); Venter v Federated Employers Assuransiempy 1978 2 C&B 756 (T) 759p2). 
298Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 158 'Die BGB skryf naamlik geld as skadevergoeding voor waar daadwerklike 
herstel buitensporig duur sal wees'. 
299Dhlamini v Government of RSA 1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 582. 
:lOODespite an earlier reference to Light v Conroy 1948 l C&B 444 (T) the court in Dhlamini v Government of RSA 
1985 3 C&B 554 (W) 586 went on to rule that the victim could have compensation for medical expenses on the basis 
of private treatment. See footnote 196. 
301 Newdigate & Honey 'The MY A Handbook' 150 suggest a method for predicting general damages awards from 
past awards. Their basis is a flat, ie non-compound rate, of 5 % per year up to 1972 and 10 % per year thereafter. 
The average flat rate of inflation between 1947 and 1972 was 6 % per year (3,8 % per year compound); between 1973 
and 1989 the average flat rate has been 42 % per year (13,6 % per year compound). If the suggested basis is correct 
then awards for general damages are declining rapidly in terms of real buying power. 
~oberg 'Delict' 573. SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). Contra Mutual & Federal Insurance v 
Swanepoel 1988 2 SA 1 (A) 11-12. 
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In certain circumstances the award for general damages will include allowance not only for 
discretionary expenditure but also the value of lost earning capacity. 303 Earning capacity 
will only be compensated to the extent that the victim has the prospect, now injured, of 
incurring living expenses, either necessary or hedonistic. 304 
[12.15. 7] Objectively observed subjectivity: It has been said that 'subjective considerations' 
influence the award for general damages.305 Awards are not made in a vacuum. 306 The 
judge does not act in an entirely arbitrary manner when making an award for general 
damages. There is nonetheless an element of judicial subjectivity, in the sense of the 
exercise of judgment, but that feature is not peculiar to awards for general damages alone. 
The 'subjective considerations' which are peculiar to the award of general damages are the 
mental and physical responses of the victim to his injuries. These are, however, substantially 
objectivized in the sense that the subjective element is only taken into account in so far as 
it is observed by the court and allowed recognition by our fellow men. The fact that a victim 
personally considers his award inadequate is not relevant.307 The award will be determined 
without regard for the utility of money to the victim,308 a consideration that substantially 
depersonalises the award and lends to it an objective quality. The award will have regard 
to the intensity of deprivation or suffering and the duration thereof.309 
[12.15.8] Enrichment of the life plan: The hedonistic element of general damages is directed 
at providing the victim with unallocated discretionary expenditure by which to offset his 
condition. This does not mean to say that the expenditure is to be applied explicitly to 
relieving the disability. 310 It is also to be utilised for enriching the victim's life plan in 
some way chosen by the victim. Such enrichment may take the form of overseas travel, a 
new car, savings, or any other pleasurable application of spending power in the fulfilment 
of a life plan. Buying power is fundamental to the adequacy of the award. It follows that 
303Southern Insurance v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 112-13. See too footnotes 178 and 179 at 63. 
~Roberts v Northern Assurance 1964 4 SA 531 (D) 537G-H; Lock/rat's Estate v North British & Mercantile 
Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 305-6. 
30sVisser 1981 De Rebus 438 438-9; Visser 1983 THRHR 43 58-9. 
306See footnote 302. 
307Visser 1983 THRHR 43 56. 
301Radebe v Hough 1949 1 SA 380 (A). Corbett & Buchanan Jed 8n64 note that the courts have not been astute -to 
abide by this directive. More generally see Visser 1986 De Jure 207 211-12. 
309Visser 1986 De Jure 207 210. Bentham's first 2 measures of utility are intensity and duration to which he adds 
certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent (Page 'Utility Theory' 33; see 31 above). The English courts 
determine loss of earning capacity or support by reference to annual loss, the multiplicand (intensity), and duration, 
the multiplier which includes allowance for contingencies (see Koch 'Damages' 48 49). 
310As was suggested by the court in Kloppers v Rondalia Assurance 1972 2 C&B 289 (y{) 295-6 (R5000 to be applied 
during childhood to ameliorate the effects of blindness); see too Reyneke v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1991 3 SA 
412 (y{) 428-9. For further examples see Visser 1983 THRHR 43 56. 
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the hedonistic element of general damages should have regard to the general cost of goods 
and services in the community at large.311 
[12.15.9] Eclectic assessment criteria: The assessment of general damages is eclectic as 
regards its theoretical basis. The award will usually comprise a core element of a 
non-patrimonial retributive character supplemented by a flexible hedonistic component of 
patrimonial character. 312 This patrimonial character is to be distinguished from patrimonial 
loss in its more usual sense in that it is awarded with little or no regard for any explicit 
income or expenditure. The dividing line between patrimonial and non-patrimonial is 
ill-defined save that the non-patrimonial core element may be clearly distinguished. Visser 
defines non-patrimonial loss as an interference with personal rights that do not affect his 
economic position. 313 This seems incorrect because the loss of a leg or damage to a head 
will usually affect both earnings (patrimonial) and quality of life (non-patrimonial). A 
satisfactory definition of non-patrimonial loss is difficult to devise because of the general 
overlap and interaction between patrimonial and non-patrimonial. 
[12.16] FLUCTUATING EARNINGS 
The earnings of self-employed persons and those earning comm1ss1on or overtime may 
fluctuate quite widely. In order to project subsequent notional earnings it is necessary to take 
out an average of earnings prior to the injury. This would ideally be done over a period of 
3 or more years. Under conditions of high inflation an adjustment must be made to the 
average to allow for the fact that the buying power of a rand earned Say 3 years ago is not 
the same as that of the rand earned today. The procedure is illustrated by the following 
example: 314 ... , 
If averaging were done without allowance for inflation then the level of earnings used for 
input to the actuarial calculation would be too low, R84250 per year compared to the 
properly adjusted figure of R102425 per year. 
[12.17] BUSINESS CAPITAL 
[12.17.l] Earning capacity of capital: The self-employed businessman commonly uses 
business capital in conjunction with his work capacity in order to generate earnings. When 
such a person is seriously injured he may immediately sell off the business assets and invest 
. the proceeds. Capital properly invested will generate income independently of the work 
capacity of the owner. The loss of earnings is the difference between earnings but for the 
injury and the investment income. If the business is making losses the duty to mitigate may 
require that he sell or close down the business. Business profits, we may observe, derive 
only partly from work capacity, the balance being attributable to the ongoing 'earning 
311 Awards 'are not made in a vacuum' (see 259). See too Beverley v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1988 2 SA 267 
(D) 271; SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). The ruling in Everson v Allianz Insurance 1989 2 SA 
173 (C) was, from a utility point of view, the same principle as in the Beverley case. 
312See paragraph 12.15.2. 
313Visser 1983 THRHR 43 52-3; 1986 De Jure 207 209n7 'wat nie sy ekonomiese posisie raak nie'. 
314Levin 'Statistics' 2ed 612-43 (note example at 633 and elimination from calculation of the highest and lowest 
values to minimize the effect of aberrant events) . See too Koch 'Damages' 146; Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 
1972 3 SA 640 (A) 645-6; Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 101 lC-D. 
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TABLE 17 - FLUCTUATING EARNINGS 
Year Nominal Inflation Real Income 
Ending Income Factor 1990 
February R PY rand values 
1987 75000 1,509 113175 
1988 66000 1,300 85800 
1989 95000 1, 155 109725 
1990 101000 1,000 101000 
Average 84250 102425 
capacity' of the business capital. 315 The earning capacity of the man is, in this sense, a 
major capital asset in the business which will be damaged if the man is seriously injured. 
[12.17.2] Declining real values (table 18): Consider a business where nothing is ploughed 
back towards maintaining business capital reserves. Although nominal asset values may be 
maintained analysis of the financial statements will reveal an ongoing decline in the real value 
of business assets. Such a business will in due course consume all capital. The contribution 
of business capital to profits can be analyzed in the manner shown in table 18. 
Column A reflects actual asset values at the end of each financial year. Column B shows 
accounting profits taken from the financial statements. Columns C and F show earnings and 
capital adjusted to common rand values as at August 1989. Different inflation factors have 
been applied to profits as to assets since the assets reflect rand values at the end of each 
financial year whereas profits are assumed to have been earned continuously through the year 
and are on average relevant to a time half-way through the financial year. 316 Column D 
shows the reduction in value of capital in real terms in each year. Column E shows the 
notional investment return at 2,5 % per year on average capital utilised during the year.317 
The last column G shows that part of profits which is attributable to the work capacity of the 
proprietor of the business. It is noticeable that the average earnings from this column 
(R73159 per year) is substantially lower than for the averages from columns B (R84250 per 
year) and F (Rl02425 per year). 
[12.17.3] Real values maintained (table 19): An alternative business scenario would be one 
where the value of business assets increases in line with inflation. The contribution by 
mPassing reference to the distinction between capital and labour is to be found in Van Staden v President 
Versekeringsmpy 1990 4 C&B L2-l (W) L2-13. 
316The assumption is not generally appropriate to farming income from crops which is concentrated just after the 
harvest. 
317ie on the average of capital at the beginning and end of each year. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
PERSONAL INJURY 263 
TABLE 18 - BUSINESS CA PIT AL DECLINES AT 4% PER YEAR 
Nominal Rands 1990 Rands 1990 Rands 
Yr End Capital Income Capital Reduction 2,5%py Income F-D-E 
Feb A B c D E F G 
1986 124800 - 202925 - - - -
1987 120000 75000 167760 35165 4634 113175 73376 
1988 115384 66000 141577 26183 3867 85800 55750 
1989 110946 95000 119933 21644 3269 109725 84812 
1990 106679 101000 100385 19548 2754 101000 78698 
Average 84250 102425 73159 
TABLE 19 - BUSINESS CA PIT AL MAINTAINED IN REAL TERMS 
Nominal Rands 1990 Rands 1990 Rands 
YrEnd Capital Income Capital Reduction 2,5%py Income F-D-E 
Feb A B c D E F G 
1986 103173 - 167760 - - - -
1987 120000 75000 167760 - 4194 113175 108981 
1988 136724 66000 167760 - 4194 85800 81606 
1989 155190 95000 167760 - 4194 109725 105531 
1990 178278 101000 167760 - 4194 101000 96806 
Average 84250 102425 98231 
TABLE 20 - BUSINESS CAPITAL INCREASING IN REAL TERMS 
Nominal Rands 1990 Rands 1990 Rands 
YrEnd Capital Income Capital Increase 2,5%py Income F+D-E 
Feb A B c D E F G 
1986 97333 - 158263 - - - -
1987 120000 75000 167760 9497 4194 113175 118478 
1988 144927 66000 177825 10065 4446 85800 91419 
1989 174371 95000 188495 10670 4712 109725 115683 
1990 212332 101000 199804 11309 4995 101000 107314 
Average 84250 102425 108224 
capital to business profits is the real rate of return, eg 2,5 % per year, on business assets used 
during the financial year. In order to maintain the real value of capital assets it will usually 
be necessary to plough back part of business profits. Because the underlying asset values 
increase in lin~ with inflation the same will happen to the earning capacity of such assets 
measured by a real rate of return of say 2,5 % per year. Table 19 illustrates such a scenario. 
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The features to be noted in table 19 are nil values under column D for reductions in capital 
values, and under column Ea constant real contribution of R4194 per year by capital towards 
business profits. This analysis indicates that a proper basis for assessing loss of earnings is 
R98231 per year. 
[12.17.4] Increasing real capital (table 20): In many businesses the value of capital will 
increase at rates above the rate of inflation. This may arise due to a judicious choice of 
assets, for example business-owned office premises or a farm, or by reason of a high rate 
of plough-back of profits and re-investment of capital. Increases in capital values above the 
normal earning capacity of the capital are properly attributed to the skill, the earning capacity 
of the man in the choice and care of the assets. The earning capacity of the assets, measured 
at 2,5 % per year, say, will increase faster than the rate of inflation. Table 20 illustrates this 
point. 
The capital values in table 20 increase in real terms by the amounts indicated under column 
D. The scenario illustrates a business in which a substantial proportion of profits is being 
ploughed back, ie saved. 318 Under column E the notional real rate of return on capital 
grows faster than the rate of inflation, that is to say increases in real terms. The proper basis 
for assessing a loss of earnings in this instance is R 108224 per year. 
[12.17.5] Wealth reduces need to work: Once the profits of a man's work capacity have been 
capitalized by plough-back they then become part of the business capital available to cushion 
his loss of income should he be severely injured. For many persons who consistently 
increase their capital, that is generate savings, there will come a time when the accumulated 
assets are sufficient to remove the need to work. If work has a negative utility and will thus 
be avoided if circumstances permit then this reduced need may be manifested by reduced 
work effort or total retirement. Conversely one finds persons for whom the accumulation 
of money, and the associated power, is an end in itself. Such persons will probably not 
reduce work effort when wealth increases. 
[12.17.6] The entrepreneur. The investment expert or entrepreneur may generate very little 
earnings by way of income in the general sense. The application of his work capacity will 
instead generate substantial capital gains, generally tax-free. The earning capacity of such 
persons should be measured by the extent to which the increase in asset values in a year 
exceeds the basic potential investment return of say 16% per year.319 Earnings of this 
nature are probably subject to a very much higher risk of fluctuation, including loss 
situations, and should be subject to a suitably increased deduction for general contingencies. 
If the accumulation of capital is unusually rapid a further increase in the deduction may be 
appropriate to allow for reduction in future work effort and/or total retirement many years 
before age 65. The claimant's background may indicate, however, a likelihood of continuing 
accumulation of wealth throughout life to well beyond age 65. 
318 A rate of plough back of 6 % per year over and above the rate of inflation. 
319See paragraph 8 .1. 9. 
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[12.17.7] Investment capacity of victim: A victim who has received compensation may have 
the skill to generate investment returns well in excess of the average returns generally 
available. 320 The rates of investment return generally available should be understood to be 
net of the costs of managing the investment and obtaining investment advice. The excess 
returns are a form of residual earning capacity which serves to reduce the overall loss 
suffered. 321 Conversely a victim's condition may be such that he cannot manage even the 
simplest finances. In such cases he will be compensated for the costs of a curator bonis.322 
[12.18] SERVICES OF WIFE IN A FAMILY BUSINESS 
[12.18.1] Cost of substitute services: In many family businesses the husband is assisted by 
his wife who receives little or no wage for her services. If she ceases to assist in the 
business it is then necessary to employ someone and pay a salary at the full commercial rate 
for the services. The income attributable to the husband's work capacity is the total income 
from the business less the value of the wife's contribution and, if appropriate, less a further 
adjustment for the use of assets. 
[12.18.2] Who claims for what?: The traditional view is that if the wife is injured and 
prevented by her injuries from working in the family business then the husband is entitled 
to claim for the cost of replacing her services323 notwithstanding that it is the wife who has 
suffered the loss of work capacity. 324 If the husband has replaced the wife's services by 
himself working harder and longer hours it is unlikely that he will receive compensation. 
This unsatisfactory result flows from the judicial tendency to focus on actual cash outlay or 
shortfalls. Considerations of utility suggest, however, that the husband has suffered a loss 
of utility by reason of his efforts and should be compensated for the value of this loss. 325 
A husband who has not suffered physical or psychological injury cannot claim general 
damages for iriconvenience.326 If the wife's injuries will in future prevent her from 
assisting in the business then it can be argued that she is to be compensated in her own right 
for the cost of providing substitute services. On the other hand it is the husband who must 
meet the cost of substitute services. Provided he has a right to demand that his wife provides 
substitute services there can be no major objection to compensating the wife for the future 
loss. 327 After all it is she who has suffered the injury. In years to come she may in any 
3200pportunities may be better in capital starved communities such as the black townships where excellent returns 
seem to be possible from owning a taxi or home-based grocery store ('spasa' shop). 
3211n practice it may be extremely difficult to prove the existence of an above-average ability to generate earnings 
from the use of capital. This is particularly true of a salaried person who has not previously had the benefit of 
substantial capital and therefore has no track record. 
3ncarstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 10290-G. 
323or the profits lost through not having her services available. 
324Plotkin v Western Assurance 1955 2 SA 385 (W). 
325Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 107-8 writes of the surgeon who has treated his own wounds. 
326Bester v Commerdal Union Versekeringsmpy 1973 I SA 769 (A). 
mErdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 409E. 
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event have ceased to render her services rn the family business and gone out to take 
employment for a cash income. 328 
[12.18.3] Adjustment for income tax: The cost of providing substitute services will be tax 
deductible. The compensation should thus be reduced for the saving by way of tax liability. 
This is a benefit which is primafacie enjoyed by the husband but not the wife. However, 
if we look at the problem from the collective viewpoint of the family unit the benefit of the 
income net after tax from the family business is enjoyed by all. If the wife were to be 
compensated for the gross cost of hiring a substitute without a deduction for taxation the 
family as a whole would be better off. By reason of the tax advantage the husband will be 
able to provide a higher level of support to his wife. In this sense the wife does indirectly 
benefit from the tax advantage. If the wife were to go out to work outside the family 
business her income would be subject to taxation. It seems correct that an adjustment is 
made for taxation. The rate of tax to be applied will depend on the manner in which the 
wife was expected to utilise her work capacity. 
[12.18.4] Injury to the husband: If the husband is injured, but not his wife, then his loss of 
earnings is the full income from the business suitably abated for the value of the wife's 
services and the contribution from business capital, if any. Such an approach presumes that 
the family business is immediately closed down or sold as a result of his injury and that the 
wife immediately takes alternative employment elsewhere. 
There are instances where the wife has successfully taken over the running of the family 
business. 329 The support she provides to her husband and children from such income 
would be rendered in terms of her duty to do so. The support she provides is not gratuitous 
and should thus be deducted from the husband's loss of earnings. The wife has a claim in 
her own right for the increased cost to herself of supporting the family during her husband's 
disability. 330 In practice a court will probably ignore such fine points of law and treat the 
wife's increased contribution as res inter alios acta. 331 
But what if the wife cannot find employment elsewhere? The family then loses the income 
of both husband and wife. We know that dependants cannot claim for loss of support while 
their breadwinner is alive because his action is not for what he needs for himself alone but 
extends to his dependants as well. 332 This suggests that the injured husband may claim for 
the total loss of support suffered by the family. 333 A deduction should then be made for 
328See, for instance, Williams v British America Assurance 1962 2 PH J 18 (SR). 
329Marine &: Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) pages 272-3 of the bundle for appeal; Nochomowitz 
v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 727A. 
3YJSchnellen v Randalia Assurance 1969 1 SA 31 CVV). 
331 As happens with death claims (Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A)). 
332De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34; Lockhat 's Estate v North British &: Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 
305; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 79. In Commercial Union Assurance v Stanley 1973 1 SA 699 (A) 
compensation was awarded for loss of the financial benefits of marriage, ie loss of support occasioned by an injury. 
333Bearing in mind that the income from the family business generally accrues to the husband there would probably 
be little difficulty with persuading a court to award compensation on this basis. 
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the value of the chance that the uninjured wife may find employment. A further deduction 
would be made for the chance that the injured husband finds alternative employment. 
Popular notions that compensation is for 'loss of earning capacity' in the narrow sense do 
not permit a solution for the permutations described in the previous paragraph. The above 
analysis suggests that the action for personal injury is best viewed as a group action334 
whereby the breadwinner acts not only for himself but also for those dependent on him. 
[12.19] ILLEGAL EARNINGS 
[12.19.1] Compensation denied: A victim will be denied compensation if the earnings which 
he claims to have lost would have been derived from an illegal or immoral activity. 335 The 
illegality taints not only the earnings but also support derived from those earnings. 336 
Dependants will thus be denied compensation by reason of the illegal conduct whereby their 
breadwinner earned his living. 337 
[12.19.2] Inadmissible evidence: One possible explanation for the illegality rule is that the 
wrongful manner in which income was earned renders evidence thereof inadmissible in court. 
Such an explanation must, however, be rejected if one bears in mind that evidence of illegal 
earnings may be led to establish earning capacity under conditions of legality.338 This 
means that the entire claim need not be defeated because at the time of the injury or death 
there was involvement in an illegal activity. The defendant who wishes to avoid liability 
must establish not only that the earnings were illegal at the time of the injury or death but 
also that such illegality would have persisted throughout the period of the claim. A court is 
competent to make an award for the value of the chance of legality .339 
[12.19.3] Tenuous earnings: The nature of an illegal activity may suggest that it could not 
have continued for very long and that for this reason compensation should be denied. This 
would certainly not explain the illegality rule. In the first place there are many illegal 
activities which continue for many years. Secondly a person who is prevented from earning 
his living illegally is likely to turn to some other activity, legal or illegal. The illegality rule 
is clearly directed at denying compensation for the loss of earnings or support derived from 
334See section 11.4. 
335Dh/amini v Protea Assurance 1974 4 SA 906 (A); Boberg 'Delict' 588-94; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 53-8. 
336Santam Insurance v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A) 85 lF-G. See too 342 below. 
337When interpreting judgments concerning illegality it should be borne in mind that a number of the anomalies are 
due more to poor trial preparation rather than deficiencies in the law. See, for instance, Santam Insurance v 
Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A) 851-2 where the appeal court refused to admit belated evidence that the deceased had 
done most of his work away from the illegal premises at his home. 
338Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) 964D-E 'Even though some of the activities mentioned ... had 
ceased before his death and others were found by the Court a quo to be illegal, they can nevertheless be relied upon 
as some indication of his earning capacity'. Visser 1991 THRHR 782 792 and Reinecke 1988 De Jure 221 
erroneously suggest that illegal earnings cannot serve as evidence of earning capacity. 
339See Davel 'Broodwinner' 416 for comments upon Fortuin v Commercial Union Assurance 1983 2 SA 444 (C). 
The value of the chance of legality was awarded in Dhlamini v MMF 1992 l SA 802 (f). In Nkwenteni v Allianz 
Insurance 1992 2 SA 713 (Ck) compensation was denied for a period of temporary illegality. See Xatula v Minister 
of Police, Transkei 1993 4 SA 344 (fk). 
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an illegal activity. The prospect of legitimate earnings in the foreseeable future will limit the 
application of the illegality rule. 340 
[12.19.4] Punishment to match the crime: The Criminal Procedure Ac~ 1 provides for 
forfeiture by a convicted person of money or goods associated with the offence. The courts 
have adopted a strict interpretation of these provisions which limits forfeiture to things 
intimately associated with the crime for which the charge has been made. Thus a drug dealer 
was permitted to retain money received from a previous drug transaction for which she had 
not been charged. 342 In another matter money accumulated from illicit diamond dealing 
was returned to a person accused of stealing funds from the police.343 The reluctance of 
the courts to order forfeiture in these criminal matters provides a startling contrast to the 
willingness with which compensation has been denied in civil matters344 for earnings or 
support derived from mildly illegal activities. The crimes which come for consideration by 
the courts apprised with the assessment of damages are generally of a commercial licensing 
nature for persons of low income and poor education. 345 The penalty which the victim or 
the deceased's family is required to bear is usually out of all proportion to the severity of the 
criminal or immoral conduct in question.346 This point is all the more relevant when the 
compensation is to be paid from a public fund, such as the MMF, to which the victim may 
himself have contributed. The effe<;t of denying compensation is to deprive the victim or his 
family of a public insurance benefit.347 
[12.19.5] Versari in re illicita: The law requires a person to wear a safety belt or crash 
helmet when travelling by motor vehicle. A person may be severely injured whilst breaking 
the law by failing to wear the required safety equipment. The courts will only reduce the 
damages payable if the absence of the crash helmet or safety belt was causally related to the 
wiShield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A); Fortuin v Commercial Union Assurance 1983 2 SA 444 (C). 
341 s35 of Act 51 of 1977. See comment thereon in S v Dlova 1986 3 SA 248 (NC) concerning the 'drakoniese 
bepalings in art 190' of the Liquor Act 87 of 1977. 
342S v Tsoai 1981 1 SA 348 (0). 
30S v Campbell 1985 2 SA 612 (SWA). 
344Fortuin v Commercial Union Assurance 1983 2 SA 444 (C) goes some way to achieve this. Mankebe v AA Mutual 
Insurance 1986 2 SA 196 (D) 203C-D states that 'A Court will not readily deprive a dependant of his right to 
recover damages resulting from the death of the deceased ... unless the prohibition against his activities of necessity 
indicates that it was the intention of the legislation to regard such activities as being both illegal and invalid'. The 
court (at 201) distinguished itself from the ruling in Santam Insurance v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A). It seems that 
the potentially draconian ruling in Ferguson's case has been substantially mitigated by the Mankebe decision. 
345Unlicensed hawker Dhamini v Protea Assurance 1974 4 SA 906 (A); unlicensed weekly cinema and dances with 
unlicensed sale of liquor Shield Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A); unlicensed taxi driver Mba v Southern 
Insurance 1981 1 SA 122 (Tk); unlicensed panelbeating premises Santam Insurance v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A). 
346If punishment is to be meted out to the victim or his family it should be limited to the relevant criminal penalty: 
Atiyah 'Accidents Compensation & the Law' Jed 565. See too Mankebe v AA Mutual Insurance 1986 2 SA 196 
(D) 203B-E. 
347
'This Court has . repeatedly held that the general object of the Act is "to afford third parties the widest possible 
protection against loss sustained through the negligent or unlawful driving of a motor vehicle"' Constantia Insurance 
v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A) 671. See too footnote 129. 
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damage suffered. 348 The attitude of the appellate division to the problem of seat belts and 
crash helmets stands in sharp contrast to the largely draconian approach to illegal 
earnings. 349 When earnings are tainted with illegality a test of causal relevance may reveal 
that compliance with the relevant regulation would have been a simple formality350 and that 
the earnings would have been the same had they been earned legally. 
[12.19.6] Hypothetical legality: There seems little doubt that where the illegality of the 
conduct has permitted far greater earnings than would otherwise have been possible the court 
would be acting correctly if it assessed compensation on the basis of the lower earnings to 
which the victim would have been restricted had he acted legally. m The illegality rule has 
been handed down to us from a previous era when the range of criminal offences was far less 
complex than today. 352 An inquiry into what the victim could have earned had he acted 
legally may, of course, reveal that he would have been unemployed. Boberg has suggested 
that when the earnings are illegal then compensation may still be awarded for loss of 'earning 
capacity' as distinct from 'loss of earnings' .353 This is essentially the same approach to 
that suggested above provided that one substitutes for the words 'earning capacity' the 
'probable earnings354 of the victim had he acted legally'. Visser355 states this principle 
in the form that regard should only be had to the 'legal' components of the damaged 
patrimonium. 356 
[12.19. 7] Tax evasion: Tax evasion is the most common form of 'white-collar' illegal 
activity one encounters when assessing damages for personal injury or death. In Santam 
Insurance v Fick351 the injured claimant was compensated for lost earnings which derived 
from a questionable scheme apparently designed to evade tax. The court ordered that a copy 
of the record be sent to the tax authorities. 358 Where there are assets which can be 
341Boberg 'Delict' 400-39 . 
349Dhlamini v Protea Assurance 1974 4 SA 906 (A); Santam Insurance v Ferguson 1985 4 SA 843 (A) . Shield 
Insurance v Booysen 1979 3 SA 953 (A) does not follow the pattern of the other two judgments and reflects a 
welcome compassionate approach to the problem. 
H00r at least achievable on due compliance with certain requirements (see Mankebe v M Mutual Insurance 1986 
2 SA 196 (D) 203E). 
msee Lebona v President Insurance 1991 3 SA 395 (W) 402-3 and paragraph concerning tax evasion. See too 
Visser 1991 THRHR 782 793; Dendy 1987 SAEJ 243-52. 
m'lt would be artificial in the extreme and reminiscent of mid-Victorian hypocrisy to deny him the aid of the law' 
Mankebe v M Mutual Insurance 1986 2 SA 196 (D) 20ll-J . 
353Boberg 'Delict' 594(d). See too Blommaert 1981 TSAR 176; Dendy 1987 SAL! 243 248-51. The ambiguities 
inherent to the expressions 'loss of earnings' and 'loss of earning capacity' are dealt with at 218 above. 
3s.Carstens v Southern Insurance 1985 3 SA 1010 (C) 1020G. See too 235 above . 
mvisser 1991 THRHR 782. 
356See too Davel 1992 De Jure 83-95 and 48 above. 
357 1982 (A) (unreported 24.5.82 case 282179/A V) . 
\ H'The damages award had not been reduced for notional taxation. The order was probably with a view to the 
'\ levying of tax on the damages award but would also have brought the tax-evasion activities to the attention of the 
.\ authorities. \ 
'\ 
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attached359 the threat of arrear apd penalty taxes usually ensures an out-of-court settlement. 
The Fick ruling suggests that if a history of successful tax evasion were to be proved, for 
example cash takings from the till, the court would nonetheless assess compensation as 
though such income had been properly subject to taxation. In other words damages would 
be assessed on the basis of what would have happened if the victim had acted legally. 
[12.19.8] Enforceability of illegal contracts: One finds mention in the judgments of an 
inquiry into the enforceability of contracts concluded during the immoral or illegal 
activity. 360 All the illegal or immoral business activities which have come before the courts 
in South Africa would seem to have been conducted in cash.361 It follows that for practical 
purposes the enforceability of the contracts is irrelevant. 362 Cash receipts will generally 
be retained regardless of questions of illegality. The principle of in pari delicto potior est 
condicio defendentis is likely to apply to most circumstances. 363 In terms of the Criminal 
Procedure Act364 forfeiture will only be ordered in respect of the particular act for which 
there has been a successful prosecution365 and then only to a very limited extent. 366 
[12.19.9] Post-injury illegality: The courts have not yet expressed an opinion on how to deal 
with the claimant who was acting legally prior to his injury but who after the injury takes to 
an illegal activity. 367 The likely solution is to have regard to what he could earn now 
injured if he acts within the law. 
[12.19.10] Immorality: There is no recorded instance in South African law where 
compensation has been denied for an activity which is immoral but not illegal.368 It could 
be argued that by reason of disuse immorality on its own is no longer a ground for refusing 
compensation. A suitable test case for this point would be injury to the kept mistress of a 
married man. May such a woman claim for the loss of the financial benefits of her 
relationship? Apart from the high deduction required for general contingencies one suspects 
that explicit compensation would be denied on moral grounds but that an award would be 
359For dependants this would mean that the deceased has left an estate. The prospect of a tax claw-back with 
penalties is only relevant to the dependants who have inherited, usually the widow. • 
J&JMba v Southern Insurance 1981 1 SA 122 _(Tk) 1250; Ferguson v Santam Insurance 1985 1 SA 207 (C) 208G. 
361 See footnote 345. 
362Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 1986 3 SA 181 (A) 194-5. 
363The rule will be applied circumspectly with a view to maintaining justice between man and man: Jajbhay v Cassim 
1939 AD 537 544; Osman v Reis 1976 3 SA 710 (C) 712G-713B. 
36ols35 Act 51 of 1977. 
365S v Tsoai 1981 1 SA 348 (0). 
366S v Mudau 1980 3 SA 1079 (V); S v Marais 1982 3 SA 988 (A); S v Campbell 1985 2 SA 612 (SWA). 
367For instance the victim who has become an epileptic by reason of his injuries and then takes to driving a taxi. 
368Dl1/amini v Protea Assurance 1974 4 SA 906 (A) makes reference to immoral activities ('contra bonos mores' at 
912F and 'teen goeie sedes' at 915C). Considering the cultural diversity of South Africa, notably the polygamy 
issue, the courts will in future need to tread warily in this area. 
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made for the chance that she might in time have married the man369or provided for herself 
through some other legal activity. 370 
[12.20] CONCLUSIONS 
The action for damages for personal injury is undoubtedly the most comprehensive of all 
rights of action available under the Aquilian action. The damages payable are not limited 
by considerations of foreseeability371 to the same extent as with negligent misstatements or 
·damage to goods. The action compensates losses not only by way of earnings and necessary 
expenditure but also loss of support and general damages by way of pain and suffering and 
loss of the amenities of life. The action has been extended to those who suffer loss by reason 
of their duty to support the victim during the pre-trial period. 372 For injury to a child the 
parent may claim for expected expenditure· even after the pre-trial period. 373 These 
alternative actions complicate claims procedures and can lead to a loss going 
uncompensated. 374 It would be preferable to have one single action by the victim with a 
procedure whereby the court can order that part of the damages awarded be used to re-
imburse those who have assisted the victim. 375 
When a breadwinner is killed the family loses the benefit of his or her earnings. For this 
reason many issues relevant to assessing damages for personal injury are equally relevant to 
the assessment of damages for loss of support. In this regard one might mention in particular 
considerations of the nature of a lump-sum award, 376 likely earnings, 377 income tax, 378 
and illegality. 379 For an injured person a deduction will be made for saved living 
expenses. 380 With the death of a breadwinner a deduction is made for the saving in the 
deceased's living expenses. 
369 After he had divorced his present wife. Loss of marriage prospects will be compensated (see 223). 




374See, for instance, Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 409H. 
msee paragraph 11.3.2. 
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CHAPTER 13 
THE DEPENDANTS' ACTION 
Summary: The loss of a right to suppon determines who may bring 
an action for loss of suppon. The financial loss suffered is, however, 
not the right to support but the value of the financial benefits 
expected from the breadwinner in consequence of this right. This 
financial value will be assessed according the value of the chance of 
receiving the support. The working wife who earns sufficient to 
suppon herself has no right, at that point in time, to claim suppon 
from her husband. The loss by the dependants will be assessed 
without regard for compensating advantages other than inheritance 
and remarriage. The focus is on the support which would have been 
provided had there been no death. The widow who takes up 
employment after the death will be compensated as though she were 
unemployed. Conversely a widow who ceases employment in 
consequence of the death has no claim under the dependants' action 
for this loss of earnings. Loss of inheritance prospects will be 
compensated to the extent that these would have provided ongoing 
suppon. Although dependants have in theory a claim for loss of 
suppon during the 'lost years' such claims will usually fail due to 
difficulties with evidence. 
[13.1] THE RIGHT OF ACTION 
273 
[13.1.1] Con.fined to loss of support: The dependants' action 'aims at placing them in as 
good a position, as regards maintenance, as they would have been in if the deceased had 
not been killed' . 1 Compensation under the dependants' action is restricted to loss of support 
and a separate action must be brought to recover any loss of earnings or medical expenses 
caused by the same wrongful act. 2 General damages are not claimable under the dependants' 
action. 3 If damages were ever to be awarded for the inconvenience and psychological shock 
flowing from the death of a breadwinner4 this would open the way to awards to dependants 
'Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614E (emphasis supplied). 
2Evins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 (A) . 
3Jameson's Minors v CSAR 1908 TS 575 602; Union Government v Warneke 1911AD657 662 666; Hulley v Cox 
1923 AD 234 243; Davel 'Broodwinner' 442-3 . See 258 above. 
4ln Bourhill v Young [1942] 2 All ER 396 (HL) compensation was denied for psychologi~al shock resulting from 
the killing of a cyclist 15 meters away from the claimant. The deceased was not related to the claimant, therefore 
the court found that there was no duty of care. In Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmpy 1973 1 SA 769 (A) 
damages were awarded to a child who suffered a severe psychological neurosis after his brother was run down in 
front of him and killed. It is not essential to establish a personal apprehension of danger (780-1). In Boswell v 
Minister of Police 1978 3 SA 268 (E) the claimant suffored physical harm from shock by reason of being falsely told 
of the death of her nephew. 
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for general damages arising from death.5 Such awards would not, however, be made under 
the dependants' action but under the action for personal injury. 
[13.1.2] Damages/or shock: There seems to be little reason why dependants who suffer the 
agonies of the shock of the death of a breadwinner should not successfully claim 
compensation for personal injury. If the death of the breadwinner is foreseeable then so too, 
one would think, is the shock and emotional disturbance of the dependants.6 In Boswell's 
case7 damages were awarded for the emotional consequences of shock caused by a false 
statement to the victim that her nephew, whom she had brought up, had been shot dead. In 
Sebatjane's case8 compensation was awarded for the psychological shock of a miscarriage. 
In Masiba's case the victim had suffered severe shock from the sight of his stationary car 
being collided with by another vehicle. In consequence of the shock he died. A right of 
action for damages for loss of support was granted to his dependants on the basis that had 
he merely been injured he would have had a personal right of action for damages for the 
injury suffered. 9 Emotional shock of short duration will, it seems, not be compensated. 10 
[13.1.3] Damages to the deceased's estate: The estate of a deceased victim has a claim for 
general damages provided litis contestatio has been reached before the death occurs. 11 This 
benefit will only accrue to the dependants if they are heirs. The benefit would have the 
effect of reducing the damages claimable by the dependants under the dependants' action12 
[13.1.4] Historical origins: The right of action for damages arising from wrongful killing 
. is said to have its origins in the Germanic law. 13 The right of action of a widow is neither 
Roman 14 nor Germanic. 15 It reflects the influence of the Church. 16• The widow, 
however, was not a blood-relative of her deceased husband and was only admitted as a 
~General damages for the death of a breadwinner are permitted in England (s3(1) Administration of Justice Act of 
1982). . 
6Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C). 
'Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 3 SA 268 (E). General damages of R750 in 1977 equivalent to R5600 in 1992. 
See too Alcock v 01ief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [ 1991] 4 All ER 907 (HL) and Hevican v Ruane 
[1991) 3 All ER 65 (QBD). 
8Sebatjane v Federated Employers' Insurance 1989 4 C&B H2-l (T). 
9Masiba v Constantia Assurance 1982 4 SA 333 (C) 343 . 
10Neethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 243n333. 
11 Potgieter v Rondalia Assurance 1970 1 SA 705 (N); Potgieter v Sustein (Edms) Bpk 1990 2 SA 15 (T). 
12See 333. 
13Jameson 's Minors v CSAR 1908 TS 575 584; Union Government v Warneke 1911AD657 664; Union Government 
v Lee 1927 AD 202 221; SA Nasionale Trust & Assuransie v fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A) 471-2; Legal Insurance v 
Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614; Davel 'Broodwinner' 32-68; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 14-25. 
14The Roman law did not allow compensation to anyone for the death of a freeman ; Davel 'Broodwinner' 11-17. 
uDavel 'Broodwinner' 55-6. The widow was not a blood-relative of her deceased husband. 
16Davel 'Broodwinner' 58-9 . See too paragraph 3.2.5. 
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claimant at a fairly late stage. Grotius, 17 writing about 1620, records the modern form of 
the dependants' action with damages payable to the widow and children, rather than the 
heirs. The Council of Trent18 in 1563 laid the groundwork for the registration of 
marriages. Prior to this time proof of marriage could be a contentious issue. 19 We may 
surmise that proper evidence of marriage by way of registration greatly facilitated the 
admission of a widow as a claimant for damages arising from wrongful killing. This 
development would have been encouraged by the Church in keeping with a policy of 
strengthening the status of a registered holy marriage. 
Quantification of the damages by reference to the earnings of the deceased20 and excluding 
general damages for emotional distress21 is typically Roman. The accommodation under 
the modem Aquilian action of a right of action for damages caused by wrongful killing has 
been by way of extension of the Roman actions for loss of earnings. 22 The major, if not 
the sole contribution of the Germanic law has been the ethic that compensation should be 
awarded in the event of wrongful killing. 
[13.1.5] The injured breadwinner. If a breadwinner is severely injured the dependants have 
no right of action for the loss of support which they suffer.23 They are obliged to make do 
with what their breadwinner is awarded, even if the breadwinner's damages are reduced by 
reason of his contributory negligence.24 If the breadwinner's expectation of life has been 
reduced by his injuries, and for this reason less damages awarded, the dependants are obliged 
to wait until he dies before they can bring an action for damages during the 'lost years'. 25 
[13.1.6] Quantum: The quantification of the damages suffered by the dependants is done on 
much the same basis as for an injury. This means that considerations of capitalize first26 
· and difference afterwards and vice-versa alternate in the assessment process. Historically 
there used to be a comparison of what would have accrued but for the death with what has 
17 /n/eiding 3.33.2. 
18Decretum tametsi (de refomzatio matrimonii) of 1563 of the Council of Trent became law in Holland through the 
Political Ordinance of 1580 and introduced civil marriage to the Roman-Dutch law. 
19Hahlo & Kahn 'The SA legal system' 450. 
20
'0perarum quibus caruit aut cariturus est: D9.3. 7 actio de effusis vel deiectis; D9. l .3 actio de pauperie. When 
fixed amounts were specified these were in the nature of punitive fines. rather than compensation (Davel 
'Broodwinner' 18-19 21-2). Under Germanic law the weergeld was assessed on a tariff basis with little or no regard 
for lost earnings (Davel 'Broodwinner' 37-8). 
21 Davel 'Broodwinner' 11-17. 
22Feenstra 1972 Al 227 229. 
23De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34; Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 
305-6. 
24Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34 40-2. 
25Lockhat v Nonh British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 305-6; Evins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 
814 (A). For further discussion see 227, 347. 
26See 65 and 68. 
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accrued having regard to the death, 27 but, as I will enlarge upon in due course, this is no 
longer a generally valid statement. The relevance of living expenses to the assessment 
process is far more obvious under the dependants' action than under the action for loss of 
earning capacity. Not the least because a deduction needs to be made from the deceased's 
projected earnings for the proportion which would have been consumed by his own living 
expenses. The determination of damages for loss of support may, in theory, proceed entirely 
by reference to the costs of supporting the family and without regard for the deceased's 
earnings. Assessments done on this basis are rare for a common household but are done 
when the dependants lived separately from the deceased . 28 
[13.1.7] Past loss: An award of damages for past loss of support is subject to the same 
anomalies and problems that attach to an award for past loss of earnings. 29 This is an 
anomalous state of affairs because while the breadwinner is still alive past support cannot be 
claimed from him30 except in so far as debt has been incurred. 31 Dependants who claim 
damages for loss of support may have their damages reduced if the evidence indicates that 
their breadwinner would from time to time not have provided them with support 
notwithstanding his duty to do so. 
Utility theory suggests that if a dependant has died prior to receiving compensation then the 
dependant's estate should have no right to compensation other than for debt that has been 
incurred. This conclusion follows from the observation that a past loss of earnings or 
support is more in the nature of general damages than patrimonial loss. 32 In practice the 
estate of the deceased dependant will probably be made an award for past loss of support. 
[13.1.8] Curator bonis: When a person is injured and is incapable of managing the 
compensation money an additional award will usually be made for the costs of a suitable 
curator bonis or trustee. 33 It is quite common that the compensation money for dependent 
children requires similar supervision and costs of administration. There is no recorded 
instance in South Africa where a court has allowed a claim for the costs of a curator bonis 
or trustee for children compensated for loss of support. If it be correct that the claim by the 
dependants for damages is confined to loss of the support34 then such additional costs are 
TIUnion Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 665; Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917; Santam 
Insurance v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) 267C-H. 
28For black migrant workers evidence as to application of funds is generally unobtainable or flagrantly unreliable (eg 
support payments of R200 per week alleged for a man earning R600 per month) . One then usually relies on a 
two-parts-one-part apportionment of earnings (see section 13.8). 
29See paragraph 12.3.1. 
300berholzer v Oberholzer 1947 3 SA 294 (0) 298; VoetAd Pandectas 2.15.14 'Non enim quisquam inpraeteritum 
vivit aut alendus est' (Gane's translation 'A person does not live nor have to be maintained in arrear'); Hahlo 
'Husband & wife' 5ed 137. 
31Farre// v Hankey 1921 TPD 590 596; Williams v Shub 1976 4 SA 567 (C) 5700-H. 
32See paragraph 12.3.1. 
33See paragraph 12.13 .6. 
34See paragraph 13 .1.1. 
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not claimable in law. It deserves note in this regard, however, that in one instance a court 
has ordered that a lower discount rate of interest be used to allow for the fact that the awards 
of damages were to be paid into the guardian's fund. 35 
(13.2] REQUIREMENTS FOR A CLA™ 
[13.2.1] Financial value: In order to claim damages for loss of support the dependant must 
demonstrate not only that he or she would have had a right to claim support from the 
deceased had he lived but also that the deceased would have provided support in response 
to that right. 36 The right to support alone is not sufficient to give rise to a right of action 
for damages. It is also necessary to establish that the benefits to be provided by the 
breadwinner had a financial value. In other words there may have been a duty of support 
but a nil or negligible chance that any support would have been provided in response to this 
duty. Conversely support may have been provided, but if there was no duty to do so then 
no compensation will be awarded. 37 
The value of the chance of the provision of support will generally be compensated and thus 
found a right of action. 38 Van Vuuren v Sam39 suggests obiter that for a successful action 
for damages the right to support must exist at the time of the death. The somewhat 
stringent requirements expressed in this judgment may reflect no more than a general 
tendency by the courts to view with circumspection claims for loss of support by parents.40 
In Young v Hutton41 the claimant's mother was killed on the day he was due for discharge 
from hospital. Compensation was awarded for the loss of the support which would have 
been provided after discharge from hospital. 
For certain family relationships the rules of pleading do not require allegation or proof of the 
financial requirements necessary to create a duty of support. This does not mean to say that 
such financial requirements cease to be relevant: 42 
' ... the typical situation in which the husband and father maintains his wife and 
children finds expression in the rule that the mere existence of one of these 
35Boonzaier v Provincial Insurance 1954 l C&B 87 (C). 
36 Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 635D-E 'Om in haar aksie te kon slaag, moes die appellante bewys ... dat 
die oorledene tot haar onderhoud bygedra het en dat hy dit gedoen het en sou voortgegaan het om dit te doen omdat 
hy regtens daartoe verplig was'. The existence of a duty of support does not mean that support will be provided (eg 
Senior v NEG Insurance 1989 2 SA 136 (W)). One needs to distinguish between support but for the death and 
support having regard to the death . The Senior case was concerned with the latter. 
37See, for instance, footnote 45. 
38 Recognition of a right to compensation for the loss of a prospective right to support is to be found in Jacobs · v 
Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474 479; Petersen v South British Insurance 1964 2 SA 236 (C) 238E-F ; 
Manuel v African Guarantee & Indemnity 1967 2 SA 417 (R) 419. 
39 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 6350-E. 
40See Singh v Santam Insurance 1974 4 SA 196 (D) 199A. 
41 1918 WLD 90. 
42Boberg 'Persons & family' 25ln9 (emphasis supplied) relying on Gildenlwys v Transvaal Hindu Educational 
Council 1938 WLD 260 262. See too Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 81-2. 
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relationships creates a rebuttable presumption of a duty of support; there is no 
necessity to allege and prove the need for support and the ability to supply it where 
a wife or a child claims maintenance' (or damages for loss thereof). 
There is evidence that for some lawyers the requirement 'duty of support' does not mean an 
enforceable duty of support having regard to the relative financial standings of the family 
members, but merely the existence of the relevant family relationship.43 
[13.2.2] Enforceable duty of support: In order for a duty of support to arise the dependant 
must firstly be 'in need', secondly the breadwinner must have sufficient means, and thirdly 
the law must impose a duty to provide support in the circumstances. 44 Need and ability to 
pay, that is to say the fist two requirement may be satisfied, and there may be a factual 
provision of support, but if the law does not impose a duty then there will be no right of 
action for damages. 45 The breadwinner may have the ability to pay but if the dependant 
earns sufficient income the duty to provide support does not arise. Thus, for example, a wife 
who works reduces or eliminates her right to claim support from her husband.46 The right 
of parents to claim support from a child is dependent on a 'spartan standard' of indigency .47 
Dependency may not exist at the time of the death but there may be a substantial prospect 
that it will arise in years to come, for example when a father retires without pension.48 
[13.2.3] Spes of support: The above considerations suggest that it is more appropriate to 
speak of the loss of a spes, or 'expectation' of suppo,rt49 rather than the loss of a right to 
support. · The right to support determines whether or not a claim may be brought but it does 
not determine how much the lost right is worth. 5° Compensation is not based upon a 
43Loss of support for a widow is sometimes done using 'method B' (see paragraph 13.9.10), an approach which 
proceeds from the premise that a wife has a right to support from her husband even if she earns more than sufficient 
to support herself. See too footnote 314. 
44Senior v NEG Insurance 1989 2 SA 136 (W) 139. 
45eg Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance 1977 3 SA 502 (E) where granddaughter was supporting grandmother while 
children of claimant were able to provide the support; Vaughan v SA National Trust & Assurance 1954 3 SA 667 
(C) concerning uncle and indigent nephews-and nieces. 
4(,Mi/ns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1012-13 . See 309 below. 
47Boberg 'Persons & family' 310-12; Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 642-3; Singh v Santam Insurance 1974 
4 SA 196 (D) 199A 'The means test as applied to a father's claim for maintenance from a son is a stringent one'. 
Calculations of poverty datum lines (PDL) include allowance for modest hedonistic expenditure on cigarettes, 
magazines, film shows, etc (Newall 'Living Wage' 29-35; Budlender 1985 (Saldru working paper 63)). 
48 Young v Hutton 1918 WLD 90; Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474 479; Petersen v South British 
Insurance 1964 2 SA 236 (C) 238; Manuel v African Guarantee & Indemnity 1967 2 SA 417 (R) 419 (more 
generally see chapter 4 at 71). 
49Grotius De iure be/Ii ac pacis 2.17 .14 uses the word 'spes' to describe the claim by dependants for loss of support: 
'Dare tantum, quantum ilia spes alimentorum, ratione habita aetatis occisi, valebat'. 
50-fhe common failure of the courts to distinguish rights from financial loss is evident in General Accident Insurance 
v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 612C 'Wat skade weens verlies van onderhoud betref, is daarop gewys dat al gese 
is dat dit om die verlies van 'n reg gaan: kyk Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) 376C, 
waar Holmes AR gese het: "What she has lost is a right - the right of support". Die getuie Koch het ... gepraat van 
die verlies van 'n "expectation" wat vergoed moet word' (but see previous footnote). 
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consideration of rights and duties. 51 Rights and duties are, however, relevant to the 
likelihood that support would have been provided. 52 
[13.2.4] Value of prospective supporl by a child: Parents of a young dependent child may 
have had hopes of themselves being supported by that child in time to come. If that child 
is killed the parental prospect of support in the distant future will usually be outweighed by 
the more immediate saving from being spared the cost of supporting that child. 53 
[13.2.5] Changing circumstances: A married woman who works and earns sufficient income 
to support herself has no right to claim support from her husband.54 By the same token a 
husband who earns sufficient income to support himself has no right to claim support from 
his working wife. Changed circumstances55 for example, cessation of employment due to 
childbirth, would give rise to a right to support for the wife. Conversely an elderly husband 
may retire and become dependent on his younger wife. A young dependent child will grow 
up and become a breadwinner. An important feature of an enforceable right to claim 
support is that it comes and goes with the passage of time. The family relationship alone 
is not sufficient. The necessary financial conditions must also be satisfied. 
[13.2.6] The posthumous child: The rights of a so-called nasciturus are suspended pending 
its birth as a viable legal subject. Such a child has a right to claim compensation for loss of 
support. 56 This is an example of the award of compensation for a prospective loss of 
support notwithstanding that no support was being provided at the time that the breadwinner 
died. 57 
[13.2. 7] Death before a wedding: If a bridegroom is killed on his way to the wedding there 
is no reason in principle why the bride should not have a claim for compensation for the 
51 Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 181 184-5 241-5 ; Bloembergen 'Schadevergoeding' 26-7. 
52Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 285sup ('The inadequacy of a classification by rights and duties) beteken nie dat 
die bestaan van so 'n reg vir die skadeleer irrelevant is nie. Die bestaan van 'n reg op die verwagte 
vermoenstoename sal naamlik Jig werp op die mate van waarskynlikheid waarmee daardie vermoenstoename te 
verwag was'. 
53Boberg 1964 SAL! 147-50; Spiro 1968 THRHR 118-23. This point is sharply emphasised by successful actions 
for damages for unwanted birth (Edouard v Administrator Natal 1989 2 SA 368 (D); 1990 3 SA 581 (A); Lind 1992 
SAL! 428). 
54
'No maintenance will be awarded to a wife who is able to support herself... In the ordinary course, maintenance 
awards will be "more lavish to a wife than to an ex-wife"' Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 361. See 309 below. 
55Gildenhuys v Transvaal Hindu Educational Council 1938 WLD 260 262-3 ; Oberholzer v Oberholzer 1947 3 SA 
294 (0) 297; Woodhead v Woodhead 1955 3 SA 138 (SR) 139-40. It is said that the primary burden falls on the 
husband but this, it seems, is no more than a reflection of the economic fact that husbands usually earn more than 
their wives (Boberg 'Persons & family' 250). 
56Chisholm v ERPM 1909 TH 297 301; Pinchin v Santam Insurance 1963 2 SA 254 (W). 
57cf Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 635D-E 'Om in haar aksie te kon slaag, moes die appellante bewys ... 
dat die oorledene tot haar onderhoud bygedra het ... '; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 59n 129. 
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value of the chance of support had tpe marriage ceremony been completed.58 There is no 
doubt that if the bride were seriously injured on her way to the wedding and the marriage 
plans thereby aborted she would be entitled to compensation for loss of the financial benefits 
of marriage. 59 
[13.2.8] Supporl by parents: Parents are obliged to support their children according to their 
means. 60 The typical family must 'cut its cloth' according to the income available. Under 
circumstances of a common household whatever income the family has must be given over 
to the support of all. 61 The duty of support by a child to a parent only arises if the child 
has more than sufficient income for his own support. 62 There is a reciprocal duty of 
support between parent and child which suggests that the same principle applies to the duty 
of a parent to support a child. 63 It follows that a duty of support towards the children only 
arises if the relevant parent has sufficient income to cover the cost of his own support. 64 
A claim by the wife for support from her husband may be resisted or abated on the grounds 
that she has income of her own.65 One would expect a similar abatement if the wife had 
assets, albeit no income. 66 A claim by children for support from their working mother may 
be resisted on the grounds that the mother has not sufficient for her own support67 and the 
father has more than sufficient to support himself and the children. 68 A working child with 
s8 Young v Hutton 1918 WLD 90; Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474 479; Petersen v South British 
Insurance 1964 2 SA 236 (C) 238; Manuel vAfiican Guarantee & Indemnity 1967 2 SA 417 (R) 419; Blyth v Van 
den Reever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 225-6. 
s9Commercial Union Assurance v Stanley 1973 1 SA 699 (A) 704G. 
flJUnion Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 668-9; Burns v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 3631-J; Boberg 
'Persons & family' 254. 
61 0osthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331 'The father has a duty to sustain his wife and children and it would be 
wholly artificial to consider the question on the footing that the father is entitled to provide for himself in priority 
to his wife and children under his roof. 
62/n re Knoop (1893) 10 SC 198; Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474 479. Regard being had to the 
general standard of living of the family. 
63S v Pitsi 1964 4 SA 583 (T) 586H 'Aangesien dit 'n wederkerige verpligting is behoort dieselfde stelling ook te 
geld wat betref die verpligting van die vader om sy kind te onderhou'. 
64Ncubu v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N) 196; Burris v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 363-4. See 308 
below. 
6sKarrim v Karrim 1962 1 PH B4 (D); Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1012-13. Hahlo 'Husband 
& wife' 5ed 361. 
66Volkenborn v Volkenborn 1946 NPD 76; Boberg 'Persons & family' 268n73. 
61Ncubu v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N) 196. In Lamb v Sack 1974 2 SA 670 (f) 674E the court ostensibly 
apportioned the costs of support 3 to 1, the ratio of the relative incomes. The father's income, however, was taken 
net of his living costs and without any apparent adjustment for substantial assets; the mother was not working but 
was deemed to earn one third of the father's net income. The reported judgment is silent as to the living costs of 
the mother. One presumes that full provision was being made for her own living costs and that none of her income 
from notional employment was needed for her own support. See too Mentz v Simpson 1990 4 SA 455 (A) and 308 
et seq below. 
61Burns v NEG lns·urance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 363-4 (by implication); Zimelka v Zimelka 1990 4 SA 303 (W) 306H 
3071. In Woodhead v Woodhead 1955 3 SA 138 (SR) 142-3 the mother earned £50 per month and the father £90 
per month. The court allocated liability for past support equally between the parents. The father was also burdened 
I 
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limited income may remain partially dependent if the parents assist with maintaining a higher 
standard of living.69 Sons undergoing military service may remain dependent but generally 
at a lower level than when full-time at home. 70 
[13.2.9] Support by children: A parent who is in need may claim support from a child who 
has the means to pay, that is say income, or assets, in excess of what that child needs for his 
own living expenses. 71 The need of a father will not be determined by what he needs for 
himself alone but will have regard to the other members of the household to whom he owes 
a duty of support. 72 Notwithstanding such considerations the right of a parent to claim 
support from a child will be viewed with circumspection. 73 The test for indigency is 
relative to the financial standing and social status of the family. 74 Poverty datum lines75 
(PDL) do not provide a satisfactory test of indigency because they reflect an absolute 
standard which ignores the financial and social standing of the family. Conservatism is 
clearly justified under circumstances where the provision of support, if any, is temporary. 76 
The circumstances of a parent/child relationship can suggest permanence.77 A parent who 
with payments of arrear maintenance and legal costs for his ex-wife, a consideration which may explain the split 
adopted. Future support for the children was by agreement. In general a court must be 'fully informed as to the 
relative financial position of the parties' (Buch v Buch 1967 3 SA 83 (f) 88D). See 308 below. · 
69Boberg 'Persons & family' 261n55 262n57. 
70Gold v Gold 1975 4 SA 237 (D). 
711n re Knoop (1893) 10 SC 198; Jacobs v CT Municipality 1935 CPD 474 479; Khan v Padayachy 1971 3 SA 877 
(W). 
720osthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331. This text suggests that the father claims in a representative capacity for 
himself and the needy siblings of the deceased (see section 11.4). This conclusion is reinforced by the rule that 
payment of maintenance must be to the custodian parent and not to the child (Hahlo 'Husband & wife ' Sed 409) . 
See too Dendy 1990 SAU 155. 
73Singh v Santam Insurance 1974 4 SA 196 (D) 199A 'the means test as applied to a father's claim for maintenance 
from a son is a stringent one'. This stringent view would seem to derive from the word 'necessities' (see Oosthuizen 
v Stanley 1938 AD 322 328). Consideration of poverty datum lines suggests that need includes allowance for modest 
hedonistiC expenditure such as cigarettes, magazines and film shows etc (Newall 'Living Wage' 29-35) . Some 
indulgence in hedonism is implicit to the example of rough bread/white bread cited in Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 
633 (A) 643E. The word 'necessity' is ambiguous: On one hand it might imply poverty, subsistence on the 
breadline; on the other hand it implies a compelling need to maintain a quality of lifestyle consistent with the overall 
status and financial means of the family as a whole. The ' stringency' test of Singh v Santam Insurance suggests an 
over-emphasis on the 'breadline' interpretation. 
740osthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 328 ' a state of comparative indigency or destitution'; Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 
2 SA 633 (A) 635D-E. In Van Blerck v Van Blerck 1972 2 SA 799 (C) the provision of a Mercedes Benz motor 
car was held to be in accordance with the standard of living of the family. The two-parts-one-part method for 
apportioning family income (see section 13.8) provides a useful test for relative indigency when there is a common 
household. 
nNewall 'Living Wage' 29-35. 
76 Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 635D-E includes the requirement that the deceased 'sou voortgegaan het 
om dit te doen'. 
77eg circumstances of Wigham v British Traders Insurance 1963 3 SA 151 (W) (middle-aged spinster daughter 
supporting aged mother) . 
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is in good health and able to go out to work will generally fail to establish indigency.78 A 
parent without income must utilise capital. 79 
[13.2.10] The obligation to seek work: This falls most heavily on an able-bodied father of 
working age. A housewife who has earning capacity is not obliged to go out and seek work, 
provided her husband's income is sufficient. However, once the parents are divorced she 
may be expected to seek employment, primarily to support herself but also, in suitable 
circumstances, to make a contribution to the support of her children. A child at school is 
usually not expected to seek work and may remain unemployed for purposes of tertiary 
education, provided he or she will benefit and the parents have the necessary means. 80 A 
widowed housewife, however, is not expected to seek work in order to mitigate her 
damages. 81 
It deserves note that although it is said that the duty of support falls primarily on the 
father82 this statement reflects no more than that fathers usually earn more than mothers and 
are thus usually better able to support the child. 83 It is quite conceivable, albeit unusual, 
that it is the father who stays at home and the wife who goes out to work.84 
[13.2.11] Temporary unemployment: In a depressed economy it is common that able-bodied 
persons without capital are unable to obtain employment.85 Unemployment is as much a 
cause of need as disability or old age and judicial views that presume employment when jobs 
are plentiful86 may need revision in times of depression. The major feature of 
unemployment due to economic conditions is that the need is temporary, even though it may 
endure for several years. Any award of compensation should include a substantial deduction 
for the contingency of finding employment, and would hence reflect the value of the chance 
of indigency. One would need to offset against such a claim the value of the chance that the 
deceased would have become temporarily dependent on the claimant. Much of the law 
governing claims for maintenance from living breadwinners centres around ponderous 
maintenance orders intended to remain in place for fairly extended periods of time. There 
780osthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 328; Anthony v Cape Town Municipality 1967 4 SA 445 (A) 456D-E; Van 
Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 SA 633 (A) 638F-G. 
79See footnote 66. 
80See footnote 151. 
81See section 13.10. 
82Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 135. 
13Boberg 'Persons & family' 250 •Although the duty is usually regarded as burdening the husband in favour of the 
wife, this is only because in practice it is usually he who has the greater means and ability to fulfil it'. See too 
Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 135. 
84Hahlo 'Husband & wife' l38n80. 
85See, for example, Business Day 10.9.90 page 3 'Number of jobless is now dangerous'; 12.6.90 pages l 2 'And 
while recent studies have shown a substantial narrowing of the black/white wage gap in the past decade, the SAARF · 
figures suggest no such narrowing and possibly a widening of the racial gap in household income. The paradox, 
one economist said, was probably because of soaring black unemployment'. These considerations suggest increasing 
dependency by black households on those members who retain employment. 
86See, for instance, Lamb v Sack 1974 2 SA 670 (f) 674; Lebona v President Insurance 1991 3 SA 395 (yV) 403B-C. 
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is no good reason why claims for damages for loss of support should be inhibited by the 
proceduralism of formal maintenance orders. 
[13.2.12] Supporl by siblings: A duty of support arises between siblings but falls away at age 
21 if the dependent sibling is able-bodied. 87 The duty of support between siblings does not 
arise if either parent is capable of providing the needed support. 88 When there is a common 
household it can be argued that the siblings have no direct claim for support from the sibling 
acting as breadwinner because their father has an over-riding right to claim what he needs 
for himself and those dependent on him. 89 A single group action of this nature may be 
limited to R25000 in terms of MVA legislation.90 In order to maximize the coverage 
provided under the Act it is likely that a court would find in favour of separate claims for 
the father and each of the siblings. 91 The ruling in Oosthuizen v Stanley92 would then only 
be relevant to the question of indigency. The judgments reveal substantial confusion as to 
the proper procedure for claims by siblings and parents. 93 The safe procedure for 
claimants, and defendants, is to insist on a separate claim for each and every dependant.94 
Legitimate children are not obliged to support their illegitimate siblings. 95 It seems likely 
that illegitimate children of the same mother do have a duty of support to one another. 
[13.2.13] Supporlfor stepchildren: No direct duty of support arises between stepparents and 
stepchildren. 96 A woman married out of community of property and without resources 
17Boberg 'Persons & family' 276; Searle v Protea Assurance 1983 (C) (unreported 6.5.83 case 1.77/81). 
88ln Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance 1977 3 SA 502 (E) duty between grandmother and granddaughter failed 
because the grandmother could look to her children for support; see Boberg 'Persons & family' 275. 
890osthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331 'In my judgment the fact that an indigent child might have a separate claim 
for support from a brother is not sufficient reason for testing a father's need for support by the amount that he needs 
for himself alone. The father has a duty to sustain his wife and children and it would be wholly artificial to consider 
the question on the footing that the father is entitled to provide for himself in priority to his wife and children under 
his roof; cf De Vaal v Messing 1938 TPD 34. It seems that the claim in Oosthuizen v Stanley was brought as a 
single action by the father of the two deceased children. The marriage was in community of property. 
90 Article 46 of MMF agreement ito Act 93 of 1989. 
91 Union & SWA Insurance v Fantiso 1981 3 SA 293 (A) 300C 'The general object of the Act (Compulsory Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Act 56 of 1972) is intended to afford third parties the widest possible protection against loss'; 
Constantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 J SA 60 (A); Ismail v General Accident Insurance 1989 2 SA 468 (D). 
92 19J8 AD J22 JJl. 
930osthuizen v Stanley 19J8 AD J22 J31; Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 19J5 CPD 474; Smith v President 
Insurance 1990 (C) (unreported J 1.10.90 case 1528J/89 in Wynberg magistrates' court). In Anthony v Cape Town 
Municipality 1967 4 SA 445 (A) husband and wife married in community of property had brought separate actions. 
sl5(JO) of Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 mentions only actions for loss of earnings (more generally see 
section 11.4). 
94In Searle v Protea Assurance 198J (C) (unreported 6.5 .83 case I.77/81) separate claims were brought for each 
dependant. Prescription does not run against a minor but it does run against the mother of the children (eg article 
56 of MMF agreement ito Act 9J of 1989). 
9~Spiro 'Parent & Child' Jed J70n94. 
% Jacobs v Cape Town Municipality 1935 CPD 474 481-2; S v MacDonald l 96J 2 SA 4J l (C); Spiro 'Parent & 
Child' Jed 48-9 J70n97. 
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other than support from her husband has no duty to support her children.97 Marriage in 
community of property provides the wife with a resource from which to provide support for 
her children from a previous marriage. She then has an enforceable duty, a liability which, 
by reason of the community of property, her husband may have to meet.98 Stepchildren 
are thus, it seems, entitled to compensation on the death of their stepfather. Such claims 
are derivative through the marital rights of the mother. For this reason it would be correct 
to make a deduction from the stepchildren' s damages for their mother's prospects of further 
remarriage in community of property. It can be argued that stepchildren do not have 
separate claims, but that their mother should claim on a group basis for what she needs for 
herself and her children.99 Where there is a common household, stepchildren will usually 
enjoy de facto support whether by right or not. 100 
[13.2.14] In-laws: A son-in-law married out of community of property has no duty to 
support his parents-in-law. 101 A wife, without financial resources and married out of 
community of property, has no duty to support her parents. It is otherwise if she is married 
in community of property. Her husband may then be called upon to meet this obligation to 
her parents. 102 In the absence of a legal obligation a husband may well feel a moral 
obligation to provide such support. 103 This might take the form of a contractual 
undertaking with his wife or her parents. Such an undertaking would not give rise to a claim 
for damages by the parents-in-law eo nomine. It is arguable that the support provided to the 
wife extends to what she needs to support her parents. 104 This may lead to an increase in 
her claim. A decision to exclude the parents' contractual support from the wife's claim 
would then raise the question of a deduction for what would in any event have been provided 
to the parents. In Munarin's case105 a deduction was made for the support which the 
deceased had provided to his mother without being legally obliged to do so. Circumstances 
97 A court might insist that she go out to work in order to provide herself with the necessary means (Lamb v Sack 
1974 2 SA 670 (f)). 
98Ford v Allen 1925 TPD 5 11; Hartman v Krogscheepers 1950 4 SA 421 (W); S v MacDonald 1963 2 SA 431 (C) 
433C; Wilkie-Page v Wilkie-Page 1979 2 SA 258 (R) 259G-H; Spiro 'Parent & Child ' 3ed 368n74; sl7(5) of 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. There is a presumption that a marriage is in community of property 
(Brummond v Brummond 's Estate 1993 2 SA 494 (Nm)). 
99Following Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331. This result seems unlikely under modern conditions: see 
Constantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A) 671; Ismail v General Accident Insurance 1989 2 SA 468 (D). 
100S v MacDonald 1963 2 SA 431 (C) 432E 'The accused obviously agreed to treat the three stepchildren as his own, 
as an inevitable concomitant with the maintenance of the household, while he had the consortium of his wife'. 
101 Ford v Allen 1925 TPD 5 6; Jacobs v er Municipality 1935 CPD 474 (stepmother). A brother-in-Jaw is not 
obliged to support an indigent sister-in-law (Vaughan v Santam Insurance 1954 3 SA 667 (C) 670-1). 
•rnFord v Allen 1925 TPD 5 11 'As her husband is liable for her obligations, by reason of the community, he may 
conceivably be called upon to carry out his wife's obligations, and thus to support his father-in-law'. See too sl 7(5) 
of Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
103Ford v Allen 1925 TPD 5 11 'There would clearly be a moral obligation on such a son-in-law to render his 
father-in-law maintenance' . 
104By analogy with Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331 'The father has a duty to sustain his wife and children 
and it would be wholly artificial to consider the question on the footing that the father is entitled to provide for 
himself in priority· to his wife and children under his roof. 
• 0~Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1965 I SA 545 (W) 556-7; see too Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 109. 
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may suggest that the support was tenuous and should be ignored because it may have 
terminated at any stage. Alternatively, when the parents share a common household and the 
continuation of the support is highly likely it might be argued that the provision of support 
is gratuitous and thus to be ignored. 106 It would be false, however, to suggest that such 
support was truly gratuitous because it would have been provided in terms of a strong moral 
duty. 107 
· [13.2.15] Support between grandparents and grandchildren: A grandparent owes a duty of 
support to a grandchild provided the parents of the children have not sufficient income to 
support themselves. 108 Conversely a grandchild owes a duty of support to a grandparent 
provided the parent of the grandchild has not the means to support the grandparent. 109 The 
mere fact that a grandchild has undertaken to support a grandparent, and has provided 
support in terms of this agreement, is not sufficient to found a right of action for damages 
for loss of support. 110 
[13.2.16] Uncles nephews and nieces: There is no duty of support between an uncle and his 
indigent nieces and nephews, 111 and vice-versa. 
[13.2.17] Support by breadwinner's estate: The common-law duty of mutual support between 
husband and wife is terminated by the death of one of the spouses. 112 It has been said that 
a parent's duty of support to the children does not terminate on death but continues as a 
· charge against the estate. 113 The better view, however, is that duty of support by the estate 
is separate and distinct from the duty owed by the deceased parent. 114 By reason of statute 
a widow now has similar rights to a child. 115 A dependant is not required to mitigate 
damages by first excussing the estate of the deceased. 116 In one instance a claim for 
support had been successfully lodged against the estate prior to finalization of the claim for 
'
06President Versekeringsmpy v Buthe/ezi 1977 1 PH 126 (A). 
'
07See for instance Van Blerck v Van Blerck 1972 2 SA 799 (C) . 
108G/iksman v Talekinsky 1955 4 SA 468 (W). 
109Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance 1977 3 SA 502 (E) . 
"
0Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance 1977 3 SA 502 (E). 
111 Vaughan v Santam Insurance 1954 3 SA 667 (C). 
112Glazer v Glazer 1963 4 SA 694 (A); Boberg 'Persons & family' 279-83. 
113Spiro 'Parent & Child' Jed 365-6; Boberg 'Persons & family' 283-9; Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 51-2. See 341 
below. 
114Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 
3 SA 295 (A). 
'"Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
116Lockhat 's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 306A 'If the wrongdoer is unable 
to pay, they (the dependants) may be able to claim support from the estate of the deceased'; Groenewald v Snyders 
1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247B-C 'But it does not seem to me .. . that the defendant can dictate to them as to the debtor 
to whom they must look' . 
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damages and a deduction against the damages was ordered. 117 It is doubtful that the 
executor acted in the proper interests of the heirs by admitting claims for support against the 
estate when there was a damages action pending which would have rendered the children 
self-supporting. 
The principles for assessing a claim against a deceased estate are materially different from 
those governing a claim for damages for loss of support. 118 
[13.2.18] Contractual right to supporl: Voet states that compensation for loss of support may 
be claimed by reason of a contract to provide support. 119 A similar conclusion has been 
drawn as regards Grotius. 120 Despite such eminent authority, and the seemingly obvious 
desirability of protecting agreements to provide support, the modem South African law 
denies a right of action for damages based on the loss of contractual support: On the basis 
of this reasoning a divorced woman has no claim for damages for the wrongful killing of her 
ex-husband from whom she was receiving maintenance even though her right derives from 
an order of court. 121 Prior to the passing of legislation122 the widow of a black 
customary union had no right to compensation. 123 The widow of a Hindu or Moslem 
marriage remains without a right of action. 124 The overly zealous technical emphasis by 
South African courts upon the right to support sets South African justice apart from other 
common-law jurisdictions where a more pragmatic and liberal approach prevails. 125 
Common sense suggests that compensation ought to have been awarded to the grandmother 
in Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance, 126 that a divorced woman should be able to claim for 
117Heyns v SA Eagle Versekeringsmpy 1988 (T) (unreported 6.7.88 case 13468/86). 
118See paragraph 6.3.4. 
119Ad Pandectas 25.3 .4; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 66-7; Van der Merwe 1961 THRHR 133 . See too footnote 125 
below. 
120lnleiding 3.33.2; Orawanda v Zimnat Insurance 1990 1 SA 1019 (ZH) 10250 1026B (confirmed on appeal 
reported 1991 2 SA 825 (ZS)). 
121 SA Nasionale Trust & Assuransie v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A) 472-3; Heyns v SA Eagle Versekeringsmpy 1988 
(T) (unreported 6.7.88 case 13468/86). The usual wording of maintenance agreements ensures a continuing right 
to maintenance from the estate of the deceased, if there is an estate (Boberg 'Persons & family' 250n6). 
122s3 l Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963. In the absence of such legislation in Zimbabwe, but having regard 
to other legislation recognizing a customary union, the High Court has recognized such a union as a proper basis 
for compensation (Chawanda v Zimnat Insurance 1990 1 SA 1019 (Z); 1991 2 SA 825 (ZS)). 
123SA Nasionale Trust & Assuransie v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Francis & Freemantle 1961SAU103-5; Boberg 
1961 SAU 214-16. 
124For some Hindu marriages the officiating officer is a designated marriage officer in terms of s3(1) Marriage Act 
25 of 1961. Such marriages are monogamous civil marriages. Where the marriage is potentially polygamous it does 
not enjoy legal force (Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A)). There are no Moslem marriage officers because the 
requirement of monogamy is contrary to the Koran. 
12~Davel 'Broodwinner' 380-3 records that compensation has been awarded in Holland to the partner of a 'gay' 
relationship. See too Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 405; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 403n3; 
McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 860-1. 
1261977 3 SA 502 (E). 
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loss of her right to maintenance, 127 and that a marriage by customary law, be it Hindu 
Moslem or black, should found an action for damages for loss of support. 128 
In Kewana's case129 it was held that the damages claimable under MV A legislation are not 
restricted by what may be claimed under the Roman-Dutch law. In casu damages for loss 
of support were awarded to a child who had been adopted by the deceased in terms of 
customary law. The modem Roman-Dutch law would deny such a child a right of action. 
The reasoning adopted in the Kewana case is to be lauded, but some doubt may be expressed 
that the appellate division in South Africa, as presently constituted, would endorse such a 
liberal interpretation of MV A legislation. 130 
[13.2.19) Diverse uncompensated obligations to maintain: A contract to provide support 
which has been made an order of court, has special features which set it apart from other 
forms of contract. 131 Contractual undertakings to provide support which have not been 
made an order of court do not enjoy special status. They cannot be varied by the court, and 
are, it seems, on the same footing as contracts of employment as regards allowance for 
increases to offset inflation and changing needs. If there is no reciprocal duty on the 
dependant to render services a contract to provide support has a charitable quality. This will 
usually fall short of outright donation by reason of the existence of a moral, or even legal 
obligation to provide the support. 132 Obligations derived from Bantu and other customary 
law, which do not enjoy the force of law, are probably best classified as contractual by 
analogy with the naturalia of a commercial contract which are determined by commercial 
custom. The wife under a black customary union has a statutory right to support133 but not 
even this, it seems, is sufficient to found an action for damages for loss of support. 134 
[13.2.20) Black lAws Amendment Act: The statutory right135 of the widow of a black 
customary union to claim for loss of support is subject to certain limitations:136 Where there 
127Francis & Freemantle 1992 SALJ 197 200-203. 
128Provided the financial requirements of need, and ability to pay, are met. 
129Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 (Tk) (unreported 28.02.93 case 112/88). 
130See paragraph 10.4.4 and the unnecessarily conservative approach there adopted by the appellate division towards 
compensation for 'loss of buying power'. On the other hand it has been said that MVA legislation should be 
interpreted liberally (Constantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A) 671 quoted in footnote 347 at 268). 
131 Strauss v Strauss 1974 3 SA 79 (A) 93-7; Levin v Levin 1984 2 SA 298 (C). 
132See for instance Van B/erck v Van Blerck 1972 2 SA 799 (C). 
133s5(6) Maintenance Act 23 of 1963. 
1340r is it? The recent judgment in Lebona v President Insurance 1991 3 SA 395 (W) 397G 403B-C suggests 
otherwise but would seem to have been less than circumspect as to the consequences of its dicta (see Paterson 1992 
SALJ 18). 
ms31 Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963. More generally see Van der Vyver 1964 THRHR 94-115. 
136Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 60n 142 maintains, following Van der Vyver, that 'daar selde berekenbare vermoenskade 
sal wees aangesien die inheemse reg op 'n ander wyse voorsiening maak vir die afuanklikes'. This incorrect 
conclusion ignores the ruling in Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247 A-D which prevents account being 
taken of alternative sources of support. 
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is more than one widow the compensation is limited to what would have been payable had 
there been only one widow. Where one wife has been married by civil rites then the 
customary unions with the other wives ipso facto are dissolved with a consequent loss of the 
right to claim compensation. 137 Since 2 December 1988 the situation has been reversed: 
After that date the pre-existence of one or more customary unions renders any subsequent 
civil marriage nul and void, save if it has been concluded with the one and only customary-
law wife. 138 This well-intended legislation has served only to cause greater confusion in 
an already difficult area of the law. 
Customary union, that is non-civil marriage, is probably the most common matrimonial 
regime in South Africa. If the Roman-Dutch law is to have relevance for many of the people 
of South Africa then a potentially polygamous customary union (Black, Hindu or Moslem) 
should have the same legal status as a civil marriage. 139 In the Transkei140 and 
Ciskei141 civil and customary marriages have equal status in the sense that fact of one does 
not terminate the other, save that a second civil marriage is bigamous. The state of the law 
in South Africa would be greatly improved by making statutory provision for a 
polygamous142 civil marriage which can be selected at the outset, just as the accrual system 
or community of property can presently be selected under South African law. 143 
[13.3] PERIOD OF DEPENDENCY 
[13.3.1) Between husband and wife: The duty of support between husband and wife may 
continue throughout their joint lifetimes144 or until the breadwinner ceases to have an 
income from which to provide support, or until divorce. 145 If the wife is somewhat 
younger than her husband she may have the prospect of supporting him in his old age. If 
the husband has a substantial pension he will be able to continue to provide support despite 
131Nkambula v Linda 1951 1 SA 377 (A); Van der Vyver 1964 THRHR 94 108-9. Some protection for black wives 
by customary union has now been introduced by sl Marriage and Matrimonial Property Act 3 of 1988 amending 
s22 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927: a party to a customary union may no longer conclude a civil marriage 
except with the other party, and then only if the customary-law wife is the husband's only wife. 
138sl Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988. See Maithufi 1992 THRHR 628-33. 
139Maithufi 1986 De Rebus 555-8; 1990 De Jure 326-33; Francis & Freemantle 1961 SALJ 103-110; 1992 SALJ 197-
203; Boberg 1961 SALJ 214-16; 'African Customary Law' Dlamini 71-85; Labuschagne 1993 De Jure 171-5; 
Chawanda v Zimnat Insurance 1990 1 SA 1019 (Z); 1991 2 SA 825 (ZS). 
140ss37 38 of Transkei Marriage Act 1978. 
141ss 2 & 6 of Customary Law Amendment Decree 1991 (Ciskei). 
1420r potentially polygamous. Dhlamini prefers to describe the black customary union as 'polyganous' (see 'African 
customary Jaw' 74-81). 
143Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
1~e joint expectation of life is shorter than the individual expectation of life of either husband or wife. Actuaries 
do not work with expectations of life but with the chances of the joint survival of both spouses to each and every 
relevant year. It is false reasoning to suggest that because men have shorter life expectancies than women the 
calculation should be based on the man's expectation of life. Some wives do predecease their husbands (see 
paragraph 5.4.8). 
14~See paragraph 13.12.6. Maintenance may be paid after divorce but a divorced woman does not have a right of 
action for damages for Joss of support (see paragraph 13.2. 18). 
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having ceased to work. For persons without other income t,he state pension for women 
commences at age 60 and for men at age 65. 146 The same pension is paid to the husband 
as to the wife. The payment of this pension is subject to a means test based on the joint 
incomes of husband and wife. 147 It follows that an unemployed wife cannot get a state 
pension if her husband works and earns an income. 
[13.3.2] Divorce: This terminates the common-law duty of support between spouses. Any 
maintenance payable thereafter is based on a separate contract and compensation will not be 
awarded for the loss thereof. 148 The deduction for general contingencies will be increased 
for the contingency of divorce. 149 The determination of the deduction for general 
contingencies has been assessed with regard to the prospect that maintenance would have 
been awarded in the event of divorce. 150 This latter approach is difficult to reconcile with 
an approach which denies compensation for the loss of maintenance paid in terms of a 
divorce order. What, for instance, of the husband who is killed on the day before the order 
for divorce is to be given? Does his wife then get compensation for the loss of maintenance? 
If he had been killed a day later she would have been denied a right of action? 
[13.3.3] Children: The duty to support a child continues until the child marries or becomes 
self-supporting. Some children, such as mongoloids or epileptics, may remain dependent 
upon the parents throughout the joint lifetimes of parents and child. Children with serious 
disability are entitled to a state disability grant from age 18. In the lower-income groups this 
pension will usually render the child self-supporting. Parents who can afford tertiary 
education for a child are obliged to provide it for those of their children who have the 
necessary ability. 151 A child below the age of 15 years may not be employed in a factory, 
shop or office. 152 
[13.3.4] Economic depression: Depressed economic conditions coupled with poor education 
facilities leads to cl)ildren in the lower-income groups remaining at school, or at home 
without employment, until fairly advanced ages such as 30. 153 Regulations permit the 
authorities to evict pupils who have not attained a certain minimum education by a specified 
1~here is draft legislation to consolidate all the welfare acts (see 199) and to increase the retirement age for women 
to 65. 
1474Die middeltoets by staatsouderdompensioene' Marais 1980/81 TASSA 83-102. 
141SA Nasiona/e Trust & Assuransie v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A) 472-3; Heyns v SA Eagle Versekeringsmpy 1988 
(T) (unreported 6.7.88 case 13468/86). See paragraphs 13.2. 18 and 13 .2.19. 
149De Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W) . For a discussion of divorce rates see paragraph 13.12.6. 
''°De Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W) 83F relying on Boberg 1964 SAU 194 202n42. 
151Ex Parte Pienaar 1964 I SA 600 (f) 607B-E. 
152sl7(a) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983. 
153Based on evidence of dependency for death claims submitted to my office. See Beckett 'No black and white 
solutions' 1990 Optima 112-33 for a description of conditions in black schools. 
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age. 154 Is a child dependent if unemployed but seeking employment? The answer seems 
to be yes. 155 Clearly a substantial deduction needs to be applied to any compensation for 
the contingency of obtaining employment. Informal employment can be difficult to prove 
and some scepticism may be expected when a healthy child of age 30 claims to be 
continuously dependent on his father. 156 
[13.3.5] Military service: A child undergoing military service is usually not fully 
self-supporting. 157 Disputes on this issue are best resolved by allocating to such a child a 
half-share of family income during the period of military service. 158 
[13.3. 6] Dependent parents: The duty of support owed by a child to the parents can continue 
throughout their joint lifetimes. The contingencies attaching to the continued provision of 
such support will usually be high. 159 A long history of bachelorhood and/or a common 
household with the parents will usually increase the prospect of continuing support. If the 
parents have provided the family home then this constitutes a major contribution and reduces 
dependency on the child. 160 A measure of the value of such a contribution might be the 
rental which the parents could have obtained if paying lodgers had shared the house. 
[13.3. 7] Siblings: The duty of support between siblings terminates at age 21 if the dependent 
sibling is of sound mind and body but may continue throughout life for a sibling in poor 
health. 161 . 
[13.3.8] Dependency but for the death: The dependants are to be compensated for the 
support which would have been provided had death not occurred. It is usual that 
compensation is not paid immediately and delays of 3 to 5 years are not uncommon. The 
death of a father may force children who would normally have enjoyed the benefit of further 
education to go out to work. The compensation should, in such circumstances, be based 
upon the notional period of dependency had the death not occurred, and should assume that 
further education had been provided. The fact that the child has received earnings in the 
1S4Rll43 of29.05.81: The director-general may refuse admission to, or continuing attendance at, a standard 5 class 
for persons over the age of 16. Attendance at a standard 9 or 10 class may be refused for persons over the age of 
18. 
155See paragraph 13 .2.11. 
156With the adverse economic conditions that prevail in South Africa thi s situation is not uncommon. Business Day 
12.6.90 pages l 2 notes that while average black wages have increased faster than inflation the average income of 
black households has not done so. The explanation could be that an increasing number of family members are 
dependent on those who remain employed. 
157Gold v Gold 1975 4 SA 237 (D). 
msee section 13.8. 
159McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 898; see too footnote 73 . 
1150Se~ footnote 66: 
161& parte Pienaar 1964 I SA 600 (T) 607E-F. See paragraph 13 .2. 12. 
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interim should be ignored for the same reasons that the earnings of a widow will be 
ignored. 162 
(13.4] FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF DEPENDENCY 
[13.4.1] Likely support: Compensation is not restricted to what the dependants could claim 
from their breadwinner as of a right. The damages will take account of 'the station in life 
of the parties and the comforts, conveniences and advantages to which they had been 
accustomed'. 163 In like manner damages for loss of earning capacity are assessed having 
regard to what the victim was likely to receive under the contract of employment, not merely 
what he had a right to claim under the contract. 164 The fact that a benefit is at the 
discretion of the breadwinner or his employer does not mean that it will be ignored for 
compensation purposes, the compensation will include the value of the chance of receiving 
such a benefit. 165 The value of lost support is usually determined by reference to the 
earning capacity of the deceased breadwinner after deduction of taxation and that part of his 
earnings which would have been applied to his own support. 
[13.4.2] Bene.fits in kind: When the deceased has provided accommodation, meals, domestic 
help, and electricity over and above his cash income the value of these benefits will be 
added to the cash benefits. 166 The value of the use of a car will also be added. 167 These 
benefits may have been provided by the deceased's employer or from the deceased's own 
assets or business. If the benefit has derived from the deceased's assets allowance must be 
made for the cost of maintaining a car or house, if this cost would in the normal course of 
events have been met from the deceased's cash income. Failure to make this adjustment will 
lead to an overstatement of the value of the benefits enjoyed by the family. Conversely a 
farmer's reported income may have been calculated net of the expenses of maintaining home 
and car. In such cases no further deduction needs to be made. 
[13.4.3] 'Social advantages': The dependants are entitled to compensation for 'loss of social 
advantages'. 168 Compensation will only be awarded if such losses are of a patrimonial 
nature. 169 The one recorded instance of an award for 'loss of social advantages' was for 
a breadwinner who had accumulated a considerable fortune notwithstanding a relatively low 
162See section 13. 10. 
163Jameson 's Minors v CSAR 1908 TS 575 602. 
164eg overtime, future promotions and increases to offset the effects of inflation. 
165See chapter 4. 
166Laney v Wal/em 1931 CPD 360 361; Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 616C-F. 
167Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) lOllB; Burns v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 361-2 (the 
unusual approach a<jopted in the Burns case reflected the manner in which plaintiff had pleaded). 
168Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 851 'The wife and children of a person of high or exalted 
position may reasonably expect tangible advantages to flow from their relationship to such person and no doubt their 
loss of such advantages could be taken into account in assessing damages'. 
169Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 721sup 'In both Hesse/son's case and Roberts' s case the 
Court was dealing with a loss of social advantages on the footing of a loss of an actual patrimonial nature'. 
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income. 170 The analysis of business capital above171 has included capital accumulation 
as part of earning capacity. 172 Conversely a history of declining net capital resources 
should give rise to a lower award than that indicated by the immediate income of the 
deceased. 173 If capital accumulation is to be included under the earning capacity of the 
breadwinner then there is no need to retain 'social advantages' in this sense as a class of loss. 
Since the expression has no other identifiable meaning it does not add anything of value to 
the discussion of damages for loss of support. 
[13.4.4) 'Comfo.rls, conveniences and advantages': These are the financial benefits that are 
enjoyed by the dependants not as of a right but rather due to the social and financial status 
of the breadwinner. Such benefits would include such things as transport in a status motor 
car, or overseas travel as a member of the deceased's family. It would also include benefits 
provided by way of discretion or goodwill, such as the provision of a motor car for personal 
use, or an overseas holiday. -This does not mean to say that every person who suffers 
financial loss by reason of the death of a breadwinner has a right of action for 
compensation. 174 The right to claim support, albeit at a lower level than was being 
provided, is essential to a successful action for loss of support. 175 The duty of support will 
usually have regard to the general standard of living of the family.176 It follows that the 
benefits described above might well be viewed as part of what the deceased was obliged to 
contribute in any event. In one instance the donation of an expensive motor car was 
considered in keeping with the standard of living of the family .177 
Just as the damages will be increased for 'comforts, conveniences and advantages' attaching 
to the provision of support so too will the damages be reduced for liabilities of the 
breadwinner which he was likely to incur, albeit not in terms of a legal obligation. One has 
here in mind the provision of additional money to a self-supporting mother178 or the 
170Hesse/son v SAR 1921(T)(unreported2.9.21) quoted in Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 851. 
171See paragraph 12.17.4. 
172See too Roberts v London Assurance 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 851; Marine & Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 
480 (A) 488-9; Santam Insurance v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) 269-70. Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 105 notes that 
'Daar word verder geen aftrekkings gemaak ten opsigte van verbandlenings nie'. 
173See paragraph 12.17.2. 
174Francis & Freemantle 1961 SAU l 03-5 provides an example of the confusion that has been created in the minds 
of some by the 'comforts, conveniences and advantages' criterion. Boberg 1961 SAU 214 points to the errors of 
the Francis & Freemantle view. 
msee paragraph 13.2.2. 
176Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 135 'The scale upon which support must be rendered depends upon the social 
position, financial means and style of living of the spouses '. 
177See footnote 132. 
178See, for instance, Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1965 l SA 545 (W) 556-7; see too Davel 
'Skadevergoeding' 109. 
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maintenance of a so-called 'common-law wife' 179 or the indulgence m expensive 
hobbies. 180 
[13.5] USE OF ASSETS 
[13.5.1) Real rate of return: The income of the deceased may include income from 
investments. Fixed interest investments will provide interest income at a nominal rate of, 
say, 16% per year. It will usually be wrong to add such interest income to the deceased's 
other income and then project future income by adding inflation. The interest income based 
on a nominal rate cannot, of its own accord, be expected to grow in future years. 181 For 
this reason it is preferable to add to the deceased's income from earnings a real rate of 
return 182 of, say, 2,5 % per year on the capital invested. If one then assumes plough back 
of the inflation component183 of the interest then it is reasonable to project future 
investment income by adding inflation. The rate chosen will usually be consistent with the 
net capitalization rate to be used for capitalizing the award. One does find very low real 
rates of return being ordered by the courts for capitalization purposes. 184 The use of such 
very low rates implies that the notional support provided by the deceased from investments, 
or the use of assets such as the family home, should be assessed at an equally low value in 
real terms. 
[13.5.2) Use value of a home: Over extended periods of time rentals and property values 
tend, with a good many leads and lags, to move in line with inflation.1 85 The value to the 
family of the use of the family home is usually not equal to the full rental value of the 
property. Ownership implies expenses, 186 property taxes and maintenance. 187 If the net 
179See paragraph 13.7.7. 
11K>See paragraph 13.7.13. 
181 Although it may go up over short periods of time when interest rates rise, but conversely it will fall when interest 
rates fall. 
182For a definition of 'real rate of return' see 128. 
183See paragraph 8.1. 7. 
is.Oberholzer v NEG Insurance 1988 4 C&B A3-1 (C) (1 % py); Ga/lie v NEG Insurance 1992 2 SA 731 (C) (1,5% 
py); Dusterwald v Santam Insurance 1990 4 C&B A3-45 (C) 60-4 (13 py). 
18sStatistical News Release P0102 'Survey of Flats - May 1990' 11 shows the index for flat rentals to have risen from 
36,4 in 1978 to 159, 1 in 1990, an average compound rate of increase of 13 3 py compared to a comparable increase 
in the CPI of 14,5% py. TRENDS September 1991 30 gives an index for house prices which increases from 30,4 
in 1978 to 178,7 in 1990, an average compound rate of increase of 15,9% py which was in excess of the rate of 
inflation. These figures suggest that shortfalls in rent increases are compensated by greater increases in property 
values. Considering the erratic nature of markets there probably have been periods when both rents and prices have 
simultaneously dropped behind the rate of inflation, and. vice-versa. 
1il&J'he extent to which immovable property is maintained will determine its rate of depreciation. If maintenance 
expenses are extensively avoided then the property will usually depreciate in value. An older person may 
deliberately engage in such a strategy in order to maximise income and in the knowledge that he will not live long 
enough to need worry about the reduced value of the property. 
1874To this, I think, should be added the value of the right of occupying, jointly with her husband and children, the 
house, which was his property ... its net rental return, after deducting rates and repairs, would probably not be more 
than £120, and I think £40 would be an ample allowance for her right of occupancy' Laney v Wal/em 1931 CPD 
360 361. In Maasberg v Hunt Leuchars & Hepburn 1944 WLD 2 13 the present value of the right of occupancy 
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real return on property exceeded the net capitalization rate used for discounting to present 
value this would imply that every claimant could invest his or her award in lettable property 
and thus that a higher rate should be used for discounting. It follows that the use value of 
ownership of a house should be in conformity with the net rate to be used for capitalizing 
the award. 188 The yearly value to the family is then that amount in rands which will give 
a real rate of return on the value of the property equal to, say, 2,5 % per year. The property 
value for this purpose should be taken net of bond indebtedness. This is so because the 
dependency calculation is usually done without deduction for the repayments which pay for 
that portion of the value of the family home which is bonded. Bond subsidies by the 
employer are usually added to the overall income from which the deceased is deemed to have 
provided support. 189 
[13.5.3) Wife's assets: If a wife has assets her right to claim support from her husband will, 
in the event of separation, be abated by reason of the support she can draw from such assets. _ 
If the wife owns the family home, for instance, she cannot then call upon her husband to 
provide her with a home, although if she has no cash income she may ask for assistance with 
the expenses of keeping the home. Where her investments provide a cash income the benefit 
thereof may be by way of a full nominal rate of return of, say, 16% per year. Alternatively 
if there is ploughback of income, or limited in~ome such as dividends, then a real rate of 
return of, say, 2,5 % per year might be used. The use of a real rate of return would be a fair 
approach if the wife owns and provides the family home. 
[13.5.4) Donations between spouses: The assets owned by the wife may have been given to 
her by her husband. In a time when donations between spouses were revocable there was 
much to be said for treating such assets as belonging to the husband. Donations between 
spouses are no longer revocable, even donations made prior to the passing of the Act. 190 
The wife is rendered self-supporting by the donation and it would seem proper to reduce the 
value of her right to support from her husband by reason of assets held in her own right. 
The fact of such donations in the past may justify an increase to the wife's award to allow 
for the chance of further such donations being made in future years. 
[13.5.5) Communal assets: Where husband and wife were married in community of property 
they were joint owners of the family assets and as such each would have contributed equally 
by way of assets t<1 the support of the family. The wife would hold such assets in her own 
of a wife without children was taken to be roughly equal to the accelerated value of the inheritance of the property. 
In Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 616D-F the Maasberg approach was rejected in favour of the 
approach in Laney v Wal/em. The Maasberg approach is at best a very rough approximation which may hold true 
under limited circumstances. 
18
'There would be a tax advantage for an owner-occupier as compared to rental income. Because expenses are 
tax-deductible the tax advantage will usually be very small. 
189This is consistent with the approach in Marine & Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) whereby 
savings are included in the income of the family apportioned to determine the notional level of support (see footnote 
172). 
190s22 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
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right and the value of her right to support from her husband should be abated 
accordingly. 191 If the community assets included business assets then the deceased's 
income would have been provided in part from the assets owned by his wife. It would be 
appropriate to reduce the deceased' s income to allow for this contribution .192 
[13.5.6] Going concerns: A business may be worth more as a going concern than in 
liquidation. Sale of the business during the lifetime of the deceased would have produced 
a higher value than in liquidation after his death. The right to support during the deceased's 
lifetime would usually have regard to the value of the business as a going concern whereas 
the deduction for inheritance would have regard to the actual realized value. If the widow 
successfully takes over the business her earnings from the business must be ignored193 but 
her advantage by way of inheritance would be the enhanced value of the business as a going 
concern. 
[13.5. 7] Rapidly depreciating assets: The above analysis of assets, both private and business, 
has presumed that these increase over the years more or less in line with inflation. Not all 
assets increase in value. Thus a motor car or computer is usually a depreciating asset. 194 
One possible solution in assessing such an asset is to depreciate the value over a suitable 
number of years and add the depreciation in each year to the deceased' s notional provision 
of support in that year. 195 Once fully depreciated the asset will be removed from the 
calculation. Alternatively one may take the view that the asset could be sold at any time and 
converted into some other asset, possibly an appreciating one. There may also be other 
appreciating assets of which the real rate of return is ploughed back and not consumed by 
the family, thereby offsetting the depreciation. For larger estates the use value of total assets 
may conveniently be taken as approximately equal to the real return on the total assets. 196 
[13.5.8] Retirement assets: Once a self-employed person, such as a farmer or shopkeeper, 
retires the income from the business will cease but the assets will become available as a 
source of support. It will usually be unrealistic to measure post-retirement income on the 
basis of the real rate of return on the assets. Part of the assets such as the home and 
furniture will be consumed to the extent that they are allowed to depreciate. 197 Other assets 
may be invested in high-income interest bearing investments, such as participation mortgage 
bonds, with an associated ongoing attrition of the real value of the capital. On the other 
191 In general see Santam Insurance v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk) 269. The Meredith case unfortunately fails to 
discuss the extent of the right to support had the death not occurred. 
1920ne has in mind here the notional real rate of return if the assets were sold and invested. The balance of the 
income is attributable to the efforts of the deceased (see paragraphs 12.17.2 to 12.17.4) provided the wife did not 
assist in the business. 
193Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 727-8. See too section 13.10. 
194In real terms if not in nominal terms. 
• 
195See paragraph 10.2.5. 
196 A rate of, say, 2,5 % py would be applied to the total net assets in the estate. This approach greatly simplifies 
the calculations and eliminates much speculation on detail whilst achieving some allowance for the use of the assets. 
See comments by the courts in legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617-618. 
197See paragraph 10.2.5. 
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hand the income apportioned prior to retirement may include an element of savings which 
will not be used to provide support until after retirement. 198 Care should be taken not to 
double count the savings built into the pre-retirement calculation. The assets observable at 
date of death will thus reflect only part of those that would in the normal course have been 
available at retirement. Whatever approach is taken as regards asset consumption after 
retirement, it should bear some sensible relationship to the standard of living enjoyed prior 
to the death. As a general rule one would assume consumption of capital. A useful rule-of-
thumb would be to assume consumption of capital at 1/2 the rate of inflation. The need for 
an express opinion in this regard is generally only necessary when the deceased was already 
approaching retirement age (say within 10 years thereof). There is no general rule that self-
employed persons retire fully at 60 or 65, as happens to salaried persons subject to pension 
fund rules. Even salaried persons may continue employment after retirement, sometimes at 
a lower rate of pay. 
In some cases there may be the prospect that the business or farm would have been sold to 
a child with provision for regular payments to the parents. Such evidence would obviate the 
need for rules-of-thumb. 
[13.5.9] Adjustment to accelerated benefits: 199 If the widow has inherited and a deduction 
is to be made for the accelerated benefit200 then the fact of consumed capital after 
retirement must be brought into account when calculating the present value of the prospect 
of inheritance had the death occurred at some other ti me: The normal calculation assumes 
that the assets to be inherited will escalate, like future earnings, in line with inflation.201 
If there is reason to believe that after retirement the assets will be consumed in real terms 
then one must assume a rate of escalation in the future value of the assets at a rate below the 
rate of inflation. This low escalation rate will give rise to a low present value for the 
inheritance prospect, and thus an increased deduction for the advantage of acceleration. 202 
Conversely her claim for loss of support will have been increased by the assumption of 
consumed capital. 
[13.6] SERVICES IN THE HOME 
[13.6.1] Separate claims: If the deceased rendered valuable services to the family, such as 
car repairs, woodworking, painting, plumbing, the value of these services reflects an addition 
to the support enjoyed by the family. 203 The most valuable contribution by way of services 
in the home is usually made by the wife. In the event of her death it is usual to determine 
compensation on the basis of the cost of replacing her services less the saving from no longer 
198Marine & Trade Insurance v Marimah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) 488-9 . 
199-fhis topic is discussed more fully at 333. 
200See 333. 
201The calculation follows the same lines as a loss of support calculation but with the yearly support payments being 
replaced with projected value of the assets in the estate and the chance of the deceased 's survival being replaced with 
the chance of his death in the relevant year (see 92). 
202See 334. 
203Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 415-16. 
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having to provide her with support. 204 This approach reflects a perception of a husband 
who claims not only what he needs for himself but also what he needs for his children.205 
The modem tendency to allow each dependant a separate claim206 suggests that the value 
of services should be apportioned amongst the dependants in the same way that other benefits 
are apportioned.207 A major objection to a claim based on expenses actually incurred after 
the death is that most families cannot afford to incur any expense until after compensation 
has been paid. There is then no award for past loss of services notwithstanding that the 
family has been deprived of such services. 208 By adding the value of notional services to 
the overall support before apportionment the dependants are assured of receiving 
compensation for the past loss of the utility of the services. 209 A further objection to 
assessing the loss of the wife's services on the basis of the incurred cost of replacement is 
that the dedicated attention day and night of a caring mother cannot be compared to the 
services of a hired help. In England the value of a wife's services has been assessed at 
greater value than the cost of hiring a replacement. 210 This presumes that the claim for the 
added value of the wife's services is to be viewed as patrimonial. If the benefit is viewed 
as a form of general damages then it is not permitted under the dependants' action.211 
[13.6.2] Utilitarian approach: If loss of services in the home were to be compensated on the 
same basis as loss of support212 then the value of the services once rendered by the 
deceased would be apportioned between the family members. 213 The care of children 
usually takes up a good deal of the mother's time and energy.214 It is thus appropriate to 
allow equal shares to parents and children. The services rendered by a father (car repairs, 
house repairs) tend to be less related to the needs of the children than to the family as a 
whole and it would be appropriate to use for a father the more usual two-parts-one-part 
204
'1t is possible that the plaintiff may prove that after making allowance for the fact that he no longer has to support 
his wife, the arrangements necessitated to replace her supervision and assistance in the upbringing of the children 
entail a pecuniary loss' Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 669inf. 
205De Vaa/ v Messing 1938 TPD 34 38; Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331. Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 48n 1 138 
views the action for loss of services as separate and distinct from the action for loss of support. See section 11.4. 
206Constantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A); Ismail v General Accident Insurance 1989 2 SA 468 (D). See 
sections 11.4 and 13.6. 
207eg on a two-parts-one-part basis. 
208See paragraph 11.3.4. 
209Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 417 418 prefers the 'loss of utility' approach; so too, it seems, do Cooper-Stephenson & 
Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 434 436 439n48. 
21
°McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 897; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 140nl00; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 418 419 re similar 
developments in Canada and the USA. Principle approved in Wood v Santam Insurance 1976 2 PH J52 (C); see 
too unreported judgment cited in Hendricks v President Insurance 1993 3 SA 158 (C) 160-1. 
211 Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 420-1; paragraphs 13.1.1and13.1.2. 
212See section 13.8. 
213 Apportionment of the value of services takes place in Australian law if there is no father at the time of the trial 
(Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 425). 
114This consideration probably accounts for the traditional limi.tation of the claim to the period of the children's 
dependency (Union Government v Warneke 191 l AD 657 669inf; Yorkshire Insurance v Porobic 1957 1 C&B 90 
(A)). 
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formula. If there are no children then the value of the services would, in the absence of 
special circumstances, be apportioned equally between husband and wife. 
[13.6.3] Substitute services: It has been ruled that the compensation due to the children 
should not be abated by reason of additional support received from the surviving parent 
subsequent to the death . 215 This ruling suggests that when assessing compensation for the 
children on a utility basis no account should be taken of the fact that a father has hired a 
substitute housekeeper, or remarried. 
[13.6.4] Services of grandparents: A deceased grandmother may have rendered services by 
way of child-minding and housekeeping. By reason of her services the mother would have 
been able to go out to work and supplement the cash income of the household. The 
grandmother's death may have brought about a very real pecuniary loss to the family. 
Compensation will probably be denied on the grounds that the mother of the children is still 
alive and well and that the grandmother did not provide the services in terms of a duty of 
support. 216 
[13.6.5] Period of loss: The claim for the loss of a wife's services has traditionally been 
limited to the period of dependency of the children.217 This approach overlooks the fact 
that a wife's services in the home have value to her husband even if there are no 
children. 218 If the wife did not work, any loss by way of her services will usually be 
wholly offset by the saving from no longer having to support her. However, where she was 
working and was largely or wholly self-supporting the husband's loss by way her services 
in the home may be quite substantial.219 The assessment of the services rendered in the 
home by a deceased husband require similar treatment to the services of a wife. 
[13.6.6] Deduction/or remarriage: The claim for loss of services in the home is subject to 
a deduction for remarriage if the claim is brought by the surviving spouse. 220 However if 
the claim for loss of services lies with the children then a deduction for the remarriage 
prospects of the surviving parent will not be made.221 
[13. 6. 7] Anomalous aspects: The value of services in the home needs to be distinguished 
from cash income and provision of accommodation, transport, food and servants. This arises 
from the nature of the duty of support: A wife who works and earns sufficient in cash and 
kind to provide for her own support has no right to claim support from her husband in the 
mGroenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247. 
216See reasoning in Barnes v Union & SWA Insurance 1977 3 SA 502 (E). 
217Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 669inf; Yorkshire Insurance v Porobic 1957 l C&B 90 (A). 
21
'McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 895n29. Finance Week 23-29.10.86. 'The work performed by women and men in 
households is not assigned any economic value; yet this work equals , in monetary terms, a huge proportion of the 
total amount of wages and salaries paid by all employers in SA'. 
2 19Luntz ' Damages' 2ed 417 (Tong v Purdy). 
22
°Cooke & Cooke v Maxwell 1942 SR 133 136; McGregor ' Damages ' !4ed 896n37. 
221 Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D; Senior v NEG Insurance 1989 2 SA 136 (W). 
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event of a separation. 222 A full-time housewife, however, may provide services in the 
home of substantial value but this, unlike cash earnings, in no way abates her right to claim 
support from her husband in the event of his leaving home. Davel223 states that the action 
for loss of services is separate and distinct from the action for loss of support. There is little 
doubt that in its traditional form it is anomalous. However one may question Davel's view 
on the grounds that the claim for both loss of support and for loss of services arises from the 
wrongful killing of another. What is more the services in issue may be claimed as of a right 
just as support can be claimed. A plea of res judicata may be raised against dependants who 
seek to claim for loss of services if they have previously finalized a claim for loss of support. 
Such a plea may not be raised if the loss of services has been caused by an injury to the 
surviving spouse. 224 The anomaly observed by Davel is more the giving of a right of 
action to the husband for expenses incurred subsequent to the death. If the value of services 
were treated on a utility basis as part of the support enjoyed but for the death and 
apportioned between the dependants then the anomaly disappears. 
(13.7] DEDUCTIONS FROM THE DECEASED'S INCOME 
The deductions here discussed are those which serve to reduce the support which the 
deceased would have provided but for his death. Deductions by way of compensating 
advantages are discussed elsewhere. 
[13. 7.1] Taxation and travel costs: There seems to be unanimity in all common-law 
jurisdictions that a deduction should be made from the deceased's notional earnings for the 
taxation that he would have had to pay had he lived.225 
If the deceased did not live at his place of work then there would be a saving as regards the 
costs that would have been incurred with travelling to and from work.226 
[13. 7.2] Deceased's own living expenses: Once a person has died the family is spared the 
cost of his own support. This needs to be deducted before allocating the balance of his 
income amongst his dependants. There are a number of family expenses which do not fall 
away when the breadwinner dies. 227 Thus, for instance: the rent for the family home will 
remain the same; the cost of the housemaid will not reduce. In South Africa the appellate 
division and has shown preference for allocating such expenses to the deceased on a 
222The extent of a right to support can as a rule, only be tested under circumstances of a family divided. 
223
'Skadevergoeding' 48nl 138. 
'224£vins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 (A); Erdmann v Sanram Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C). 
'225Even in Canada, where no deduction is made for taxation when assessing loss of earning capacity, tax is deducted 
when assessing loss of support: Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 181-95 463-4. 
'226See 152 and 226. 
227McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 890n8 l 896n4 l ; Luntz 'Damages ' 2ed 412; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages 
in Canada' 428-9 refer to the 'marginal cost of the expenditures to the deceased' , ie the extent to which the presence 
of the deceased in his lifetime had raised the cost of running the household. 
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somewhat formal basis, usually with two parts to each parent and one part to each child. 228 
This South African approach reflects the utility prior to the death of the breadwinner's share 
of the overall cost of maintaining the family unit, including himself. 
[13.7.3] Maintenance provided in absence of duty to do so: In general the extent of the 
support enjoyed by dependants is a question of fact. It is not enough to establish that the 
deceased had a duty to provide support and the means to provide it. 229 It must also be 
established that the deceased would have provided support in pursuance of this duty. It 
follows that if the deceased would regularly have applied his income to expenditures not 
for the benefit of his dependants then the income available for the support of the 
dependants should be reduced. 230 An important consideration would be the likely 
continuance of the expenditure in the future. In one instance the court found that the 
deceased had been making payments to his mother in Italy without having a duty to do so. 
The notional income available for the support of the dependants was reduced by these 
payments. 231 Likewise, it seems, payments of support to an ex-wife should be deducted 
despite there being no common-law duty to make such payments. The provision of support 
to stepchildren would also seem to be deductible.232 Further such deductible items are now 
discussed: 
[13. 7.4] More than one wife: For women married by polygamous customary union there is 
a statutory directive that compensation for two or more wives be limited to what would have 
been payable had there been only one wife. 233 The proper approach to the children's 
claims is not quite clear. The one-wife share would be apportioned equitably between the 
widows. The simplest method is to apportion equally between the two· or more widows the 
two parts of family income normally allocated to a single widow.234 With three widows 
this would mean allocating two thirds of a part to each widow. The children would then be 
allocated one part each. This may well lead to overcompensation for the children, but since 
the widows are probably undercompensated the defendant has little to complain about. 
[13. 7.5] Hindu and Moslem marriages: The wife or wives of marriages concluded by Hindu 
or Moslem rites will have a contractual right to support while the common household 
228Lega/ Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 616B-F (rental value of flat); Nochomowitz v Santam .Insurance 1972 
3 SA 640 (A) 647-9 (suggested that two servants be reduced to one). The finding in Maasberg v Hunt Leuchars & 
Hepburn 1944 WLD 2 15 in favour of allowance for indivisible expenses does not reflect good law in South Africa; 
see too Davel 'Skadevergoeding • 110-11 . 
229See paragraph 13.2. 1. 
230See paragraph 13.4.4. 
231 Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) (both the mother of the deceased and the mother 
of the wife had derived benefit from the deceased 's income). 
232See paragraph 13.2.13. 
233s31 of Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963. 
234See section 13.8. 
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lasts. 235 For this reason it seems correct that a deduction be made for the expenses of their 
keep. 
[13. 7. 6] Further children and fwther wives: For a young family there will be the prospect 
of further children and a deduction needs to be made for the notional costs of keeping these 
children. 236 For potentially polygamous marriages there is the prospect that the deceased 
may also have taken a further wife, or wives. Allowance for this consideration would be 
done on the basis of the value of the chance and may well be brought into account under the 
deduction for general contingencies. 237 
[13. 7. 7} 'Common-law wife': When a man and a woman choose to live together as man and 
wife but without the sanction of a formal ceremony, civil or sacred, it is usual to speak of 
a 'common-law wife'. 238 The act of setting up a common household and the manner of its 
management will in the normal course of events give rise to a contract, express or implied, 
governing the relationship between the parties as to provision of support, services, etc. This 
contractual right to support from the deceased would justify making a deduction for the 
expenses of keeping the 'common-law wife' notwithstanding that she has no claim for 
damages for loss of support.239 The increasing prevalence of such relationships may lead 
in time to the granting of a right of action to the 'widow'. 
[13. 7.8} Gratuitous support: In Buthelezi's case240 the support provided to waifs taken in 
from the street was viewed as charitable and thus to be ignored in assessing the damages for 
the legitimate children of the deceased. This principle suggests that the support provided to 
a 'common-law wife' should be similarly treated. However, the provision of support to the 
mother of a man's children is provided in terms of strong moral, if not contractual, 
obligation. Even without bearing children the 'common-law wife' will usually have rendered 
valuable services in the home for which her support may be viewed as a quid pro quo. The 
relationship between the deceased and his 'common-law wife' would not have been without 
benefits for the deceased. It seems inappropriate to describe support provided under such 
circumstances as 'charitable'. 241 · 
msee, for example, Ismail v Ismail 1983 l SA 1006 (A). 
23601isholm v ERPM 1909 TH 297 30linf; Burns v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 362G; Milns v Protea 
Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1010-11; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 9198 llln753. Roughly 2 children per white 
woman, 3 per coloured woman, and 5 per black woman (see 'Demographic Trends' 81-103). This may be done 
explicitly in the actuarial calculation. 
237Black custom frowns upon the remarriage of a widow (Seymour 'Customary Law' 5ed 286-94). 
238The expression is misleading in that the Jaw does not give recognition to such a de facto marriage , if marriage it 
can be called. The 'wife' of such a relationship is also known as a 'houvrou'. 
239See 292. McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 893-4 discusses an English ruling where the cost of supporting a common-
Jaw wife was deducted when assessing the damages for the children. See too Luntz 'Damages ' 2ed 413n4. The 
deduction made by the English and Australian courts has regard to indivisible household expenses (see paragraph 
13.7.2 above). 
240President Versekeringsmpy v Butlrelezi 1977 l PH J26 (A). 
241 ln Munarin v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1965 l SA 545 (W) 556 the court deducted gratuitous payments to 
the deceased's mother and mother-in-law. There seems to have been some sort of contractual undertaking to support 
the mother-in-law who shared the common household. The deceased's mother in Italy was provided with payments 
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[13. 7.9] Charity: Expenditure on a charitable cause will generally form part of the support 
provided to the family. 242 Not the least reason for this consideration is that the relevant 
financial resources could at any time be diverted to other forms of expenditure for the benefit 
of the family. In Buthelezi's case the family had taken in a number of needy children. The 
family income was apportioned amongst the natural children of the deceased. Care needs 
to be exercised when dealing with black family relationships because the relevant customary 
law may have created a contractual or moral obligation to provide the relevant support under 
circumstances where the Roman-Dutch law imposes no such obligation. 243 
[13.7.10] Pension deductions and insurance premiums: If the deceased contributed to a 
pension fund it is usual to deduct the relevant contribution from current income, and then to 
add back the value of the notional pension which would have accrued on normal 
retirement. 244 It has been suggested that by reason of the Assessment of Damages Act245 
a like deduction should be made for life insurance premiums. 246 If such a deduction were 
to be made, by analogy with pension benefits, then there should be added back the present 
value of the benefits when the policies eventually mature.247 Prior to the passing of the 
Assessment of Damages Act it was ruled that no deduction should be made for life insurance 
premiums.248 This, it seems, continues to be the practice. Pension-fund deductions from 
salary are compulsory, a condition of service. Life insurance premiums are discretionary 
savings which could be diverted to other purposes at any point in time. When interpreting 
the Assessment of Damages Act considerations of fairness do not play a major role.249 
[13. 7.11] Savings: It has been suggested that a deduction be made for that part of the 
deceased's income which would have been saved and thus not applied to the support of the 
family. 250 Savings, however, reflect discretionary spending capacity. Savings may be used 
in the long term to finance old age or to provide continued support after the premature death 
of the breadwinner. In the shorter term savings may be spent at any time by, for example, 
purchasing a new car or a swimming pool or upgrading the family home. By increasing the 
family's assets the value of the usufruct of the assets is increased. It is clear that the ability 
now and again, and such payments seemed lik~ly to continue until her death. 
242President Versekeringsmpy v Buthe/ezi 1977 1 PH J26 (A). 
241eg the ukungena relationship whereby a brother or nearest male relative of the deceased must take over 
responsibility for the wives of the deceased (Seymour 'Customary Law' 286-94). See too Kewana v Santam 
Insurance 1993 (fk) (unreported 28.02.93 case 112/88) for adoption by customary law. 
244See, for example, Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 1979 2 SA 904 (A). 
24
'9 of 1969. 
246Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 180; Davel 'Broodwinner' 535-6 575; Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 54. 
247The majority of policies sold these days are endowments. A life policy or term policy provides no benefit during 
the lifetime of the breadwinner. 
248Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247-8. 
249See, for instance the anomalous result in Du Toit v General Accident Insurance 1988 3 SA 75 (D). The widow 
was compensated for the loss of her husband's pension notwithstanding that as a widow she had become entitled to 
80 % of that pension from the same source. 
2~Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 110n748. 
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to save may ensure a better standard of living in future years or a greater security for the 
prevailing standard of living. Savings imp'ly improved inheritance prospects for the 
dependants. It follows from the above considerations that it will be rare indeed to find a 
deduction being made for savings. 251 
[13.7.12] Wife's income: It has been suggested that a wife may work and keep her earnings 
without any obligation to contribute to the support of herself or the family .252 All support · 
is provided by her husband. The Matrimonial Property Act253 now makes it compulsory 
for a wife to contribute to household expenses pro-rata her means. 254 Quite part from this 
legislation, for the reasons set out in the previous paragraph it would be rare indeed that a 
wife's earnings were not completely or partially applied to the benefit of the family either 
by way of savings or by providing luxuries such as overseas travel or a swimming pool or 
tertiary education for the children, things which would not have been possible on the 
husband's income alone. In Yorkshire Insurance v Porobic255 it was accepted that the 
entire combined income of husband and wife had been applied to the support of the family. 
It is conceivable that a wife may utilise her earnings for the support of her parents or donate 
her earnings to a charitable cause. 256 
[13.7.13] Expensive hobbies: The evidence may reveal that the deceased engaged in an 
expensive interest to the exclusion of his family, eg yachting, big-game hunting, irresponsible 
business speculation, gambling or keeping a mistress. It would be appropriate to exclude 
such expenditure from the deceased's earnings to the extent that the self-indulgence was 
likely to persist in the future to the detriment of the family support. The earnings of a wife 
might likewise be applied to selfish ends such as overseas travel for herself alone. 
[13.7.14] Insolvent breadwinner. An insolvent breadwinner, that is to say one whose 
liabilities exceeded his assets shortly before he died, would, had he lived, have had to apply 
part of his income to servicing and reducing his debt. It follows that the income available 
for the support of his dependants should be reduced to allow for this. The extent of the net 
indebtedness would normally be determined by reference to the deceased's estate after 
exclusion of life insurance benefits. If insolvency proceedings seem likely then he may be 
rnMarine & Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) (compensation based on full income from business 
notwithstanding drawings at very much lower level). See too McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 877; Cooper-Stephenson 
& Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 440-2. 
252Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 138-9; Milns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1012. Section 3 of Matrimonial 
Affairs Act 37 of 1953 reads 'A husband and wife married out of community of property shall be liable jointly and 
severally for all debts incurred by either spouse in respect of necessaries for the joint household: Provided that if 
the wife pays any such debts or part thereof, she shall have a right of recourse against the husband for the full 
amount paid by her'. It is unclear whether this section records a pre-existing perception of the law of whether it 
has created the view expressed by Davel. Suffice it to say that the section has now been repealed (see next footnote). 
253 88 of 1984 s23 as regards marriages out of com~nunity of property. 
254For a wife married in community of property he~ earnings are pooled with those of her husband. 
255 1957 1 C&B 90 (A) 94 'the fact that the necessity persisted for such a long time rather suggests that this may have 
been a family, like so many others, in which the whole of the income was consumed by the cost of living'. 
256See paragraph 13.7.3. 
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relieved of such obligations and his earnings protected from his creditors because they are 
entirely needed for the support of his family. 
[13.8] APPORTIONMENT OF FAMILY INCOME 
[13.8.1] Family income de.fined: The financial resources available for supporting the family 
include the combined net earnings of husband and wife plus the yearly value of the use of 
assets. The assessment of damages for loss of support is concerned with what have been 
provided had the death not occurred. 'Family income' is thus not so much a question of 
what has been provided in the past but rather what would have been provided in the future, 
had the deceased lived. Where the calculation is to be based on the earnings of the deceased 
the court may have regard to his earning capacity in lieu of explicit evidence of what was 
being earned at the time of the death.257 A similar approach is appropriate as regards the 
earnings of the wife. In those instances where she was unemployed at the time of the death 
there may have been a substantial chance that she would have taken up employment in time 
to come. 
The discussion below begins with the situation where only one spouse would have worked 
during the subsistence of the marriage. The assessment problems created by the earning 
capacity of the surviving spouse are discussed subsequently.258 
The value of services in the home are excluded from this part of the calculation because it 
is subject to different considerations as regards apportionment. 259 
The share of family income to be apportioned to each family member is, in theory, a 
question of fact to be determined from the evidence. In practice families do not keep 
meticulous financial records as to the past allocation of resources. The court is often driven 
to doing the best it can with scanty or non-existent evidence. 
[13.8.2] Two-parls-one-parl method: In order to fill this evidential void reliance is often 
placed upon a formalism of calculation whereby two parts are allocated to each parent and 
one part to each child. 260 As each child becomes self-supporting the available income is 
reallocated amongst the remaining family members until a time is reached when all children 
have notionally left home and the husband and wife enjoy the family income in equal shares. 
Whether this formalism is an actuarial invention or a product of the maintenance courts we 
cannot tell. It is, however, in widespread use for purposes of resolving disputes as to the 
allocation of family income. It is not, however, a rule of law and the courts have no 
obligation to abide by such an apportionment of family income. 261 
mlebona v President Versekeringsmpy 1991 3 SA 395 (IN) 401-2; Van Staden v President Versekeringsmpy 1990 
4 C&B L2-l (IN). See discussion of earning capacity at 213 and likely earnings at 235. 
258See 308. 
259See section 13.6. 
260Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 110-11. 
261 Jn Van Heerden v Bethlehem Town Council 1936 OPD 115 the two-parts-one-part approach is described as being 
more fair than the other alternative proposed to the court. 
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[13.8.3] A convenient approximation: The allocation of two parts for each adult and one part 
for each child has an intuitive appeal although its correspondence with the realities is 
questionable. An attempt to introduce a more sophisticated apportionment model has been 
rejected in favour of maintaining simplicity of calculation.262 Quite clearly parents will 
benefit more from savings than their children. Children may well eat as much if not more 
than adults. Adults, however, will have greater say in the allocation of resources, 
particularly discretionary spending at an hedonistic level. 
[13.8.4] Numerical example 1: Consider a family comprising a father, a mother and two 
children. Assume for the moment that only the father works and that his earnings, net after 
deductions, available for the support of the family is R90000 per year. If two parts are 
allocated to each adult and one part to each child this income will need to be split 6 ways 
with R30000 per year per adult (two parts) and Rl5000 per year per child (one part). These 
amounts would be escalated after the death to allow for the deceased's notional salary 
increases and reduced for the chance that he may have died in any event.263 The 
apportionment calculation would be repeated for each separate year after the death. When 
the oldest child notionally becomes self-supporting264 the available income will then need 
to be split only 5 ways. This means a larger share for each of the remaining family 
members. If we assume, for sake of the discussion, that there has been no inflation then the 
deceased's income will still be R90000 per year. Each parent will then be allocated R36000 
per year (two parts) and the remaining child RI 8000 per year (one part). After the second 
child has become notionally self-supporting, the deceased's notional income of R90000 per 
year is notionally divided equally between himself and his 'wife' with R45000 per year being 
allocated to the 'wife'. The word 'wife' is used here rather than the word 'widow' because 
we are here concerned with what support would have been provided had there been no death. 
This usage will be continued in the pages below. 
[13.8.5] Presumption of common household: As a general rule the two-parts-one-part 
method of apportionment should only be used when the deceased shared a common household 
with his family. The relevance of the formalism to migrant workers who spend much time 
away from home is questionable. Nevertheless, the general absence of suitable evidence 
usually leads to a use of the two-parts-one-part approach. 
[13.8.6] Single-parent families: The two-parts-one-part formalism is adaptable to 
non-standard family relationships: Thus a single divorced parent has been allocated three 
parts of his income with one part to each child . 265 The increased allocation to the parent 
may be justified on grounds of possible remarriage or hedonistic excesses at the expense of 
the children. But there is certainly no fixed rule that a single parent should be allocated three 
parts. For single parents living close to the breadline an allocation of two parts is usually 
more appropriate. 
262Snyders v Groenewa/d 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 789H. 
263For the widow the calculation would include adjustments for the contingency of her early death. 
2tl-40r marries or dies. 
mvan Aardt v Southern Versekerings-Assosiasie 1986 (0) (unreported 27.2.86 case 523/82). 
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[13.8.7) Dependent grandparents: The single-parent family of limited means commonly 
shares resources with the grandparents of the children in a common household. The 
grandparents will often enjoy modest incomes from pensions or employment. If the single 
parent has been killed and damages need to be assessed it is quite often appropriate to 
aggregate all incomes and then allocate one part of this total to each child and grandparent 
and two parts to the deceased. 266 Where the mother of the deceased filled the functions of 
a wife in the home it may be appropriate to allocate to her two parts. The dependency of 
a grandparent would then be the difference between the one-part, or two-part, share and that 
grandparent's income. If the grandparent's income exceeded the one-part, or two-part, share 
this would indicate that there would have been no dependency in the year to which that 
calculation relates. · 
[13.8.8) Lower-income household.finances: A child who has gone out to work may continue 
to live at home pending marriage. In communities with limited financial resources it is 
common that all working members of the family pay over part or all of their pay packets to 
the mother of the house. 267 She then pays the bills for general overheads such as rent, 
telephone, food, and gives pocket money to the various family members. Working members 
of the family will have greater say in extracting pocket money from the mother of the house 
or may refrain from paying over their full pay packet. Such situations are probably best 
analyzed by allocating two parts to each working member of the family and the mother of 
the house and one part to each of the others. Allowance will usually be made for the 
notional marriage of the deceased at a time a few years after the death, depending on the 
evidence. The chance of marriage will usually diminish as the child grows older. For a 
single child over the age of 30 one would probably assume permanent residence with the 
parents subject to a substantial contingency deduction for the chance of marriage or leaving 
home. In poorer communities one finds that a younger child will bring his new wife to live 
at the home of his aging parents who will provide babysitting and housekeeping services. 268 
This will permit the new wife to take employment and thereby pay for her own keep. 
[13.8.9) Employment benefits not shared with family: The migrant-labour system in South 
Africa prevents fathers and mothers from working near home.269 The remuneration 
package of a migrant labourer frequently includes benefits in kind by way of board and 
lodging and medical care. The family did not share in these benefits in kind but did gain 
financially in that the deceased had no major living expenses and was thus, in theory at least, 
able to send home a substantial proportion of his income. 270 The value of benefits in kind 
can be a large proportion of the deceased's earnings. The normal two-parts-one-part method 
of apportionment applied to the total remuneration package can produce absurd results when 
there are many children. The father's two-part share is then often less than the value of the 
2660ne assumes that aged parents will have little control over the allocation of funds and also be less active socially. 
In practice there may be extra costs for care and medication . 
267
'The wages of adolescent children are often used to budget for household expenses' HSRC 'Marriage & Family 
Life' 99. 
268Based on claims handled by my office. 
269This phenomenon is expected to continue in post-apartheid Sou ch Africa ( 'Land Reform ' 42). 
270Whether he actually did so is generally very difficult to ·ascertain. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
THE DEPENDANTS' ACTION 307 
board and lodging and medical treatment provided to him alone by his employer. To avoid 
this incongruity one needs to apportion only the cash earnings but allocate to the deceased 
less than two parts of his cash income to allow for the saving in his living expenses. It 
would be preferable to have explicit evidence as to the application of the deceased's income. 
Such evidence is usually extremely difficult to obtain. 
[13.8.10] Lobo/a money: A young black man, without children and working far from home, 
may send his money home to his parents. 271 Care needs to be exercised with interpreting 
such payments for these are not always by way of support. The father, and sometimes the 
mother, has a moral duty to provide the son with the bride price.272 The payments may 
well be directed towards savings for lobola rather than parental support. There may also be 
substantial doubts as to the continuance of such payments over an extended period in the 
future. 
[13.8.11] Supporlfor illegitimate children: For single women with children one will usually 
assume that they will remain single without further children. Should such a woman be killed 
her history may suggest the likelihood of further children notwithstanding the absence of a 
formal husband. For single black mothers it is rare to find a contribution to support by the 
father of the child. 273 
[13.8.12] Direct evidence of maintenance payments: The use of a two-parts-one-part division 
is, strictly speaking, only valid when all dependants live together with the breadwinner in a 
common home. For migrant workers evidence should always be provided as to the extent 
to which the deceased sent money home for his family. In practice it is extremely difficult 
to get such evidence and it is usual to rely on a two-parts-one-part division of the deceased's 
earnings. This is not to say that where evidence is available it need not be adduced. The 
deceased may have been providing maintenance for illegitimate children or children of a 
previous marriage. It is then often possible to produce a copy of the divorce order or the 
order of a maintenance court. Evidence of unofficial payments is usually brought by way 
of affidavit. It is usual that formal cash payments are supplemented by informal expenditure 
on food, clothing and recreation . 
It is usually reasonable to assume that the earnings of the deceased would in future have 
escalated more or less in line with inflation. With maintenance payments this presumption 
is not so obviously valid. The fact of inflation, or an increase in salary, is on its own not 
271Judging by claims submitted to my office this is a fairly common occurrence. 
272Usually for the first wife only: Seymour 'Customary Law' 5ed 160-3. Fairly complex family property 
arrangements are found for meeting the cost of lobola (Seymour 'Customary Law' 5ed 77-80): 'A family head is 
entitled to allot one or more cattle of a house to a son of the house•. 
273
'African Customary Law' Burman 36-51. Under black customary law the child belongs to the house of the 
mother. The unmarried mother falls under the authority of her father. But- since the child does not belong to the 
house of his father, the father has, under customary law, no claim to the child nor a duty of support. The father 
of the child may acquire custody of the child, and the duty of support, by paying over the isond/o beast (Seymour 
'Customary Law' 5ed 230-4). This absolves the family of the mother from providing further support. 29 death 
claims in my office files for single black females revealed not one single instance where support by the father of the 
children was reported. Non-disclosure is unlikely because in none of these instances were the children assisted by 
their father with bringing the action for loss of support. 
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sufficient to justify an increase in maintenance payments. 274 The crucial question is 'Had 
there been no death would the maintenance payments have been increased , and if so to what 
extent?' It is common that after the death an application for increased maintenance is 
brought against the deceased's estate. This, however, does nothing to prove what would 
·have been provided had there been no death . In general escalation in line with inflation 
would be assumed if there had been an active interest by the deceased in his dependants. On 
the other hand where the deceased has been irregular with maintenance payments one might 
assume not only no increases but also a large deduction for the contingency that the 
irregularity would have continued in future years, even to the point of cessation of payments. 
The fact of a right to support does not imply that right has a value. The evidence must 
indicate at least the value of a chance that maintenance would have been provided in terms 
of that right. 
[13.8.13] Services in the home: The considerations governing the apportionment of services 
rendered in the home by the deceased have already been discussed. 275 
[13.9] THE WORKING WIFE 
[13.9.1] Self-supporting to exte.nt of her own income: There is an increasing tendency for 
married women to go out to work.276 The traditional family model of the breadwinner 
husband at work and the housewife at home is being displaced under pressures to maintain 
or improve standards of living in the face of taxation, inflation, and increasing job insecurity 
for husbands. By reason of these earnings the wife becomes partially or wholly self-
supporting. If she becomes fully self-supporting then she ceases to have a right to claim 
support from her husband: 
'No maintenance will be awarded to a wife who is able to support herself .277 
If she becomes partly self-supporting then her right to claim support from her husband is 
restricted to the difference between her net earnings and the cost of her support: 
274For a divorced wife inflation is but one of the factors to be taken into account (KB/ v Steyn 1992 1 SA 110 (A); 
Robinson 1992 THRHR 489). In Levin v Levin 1984 2 SA 298 (C) the fact of inflation alone was held sufficient 
grounds for increasing mainten;mce under circumstances where high rates of inflation had not been in the 
contemplation of the parties when the original divorce order was negotiated. In Green v Green 1976 3 SA 316 
(RAD) the court distinguished maintenance orders for children from maintenance orders for divorced wives and 
allowed an increase in the child's maintenance on the grounds of inflation alone. In Erasmus v Booyse 1963 l PH 
B4 (C) 12 the court ordered the father to pay maintenance at the rate of 11 % of his gross monthly income per month 
per child. This ensured that maintenance payments increased in line with his salary. 
msee section 13.6. 
276HSRC 'Marriage & Family Life' 318: In 1960 19,4% of married white women were economically active. In 1980 
this proportion had increased to 36,6%. The equivalent figures reported for other racial groups were: Asians 3,6% 
in 1960 and 19,4% in 1980; coloureds 23,2% in 1960 and 36,2% in 1980; blacks 15,6% in 1960 and 31,8% in 
1980. The figures for blacks reflect registered marriages only and do not include the "independent" homelands; the 
figures thus reflect the norms for a largely urbanized population. HSRC Register of Graduates communication 21 
reports that in 1980 60% of married white female graduates were economically active. The equivalent figures for 
other races were: Asians 74%; coloureds 81 %. No figure is reported for blacks. 
277Hahlo 'Husband & wife' Sed 361. Boberg 'Persons & family ' 338n44 'This is simply an application of the general 
principle that no person who can support himself is entitled to claim support from another'. 
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'If, however, the husband's income is insufficient to provide the necessary support 
the wife would go out and work in order to supplement his income. In these 
circumstances if the husband is killed the value of the right lost by the wife through 
his death would not be the value of one half of his income, but the value of what he 
contributed towards her support. ... (in other words) how much of the deceased's 
income would have been devoted to his wife's support had he not been killed'. 278 
309 
If she ceases to earn an income her right to claim support will revive. Conversely a husband 
may become dependent on his wife when he is unemployed or retired. 
[13.9.2] Numerical example 2: Consider a family comprising a husband and a wife, but no 
children. Suppose that both husband and wife are employed with the husband earning 
R60000 per year net of deductions and the wife earning R30000 per year net of deductions. 
The total income available for their joint support is thus R90000 per year. If this is allocated 
in equal shares to husband and wife then the total cost of maintaining the wife is R45000 per 
year. Of this amount she contributes R30000 per year and the husband R15000 per year. 
If the husband were to be wrongfully killed her claim for damages would be for a loss of 
support of Rl5000 per year, this being the support that she would have received had her 
husband lived. Had she been wrongfully killed her husband would not have had a claim for 
loss of support. 
It deserves note that the calculation focuses upon what she would have earned had the 
husband not been killed. After the death she may elect to stop work or to take on higher 
paid employment. These factors will, it seems, be treated as res inter alios acta in so far 
as her loss of support claim is concerned. 279 She may, however, have a separate right of 
action for loss of earnings due to personal injury.280 
[13.9.3] The support of children: The general principle observed above is that the income 
of a wife is applied first to her own support. Only if her own income is insufficient is she 
entitled to look to her husband for additional support. The same principle applies as regards 
the income of a child: 
'In accordance with the general principles applicable to all duties of support, no 
obligation rests upon a parent who, whether by reason of indigence, ill-health or 
otherwise, is unable to discharge it. Likewise, a child who has the means to support 
himself cannot require his parents to do so; they are entitled to apply the child's 
income to his maintenance before using their own resources for this purpose' .281 
mMilns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1012-13. See too Van der Menve v Pearl Assurance 1967 2 PH 
131 (A); Lebona v President Insurance 1991 3 SA 395 (W) 399-400; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 416 448. 
279See section 13.10. 
21KlSee section 13.10. 
281 Boberg 'Persons & family' 261. See paragraph 13 .2.8. 
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The general principle is that each parent owes a duty of support to the children in 
accordance with his or her means. 282 The incidence of the duty of support is not affected 
by whether the parties are married in or out of community of property .283 If one parent 
has made too large a contribution towards the support of the children then that parent has a 
right to recover the excess from the other parent. 284 
[13.9.4] Statutory and common-law rights of recourse: The Matrimonial Property Act285 
provides for a right of recovery, in certain circumstances, by one spouse from another for 
expenditure on household necessaries. For marriages out of community of property after the 
commencement of the Act a right of recourse is not automatic, but one may have been 
stipulated in the antenuptial contract. The Matrimonial Property Act286 does not apply to 
persons who. are divorced. Such persons nonetheless have a common-law right of recourse 
for excess expenditure on the support of the children. 287 It is doubtful that the common-
law right of recourse of a married person as regards excess expenditure on children is co-
extensive with the statutory right to recover excess payments as regards household 
necessaries, 288 although the two rights of action do seem to overlap in many instances. 
[13.9.5] Joint and several liability of parents: The primary significance of the nght of 
recourse between the parents is that it reflects their joint and several liability as regards the . 
children. 289 A child may thus look to either parent for support. That parent may then 
recover a contribution from the other parent. Only if a parent has only sufficient for his or 
her own support, and is unable to raise the additional funds by work or liquidation of assets, 
will that parent be relieved290 of the duty to provide support.291 A court order that one 
282There is copious authority for this proposition. See, for instance, Arendse v Maher 1936 TPD 162; Plotkin v 
Western Assurance 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 394-5; Senior v NEG Insurance 1989 2 SA 136 (W) 141F; Hahlo 'Husband 
& wife' 5ed. 134; Boberg 'Persons & Family' 254 408; Spiro 'Parent & child' Jed 368. 
283P/otkin v Western Assurance Co Ltd 1955 2 SA 385 (W) 395C-D. See too footnote 324. 
214Farrell v Hankey 1921 TPD 590; Woodhead v Woodhead 1955 3 SA 138 (SR); Boberg 'Persons & family' 257 
266; Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 414-15. 
285s23 of Act 88 ~f 1984 provides for a right of recourse between spouses for household necessaries provided such 
marriage was out of community of property and concluded before the commencement of the Act (subsection (3)). 
There is, however, no automatic right of recourse, other than by prior agreement, for marriages concluded after the 
commencement of the Act. For marriages in community of property there is a pooling of funds and thus an 
automatic and immediate adjustment for excess contributions. 
28688 of 1984. 
287See footnote 284. 
28
'Boberg 'Persons & family' 276n7 'The fact that a man is not obliged to support his stepchildren does not, 
however, prevent his being liable for household necessaries purchased by his wife on their behalf, provided they 
share a joint household with him and his wife'; Clerk & Co v Lynch 1963 1 SA 183 (N) 1860-F. 
· 
289Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 415 'In the absence of an order of court the principles governing joint liabilities 
apply. A spouse who has contributed more than his or her share has a right of recourse pro tan to against the other 
spouse'. 
290Spiro 'Parent & child' Jed 371 n2 remarks that 'The father is here not relieved of his duty, in the premises he has 
no duty'. 
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parent pay maintenance for a child to the other parent operates between the parents and not 
between the parent and the child. 292 It follows that the direct provision of benefits to the 
child in cash or in kind do not justify an immediate reduction in maintenance payments for 
the child, unless such reduction has been sanctioneq by the court. 293 The payments of 
maintenance for a child are, however, to be distinguished from a right of recourse. 294 An 
agreement to pay maintenance for a child is a stipulatio alteri whereas a right of recourse 
does not have regard to needs of the child. A court order for maintenance for a child is 
often expensive and time consuming to obtain. 295 For this reason an order to pay 
maintenance will be made even though at the time it is made the relevant parent has no 
means. 296 The order does not mean that a resourceless person has a duty to support a child 
but rather that the court expects that there will in time be resources from which a 
contribution may jnstifiably be expected. 
[13.9.6] In accordance with his or her 'means': In order that a right of recourse be 
exercised it is necessary to establish what contribution each parent is obliged to make. The 
guiding principle is that each must contribute 'in accordance with his or her means'. 297 
This expression is capable of a variety of interpretations: The most simplistic is that each 
parent must contribute 'pro-rata his or her total income'. 298 Most judgments, however, 
have regard to surplus income after deduction of various expenses and deductions. 299 In 
291Ncubu v NEG Insurance 1988 2 SA 190 (N) 196B ' From all this it is clear that, aside from the bare necessities 
of life, a parent is not liable to provide any particular aspect of maintenance, even if he is able to afford it, unless 
the circumstances of inter a/ia the parent justify it. If that is so, then a fortiori if the parent is financially unable 
to provide any aspect of maintenance required by the child , then he is under no obligation to do so. It seems to me 
that the probable reason why the old writers, and indeed the new, do not say this expressly, is because they assume 
it to be understood by all'. Spiro 'Parent & child ' 3ed 368 'If parents do not earn at all or earn only enough to 
support themselves they must resort to any capital they possess' (emphasis supplied). The point of citing this 
passage is that if the parent has no capital and only sufficient income for his own support, then there is no duty of 
support. This conclusion follows from the consideration that the duty of support between parent and child is 
reciprocal. The child's right to claim support from a parent is limited by the parent's reciprocal right to claim 
support from the child. 
292Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 414 'A maintenance order determines the liability of the spouses inter se. It is not 
binding on the child'. 
293R v Glasser 1944 EDL 227. More generally see Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 414-15. 
2~Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 'Where the non-custodian spouse has a right of recourse, he cannot set it off against 
the maintenance which he has to pay to the custodian spouse, for maintenance is paid in the interests of the children, 
whereas the right of recourse lies against the custodian spouse personally'. Otherwise stated, an agreement between 
the father and mother for the payment of maintenance in respect of a child 'is an agreement between them for the 
benefit ofa third party, their minor child' (R v Glasser 1944 EDL 227 231). 
295See comments in Erasmus v Booyse 1963 1 PH B4 (C). 
296See, for instance, Lamb v Sack 1974 2 SA 670 (T) 673-4 where a mother was ordered to provide maintenance for 
a child despite a finding by the court that she was 'without means'. See too Lebon a v President Insurance 1991 3 
SA 395 C'N) 403B-C. 
297See footnote 282. 
298This was the approach adopted by the magistrate which was taken on appeal in Zime/ka v Zime/ka 1990 4 SA 303 
C'N) 305-6. 
199Lamb v Sack 1974 2 SA 670 (f) 674 had regard to the father's income net 'after making allowance for his monthly 
expenses'; the estimated income of the mother, were she to find employment, was presumably determined on the 
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general the allocation of the burden of support for children is not '!n exact science, that is to 
say it is subject to the discretion of the judge. 300 It follows that a court will have regard 
to the equities of the situation when exercising this discretion. 
[13.9. 7] Pro-rata contributions by spouses: The Matrimonial Property Act301 lays down 
that spouses married out of community of property are obliged to contribute to household 
expenses 'pro-rata' their respective ' means'. Considerations relevant to the interpretation of 
this provision are: 
* Earlier legislation used the word 'income' in lieu of the word 'means' .302 The two 
words are not synonymous in meaning, although 'means' undoubtedly includes 
'income', or at least what remains after deduction of normal expen~es. 
* The Act is concerned with the contribution to be made to the overall household 
expenses, not the particular costs of the children of the marriage. The directive applies 
equally to childless marriages where the mother's pro-rata contribution is directed 
entirely at covering her own living expenses. With damages calculations it is usual to 
assume that the entire net incomes of husband and wife are consumed with supporting 
the family. 303 This assumption gives full effect to the Act. 
The 'means' of a parent will include assets. 304 That is to say a parent is obliged to use 
both income and assets in order to provide proper support for the children. If a parent has 
major financial commitments, such as bond repayments or pension fund contributions, the 
parent's income will be reduced by these charges. 305 By reason of the reciprocal duty of 
support between parent and child, a parent should be left with sufficient income for his or 
her own support. 306 In other words a child cannot expect so high a standard of living at 
a parent's expense that the parent is rendered destitute. In general the overall standard of 
living of the family, that is to say of both parents and children, must be reduced to fit within 
the available income and other means. This last point deserves closer consideration where 
father and mother are divorced or never married, and live separately: 
[13.9.8] Unfair treatment of mothers: Consider a divorced mother who earns a R20000 per 
year net after tax and other deductions. The father of the child lives separately and earns 
same basis of that of the father, that is to say net after monthly expenses. 'Monthly expenses' presumably included 
the normal costs of each parent's own support (see footnote 67). For a discussion of Woodhead v Woodhead 1955 
3 SA 138 (SR) see footnote 68. See too Harwood v Hanvood 1976 4 SA 586 (C). 
300Just as an award for damages for loss of support is subject to a wide discretion (see 37). In Bordihn v Bordihn 
1956 2 PH B32 (A) it was held as regards an order for maintenance that the approach of the appeal court, when 
asked to interfere with the estimate of the trial judge, should be along the lines adopted in compensation cases. 
301 88 of 1984 s23. 
302Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 s3 as amended; see Boberg 'Persons & family' 209-10. 
303See paragraphs 13.7. 11 and 13.7.12. 
304Spiro 'Parent & child' Jed 368; Boberg 'Persons & family' 260n50; Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 135n49. 
30
'See, for instance, Harwood v Hanvood 1976 4 SA 586 (C). 
306See footnote 291. 
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R80000 per year net after tax and deductions. Neither parent has any assets of consequence. 
If the cost of supporting the child is R20000 per year to what extent should each parent 
contribute? A pro-rata approach based on the incomes of each parent would require a 
contribution of R2000 per year from the mother and R 18000 per year from the father. The 
father is then left with R62000 per year for his own support and the mother Rl8000 per year 
for her support. But, one may ask, why in these circumstances should the mother make any 
contribution at all? Why should she forfeit R2000 per year from her meagre income when 
her ex-husband has a lifestyle based on R62000 per year? This problem in equity does not 
seem, as yet, to have been properly addressed by the courts.307 
[13.9.9] Numerical example 3 (method A): Consider a family comprising a husband, a wife 
and two dependent children. Suppose that both husband and wife are employed with the 
husband earning R60000 per year net of deductions and the wife R30000 per year net of 
deductions. The total income available for the support of the family is thus R90000 per year. 
If this total is allocated with two parts to each adult and one part to each child, a parent's 
share is R30000 per year (two parts) and a child's share is Rl5000 per year (one part).308 
But these are shares of the total. If the father has been wrongfully killed, and damages for 
loss of support are to be calculated, to what extent is the father's income to be allocated to 
his wife, and separately to the chilpren? The previous analysis of the right to support of a 
wife who has no children309 has indicated that the wife only has a right to claim support 
from her husband if her own earnings are insufficient to cover the cost of her support. In 
the present example the cost of the wife's support is ex hypothesi R30000 per year. She 
earns R30000 per year. Her own claim for loss of support for the year in question is thus 
nil. However, by reason of the death of the father the family has lost R60000 per year of 
which R30000 per year was applied to the cost of his own support. The balance of R30000 
per year is appropriately allocated in equal shares of Rl5000 per year each to the two 
children. Once one of the children has become self-supporting the total notional family 
income of R90000 per year3 10 will be allocated 5 ways giving R36000 per year per parent 
and R18000 per year for the child. The mother's income is still R30000 per year. Her loss 
of support in that year is thus R36000 per year less her earnings of R30000 per year, that 
is to say R6000 per year. The child suffers a loss of R18000 per year. Once the second 
child leaves home the wife's yearly loss becomes the same as had there been no children in 
307In Zimelka v Zimelka 1990 4 SA 303 CW), on facts very similar to those used for the example in this paragraph, 
the father had custody of the children. A magistrate had ordered that the mother make monthly payments of support 
for the children to the father. This order was negated on appeal (the reported judgment), it being noted that the 
mother had de facto custody of the children for several months in the year and thus incurred substantial costs with 
their support. The judgment did not investigate whether the mother had a duty to provide the support that she did, 
nor was the appeal court asked to consider whether the mother was entitled to recover from the father what she had 
laid out for the support of the children.· Considering the widely disparate standards of living there was much to be 
said for allowing the mother to recover these expenses from the father. 
308See paragraph 13.8.4 for a more detailed explanation of the calculations. 
309See paragraph 13.9.2. 
3
'
0See numerical example 1 at 305 for a discussion of the effects of inflation and the approach thereto in these 
examples. 
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the first place. 311 The method of calculation described in this paragraph will hereafter be 
described as 'method A'. 
If it were the wife who had died then the net loss to the family would be her earnings of 
R30000 per year less the cost of her support of R30000 per year, that is to say a nil loss. 
It deserves note that this method A allocates family resources to the children pro-rata the 
surplus income of each parent, as distinct from pro-rata the total income of each parent. 
By focusing on income surplus to each parent's personal requirements method A gives effect 
to the limited nature of the wife's right to support from her husband. 
[13.9.10] Numerical example 4 (method B): Analysts who focus solely on the pro-rata aspect 
of the duty of support by a parent to a child prefer a different approach to that described in 
the previous paragraph. The husband's income of R60000 per year is apportioned with two 
parts to each parent and one part to each child, that is to say R20000 per year to the 
husband, R20000 per year to the wife, and RlOOOO per year to each child. By reason of the 
pro-rata obligation that the wife has to support the children her income is likewise 
apportioned with two parts to each parent and one part to each child, that is to say RlOOOO 
per year to the father, RlOOOO per year to herself, and R5000 per year to each child. A 
notable feature of this approach is that a working wife who earns sufficient to support herself 
is deemed to have a right to claim support from her husband, and simultaneously to be 
obliged to contribute to his support while he is working.312 If the father is wrongfully 
killed then damages for loss of support by the children are calculated as RlOOOO per year per 
child until the oldest child leaves home. The father's income of R60000 per year is then 
apportioned 5 ways to give a child's share of R12000 per year until the youngest child 
becomes self-supporting. The widow's loss is calculated as R20000 per year less the RlOOOO 
per year that she was contributing to the deceased's support from her own income, that is 
to say a net loss of support for her at the rate of R 10000 per year. After the oldest child 
leaves home the incomes are apportioned 5 ways and the widow's loss becomes R24000 per 
year (two parts of the deceased's income) less Rl2000 per year (two parts of the wife's 
income) giving a net loss of Rl2000 per year. Once the youngest child leaves home the 
widow's net loss becomes R30000 per year (one half of her husband's income) less R15000 
per year (one half of her own income) giving a net loss of Rl5000 per year. The method 
of calculation described in this paragraph will hereafter be described as 'method B'. 
If it were the wife who had died then the husband would suffer no loss due to his high 
earnings but each child would suffer a loss of R5000 per year. Once the youngest child had 
311 See numerical example 2 at 309 . 
312lodaiken v Jodaiken 1978 l SA 784 (W) 788H 'One of the legal consequences of marriage, whether in or out of 
community of property, is that the spouses owe each other a reciprocal duty of maintenance according to their 
means'. Taken literally this statement supports the seemingly anomalous cross-support provisions of method B. 
Having regard to the basic requirements for an enforceable duty of support (see 278 above) it is doubtful that this 
terse statement of principle means any more than that either husband or wife may have a duty of support, depending 
on circumstances, but not both at the same point in time. It is a contradiction of terms to suggest that a spouse 
should simultaneously have 'adequate means' and also be 'in need' . 
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left home the loss of the remaining child would increase to R6000 per year, being one fifth 
of R30000 per year. 
[13.9.11] Method A is to be preferred: Method A has been preferred by a Cape court. 313 
Method B has been preferred by a Transvaal court. 314 Other judgments point towards 
method A as the preferred approach: 
* In Yorkshire Insurance v Porobic3 15 the wife had been wrongfully killed. The 
damages were calculated by deducting from her income the cost of her support. The 
calculation was done over the period of dependency of the children. Had the wife's 
income been less than the cost of her support the damages would have been assessed 
as nil. With method B there is always a calculable loss for the children regardless of 
the cost of supporting the deceased. 
* In Milns case316 the court makes the point that a husband is only obliged to contribute 
to the support of his wife to the extent that her earnings fall short of what she requires 
for her support. Method B, on the other hand, takes the view that whatever a wife 
earns her husband is obliged to contribute two parts of his income to her support. 
[13.9.12] Fonn of contributions by spouses: One argument raised in support of method B 
is that a mother will, for instance, buy all the groceries which are then applied for the benefit 
of all dependants. The father will pay the rent and the instalments for the family car. Each 
of these benefits is arguably shared pro-rata by all family members. However, if each parent 
has a right to recover excess payments from the other3 17 then there would be a constant 
state of offset, an overpayment on groceries being offset against an overpayment on the rent, 
and so on. The fact that a wife buys all the groceries is then no more than the form of her 
contribution to the overall expenses of the household, just as when one engages in a joint 
venture, such as a safari trip to the Okavango, each member of the expedition contributes his 
or her share of the expenses. With a safari trip one does not say that one member one has 
bought all the groceries and thus contributed to the costs of each of the other members. 
313Burns v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 363-4. The preferred approach, method A, is described as 'the 
customary basis, as Mr Koch suggested ' . Method B, 'that of Mr Beets', was rejected. The only reason given was 
that method B was 'prejudicial to the interests of the minor child'. 
314Bosch v Mutual & Federal Insurance 1993 (f) (unreported 25.3 .93 case no 2090/92). Central to the court's ruling 
was its finding that the ruling in Zime/ka v Zimelka 1990 4 SA 303 (W) did not support the conclusions of Mr Koch 
in 1992 THRHR 128-34. The court, however, did not study any of the other judgments listed in the article in 
support of this conclusion. A series of relevant judgments on damages for loss of support were dismissed on the 
ground that they were irrelevant divorce matters (see paragraph 13.9.16). The court emphasised that the marriage 
had been in community of property. The court finds further support for its view in paragraph 46 of Mr Koch's 
report which it is interpreted to mean that method A does not put the claimants in the position they would have been 
in had there been no death. Mr Koch's report did not contain a paragraph 46 and the mysterious paragraph is not 
quoted in the text of the judgment. The court seems to have been unaware that method A required a larger award . 
of damages to the children than did method B (see paragraph 13.9.14). It is notable that in this matter the actuaries 
did not give evidence before the court, as they did in the Burns matter (see footnote 313). 
m1957 1 C&B 90 (A); 1957 2 PH Jl6 (A). 
316See quotation in· paragraph 13. 9 . 1. 
317See paragraph 13.9.4. 
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[13.9.13] Equity between parents: When reliance is placed on a two-parts-one-part method 
of apportionment, as in numerical examples 3 and 4 above, the cost of support for the wife 
is ex hypothesi equal to that for the husband. This feature distinguishes the family situation 
from that where the parents live separately. When the parents live separately then each has 
a standard of living commensurate with his or her separate means. I have noted above31 8 
that even-handed justice between the parents requires that the parent with the higher standard 
of living is the one who should reduce his or her standard of living in order to provide for 
the children. The other parent should not be required to contribute until there is reasonable 
parity between the respective standards of living of both parents. Method A provides a 
calculation methodology for achieving this result. 
Considerations of equity between the parents must, however, give way, when necessary, to 
the more important requirement that the children should be assured of proper support, 
whichever parent is required, in the short term, to reduce his or her standard of living in 
order to provide it. The question of the relative standards of living of the parents affects the 
right of one parent to claim a contribution from the other, but not the right of a child to 
claim support from whichever parent he or she chooses. Normally the children will live with 
the custodian parent who will personally meet most of the costs of the support of the 
children , and then claim a contribution from the other parent. The ongoing rate of 
contribution by the non-custodian parent would normally be formalised in terms of 
maintenance payments. The fact that the custodian parent buys all the groceries and pays all 
the rent does not mean that the children are entirely dependent on that one parent. 319 
Regard must also be had to the contribution by the other parent. 
[13.9.14] Spurious 'losses' indicated by method B: Revert now to the family situation where 
both husband and wife live together with the children and both have the same standard of 
living. In terms of both numerical examples 3 and 4 above each parent enjoys a standard' 
of living based on R30000 per year. In terms of method A the wife's earnings are applied 
entirely to covering the cost of her own support and her husband meets the full cost of the 
support of the children at the rate of Rl5000 per year per child. In terms of method B the 
wife applies only RlOOOO per year of her earnings to her own support with RlOOOO per year 
applied to the support of her husband and R5000 per year to the support of each child. Her 
husband applies R20000 per year of his earnings to his own support, R20000 per year to the 
support of his wife, and RlOOOO per year to the support of each child. If damages for the 
death of the father are determined using method B, then the widow and children will be 
awarded compensation based on RlOOOO per year each. Prior to the death the children 
enjoyed support of R15000 per year each. For the balance of R5000 per year per child they 
are expected to continue to look to their mother. The mother will have R30000 per year by 
way of her own earnings. Her own cost of living is R30000 per year ex hypothesi . In order 
that she can provide each child with the additional R5000 per year, for which method B 
expects them to look to her, she needs a total of R40000 per year. The additional RlOOOO 
per year she gets by way of her owri damages for loss of support. This RlOOOO per year that 
is accorded to the widow, ostensibly as damages for her own loss of support, is, in reality, 
318See paragraph 13.9.8. 
319See paragraph 13.9. 12. 
,_ 
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the balance of the support needed to ensure that the children are able to maintain the same 
staridard of living. Thus method B indirectly compensates the children for their father's 
death by awarding part of what they need to their mother. This seems to be a thoroughly 
unnecessary complication, particularly bearing in mind the very much larger deductions for 
general contingencies and remarriage, that are applied to compensation for a widow as 
compared to compensation for a child. 
In the Bosch case, 320 where method B was preferred, the widow was about to remarry and 
her claim had been agreed to be nil. In such circumstances the additional R5000 per year 
needed for each child, to ensure continuing support at the same level as prior to the death, 
woulg have had to come from the children's stepfather. 
In the circumstances of numerical examples 3 and 4 above method A leads to a larger award 
than. does method B when it is the father who has been killed. The reasons have been set 
out in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, if it had been the wife who had been 
wrongfully killed method A would have indicated a nil loss for the children whereas method 
B would have indicated a 'loss' by the children based on R5000 per year per child. This 
'loss', if such it can be called, is at odds with the overall financial position of the family. 
The family has lost the income of the mother of R30000 per year. The cost of her support 
was ex hypothesi R30000 per year. The net loss to the family is nil. If the children are then 
awarded compensation based on method B at the rate of R5000 per year each then the family 
will be better off, in a financial sense, after the death of the mother than before her death. 
The father will still have his income of R60000 per year. If the cost of his own support 
continues at R30000 per year then there will be R30000 per year, R15000 per child, 
available to support the two children. The father's income is thus entirely sufficient to 
support himself and the children after the death without the need for a contribution by way 
of damages from the defendant. 
[13.9.15] Numerical example 5 (method A): Consider a family comprising a working father, 
a working mother, and two dependent children. Suppose the father. earns R45000 per year, 
net after deductions, and the mother R30000 per year net after deductions. The total family 
income is thus R75000 per year. 321 The two-parts-one-part method allocates R25000 per 
year to each parent and R12500 per year to each child. The mother's income is R30000 per 
year. The cost of her support is ex hypothesi R25000 per year. Her surplus income, that 
is to say her 'means' available for the support of the children, is R5000 per year, that is say 
R2500 per year per child. The father's income is R45000 per year. The cost of his support 
is ex hypothesi R25000 per year leaving surplus income of R20000 per year. If this is 
allocated to the children in equal shares then each child is dependent on his or her father to 
the extent of RlOOOO per year. Once the oldest child leaves home .the R75000 per year is 
apportioned 5 ways giving R30000 per year per parent and R15000 per year for the one 
remaining dependent child. The mother's income is R30000 per year. Thus while the family 
has only one dependent child she makes no contribution to the support of the child, but is 
also entirely self-supporting and thus not dependent on her husband. Once the youngest child 
320See footnote 314. 
321These were the agreed facts before the court in the Bosch case (see footnote 314). 
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leaves home the income of R75000 per year is divided equally between husband and wife. 
The wife's dependency on her husband is then R7500 per year, that is to say R37500 per 
year less R30000 per year. 
[13.9.16] So~rces of legal autholity: In Lebona's case322 it was said that to determine the 
incidence of the duty of support one should have regard to the position with a family divided. 
In Bosch's case323 it was said that divorce matters are not relevant to the assessment of 
damages for loss of support from a marriage. In general the writers on family law and the 
duty of support do not distinguish between damages cases and divorce matters when 
discussing the incidence of the duty of support.324 The preferable view seems to be that 
regard may be had to divorce matters, provided it is borne in mind that after divorce the 
parents no longer share a common household and thus a common standard of living. 
[13.9.17] Redistribution of burden of supp01t: Suppose under numerical example 5 that the 
father had died under circumstances which did not give rise to an action for damages for loss 
of support.325 The mother and the two children would then have had only her income of 
R30000 per year for their combined support. The two-parts-one-part formula indicates 
R15000 per year for the support of the mother and R7500 per year per child. Even when 
damages can be claimed it could be argued that the claims by the dependants for loss of 
support should be assessed having regard to this redistribution of the burden of support after 
the death. There seems to be general agreement, however, that the ruling in Groenewald v 
Snyders326 precludes regard being had for such a redistribution of liability for the support 
of the children. The assessment of the damages proceeds on the basis that the dependants 
continue to live at the same standard of living, and with the same application of the 
contribution by the widow, as had the deceased remained alive. Whatever the family lacks 
is made good by the damages paid by the wrongdoer who thereby, in a manner of speaking, 
'steps into the deceased's shoes'. 
[13.9.18] Foreign jurisdictions: The assessment of damages for loss of support in 
England, 327 Canada328 and Australia329 generally has regard to the overall loss by the 
322Lebona v President Versekeringsmpy 1991 3 SA 395 (W) 402-3. 
323See footnote 314. 
324See, for instance, Hahlo 'Husband & wife' 5ed 134n46; Boberg 'Persons & Family' 255-6 308n28; Spiro 'Parent 
& child' Jed 369n83. 
325 Assuming as well that there were no life polices nor pension benefits nor assets. 
326 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 248A-D; Milburn-Pyle & van der Linde 1974 TASSA 292 333-4; Constantia Versekeringsmpy 
v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A). 
327McGregor 'Damages' 14ed 864 'The practice which is generally followed ... is first to assess the loss to the family 
as a whole and then to apportion the sum between the various dependants . . .. Nevertheless the court is entitled to 
consider the case of each dependant separately in the first instance, thus ascertaining the total sum by addition'. 
328Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 417 'One mode of assessing damages in a fatal accident 
claim is to calculate first the loss to the family as a whole and then to divide that sum among the various dependants. 
The preferable mode, however, is to make a separate calculation for each dependant right from the start .... At the 
very least, if judges insist on attempting to compute the family loss first, they should be careful to postpone any 
necessary deductions until after the loss has been apportioned. Deductions on account of matters such as 
contingencies, collateral benefits and, in some instances, contributory negligence , should not be made against the 
·, 
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family, that is to say the contribution made by the deceased breadwinner, usually by way of 
earnings, is reduced for the saved living expenses of the deceased. 330 The loss indicated 
by this calculation is then apportioned to give the damages to be separately awarded to each 
dependant in his or her own right. The major objection to this approach is that it fails to 
have regard to the different contingencies and collateral benefits affecting different claimants. 
For this reason the overall damages is sometimes assessed, as in South Africa, by first having 
regard to the damages for each individual dependant. 
[13.9.19] Chances of death, divorce or unemployment: The nil loss for the death of the 
mother calculated under numerical example 3 above is based on the assumption that both 
parents remain alive, married to one another, and that both retain their employment. There 
are substantial contingencies attaching to all these considerations which justify a small award 
to the children for the value of the chance that things may not have turned out as expected, 
and that the children may have found it necessary in the future to depend entirely on the 
earnings of their mother. 331 The damages for this consideration would ideally be assessed 
by taking a percentage of 5 % or 10 % , say, of the damages that would have been awarded 
had the deceased mother been the only parent, that is to say ignoring the existence of the 
father. 
[13.9.20] Further children: The discussion thus far has ignored the effect of further children. 
Suppose that a third child was born to the family discussed under numerical example 3 
above. The cost of the support for father and mother would then have reduced to R25714 
per year. The mother's earnings of R30000 per year would then have exceeded the cost of 
her own support by R4286 per year. To this extent she would be contributing to the support 
of the children. Her contribution of R4286 per year is appropriately apportioned in equal 
shares between the three children giving Rl429 per year per child. If she were to be killed 
then all three children would, in terms of method A, have claims for loss of support. When 
a parent has been killed it is sometimes appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of 
the family, to make explicit allowance in the calculation for further notional children. 332 
In terms of numerical example 3 above the children suffer no loss on the death of their 
m~ther. However, if a third child were to be hypothesised then method A would indicate 
a loss of support for the two claimant children, that is to say increases the damages. 
Usually, however, the allowance for further children decreases the damages. 
family as a whole but only against that dependant to whom the particular deduction relates'. 
329Luntz ' Damages' 2ed 'If the total damages are arrived at by assessing the loss of each claimant separately and then 
adding up the amounts, the necessary apportionment is achieved automatically. Where, however, the loss to the 
family as a whole is calculated, the method of apportionment needs some consideration .... However, provided that 
in the actual apportioning process, the gross loss is first divided and then the gains of individual claimants are set 
off, it would generally not matter that at an earlier stage the total damages had been arrived at by setting off the total 
gains against the gross loss'. 
3
'.IOJ'his is much the same procedure as is contemplated by method A (see paragraph 13.9. 14). 
331Considered in Cooke & Cooke v Maxwell 1942 SR 133 136 but for technical reasons not awarded. 
332See footnote 236. 
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[13.9.21] Services in the home: The deceased may have rendered valuable services in the 
home for which a claim may be brought. Traditionally this claim lies with the husband333 
but, as I have noted above,334 there is much to be said for allowing a claim to the children 
for a proportion of the value of the services rendered by their moth.er.335 This latter 
approach would cover instances where the father's own claim has prescribed. When the 
father claims in his own right he must offset what he has saved by reason of no longer 
supporting his wife. For a working wife this deduction may be very small if not nil. 3.36 
However, working wives will often employ domestic help and this factor needs to be brought 
into account. It follows that evidence will need to be submitted as to the extent and value 
of the services which she provided. 
[13.9.22] Wife's personal obligations: A working wife may have a duty to support her 
illegitimate child or her aged mother. Her husband, on the other hand, has no duty to 
support his wife's mother, 337 and in the absence of community of property no duty to 
support the child. 338 How then is the wife's dependency to be calculated for loss of support 
arising from the death of the husband? The approach adopted in Lebona's case339 was to 
apply the widow's income first to the support of her personal dependants with only the 
balance of her income being applied to her own support. To the extent that this balance fell 
short of her two-part share her husband was then deemed to provide her with support. 
Otherwise stated the compensation awarded to the widow was the difference between her own 
earnings and what she needed in total for herself and those dependent on her who do not 
have claims for loss of support eo nomine. This is an application of the general principle 
that the claim of a father (or mother) should have regard not merely to the personal needs 
of the claimant but also to what additional amount the claimant needs to support his or her 
dependants. 340 
[13.10] WIDOW'S EARNING CAPACITY HAVING REGARD TO THE DEATH 
[13.10.1] Widow's earnings are ignored: A non-working wife is not required to mitigate her 
damages after the death of her husband by going out to find employment.341 Even if she 
has taken up employment this income must be ignored when assessing her loss. 342 If she 
had been working prior to the death, or would have gone out to work even if her husband 
333 Union Government v Warneke 1911 AD 657 669; Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) . 
334See paragraph 13.6.2. 
335McGregor 'Damages ' 14ed 896-7. 
336See numerical example 3. 
mFord v Allen 1925 TPD 5. 
331S v MacDonald 1963 2 SA 431 (C) 433C; Spiro ' Parent & Child' 3ed 368n74; sl 7(5) of Matrimonial Property 
Act 88 of 1984. 
339Lebona v President Versekeringsmpy 1991 3 SA 395 (W) 399-400. 
3400osthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 331. 
_ 
341 Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) 3768. Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages 
in Canada' 438 446; Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 447-8 records this samt! principle. 
342Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) 376. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
THE DEPENDANTS' ACTION 321 
had lived, then her earnings subsequent to the death are relevant, but only as guide to what 
she would have earned but for the death. 343 The logic of these rules has become plainer 
with the ruling in Evins v Shield lnsurance344 that the action for loss of support and the 
action for loss of earning capacity are separate and distinct actions. The value of lost support 
is calculated as though the wife/widow's earnings had continued uninterrupted through the 
event_ of her husband's death. Any loss that she experiences by way of earnings must be 
recovered by way of a separate action for personal injury. 345 
When considering this conclusion the reader should bear in mind that under 'method A' the 
two-parts share of family income that she would have enjoyed had her husband lived is 
determined by reference to the joint income of her and the deceased. If her reduced earnings 
after the death are used for the calculation this understates her two-parts share. For example 
consider a deceased breadwinner who earned R90000 per year and a wife who earned 
R30000 per year. The total family income was thus R120000 per year. Assume that the 
wife, now a widow, takes up a half-day job after the death and earns only R18000 per year. 
Assume that there are two children. The wife's two-parts share of the total family income 
while her husband lived was thus R40000 per year. 346 Her loss of support is the 
difference between R40000 per year and her earnings of R30000 per year, that is to say 
RlOOOO per year. By reason of her changed employment she suffers a further loss of 
R12000 per year being the difference between R30000 per year and her actual earnings after 
the death of R18000 per year. This, however, is not a loss of support but a loss of earnings. 
The extent to which she may claim for this loss of earnings will depend on the cause of that 
loss. 
[13.10.2) Widow's changed tax position: If a wife continues working after the death of her 
husband, with the same earnings as prior to the death, her liability for taxation will reduce: 
Prior to the death she would have been taxed according to the table for married women; after 
the death she will be taxed according to the table for single breadwinners. 347 The 
calculation of damages for loss of support proceeds as though the death had not 
occurred. 348 For this reason her gain from lesser taxation should be ignored when 
assessing her damages for loss of support. Her gain from reduc.ed taxation would, however, 
be relevant to any claim she submits for loss of earnings arising from her personal injury. 
[13.10.3) Widows who cease working: It does happen that, due to the shock of the event 
and/or the needs of the children for closer care, a widow ceases employment after the death 
343Mi/ns v Protea Assurance 1978 3 SA 1006 (C) 1012-13. 
344 1980 2 SA 814 (A). 
3451°he two separate actions may be brought jointly if the necessary formalities have been met. 
3460ne third of Rl20000 per year (R90000+ R30000). 
347This holds true for the tax tables applicable in South Africa for the 1992/93 tax year. 
348See paragraph 13. 9 .17. 
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of her husband.349 For certain cultural groups cessation of employment after the death of 
a spouse is mandatory. 350 The loss of earnings suffered by the widow under these 
circumstances is patrimonial and to be distinguished from the agony of pure emotional 
shock. 351 As a general rule compensation will not be awarded for loss of earnings 
occasioned by the death of a husband. 352 
One exception to this principle would be where the loss has been occasioned by the need to 
care for the children. 353 The question of loss of services in the home has been discussed 
above.354 The earnings foregone by the widow must needs be reasonable having regard to 
the services that have been lost. In other words a wife who worked full day would, in the 
absence of the death, have, in any event, had to make arrangements for child care. The need 
to cease work may be occasioned by a perceived need to attend to the shocked state of the 
children over the death. South African law is a little bit vague as to whether such a claim 
lies under the dependants' action or under the action for personal injury. Suffice it say that 
the need for a widow to stay at home with her shocked children can at best be of fairly short 
duration. 
[13.10.4] Child's loss of earning capacity: The death of a father may well interfere with a 
child's career. This might happen, for example, if the family business collapses before the 
child is old enough to take it over; or there may be a lack of funds during the pre-trial period 
with a consequent delay with the child's qualification in a professional capacity and 
subsequent entry into the labour market. A delay of this nature will give rise to a loss of 
earnings. 355 The ruling in Evins v Shield Insurance356 suggests that compensation for 
such losses must be claimed under the action for personal injury. This action is not available 
if the loss is caused by the death of another without psychological or physical injury to the 
child. It seems that as a rule the loss must go uncompensated.357 
[13.11] EMPLOYMENT IN THE FAMILY BUSINESS 
[13.11.1] The duty of supporl: Where the wife works for her husband in the family business 
she thereby saves him the cost of employing an outsider to do the work. Sometimes the wife 
will receive salary payments from the business. More often she will receive no explicit 
349Life insurance and pension benefits payable as a result of the death are ignored in terms of the Assessment of 
Damages Act 9 of 1969. For this reason a widow may cease to need to work and yet still have a claim for damages 
for loss of support. Her loss of earnings is, however, a loss of her own making. 
3~Notably Moslems. 
m See footnote 3. -
352English and Australian law do not compensate under the dependants' action a purely commercial loss such as loss 
of a contract of employment or partnership (Luntz 'Damages' 2ed 409-10). 
mFor instance, the husband may have worked day shifts and the wife night shifts. 
354See section 13.6. 
msee, for instance, Du Preez v AA Mutual Insurance 1980 3 C&B 206 (E) 223-4; Protea Assurance v Lamb 1971 
2 C&B 117 (A) 125-6 (relevant text omitted by editors in 1971 1 SA 530 (A)). 
356 1980 2 SA 814 (A). 
3S7Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmpy 1973 1 SA 769 (A) . See too footnote 352. 
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salary payments but will be provided with money with which to meet family expenses, 
possibly through a bank account operated jointly with her husband. In order to test the 
incidence of the duty of support one must consider a breakup of the family by say, divorce. 
She would probably find herself without employment but her husband would find himself 
without her services in the business. The skills applied in the family business may enable 
her to obtain alternative employment. If so then she is in the _same position as regards 
claiming support from her husband as though she had such employment all along. If she 
cannot find employment then she will have a right to claim support from a husband whose 
income has in the meanwhile been reduced by the cost of employing a substitute. In the light 
of these considerations what then is the loss she suffers in the event of her husband's death? 
[13.11.2] Earnings after the death are ignored: If she has taken over the family business 
and is successfully running it for her own account, this fact must be ignored.358 The 
underlying principle would seem to be that a gain or loss of earnings should be dealt with 
strictly under the action for personal injury and not the action for loss of support.359 This 
same reasoning suggests that if the family business has ceased with the husband's death and 
she becomes unemployed and suffers a loss of earnings then this fact cannot be taken into 
account when assessing her loss of support. The value of her earning capacity for purposes 
of loss of support must be determined as though the death had not occurred. 
[13.11.3] What model now?: The cost of replacing her services in the family business would 
be the measure of her earning capacity, and she is to that extent notionally capable of 
supporting herself. This capacity reduces the value of her right to claim support from her 
husband. In Mariamah's case360 the court made allowance for the wife's one-third 
contribution to earnings derived from the family business by deducting one third from the 
value of her claim. Both models A and B require a deduction of two thirds.361 This point 
is mentioned in the heads of argument for the appeal but is not discussed in the appeal 
court's judgment. The Mariamah case provides no real assistance on the basic principles in 
this regard362 save perhaps to emphasise that there is no general principle which the courts 
consistently apply. 
[13.11.4] Savings in expenditure: The distinction between a wife's services in the home and 
her services in the family business can be a fine one. It has been said that the capacity to 
render services in the home, ie home-making capacity, is of the same nature as earning 
capacity.363 The wife's work capacity applied to home-making does not affect her right 
mNochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 727-8. 
mEvins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 (A). 
360Mariamah v Marine & Trade Insurance 1977 2 PH 130 (D); Marine & Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 
480 (A). 
3610ne third of the total income from the business is two thirds of the wife's half-share thereof. For example R4000 
py out of Rl2000 py of total income is two thirds of R6000 py, the half share. 
362Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T); this judgment, like the Mariamah ruling, is inconclusive. 
In Williams v British America Assurance 1962 2 PH J 18 (SR) the damages were assessed without regard for the 
husband's earnings nor the saved cost of supporting him! 
363Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) 406-7 read together with 409E. 
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to claim support from her husband whereas the wife's work capacity exercised in the family 
business does affect her right to claim for loss of support.364 Yet in both circumstances 
the wife's services give rise to a saving in expenditure. The activities of the wife in the 
family business increase the cash income of the family by a saving in business expenditure. 
The activities of the wife in the home improve the quality of family life and increase the 
family's spending power by a saving in domestic expenditure. 
[13.11.5] Taxation: If a wife ceased to assist in the family business her husband would need 
to hire a substitute. 365 The overall income of the family would be reduced by this cost. 
This expense would be tax deductible and should be adjusted for the tax saving. The value 
of the notional contribution by the wife is thus not the full cost but that cost less tax at the 
husband's marginal rate. The tax tables for married women are such that it may pay the 
family to have the wife go out to work and to hire an outsider to perform services in the 
family business. If, despite the tax advantage, a wife does not go out to work away from 
home, this would suggest that her contribution to the family business is worth as much or 
more than her potential net income away from home. For this reason it would usually be 
reasonable to assess the tax adjustment to the value of the wife's services as though she had 
worked outside the family business. 
[13.11.6] Assessment of damages: In Porobic's case366 the deceased wife had been running 
a store on her husband's farm. The loss was assessed by deducting from the income she 
generated the estimated costs of her support. In Mariamah's case367 allowance for the 
wife's services was made by reducing her compensation by one third, this being her agreed 
contribution to the profits of the business. The children's claims were not correspondingly 
reduced, as one would have expected had the method of calculation been consistently carried 
through. The Porobic and Mariamah judgments cannot be reconciled. In practice it seems 
likely that damages will be assessed as though the wife had earned as income the deemed 
value of her services in the family business. 
[13.12] REMARRIAGE 
[13.12.1] Fi.nancial value: If a widow remarries, her right to support is reinstated. On the 
death of her husband the value of her loss of support is reduced for the contingency of such 
remarriage. 368 The deduction to be made will depend not only on the percentage chance 
3
,,.Mariamah v Marine & Trade insurance 19772PH130 (D); Marine & Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 
480 (A). 
365See, for instance, Plotkin v Western Assurance 1955 2 SA 385 (W). This matter was concerned solely with past 
loss. Erdmann v Santam Insurance 1985 3 SA 402 (C) sets out the principles governing a future loss in the event 
of injury to the wife. 
366Yorkshire Insurance v Porobic 1957 1 C&B 90 (A). 
3tliSee footnote 418. 
368Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) 3760; Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 
1 SA 601 (A). More generally see Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 124-8. 
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of remarriage but also the likely income, age and other characteristics of the second 
husband. 369 A second marriage may mean further children. 
A deduction for remarriage should also be applied to the value of a lost spes of inheritance 
if the evidence suggests that the notional new husband will have assets and will bequeath 
some or all of these to his new wife. 
The deductions made in practice range from 0 % to 70 % . 370 This corresponds with the 
range of deductions indicated by remarriage statistics. 371 
[13.12.2] The remarried widow: If the widow has actually remarried prior to the final 
assessment of compensation the financial circumstances of her new husband will cease to be 
a matter for speculation. The new husband may provide not only an income but also 
prospects of inheritance and services in the home. If the value of support expected from this 
husband is greater than the value of support expected from the deceased then the claim for 
future loss of support will fall away. In other words the deduction for remarriage is 
concerned not only with the right to support itself but also with the value of that right to 
support. If the value of prospective benefits from the new marriage exceed the value for old 
marriage then the widow has gained. There is no reason why this gain should not be offset 
against her past loss of support up to the date of remarriage. 
In Glass's case372 it was ruled that if remarriage has taken place then no regard may be had 
for the lesser value of the right to support from the second husband. The Glass case is 
couched in disturbingly emotive terms and seems to have misinterpreted the earlier 
judgments. It seems unlikely that the Glass ruling will be followed by future courts. 
[13.12.3] Period until remarriage: The deduction for remarriage reflects the value of the 
chance of remarriage. This deduction reduces the 'multiplier' used in a gross multiplier 
calculation373 and for this reason one finds reference in the literature to a 'period of 
widowhood', that is to say the number of years until remarriage. 374 This simplistic 
interpretation of the multiplier is misleading and should, if at an · possible, be avoided. 
Consider the following example: The tabular remarriage rate at age 50 for a white woman 
369Lega/ Insurance v Bores 1963 l SA 608 (A) 617-18; Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850. 
In practice one often finds the widow's calculation of loss of support cut off from the date of remarriage on the 
grounds that her right to support from a different breadwinner has been reinstated. The Bores and Roberts judgments 
state by implication that reinstatement of the right to support does not terminate the claim calculation at that point 
in time and that regard should be had to the financial value of the new right to support. 
370Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 125n914. 
371 See Quantum Yearbook 1993 at 84 (03 to 75%). 
372G/ass v Santam Insurance 1992 l SA 901 (W). 
373The net multipliers used by the English courts are reduced for all general contingencies (see 97). 
mBoberg 1966 SAU 402 407-9 'Remarriage is relevant because it reduces the period of dependency' ; Boberg 1988 
BML 55 56 'The whole object of reducing damages for remarriage prospects is to ensure that, theoretically, nothing 
remains of the award by the time the widow remarries' Legal Insurance v Bot es 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 6 l 7inf. 
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is 10%.375 Her expectation of life is 27,8 years. 376 The 'period until remarriage' 
calculated according to the remarriage percentage deduction is then 25 years, that is to say 
until she is about age 75. This is clearly an untenable proposition . She will either to 
remarry fairly soon after the death or remain single. 377 Compensation by instalments 
provides no solution because widows will then just refrain from remarriage.378 
[13.12.4] Increased remarriage rates: Once endowed with a lump sum the widow's chances 
of remarriage may be enhanced well above average. 379 Many widows will have forestalled 
remarriage plans pending the finalization of the claim for loss of support. Deferred marriage 
plans are likely to have the effect that remarriage rates amongst compensated widows are 
well above the statistical average. For this reason when assessing damages for loss of 
support the deduction for remarriage should really exceed the population average revealed 
by statistical tables. 380 
[13.12.5] Death occasions remarriage: The deduction for remarriage reflects the present 
utility of the prospect of a second husband. As has been noted in the discussion of causation 
above, the death of the first husband does not cause this remarriage but occasions it in the 
sense of increasing the likelihood of such an event in the mind of the reasonable man.381 
[13.12.6] Divorce rates: Population statistics indicate that about 20% of white marriages 
concluded in 1960 had been dissolved by 1980, a divorce rate of roughly 1 % per year. 382 
The divorce rate increases markedly for marriages concluded more recently. 383 The risk 
of divorce is greatest during the first 5 years of marriage. 384 The conclusion to be drawn 
from these statistics is that the risk of divorce for a white marriage is substantial and of the 
order of 1 % for each year until about age 55. That is to say about 20% for a couple with 
an average age of 35. The deduction for the contingency of divorce would be roughly half 
37
'Thomson 1988 De Rebus 67 70. 
376Koch 1986 De Rebus 551 552. 
377With a fairly remote possibility of a marriage late in life. 
378De Wet v Odendaal 1936 CPD 103 107 'She may also be deterred from a further marriage by the consideration 
that she will lose the usufruct'; for comparative remarriage rates see Koch 1988 De Rebus 631 632. Davel 
'Skadevergoeding' 128n957 displays little sympathy for widows who deliberately defer remarriage for financial gain. 
379Roberts v London Assurance (3) 1948 2 SA 841 (W) 850; Trinunel v WillianLS 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 793C-D; Burns 
v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364H. 
38()Such as Thomson 1988 De Rebus 67 70. These statistics include remarriages by widows who have waited for 
damages awards. The extent to which the statistical remarriage rates are distorted by the inclusion of late marriages 
by compensated widows is not clear, but one suspects that the error is of negligible proportions in so far as damages 
assessments are concerned. 
381Boberg 1964 SAU 194 204n52. See section 11.9. 
382Strijdom in HSRC 'Marriage & Family Life ' 446 462. For the 1960 cohort the proportion divorced rises quite 
evenly from 4,7% in the first 5 years to 10,3% after 10 years, 15 ,3% after 15 years and 19,2% after 20 years. 
383Strijdom in HSRC 'Marriage & Family Life' 446 462 records 8,8% divorces in the first 5 years for 1975 
marriages compared to 4, 7 % for 1960 marriages. 
384Strijdom in HSRC 'Marriage & Family Life' 446 464 records that 39 ,5% of white divorces in 1984 had a duration 
of less than 5 years. 11 % of divorces were for marriages which had endured more than 20 years. 
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of 20%, that is say 10%, because even if divorce within 20 years were a certainty the time 
of that divorce remains unknown. A doomed marriage may yet last a further 10 years. A 
further adjustment would probably be made for the prospect of maintenance and remarriage. 
One thing that is clear from these high divorce rates is that a white married woman has a 
substantial chance, while married, that in her lifetime she will become divorced from one 
husband and remarried to another. 385 If her present husband dies this chance of remarriage 
then increases substantially. 386 
[13.12.7) Remarriage by blacks: The remarriage rates for coloureds and asians are very 
much lower than those for whites. 387 Little is known of the remarriage rates for blacks. 
The ukungena custom388 amongst tradition-minded blacks reflects a taboo on remarriage. 
The wife is considered property in the deceased's estate paid for with the bride price, the 
lobola. 389 A designated male, usually a brother of the deceased, acquires the duty to 
consort with the wives of the deceased. The primary purpose of this custom is to ensure 
further children for the deceased's house, 'the cattle not the man beget the children' .390 
The custom belongs to a culture where children provide labour and are considered a financial 
advantage. The custom brings with it a duty to provide support for the children.391 It 
seems reasonable to anticipate that with education and urbanization the customary taboos and 
values will lose strength and remarriage will become more common, possibly moving 
towards the rates observed for the coloured population.392 
[13.12.8) Remarriage statistics: The appellate division has seriously undermined the 
usefulness of remarriage statistics as a basis for dispute resolution. 393 It seems likely that 
this was unintentional, the emphasis being on the diverse factors which should be allowed 
to supplement the statistics. That remarriage is a fickle subjective issue is beyond doubt. 
This, it seems, is all the more reason for preferring an objectively determined statistic to the 
385Strijdom in HSRC 'Marriage & Family Life' 446 450-3 records copious statistics concerning the status of persons 
contracting marriages. In 1984 32,3% of white marriages included at least one partner who had been previously 
divorced. In 13,3 % of marriages both parties had been previously divorced. 
3860ne is here reminded of the 'adequate cause• theory proposed by von Kries (Hart & Honore 'Causation• 2ed 469) 
that there is causation if the wrongful act has increased the chance of the event by a substantial amount. Causation 
of remarriage by death clearly falls within this definition. See too 207 above. 
387Thomson 1988 De Rebus 67 70. 
388Seymour 'Customary law' 5ed 286-94; Van der Vyver 1964 THRHR 94-115. 
389Hahlo & Kahn 'SA Legal System' 344 'Matrimony (under the old Germanic law) had the features of the African 
/oho/a-marriage'. 
390Seymour 'Bantu Law' 3ed 266. 
391Seymour 'Bantu Law' 228-9. 
392For practical purposes one would probably have to-give equal weight to the customary law and the social realities 
reflected in the statistics. This would mean using a remarriage deduction of one half of the coloured rate (see 
Thomson 1988 De Rebus 67 70). 
393Lega/ Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 617inf 'The census statistics ... should not be regarded as a starting 
point, but merely as one of the facts, to be considered along with all the other facts - one of which is that Cupid is 
notoriously i·ncorrigible and unpredictable'. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
328 DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
'gut feel' of the court. 394 Reliance on statistics would place the remarriage issue on the 
same footing as the allowance for mortality and substantially obviate the need for judges to 
engage in what many perceive to be distasteful speculation. 395 Depending on the evidence 
the tabular remarriage rate may then be adjusted for relevant considerations. 396 One must 
in any event express serious reservations about the subjective judicial assessment of 
remarriage prospects for widows from unfamiliar cultural backgrounds. White remarriage 
rates are very high compared to other social groups in South Africa and a white judge should 
be wary of overstating the remarriage prospects of a black widow. 397 
It is common that the widow is injured in the same accident that killed her husband. Such 
widows will usually have reduced chances for remarriage. The loss of marriage prospects 
is caused by her injury and not by the death of her husband. It follows that her claim for 
loss of support should be assessed as though she had not been injured and had normal 
remarriage prospects. She then has a separate claim by way of her personal injury for loss 
of the financial benefits of marriage. 398 
[13.12.9] Effect of children: Due to the effect of a dowry and forestalled marriage plans the 
tabular rates are probably too low for widows claiming compensation. 399 The opinion of 
a white widow on her remarriage prospects has been given little weight400 whereas the 
opinion of a black widow has been accepted.401 The presence or absence of children may 
require an adjustment to the tabular rate. 402 It needs to be borne in mind, however, that 
the children will be largely self-supporting due to the award to them of damages.403 The 
tabular remarriage rates relate to average widows who would have an average number of 
children, and a downward adjustment is suggested for widows with more than the usual quota 
of children. Conversely for the widow without children the tabular rate should be increased. 
[13.12.10] Case study: Consider the following circumstances: After the death of the 
breadwinner, a freshly qualified surgeon, the widow, previously a housewife, trains as a 
394Southern Insurance v Bdiley 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 1140. 
395Boberg 1976 BML 113 114. Much of the problems experienced by the courts in this regard would be avoided 
if the average was taken as a starting point to be modified in the light of the evidence before the court. 
396Such as cultural and physical factors and the likely level of support from remarriage. 
397The approach of the court in Masiba v Constantia Insurance 1982 4 SA 333 (C) 344-5 was to accept the widow's 
evidence and make no deduction at all. The defendant did not lead evidence on the point. More generally see 
Burman 'African customary law' 74-81. 
398See paragraph 12.4.3 and section 13.10. 
399See paragraph 13 .12.4. 
400Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 6 l 7F 'Her attitude is that she will not remarry unless it is necessary 
to do so to support her child. I think little weight should be attached to her attitude'. 
401 Masiba v Constantia Insurance 1982 4 SA 333 (C) 344-5 'having regard to her evidence that she did not wish to 
remarry in the future, which I see no reason to reject. .. '. · 
402Boberg 1964 SAU 194 2 l 8n43 'I devote no time to consideration of the likelihood of a widow with sev·en children 
remarrying'; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 1251120. 
403Trimmel v Williams 1952 3 SA 786 (C) 793C-D. 
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teacher and then marries a teacher and herself continues working. How now is the 
adjustment for remarriage to be assessed?404 The new husband earns much less than the 
deceased. The value of her right to support from her new husband is close to nil because 
she is largely self-supporting. However, no regard may be had for her earnings. 405 In 
fairness to the defendant it seems that her earnings should be left out of account when 
determining the value of her right to support from the second husband. 
[13.12.11] Remarriage by a widower: It does happen · that a deceased wife was the main 
breadwinner. One then needs to consider the allowance to be made for the remarriage 
prospects of the widower.406 There are no statistics for remarriage rates for men. These 
rates will be higher than for women if it be true ·that there is a tendency that a man on second 
marriage to chooses a wife very much younger than the first. 407 
The claim by a father for the loss of the services of his deceased wife has been reduced for 
the contingency that he may remarry and thereby replace the services. 408 If the value of 
the mother's services has been included in the claims for each child409 then no deduction 
would be made for the contingency of the father's remarriage. 410 The father's claim would 
then include only the value of his share of the deceased's services. Such a claim is properly 
reduced for the contingency of his remarriage and for what he would otherwise have 
expended on supporting his late wife. 
[13.12.12] Adoption of a child: The adoption of a child will be ignored. The adoption of 
an orphaned child has been likened to the remarriage of a widow. 411 
[13.12.13] Criticism of the remarriage deduction: The deduction for remarriage has been 
the subject of substantial criticism. 412 Much of this criticism reflects a failure to appreciate 
the nature of causation in the sense of occasioning an event.413 The remarriage deduction 
is entirely reasonable if lump-sum compensation is seen for what it is, a fair price for which 
to forego the right to bring further litigation against the defendant. 
404-rhese are the facts of a claim which was eventually settled on the basis that the period for the claim terminated 
when the new marriage re-established the right to support. No regard was had for the value of the new right to 
support. 
40
'Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A). 
406If the husband was in ill health, or otherwise disabled from working, then his remarriage prospects may be 
negligible. 
4071 have been unable to find researched authority for this proposition which seems to be true in terms of general 
experience. 
408Cooke & Cooke v Maxwell 1942 SR 133; Boberg 1964 SAL! 194 216n28. 
409See section 13.6. 
410Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. 
411 Constantia Verseke1ingsmpy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A). 
412 Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 l SA 601 (A); 123F; Davel ' Skad~vergoeding ' 127-8. 
413See paragraph 2.8.2 and section 11.9. 
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[13.13] LOSS OF INHERITANCE PROSPECTS 
Before discussing the deduction for accelerated benefits It IS useful to consider more 
generally the extent to which damages will be awarded for loss of inheritance prospects. The 
main concern here is with loss of inheritance prospects occasioned by early death, but other 
causes of loss of inheritance prospects will be canvassed. 
[13.13.1) Interference with testator's free will: Damages will not be awarded for loss of 
inheritance prospects if a testator has been persuaded to change his will by reason of 
wrongful conduct. 414 . If there has been fraud or duress the new will may be declared 
invalid.415 The legal mechanism for righting the balance is by way of forfeiture and not 
damages. 
[13.13.2) Negligence as to procedures: In Trumpelmann v Barclays Bank416 there was a 
substantial out-of-court settlement for loss of inheritance. The bank, which held itself out 
to be an expert in such matters had been negligent in the preparation of a will. There was 
no interference with the exercise by the testator of his freedom of testation. The wrongful 
act was negligently to fail to follow the procedures legally required to give effect to that 
intention. It seems highly likely that a South African court apprised with such circumstances 
would award damages.417 
[13.13.3) Caused by early death: Damages for loss of inheritance prospects will be awarded 
under the dependants' action in conjunction with a claim for loss of support.418 The most 
common form of such an award is by way of the deduction for accelerated benefits when a 
value is placed upon the spes of inheritance had the death not occurred when it did. 419 
Where the deceased would have received a substantial retirement lump sum had he lived so 
long then his estate would have been swelled after retirement with an associated increase to 
the value of the inheritance prospects for his heirs. 420 This circumstance can give rise to 
a calculable loss of inheritance prospects without there having been any material inheritance 
at the time of the early death. 
414Mil/ward v Glaser 1949 4 SA 931 (A) 941; Hayward v Protea Insurance 1985 3 C&B 588 (C) 598-601. 
•ucorbett Hahlo Hofmeyr & Kahn 'Law of Succession' 77. 
416Trumpelmann v Barclay's Bank reported in Sunday Times 04.10.81 pg 7. At the instance of the bank the will had 
been initialled on each page instead of being signed in full. 
417ln Ross v Caunters [1979) 3 All ER 580 (ChD) damages were awarded to a disappointed legatee because the 
attorneys had failed to warn the testator as to the proper procedures. See further Cilliers 1980 De Rebus 388; 
Erasmus 1980 De Rebus 389; Wunsh 1988 TSAR 1; Sonnekus 1981 TSAR 172. 
411Marine & Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) 481 488-9. In this case the family had lived on 
drawings from the family business. The drawings were somewhat less than the net profit generated by the business. 
The unconsumed profits were saved by way of ploughback into the business. The court ruled that the damages 
calculation should be based on the profits and not the drawings . 
419See paragraph 13.14.1. 
420See paragraph 5.5.3 . 
,. 
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The award to a dependant, usually the widow, of the value of lost inheritance prospects is 
an example of the award of the value of the chance.421 A proper adjustment needs to be 
made for general contingencies. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that the dependency 
calculation based on the deceased's earnings includes that part of the earnings which would 
have been accumulated as further savings.422 Because the dependants' action is directed 
at compensating loss of support it is proper to restrict the award for loss of inheritance 
prospects to such amounts as would be reasonable for providing ongoing support. As a rule 
the award for loss of inheritance prospects is made in conjunction with a deduction for what 
has been inherited. Mariamah's case423 provides an example of an award for loss of 
inheritance prospects separately from a deduction for accelerated benefits. This suggests 
that, in conjunction with a claim for loss of support, a claim for pure loss of inheritance 
prospects would receive favourable consideration by the courts. 
Consider the following example: The will of the deceased's father provided that the family 
farm go to his son, now deceased. The deceased's father dies one year after his son leaving 
the farm to the deceased's brother. Had the son not died he would have inherited the farm 
from his father, and the deceased son's wife, now a widow, would have had substantial 
prospects of inheritance. This seems to be an instance where an award for the value of the 
chance of lost inheritance prospects could and should b~ made.424 
[13.13.4] Ongoing support from inheritance: The dependants' action is directed at 
compensation for what has been lost by way of support.425 The dependants are 
compensated for loss of inheritance prospects because an inheritance would have provided 
for the continuation of support.426 Consistent with this principle a self-supporting child has 
no right of action for loss of inheritance prospects in the event of the premature death of his 
father. 427 It follows that any award for loss of inheritance prospects should be limited to 
what is needed to provide ongoing support. This is particularly relevant when assessing 
compensation for a dependent child because the chance, the spes, of inheritance during the 
period of dependency will usually be so small that it may be ignored.428 It also is relevant 
in this regard that a child is not required to apply inherited capital to meeting the costs of 
421 See chapter 4. 
422See footnote 418 . 
423See footnote 418. 
424A surviving wife would usually be left the usufruct of the family farm. In the event of marriage in community 
of property she will often become a half-owner of the farm immediately her husband acquires it. 
mlegal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 614E; Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Munarin 1965 3 SA 367 (A) 
3768; Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. 
426Millward v Glaser 1949 4 SA 931 (A) 940. Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 50-56 states that there is no good reason for 
protecting inheritance prospects per se (at 55). 
mlocklzat 's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 3040-E. 
428Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 132n2 maintains that a ch ild should be compensated for inheritance prospects falling 
outside the period of dependency. Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 55 writes as regards this anomaly ' Hoekom sou 'n kind 
wat 'n athanklike is, maar skadeloos gestel is, se aanspraak sterker wees as 'n kind wat nie 'n afhanklike is nie?' 
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support. 429 It follows that only the income from the inheritance may be brought into 
account as a deduction.430 Where the child has inherited cash the interest earnecI on that 
money will be deducted. Where the child has inherited real assets, such as a share in the 
family home, it is by no means clear to what extent the value may be brought into account. 
In practice one usually assumes that the real asset has been converted to cash shortly after 
the death. 
[13.13.5] Incongruous ruling: In Burns v NEG lnsurance431 the deceased's employer had 
improved the pension fund benefits between date of death and date of trial such tha_t had the 
employee died at a later date his widow would have received a substantial pension. Because 
the death was premature the widow did not receive a pension. Compensation was claimed 
for the value of the loss of this spes.432 The interpretation of the Assessment of Damages 
Act433 is not governed by considerations of fairness. 434 Compensation was denied on the 
grounds that had the deceased died at some later date the widow would then have had no 
action for damages. 435 The reasoning here is difficult to grasp. If valid it implies that no 
claim may ever be brought for loss of inheritance prospects. One must conclude that the 
Burns ruling is wrong. 
[13.13.6] Loss of life cover: In De Vos v SA Eagle Versekeringsmpy436 the death had 
prevented the payment of the premium which would have brought life cover into effect under 
a new life policy. The loss of the benefits under the policy were claimed as damages. 
Compensation was denied on the grounds that had there been no death the deceased would 
have been alive and without a right to claim under the policy. This was hardly a good reason 
for denying compensation because had the deceased still been alive he would have been at 
risk for dying at some other time at which stage the policy benefit would have been payable. 
One may observe, however, that the present value of premiums payable under the policy was 
at least equal to, and cancelled out by, the present value of the chance of benefits payable 
in the event of death at some later date. The De Vos ruling would seem to be correct, but 
for the wrong reasons. 
429Constantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 612-13; Boberg 'Persons & family' 261n56 (footnote 
continued on page 262). 
4»fhis was the approach in Pym v Great Northern Railway Co (1863) 4 B&S 396 (Ex Ch); 122 ER 508 (Ex Ch). 
431 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364C. 
432The Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 precludes a court from taking account of 'benefits payable as a result 
of the death'. The words 'the death' seem to confine the application of the Act to benefits payable as a result of the 
death giving rise to the action for damages . Notional death at some other time does not seem to fall within the ambit 
of the Act. If the Act was intended to extend to later notional death the word ' the' should have been omitted. 
4339 of 1969. 
434Du Toit v General Accident Insurance 1988 3 SA 75 (D) 75inf. 
mBurns v NEG Insurance 1988 3 SA 355 (C) 364F-G 'The widow's pension could only have benefited her if he 
had not died in this collision but some four or five years later: as a result of some other collision? from cancer? -
in which event defendant would have incurred no liability and she would have had only that pension and no damages 
claim against it'. 
436 1985 3 SA 447 (A). 
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In the Burns matter, it deserv~s note, the earnings of the deceased had already been reduced 
for the contribution that he would personally have made to the pension fund, quite apart from 
the fact that the calculation had ignored all additional contributions that would have been 
made by the employer towards pension benefits. There was, in the Burns case, no question 
of the offset of gains and losses that validates the De Vos ruling. 
[13.14] ACCELERATED BENEFITS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
[13.14.1] Inheritances: On death the assets of the deceased pass to the heirs. The death may 
also give rise to the payment to the estate of life insurance and pension benefits. The 
Assessment of Damages Act437 requires that when assessing damages for loss of support 
no regard shall be had, inter alia, to life insurance and pension benefits payable as a result 
of the death. The balance of the estate constitutes a deductible benefit.438 The appropriate 
deduction to be made for the gain from an inheritance is a complex issue. For analysis 
purposes one needs to identify three separate components: 
The usufruct: The value of the use of the assets by the family had there been no death. 
The inheritance: The value of the assets which have accrued as a result of the death.439 
The spes: The present value of the prospect, that is the spes, of inheriting at a later date had 
the death not occurred premature! y. 440 
[13.14.2] Use of assets: I have already dealt with this topic. Suffice it to say by way of 
recapitulation that if the breadwinner provided, for instance, the family home it follows that 
he provided support not only directly by way of a share of his earnings but also by way of 
a share of the use of the family hoine. The annual amount provided by way of support 
should thus be increased to allow for the use of facilities such as the family home.441 
Investments held by the deceased in, for instance the stock exchange, would not have been 
directly available for use by the family but the associated investment returns would have 
augmented the income available for the support of the family. It will usually be appropriate 
to add to the deceased's notional income available for support a real rate of return on the 
invested assets. The use value of business assets will usually be included in the deceased's 
reported earnings. 442 
4379 of 1969. Discussed at 345. 
438ln England the exclusion now extends to inheritances as well (s3(1) Administration of Justice Act 1982). 
439Groenewald v Snyders 19126 3 SA 237 (A) 248E-F item (a). 
44/JGroenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 248E-F item (b). Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 31 55 points out that the 
value of the chance of inheritance, the spes, forms part of the claimant's patrimony. 
441 See section 13.5. 
442See analysis in table 19 at 263. 
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[13.14.3] Changing values: The value of the inheritance will be taken from the liquidation 
and distribution account after exclusion of life insurance benefits.443 By the time of the 
trial the values of the inherited assets will have changed and it becomes necessary to revalue 
these assets in the light of supervening events.444 In the absence of explicit evidence it is 
usually reasonable to assume that growth asset values, like earnings, increase in line with 
inflation.445 For depreciating assets, such as a motor car, one might allow for a decline 
in value.446 
There is some uncertainty as to whether the deduction for inheritance is subject to currency 
nominalism,447 that is to say should not be adjusted for subsequent increases in value, or 
whether regard should be had to changes in asset values during the pre-trial period. The 
Hanley decision distinguished adjustments for inflation in order to estimate earnings levels 
during the years following the injury or death, and the additional adjustment for loss of 
buying power.448 In Santam Insurance v Meredith449 the value of the business inherited 
by the widow had decreased substantially during the pre-trial period. The court had regard 
to this supervening event. The technique of adding inflation to estimate current asset values 
is not a prohibited adjustment for loss of buying power, but rather an estimate of the current 
value of the inherited assets. This estimate must of necessity give way to explicit evidence 
as to the actual value of the relevant assets. 450 It will be seen from table 21 below, column 
C, that the usual calculation of an accelerated benefit includes the assumption that the assets 
inherited will increase in future on average in line with inflation. In certain circumstances 
one might assume increases at a rate below the rate of inflation. 
[13.14.4] Discussion of table 21: This table shows the detail of the calculation of the present 
value of the spes of inheritance had the deceased not been wrongfully killed when he was. 
The calculation contemplates a husband and wife both of the same age; it has been assumed 
that it is the husband who has died and that his widow now claims damages for loss of 
support. Column A shows the chance in each year that the wife, now a widow, would have 
been alive to inherit.451 Column B shows the chance that her husband, had he not died 
443The calculation of the notional estate and distribution is not without difficulties. Not the least of the complicating 
factors is the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 (see section 13 .17). 
"'Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 1SA608 (A) 617; Santam Insurance v Meredith 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk). In the latter 
case the value of the deceased' businesses inherited by the widow had declined substantially after the deceased 's 
death. See too Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 122-3; Boberg 1988 BML 11 18 55 56n16. 
445See paragraph 13.5.2. 
446See paragraph 13 .5 . 7. 
447SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A). 
448SA Eagle Insurance v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 840-1. See too paragraph 10.4.4. 
449 1990 4 SA 265 (Tk). 
•»fhis task is greatly complicated by the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 (see section 13.17). 
451Based on life table 2 per Quantum Yearbook 1993 . 
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TABLE 21 - YEAR-BY-YEAR CALCULATION OF SPES OF INHERITANCE 
Life-table chances Year-by-year method 
Chances Chances Estimated Interest Present 
Age or life of death inheritance Discount Value Age 
13,2%py 16%py R 
A B c D AxBxCxD 
75 1.000 0.0755 100000 1.0000 8033 75 
76 1.000 0.0753 113200 1.0000 9069 76 
77 1.000 0.0741 128142 1.0000 10103 77 
78 0.972 0.0718 145057 0.9285 9999 78 
79 0.915 0.0684 164205 0.8004 8750 79 
80 0.857 0.0649 185880 0.6900 7586 80 
81 0.797 0.0615 210416 0.5948 6529 81 
82 0.737 0.0587 238191 0.5128 5620 82 
83 0.674 0.0574 269632 0.4421 4909 83 
84 0.610 0.0551 305223 0.3811 4159 84 
85 0.544 0.0525 345512 0.3285 3451 85 
86 0.478 0.0492 391120 0.2832 2773 86 
87 0.413 0.0450 442748 0.2441 2137 87 
88 0.350 0.0400 501191 0.2 105 1571 88 
89 0.290 0.0344 567348 0.1814 1093 89 
90 0.236 0.0285 642238 0.1564 717 90 
91 0.187 0.0231 727013 0.1348 450 91 
92 0.144 0.0182 822979 0.1162 267 92 
93 0.108 0.0141 931612 0.1002 152 93 
94 0.079 0.0105 1054585 0.0864 80 94 
95 0 .055 0.0077 1193790 0.0745 40 95 
96 0.037 0.0055 1351370 0.0642 19 96 
97 0.023 0.0038 1529751 0.0553 8 97 
98 0.012 0.0025 1731678 0.0477 3 98 
99 0.005 0.0016 1960259 0.0411 1 99 
E Total 87521 I; 
when he did,. would have died in some later year. 452 Column C shows the estimated value 
of the future inheritance based on the assumption that the value of the inheritable assets 
would have increased in line with inflation.453 Column D shows the discount for 
investment returns, and the column headed AxBxCxD shows the present value of the loss for 
4~he chances of death shown in this column decrease with advancing age when one would have though~ that they 
should increase. The reason for this anomaly is that the chances of death are calculated taking a stand at age 75. 
The death rate at age 75 is so high that there are very few persons left to die off at the older ages. 
m13,2 % per year .compound has been used by way of example for expected future inflation. Some actuaries add 
the full rate of the expected investment return: see Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde 1974 TASSA 292 315. This latter 
procedure is not generally appropriate (see discussion under paragraph 13.14.7). 
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each separate future year. These separate losses total R87521, this being the value of the 
chance of inheritance, that is to say the value of the spes.454 This value may need to be 
adjusted for general contingencies.455 Important points to be noted in respect of this 
calculation are: 
[13.14.5] Past loss of inheritance prospects: If the claim is settled some time, say, 3 years 
after the death then there will be a past loss of inheritance prospects. 456 The total of 
R87521 in table 12 comprises R27205 by way of past loss of the chance of inheritance, plus 
R60316 by way of future loss of inheritance prospects. 
[13.14.6] Date for discounting: It is settled law that discounting should be done to the date 
of trial or settlement.457 It follows that the present value of the spes of inheritance should 
also be calculated by discounting to date of trial or settlement. This needs to stated here 
because many actuaries continue to discount to date of death for this part of the 
calculation. 458 
[13.14. 7] Projection of future value of inheritance: In table 21 this has been done in line 
with inflation (column C). This assumption presumes that real assets will increase in value 
in line with inflation. Some actuaries do the projection using the discount rate of interest 
instead of inflation.459 Their reasoning is that all investment returns are ploughed back into 
increasing the value of the estate. In certain limited circumstances this may be a correct 
assumption. More usually, however, the family will be using assets such as the family home 
or a holiday cottage. The assumption that all returns are ploughed back thus ignores the fact 
that all family members shared in the benefit. For this reason it is preferable to reduce the 
rate of escalation of assets to the rate of inflation, and sometimes less, and then to add to the 
family income for apportionment between the dependants the use value of the assets. In 
certain instances it may even be appropriate to assume that the assets would all have been 
cash invested at interest, and that the entire interest receipts were being consumed with the 
support of the family. In this instance the prospective inheritance would be estimated without 
allowance for any increase in the nominal value of the assets. The discussion thus far has 
ignored savings from the deceased's income. These will usually be brought into account by 
4s.For further worked examples see Koch 'Damages' 207 289-90 303 . 
mGroenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 248E 'The better way is to value the benefit as the excess of (a) the 
sum received, over (b) the value of the prospect, which the dependant had, of receiving it eventually. The latter 
value will take into account any contingencies, such as the possibility that the bread-winner might have altered his 
testament. . .'; see too Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 726A. A deduction will generally not 
be made for remarriage prospects due to the accumulated uncertainty of whether the notional husband on re-marriage 
will have assets and, if he does, the further uncertainty of whether or not he will bequeath any of them to his wife. 
•S6see section 13 . 13. 
mGeneral Accident Insurance v Summers 1987 3 SA 577 (A). 
4580bservation based on numerous actuarial reports analyzed by my office up to 1993. The formulation of the 
deduction for accelerated benefits by Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde 1974 TASSA 292 315 as (1-A). This 
oversimplification suggests that they too contemplated di scounting to date of delict. 
459See footnote 453. 
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apportioning between the dependants the ,geceased's total earnings without adjustment for that 
part of the earnings which would have been saved.460 
[13.14.8] Complex contingencies: The year-by-year technique illustrated in table 21 permits 
the analysis of extremely complex inheritance situations involving 3 lives and more, an 
important consideration when allowance needs to be made for inheritances which the 
deceased, had he lived, may have received from his parents. For a civil servant the year-by-
year technique provides a properly discounted value for the retirement gratuity which would 
have swelled his estate had he lived to normal retirement age.461 There is a simpler, but 
less accurate, method of calculation based on the expectation of life.462 
[13.14.9] Inheritance of family business: If the widow has taken over the family business 
the income she generates will be ignored when assessing her compensation. Only the value 
of the inherited business will be brought into account.463 
[13.14.10] The 'Maasberg' approach: The view has been expressed that the deduction for 
inheritance should be assessed without regard for assets which were available for the use of 
the family prior to the death.464 Typical of such assets would be the family home and 
furniture. This view relies on the judgment in Maasberg v Hunt Leuchars & Hepburn465 
where in the absence of dependent children the combined add-on value of usufruct and 
inheritance prospects were assessed as being equal to the deduction of what was inherited 
with a resulting nil adjustment to the award. The court did not profess to lay down a general 
rule in this regard. The Maasberg approach does not stand up to close analysis466 and in 
Snyders v Groenewald467 the court expressed the opinion that some deduction should be 
made for the advantage of the accelerated receipt of full dominium of the family home.468 
4flJMarine & Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) 481. See footnote 418. 
461The rough and ready approach using life expectancies would overstate the relevant value (see paragraph 5.5.3). 
462Howroyd 1958 SAIJ 65 77. See too paragraph 5 .5 . l. 
463Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 1 SA 718 (T) 727-8. 
464Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde 1974 TASSA 292 316; Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 180(c). This 
approach reflects English law (McGregor 'Damages' I 4ed 913). It is most appropriate in jurisdictions where the 
dependants claim as a group (see section 11.4). Under South African law each dependant has a separate claim 
(Constantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A)). What is more, South African law does not acknowledge the 
existence of indivisible household expenses (see Davel 'Broodwinner' 111; footnote 187 above). 
463 1944 WLD 2 13-14. 
466See discussion in paragraphs below. 
467 1966 3 SA 785 (C) 791D 'It seems to me that the dominium acquired by plaintiff under the will is a benefit over 
and above thaf enjoyed by her before her husband's death, and that some deduction must be made for this'. See too 
Milburn-Pyle & Van der Linde 1974 TASSA 292 316-19. 
468Consider a childless married couple both aged 40 and a family home valued at RlOOOOO. The Quantum Yearbook 
1993 at 74 shows the value of the spes of inheriting RlOOOOO to be 0,3410xR100000=R34100. The yearly value 
of the use of one half of the house may be estimated as half of 2,5 % py on RlOOOOO, ie RI250 per year; this has 
a present value of R25580 if one discounts at 2,5 % per year over the 27 ,52 years which is the joint life expectancy 
of the couple. The net gain for the widow immediately after the death is R40320 (100000 - R34100 - R25580). 
This is significantly different from the nil deduction adopted in Maasberg's case. The use value ofR1250 per year 
may seem very low but one must bear in mind that this is the rental value net of all maintenance and running 
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For a healthy husband and wife of equal age the value of the spes is generally less than one 
half of the value of the relevant asset. 469 
Central to the treatment of the family home is the question of indivisible household expenses. 
In Legal Insurance v Botes470 the widow was awarded only 50% of the rental cost of the 
flat occupied by herself and her husband jointly. The court dismissed the argument that the 
cost of providing her with alternative accommodation would probably have been a good deal 
more than the figure awarded. It seems that no express evidence had been led as to the cost 
of alternative accommodation. The allocation of one half seems to reflect an extension of 
the two-parts-one part formalism. If so then evidence as to the actual cost of alternative 
accommodation may well be admissible. There is authority for allowing the widow's 
relocation costs as part of the damages for loss of support.471 The use of the two-parts-
one-part formalism reflects a focus on the utility of what would have been provided had there 
been no death, rather than the need of the dependant havil)g regard to the death. 
[13.14.11] Family home out of community: If the marriage was out of community of 
property the wife would have shared the use of the family home with her husband, that is a 
one-half share of the usufruct.472 Suppose that on the death of her husband she inherits the 
entire family home. The value of a usufruct, any usufruct, is always less than the value of 
unencumbered · ownership, particularly when the usufruct is over a limited period such as a 
lifetime. This means that the value of what has been lost by way of one half of the use of 
the family home is less, often considerably less, than one half of the value of the family 
home.473 The widow has, on the other hand, gained by way of the full ownership of a 
home which she only occupied prior to the death. Even if one then brings into account the 
value of the spes she had of inheriting this home at some other time she still has a net 
financial gain . 
For an aged or sickly breadwinner and a youthful wife it is conceivable that the value of the 
spes of inheritance in the event of the death of the breadwinner substantially exceeds one half 
of the value of the asset. However, the same factors that swell the value of the spes will 
markedly reduce the value of use during the breadwinner's lifetime. 
expenses which would have been met out of the deceased's earnings (see section 13.5). 
469See table of values for inheritance prospects published in Quantum Yearbook 1993 at 72-83. For a couple both 
aged 40 and subject to table 2 mortality the value of the spes of inheriting a home worth RlOOOOO is R34100. From 
this should be deducted contingencies of about 15% giving a net value for the spes of R30000 in round figures. 
470 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 616D-F. More generally see 293 and 299. 
471Laney v Wal/em 1931 CPD 360 364 'Then also the reduction in expenditure, which the death of the head of the 
household warrants, cannot at once be put into force when he is taken away suddenly. The house cannot be let 
immediately, servants cannot at once be dismissed'. 
411Legal Insurance v Botes 1963 1 SA 608 (A) 616B-F makes it clear that the widow's compensation must be based 
on one half of the value of the use of the family home. In this matter it had been argued that after the death she still 
required the entire home. See too Nochomowitz v Santam Insurance 1972 3 SA 640 (A) 647-9; Davel 
'Skadevergoeding' 111. 
473See footnote 468. 
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[13.14.12) Family home in community: If the marriage was in community of property the 
wife would have owned one half of the family home in her own right. The benefit of one 
half of the use of the house which she enjoyed would have been derived, not from her 
inheritance but from her own half share. She was thus fully self-supporting as regards her 
own occupation of the family home. Her future inheritance of her husband's half share 
would thus be a deductible gain474 adjusted only for the spes of notional later 
inheritance.475 It could be argued that her half-share derives entirely from the past earnings 
of the deceased and thus that the fact of her half ownership should be ignored. This 
reasoning, however, overlooks the fact that the asset had accrued to her by the time of the 
death, it was hers whatever its source.476 The calculation of future loss of support, because 
it includes allowance for savings, would include the value of such future accruals. 
[13.14.13) Deprived children: When assets used by the family are ignored as in the 
Maasberg case, then nothing is added to the claims of the children for what they have lost 
by way of use of such assets. Groenewald v Snyders477 requires that when assessing the 
claims of the children no regard should be had to the support which they may now claim 
from their mother. This would include a right to occupy the family home which now belongs 
entirely to their mother. If there had been divorce and remarriage prior to the death, some 
of the children of the deceased may, after his death, be sent back to their mother, the wife 
of the first marriage. There is then no question of them continuing to share the family home. 
[13.14.14) Right of recourse: The Apportionment of Damages Act478 gives the defendant 
a right of recourse against the estate of the deceased if the deceased was contributorily 
negligent in bringing about his own death. This issue has already been discussed.479 
[13.15] ACCELERATED BENEFITS - SELECTED PROBLEMS 
[13.15.1) Funeral expenses: The person who pays the funeral expenses may recover them 
from the wrongdoer. 480 The loss suffered is the accelerated value of the funeral expenses, 
414Botes v SAR 1937 2 PH Jl8 (C). In this matter the court erred by failing to make an adjustment for the spes of 
later inheritance. Because the wife had provided her own half share of the accommodation there should be no 
adjustment for Joss of use. See too Legal Insurance v Bores 1963 I SA 608 (A) 621E-G. 
47~he figures in footnote 468 contemplate a marriage out of community of property. If the marriage had been in 
community of property the widow would have inherited one half of the family home worth R50000, the other half 
would have been hers by right, by reason of the community of property. The present value of her spes of inheriting 
this half share at a later date is one half of the value calculated under footnote 468, that is to say Rl 7050 (half of 
R34100). Her half share of the use of the house was the half share she owned; her husband thus contributed nothing 
to her support by way of the use of half of a house. She has thus inherited R50000 and Jost a spes worth Rl 7050, 
a net gain of R32950 at the time of the death, assuming that a nil deduction for general contingencies is appropriate. 
476See paragraph 13.5.4. 
477 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. 
47834of1956 ss2(1B) 2(6)(a); Boberg 1971SAU423 441-58. 
479See section 13.16. 
480Ronda/ia Assura.nce v Britz 1976 3 SA 243 (T); Commercial Union Assurance i• Mirkin 1989 2 SA 584 (C). This 
will include the cost of a tombstone Commercial Union Assurance v Mirkin 1989 2 SA 584 (C). The costs of a wake 
would also seem to be recoverable. 
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that is the cost actually incurred less the prospect of incurring the expense in years to 
come. 481 The practice in this regard is to award the full cost incurred without any 
abatement for the chance that the expense would have been incurred in any event at some 
later date. In practice the overstatement of the loss is largely offset by the non-award of 
interest on the damages and a rough justice is thereby achieved. 
[13.15.2] Testamentary supporl: The claims by children will not be abated if, after the 
deduction for accelerated benefits, the widow has a financial gain. 482 This principle 
ensures that the widow is able to treat her inheritance as though the children were all self-
supporting, as would have been the case had the death occurred in later life. However, if 
the will explicitly directs the widow to use her inheritance for the support of the children it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this is a testamentary disposition in favour of the 
children which must be brought into account against their claims. 
[13.15.3] Gratuitous transfer of inheritance: A mother may gratuitously transfer her right 
to inheritance to the children. This could be achieved by donation, sale on favourable terms, 
or a refusal to adiate. It seems that the damages for both her and the children should be 
assessed as though the disposition had not been made. Her gratuitous act is res inter alios 
act a. 
[13.15.4] Loss of benefits of divorce: When husband and wife divorce the court is 
empowered to order a redistribution of assets. 483 In the event of death prior to divorce 
there is no provision for such redistribution but the widow does have a right to claim 
maintenance from the deceased's estate.484 A widow is not obliged to mitigate her damages 
by claiming such maintenance. 485 It is appropriate to make a deduction for the contingency 
of divorce.486 An untimely death of the husband prior to the divorce would deprive the 
widow of the prospect of a substantial transfer of assets on divorce, a consideration which 
may well offset any deduction which might otherwise have been made for the contingency 
of divorce. This consideration would be particularly relevant if divorce proceedings were 
in progress at the time of the death. A divorced woman has no claim for damages for loss 
of support.487 The position of a woman who is about to divorce is unclear, but one may 
speculate that the court will take a generous view. 
481 Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 34-5. 
4112 Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. 
483s7 Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
484Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
485Locklrat's Estate v North 81itish & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 306A; Groenewald v Snyders 1966 
3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. 
486De Jongh v Gunther 1975 4 SA 78 (W). 
487See paragraphs 13.2.19 and 13.2.20. 
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[13.15.5] Support claimed from estate: The children have a right to claim support from the 
estate of their deceased breadwinner. 488 A wrongdoer cannot demand that the children 
mitigate their loss by exercising this right. 489 In Heyns case it was held, however, that if 
the children have exercised their right against the estate before finalizing their claim for 
damages then the value of support from the estate is deductible.490 The claim against the 
estate is for future support and is granted on the understanding that the child will be in need 
in future years. An award for damages would render the child self-supporting without any 
payment from the estate being necessary. The executor of an estate who admits a claim for 
support by children who have a right to damages would seem to be acting contrary to the 
interests of the heirs and may well incur personal liability for such an oversight. The 
provision of support from an estate is claimed not as an inheritance but as a debt owing by 
the estate.491 The Heyns ruling offends against the principle that alternative sources of 
support after the death should be ignored. 492 The proper approach seems to be that the 
payments of support by the estate should be ignored. If any payments have been made the 
estate should be entitled to recover these from the child by way of the condictio indebiti, 
after damages have been awarded. 493 
[13.15.6] Usufruct: It is common with large estates that the widow is left a lifetime usufruct 
of the entire estate while the children inherit the nudum dominium. Alternatively, this may 
be structured as a trust with the children as reversionary beneficiaries. The yearly value of 
a usufruct over real assets, ie immovable property or shares, will usually increase over the 
years, probably more or less in line with inflation. 494 The value of the nudum dominium 
will usually increase similarly. The value accorded to the use of immovable property is the 
open-market rental value reduced for running costs and maintenance. 
A usufruct over money usually implies the right to take the full nominal rate of interest. The 
value of the nudum dominium will then not increase but remain constant in nominal terms. 
The usufruct over assets in general will usually include the right to switch assets between, 
for example, growth assets and cash deposits, although there may be restrictions on the 
disposal of immovable property, such as a farm. Due to the complications created by 
insurance pay-outs the mix of assets at the date of death is often a decisive factor when 
valuing the usufruct. 
488See paragraphs 6.4.4 and 13.2.17. 
489Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 306A; Groenewald v Snyders 1966 
3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. Contra Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 50-56. See too 285 above. 
490Heyns v SA Eagle Versekeringsmpy 1988 (T) (unreported 6.7.88 case 13468/86). To the extent that such support 
derives from life insurance money it must be ignored. 
491 See paragraph 
m.Groenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247A-D. 
493See Visser 1988 THRHR 492-507; Van Zyl v Seifontein 1992 2 SA 450 (C); Muller v The Master 1992 4 SA 277 
(T) for the requirements for bringing the condictio indebiti. 
494See section 13.5. 
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[13.15.7] Fideicommissum: The value of afideifommissum would probably be assessed on 
the same basis as a usufruct. A fideicommissum residui would have a larger value to the 
holder than afideicommissum which requires onward transmission of undiminished assets. 
[13.15.8] Massing: This gives a rise to a usufruct for the surviving spouse over the combined 
assets of husband and wife. The children become owners of the nudum dominium of the 
entire joint estate. The death thus deprives the widow of the ownership of her own assets. 
The accelerated value of this loss should be offset against the gain by way of the accelerated 
value of an unshared usufruct over the deceased's assets. 
[13.15.9] Inheritances by children: A child who inherits the nudum dominium of an asset 
cannot in any way utilise this to meet the costs of his .support. 495 It seems correct that a 
child's claim should not be reduced by reason of such an inheritance. This same 
consideration suggests that a deduction should also not be made from the child's 
compensation for the value of the spes of receiving full ownership in the distant future when 
self-supporting. A child who inherits full ownership, usually in trust, is not required to 
utilise capital to meet the costs of support unless ordered to do so by a court.496 It follows 
that the deduction for such an inheritance should be limited to the income derived from the 
inheritance during the period of dependency. If the inheritance is a cash sum the income is 
the nominal interest return on the capital. For real assets such as lettable property the 
income may be the rental income net of expenses. If the rule against consumption of capital 
views capital as the nominal value inherited at death then the child may be compelled, 
notionally at least, to convert growth assets into fixed interest assets. The value of the spes 
of receiving this income had death not occurred when it did is generally so small that it can 
be ignored. 497 
[13.16] APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES 
[13.16.1] Contributory negligence of deceased: The Apportionment of Damages Act498 
provides that if the deceased was contributorily negligent in bringing about his own death 
then the wrongdoer and the estate of the victim are to be joint wrongdoers.499 The 
wrongdoer is obliged to pay in full but has a right of recourse against the estate assets to the 
extent that such assets have not been brought into account in assessing the damages. When 
the estate has no assets, as happens with the vast majority of deceased victims in South 
495 Amongst Indian families the nudum dominium is commonly left to the oldest son with a usufruct to his mother. 
Under black customary law the entire estate goes to the eldest son of the deceased (Seymour 'Customary law' 5ed 
274-9). 
49(jConstantia Versekeringsmpy v Victor 1986 1 SA 601 (A) 612-13. In Ex parte Jacobs 1950 2 PH M26 (0) in a 
claim for maintenance from a deceased estate the court ordered that a deduction be made for the full amount of the 
child's capital. 
497See footnote 428. 
49834 of 1956 ss2(1B) 2(6)(a); Boberg 1971 SAU 423 441-58. 
499ss2(1B) 2(6)(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956; Boberg 1971 SAU 423 441-58; Davel 
'Skadevergoeding' 82-4. 
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Africa, the wrongdoer is without recourse. 500 The so-called '1 % rule' then applies501 
whereby the wrongdoer incurs liability for 100 % of the damages notwithstanding contributory 
negligence of only 1 % . The dividing line between this and absolute no-fault liability is 
extremely fine. A defendant may no longer avoid liability by reason of the so-called 'last 
chance' rule. 502 
[13.16.2] Assets protected against recourse: The wrongdoer who seeks a contribution from 
the estate of the deceased may only proceed against assets which were not brought into 
account in assessing the damages. 503 The widow who has inherited will have her damages 
reduced by the accelerated value of her inheritance. The accelerated value is calculated as 
the amount actually inherited less the value of the chance of inheritance at some later 
date. 504 It has been suggested that a defendant ·may recover from the excess of the 
inheritance over the amount actually deducted. 505 The better view is that protection extends 
to the full amount inherited.506 To the extent that persons other than dependants have 
inherited507 the assets are available to satisfy a right of recourse. If the assets have been 
distributed the wrongdoer who has paid may recove~ by way of the condictio indebiti.508 
[13.16.3] Recourse against life insurance payments: The Assessment of Damages Act509 
precludes a court from making a deduction for the accelerated value of life insurance 
payments made to the estate. It follows that such life insurance monies are not taken into 
account by the court when assessing damages. The proceeds of the policies are thus 
available to satisfy the defendant's right of recourse. The first RlOOOO of policies which 
have been in force for longer than three years is protected under the Insurance Act. 510 If 
SOOWith small estates it is usual that the widow takes over the assets and signs an undertaking to pay all debts of the 
estate (sl 8(3) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965). It is conceivable that a wrongdoer may exercise a 
right of recourse against such a widow. It is doubtful, though, that the Master would require the widow to meet such 
a claim. An executor could then be appointed and the estate wound up as insolvent. 
'°1 Uni~n Government v Lee 1927 AD 202. 
moavel 'Skadevergoeding' 85-6. 
'°3s2(6)(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. 
'°4Groenewa/d v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 248E-F 'The better way is to value the benefit as the excess of (a) the 
sum received, over (b) the value of the prospect which the dependant had of receiving it eventually'. See section 
13.14. 
'°5Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 84; Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 189(c). 
'°6'fhe expression 'accelerated benefits' lumps together as one net amount a deduction for the full amount inherited 
with an add back for the spes of inheritance at some later date had the death not occurred when it did (see section 
13.14). If one has regard to the separate components of the deduction then it is clear that the entire inheritance is 
brought into account when assessing the damages (Corbett & Buchanan 3ed 95). 
m A house or farm or business may be left to an older self-supporting son. 
'°8See Visser 198$ THRHR 492-507; Van Zyl v Se1fontein 1992 2 SA 450 (C); Muller v 17ze Master 1992 4 SA 277 
(f) for a discussions of the requirements for bringing the condictio indebiti. 
5099 of 1969. For a fuller discussion of this Act see 345. 
510ss39 40 of the I.nsurance -Act 27 of 1943. Newdigate & Honey 'The MVA Handbook' 189 take this to mean 
'RlOOOO of life cover'. An alternative interpretation is 'R 10000 of surrender value immediately prior to the death'. 
The death claim values for such policies may amount to several hundred thousand rand. s45 states that the 
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it is the widow who has inherited then the right of recourse may be effected by an offset 
against her claim for damages. She will then have to bear the burden of apportionment not 
only for her own claim but also for the claims of the children. 
[13.16.4] Assets used by the family are protected: In order to allow for the value of the use 
but for the death it is common to make no deduction for the accelerated value of the family 
home, furniture and car. 511 The reasoning underlying this approach is that the gain of these 
effects offsets a loss suffered of equal value.512 It follows that the family home, furniture 
and car, have, in an in-out sense, 513 been taken into account in assessing the damages and 
are thus not available as assets to satisfy the wrongdoer's right of recourse. 514 
[13.16.5] Two schools of thought: The prevailing state of the law governing the effect of the 




The first school points out that the dependants' right of action arises by reason of the 
death and lies directly between the dependants and the killer. The wrongful conduct 
of the breadwinner in bringing about his own death is a matter between the wrongdoer 
and the deceased. Because the dependants did not act negligently in bringing about 
their loss they are accordingly entitled to damages without · reduction for the 
contributory negligence of their breadwinner. 
The second school takes the view that value of the right to support which has been lost 
is only as good as the breadwinner himself. This school does not deny that the right 
of action of the dependants is separate and distinct from that of their breadwinner. It 
does maintain, however, that the economic value of what may be claimed in terms of 
that right is intimately affected by the conduct of the breadwinner. 
It deserves note that the contract of employment of the deceased lies between himself and his 
employer. The dependants are not party to this contract and yet they may rely thereon for 
purposes of proving the quantum of their damages. If the evidence reveals that the deceased 
was an irresponsible or reckless person this will lead to a substantial deduction for general 
contingencies. In other words the past and anticipated future negligence of the breadwinner 
in the conduct of his financial affairs will affect the damages claimable by the dependants. 
If a breadwinner had been dismissed from his job shortly before his death this would be 
judgement creditor or executor may choose which policies are available for satisfaction of the claim. 
mNewdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 180(c) (the relevant case is Maasberg v Hunt Leuchars & Hepburn Ltd 
1944 WLD 2 and not the one cited). It is doubtful that this rough and ready approach is generally valid: see Koch 
'Damages' 194-5 207-11; Davel 'Skadevergoeding' 123. 
mMaasberg v Hunt Leuclrars & Hepburn 1944 WLD 2 13-14. See 333 below. 
msee 183 for the in-out adjustment for pension benefits received by an injured victim. 
514Newdigate & Honey 'MVA Handbook' 189(A) express the contrary opinion but seem to have failed to appreciate 
the reasoning behind ignoring the assets. 
meoberg 1971 SAU 423 446-59. 
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taken into account when assessing the damages. If he chooses to commit suicide the 
dependants have no right of action. If he chooses to drive recklessly and is then killed it 
seems perfectly reasonable that the dependants should carry that part of their loss attributable 
to the conduct of their breadwinner. 516 
A major criticism of the logic of the first school is that it is unduly legalistic. 517 It ignores 
the economic realities. 518 The major argument in its favour is that, whatever the failings 
of the breadwinner, society should ensure adequate support for needy dependants. However, 
if this is to be the guiding factor then all needy dependants should be compensated regardless 
of considerations of fault. 519 It would be wrong when distributing public funds to create 
a privileged class. 520 
[13.17] INSURANCE AND PENSION BENEFITS 
[13.17.1] Unfair legislation: An important function of insurance and pension benefits it to 
ensure adequate funds for the support of dependants after the death of the breadwinner. 521 
The support lost by dependants will include the value of savings, 522 including savings 
through the medium of insurance policies and pension funds. Such considerations 
notwithstanding legislation has been passed which precludes a court from taking account of 
pension and insurance benefits payable as a result of the death.523 The effect of this Act 
is that a dependant may claim compensation for the loss of savings whilst at the same time 
enjoying the benefit of those same savings. 524 There are numerous objections to this 
51 6This problem has been resolved in English, Canadian and Australian law by giving to the dependants no better 
right after the death than the breadwinner would have had in the event of his being injured and personally suing for 
Joss of earnings. (Davel 'Broodwinner' 160-1; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 406-7; Luntz 
'Damages' 2ed 109-15). · · 
517Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 59 66 86 165 241 282 285 has criticized the analysis of damages assessment in 
terms of the legal science of rights and obligations; see too Bloem bergen 'Schadevergoeding' 22 26-7; 48 above. 
518
'Dit kl ink waarskynlik logies .. . Daar by die verhoor gekyk moet word na al die gebeure wat dit voorafgegaan het 
en om skadevergoeding in die Jig van al die bekende feite en die werklikhede te bepaal ' General Accident v Summers 
1987 3 SA 577 (A) 6120 615B. 
51 9The modern dependants' action in South Africa compensates on the basis of loss not need. For instance life 
insurance and pension payments to widows will be ignored in terms of the Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
520
'We see no reason why victims of traffic accidents must be favoured above others' Grosskopf Commission report 
(1981) 14. -
mGroenewald v Snyders 1966 3 SA 237 (A) 247 248sup 'Buying insurance cover is a recognised feature of family 
protection in modern times'; Commercial Union Assurance v Stanley 1973 1 SA 699 (A) 704H 'Her husband would 
probably have secured her future, if he were to predecease her, by insurance or suitable investments'. 
512Marine &: Trade Insurance v Mariamah 1978 3 SA 480 (A) 488-9. 
523 Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
mDu Toit v General Accident Insurance 1988 3 SA 75 (D) : The deceased had been a pensioner. The provision of 
a pension from the same pension fund but under a different paragraph in the rules was held to be non-deauctible in 
terms of the Act. I have under paragraph 13. 7 . 10 discussed the inclusion of life insurance premiums in the income 
apportioned between dependants. 
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legislation, most notably that it creates a privileged class of claimants. 525 Certain points 
governing its application deserve mention: 
[13.17.2) Benefits deemed non-existent: The Act states that insurance and pension benefits 
payable as a result of the death shall not be taken into account when assessing damages for 
loss of support. This means that compensation is to be assessed as though the benefits do 
not exist. 526 It follows that estate duty should be recalculated on the reduced value of the 
estate. 527 The executor's fees should similarly be recalculated. If the widow has inherited 
shares in a company the value of which has been enhanced by the payment of an insurance 
benefit on the life of the deceased then the shares must be revalued as though the insurance 
payment did not exist. 528 
[13.17.3) Not all benefits are payable as a result of the death: 529 The pension under a 
retirement annuity plan, for instance, may continue to be payable for a total of 10 years by 
reason of the original contract concluded by the deceased. The rules of some pension funds 
may provide for a continuation of part or all of the deceased's pension. 530 Such pension 
benefits do not fall within the definition of the Act531 and are thus deductible when 
assessing damages for loss of support, subject to an adjustment for acceleration. 
[13.17.4) Deductible life insurances: The deceased may have been owner of policies on the 
lives of his children or his business partners or his wife. The surrender values of such 
policies will be included as assets in the estate accounts. These are not benefits payable as 
a result of the death and should be included in the deductible value of the deceased's estate. 
Sometimes the death occurs shortly after the maturity date of an endowment policy. The 
benefit paid to the estate is then not payable as a result of the death but as a result of the 
maturity. One also encounters instances where a woman has been twice widowed. The 
pension and life insurance benefits provided as a result of the death of the first husband do 
525Koch 1989 THRHR 203 214-15. Contra Van der Walt 'Sommeskadeleer' 229; 1980 THRHR 1 19. Van der Walt 
views the Act as an example where public policy justifiably overrides logic . The Act undoubtedly echoes the 
irrational sentimentality with which many view the phenomenon of death. At a more mundane level it reflects 
successful opportunism by life insurance offices with a view to promoting sales (Boberg 1964 SAU 346 353-4 
records the early history of this legislation). The major criticism of the legislation is that it favours those who can 
afford life and pension benefits. 
mHeyns v SA Eagle Versekeringsmpy 1988 (T) (unreported 6.7.88 case 13468/86). 
min England the courts have refused to adjust estate duty on the grounds that the duty was a debt owing by the estate 
which could not be apportioned to individual assets (Baker v Hopkins [1958) 3 All ER 147 (QBD); Boberg 1964 
SAU 346 357-8). In South Africa sl3(2) of the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 prescribes a formula for apportioning 
the duty between assets. This formula has regard to the life insurance benefits paid. The better view is to exclude 
life insurances from the estate altogether and then to re-assess the estate 's notional liability for duty, if any. 
528Malyon v Plummer [1963] 2 All ER 344 (CA); Pitt v Economic Insurance 1957 3 SA 284 (D) 286F-inf; Boberg 
1964 SAU 346 359n52. 
~129C/R v Nolan's Estate 1962 1 SA 785 (A) . 
5
'3-0Du Toit v General Accident Insurance 1988 3 SA 75 (D). In this matter the court found that in terms of the fund 
rules the widow's pension was not a continuation of the deceased' s pension but a new and separate entity. 
531 Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
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not fall within the ambit of the Act532 and should thus be brought into account when 
assessing the damages for loss of support from the second husband. 
[13.18] THE 'LOST YEARS' 
[13.18.1] Dependants' right of action: When a breadwinner is seriously injured his loss is 
shared by his family in the sense of a reduced value for their right to support. The 
compensation awarded to the breadwinner for his personal injury notionally restores the value 
of the dependants ' right to support. 533 However, if the breadwinner has suffered a 
reduction to his expectation of life he will receive no compensation for the 'lost years'. 534 
The dependants have then primafacie suffered a loss of support in respect of the 'lost years'. 
There are three main methods for dealing with this problem in equity: 
Method 1: Wait until death: The dependants could wait until the breadwinner eventually 
dies before they bring their claim. 535 
Method 2: Immediate increase to breadwinner's claim: The breadwinner could include in 
his claim the value of the support lost by the dependants during the 'lost years'. 
Method 3: Immediate separate right of action for dependants: Allow the dependants to 
bring their own actions for loss of support concurrently with the action by their breadwinner 
for loss of earnings. 536 
The position in South African law is that the dependants must wait for their right of action 
for loss of support until their breadwinner eventually dies,537 that is to say that method 1 
applies. 
[13.18.2] Difficulties with evidence: The requirement that the dependants must wait until 
death actually occurs presumes that proof of cause of death, when it occurs, will be a 
straightforward matter. This is to be doubted. Proof of cause of death 10 or 20 years after 
m Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969. 
mDe Vaa/ v Messing 1938 TPD 34 38; Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 
303-4. Under the dependants ' action itself there is some overlapping of rights of action (Dendy 1990 SAU 155-167) 
but this only arises once death has occurred. 
534Lockhat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 306F-G. See 227 above for further 
discussion. 
535This is the approach proposed by Reinecke 1976 TSAR 26 50-56 coupled with a claim by the breadwinner during 
his lifetime for what he would have earned during the 'lost years' . 
536See footnotes 551 and 552. 
537Ex parte Oliphant 1940 CPD 537 543-4; Evins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 839E-F 'The cause of action 
for loss of support ... will arise only upon the death of the deceased, which may occur some considerable time after 
the accident'. This statement is clearly obiter, but, considering the history of the dependants' action, would probably 
be decisively persuasive. See too Lock/rat's Estate v North British & Mercantile Insurance 1959 3 SA 295 (A) 303-
4. English law on this subject needs to be received with considerable caution on this topic because under English 
law the award of compensation to the breadwinner precludes the dependants from thereafter bringing an action for 
loss of support (McGregor ' Damages' 14ed 861 862; Cooper-Stephenson & Saunders 'Damages in Canada' 240; 
Luntz ' Damages' 2ed 399-400). 
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the date of the original injury is likely to be a highly contentious matter. The absence of 
reported judgments on this subject538 suggests that it is so contentious that litigation is 
considered unduly risky and dependants go uncompensated for a loss genuinely suffered, 
albeit in a contingent sense. 
Consider the following list of causes of death for paraplegics: renal failure (15,3% of 
deaths); cardiovascular failure (19,6% of deaths); respiratory failure (13,9% of deaths); and 
suicide (10,8 % of deaths). 539 In many instances it will be extremely difficult many years 
after the original injury to establish a causal link between the original injury and the eventual 
death. 540 Not the least problem will be an ever-increasing list of supervening events. 
Thus, for instance, the death of a paraplegic who fails to obtain medical assistance for 
pressure sores cannot be imputed to the person who caused the paraplegia. 541 And yet 
numerous deaths of this nature are included in the normal average mortality statistics for 
paraplegics. 542 Is it fair to burden a defendant with damages for a death where the 
proximate cause is the deceased's own negligence? One may note that the early death of a 
paraplegic due to his own negligence with handling his condition is a foreseeable event. 
What is more the condition of paraplegia increases the degree of health care needed in order 
to stay alive. If one bears in mind that legal causation is largely a question of judicial policy 
then there is much to be said for ignoring the deceased' s own negligence, and even dolus, 
as regards his health care. However, even if the deceased had not been injured he would 
have been at risk for dying early at some other time due to the normal hazards of life. It 
would not be fair to burden a defendant with the cost of the chance of loss of support in the 
normal uninjured course of events. The defendant's liability is for the increased risk of such 
loss. The problem with waiting until death actually occurs many years later is that the health 
consequences of paraplegia will be a contributory factor in most instances. The court will 
then be faced with a complex web of supervening causes which will complicate, rather than 
facilitate, the problem of allocating responsibility for the loss suffered by the dependants. 
One solution to this problem of allocating responsibility for the loss would be to 
apportion the loss of support on the basis of the increased statistical risk of death 
occasioned by the original injury. Such an allocation is best done while the breadwinner 
is still alive, and concurrently with assessing his own damages for personal injury. 
Quite apart from the problems with cause of death it is quite conceivable that 10 or 20 years 
after the event the defendant is untraceable. The injury would have interrupted the 
breadwinner's career 10 or 20 years earlier. The dependants' loss should be measured in 
terms of that notional career path. The employer may be untraceable or so changed in 
character that a career path cannot be identified. Interpreting extensive facts can be a 
531Ex parte Oliphant 1940 CPD 537 was concerned with death within 12 months after the injury. 
539Geisler et al 1983 Paraplegia 364 369. 
540 Alternative consider the deleterious effects of liver failure caused by injury which will impede a breadwinner's 
judgment resulting in his dying by, for example, a fall down a staircase or carelessly stepping into a lane of fast 
traffic. The same may happen to a person with a brain injury. 
s..is v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A). 
s..2The statistic for suicides probably excludes those who wilfully induce their death by drinking, smoking, or 
otherwise failing to follow medical advice. 
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daunting and inconclusive task. The employer and the insurer will often, after 5 to 10 years, 
have destroyed all records relating to the deceased. 
The above considerations suggest that the rights of the dependants, and the defendant, are 
not adequately protected by granting a right of action when a compensated breadwinner 
eventually dies. The case law is such that reform needs to be introduced by legislation. 543 
But what form should it take? 
[13.18.3] Refonn: Whatever method is adopted, the dependants should receive immediate 
rather than deferred compensation for the prospect of loss of support during the 'lost years'. 
The advantage of processing the dependants' claims at the same time as that of the 
breadwinner is that all the relevant evidence will be on hand. This will ensure, inter alia, 
that the dependants are informed that they have an action in law. Compensation for 
dependants at the time of the breadwinner's claim would be achieved both by method 2 and 
method 3 above. Method 3 is to be preferred in that it removes from the discretion of the 
breadwinner the disposition of funds relating to events notionally after his death. 544 
Bearing in mind that dependants, both widow and children, have a right to support from their 
breadwinner's estate545 this consideration is not a weighty one. Adoption of method 2 has 
the disadvantage that a breadwinner who settles his claim for damages thereby contractually 
deprives his dependants of their rights of action under the dependants' action. This would 
be contrary to one of the fundamentals of the dependants' action.546 Burchell records that 
the Law Commission in England547 has rejected as too complicated ·the granting to the 
dependants of a separate right of action during the 'lost years', that is to say a solution 
according to method 3.548 South African lawyers on the other hand are familiar with the 
logistics of separate rights of action for each dependant. 549 The objection recorded by 
Burchell probably has much less force in South Africa than in England. The granting of 
separate rights of action to the dependants at the time of the injury ensures that a plea of res 
iudicata may be raised against the same dependants if the breadwinner subsequently dies 
under circumstances which can be directly imputed to the injury, that is to say circumstances 
which would give rise to claims for damages by the dependants for loss of support, if they 
had not already received compensation . 
.s43It is conceivable, but unlikely, that the courts would view the dictum in Evins v Shield Insurance 1980 2 SA 814 
(A) 839E-F as obiter and initiate such reform judicially. The problem of reduced expectation of life was unknown 
to the Roman-Dutch jurists who dealt with all claims using the tables from the Digest (035.2.68) (see 83). Such 
an extension of the dependants' action would be an appropriate response to changing circumstances. 
S«Jn England where method 1 prevails it has been said that 'The law can make no distinction between the plaintiff 
who looks after dependants and the plaintiff who does not. .. On his death those damages will pass to whosoever 
benefits under his will or on an intestacy' Pickett v B1itislr Rail Engineeling ( 1979] 1 All ER 774 (HL) 784e. 
545See 285. 
546 Jameson's Minors v CSAR 1908 TS 575 588 589; Davel 'Broodwinner' 488. 
547No 56 of 1973. 
548 1976 SAU 365-7. 
549Constantia Insurance v Hearne 1986 3 SA 60 (A). 
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It perhaps deserves note that when a dependant is injured the breadwinner who incurs 
expenditure, by reason of his duty of support, has an immediate right of action for the loss 
suffered. 550 Potgieter Neethling & Visser are in favour of allowing an immediate right to 
action to the dependants551 as too is Boberg. 552 
[13.18.4] Prescription: The only real difficulty with adopting method 3 is the question of 
prescription. Death is readily proved, but not so easily a reduction in life expectancy. It is 
quite likely that evidence as to reduced life expectancy only becomes available at the time 
the breadwinner's claim for damages for personal injury goes to trial. Even then it may be 
hotly disputed by the breadwinner. A satisfactory solution to the prescription problem would 
be to suspend its running against the dependants until the eventual death of the breadwinner. 
Defendants cannot complain about such an arrangement which would place them in no a 
worse position than they are at present. 553 By allowing the dependants a right of action 
concurrently with the breadwinner, defendants would be able to finalize at an early stage all 
aspects of liability arising from the injury . 
[13.19] CONCLUSIONS 
[13.19.1] Registration of marriages: The action for damages for loss of support has its 
origins with popular Germanic dissatisfaction with the Roman-law ethic that the body of a 
freeman has no value. It is perhaps no accident that the modern form of the dependants' 
action crystallized after the Council of Trent554 and the introduction of formal procedures 
for proving the existence of a marriage. Modern South Africa faces a similar crisis with the 
need to accommodate the social values of blacks, values that echo those of the early 
Germanic law of Europe. 
The first major step in the right direction would be to elevate the status of black customary 
marriages to the same level as civil marriages. This might be by way of legislation enabling 
the registration of a civil polygamous marriage. 
550Schnellen v Rondalia Assurance 1969 1SA31 (W) ; see discussion at 193 above and Neethling Potgieter & Visser 
'Deliktereg' 2ed 288. 
mNeethling Potgieter & Visser 'Deliktereg' 2ed 289 'Gevolglik behoort die afuanklike in beginsel ' n aksie te he vir 
sover hy verlies van onderhoud kan bewys ' . 
552Boberg 1960 SAIJ 438 447 writes 'It is submitted that in this situation the dependants may recover damages for 
loss of support which they would probably have received during the period by which the breadwinner's life has been 
shortened. When a man has been killed his dependants have an action for loss of support: surely killing may be 
regarded for this purpose as no more than a shortening of a man's expectation of life to the limit. Can it be logically 
relevant that he survives an hour, a day, a year or a decade, as long as his life has been shortened? The fact that 
the injured man is not yet dead when the dependants sue can make no difference in view of the recognition of a 
dependants' action for bodily harm short of death ' . This was written before the handing down of the ruling in Evins 
v Shield Insurance (see footnote 25) . See Howroyd 1960 SAIJ 448 450 for a similar opinion to that of Boberg. 
m At present they have the prospect of an action by the dependants at some undetermined future date . They may 
argue that in practice they are at present never called upon to meet such a claim, but that with solution 3 they would 
be called upon to meet many claims by dependants. Such an objection to reforming legislation would only serve 
to highlight the need for such reform . 
5S4See paragraph 13 .1.4. 
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A second step would be to allow claims for dependants whose right to support derives from 
contract. The limiting factor to the size of such claims would be the general contingencies 
attaching to the continued provision of support. The value of the chance of durability may 
be very small indeed. The fact of a registered marriage would enhance the prospects of 
permanence. 
[13.19.2] Fonnalisms: The dependants' action, more so than the action for personal injury, 
has become highly formalised. The assessment of damages for loss of support is based 
increasingly on formulas such as the two-parts-one-part apportionment of family income.555 
A number of compensating advantages, notably life insurance and pension benefits556 and 
the revived earnings prospects of a widow after the death,557 are left out of account. These 
are not necessarily undesirable developments provided it is accepted that the dependants' 
action is becoming less and less compensatory and increasingly like an extended life 
insurance policy with benefits defined by common-law rules of assessment. The difficulties, 
particularly in the South African context, of adducing adequate evidence render an abstract 
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OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The major theme of this thesis has been the contingent nature of damages and the interplay 
of diverse compensating- and loss-aggravating factors in the assessment of damages for 
personal injury and death. The concept of the balance sheet of a life plan brings these 
factors together in a single schematic. The present value of uncertain prospective gains and 
outlays is assessed using the technique of valuation of a chance. This technique is of 
universal application to all valuation problems, although for practical purposes the calculation 
process is often simplified by using short-cut techniques. The analyst should take care to 
distinguish short-cut procedures from fundamental structures. 
Consideration of utility in abstract, and its concretisation by way of formalisms of calculation 
and evidence, leads to the conclusion that the present value of a life plan is a price, in a 
manner of speaking, a form of value in exchange. The lump sum does not provide the 
means to replace, or reproduce, the earnings or support that it represents. It is does not 
effect restitution in the sense of recreating the income or support that would otherwise have 
been earned, or received. As with the old Germanic wergilt it is but the price that the law 
allows as compensation for the wrong done to the claimant. Admittedly the price is 
calculated according to complex considerations of law, economics and medicine. These 
considerations have close regard for the life plan that has been destroyed. The calculation 
done by an actuary does not provide some mystical value which may used by consuming 
interest and capital to replace the lost income or support. The value calculated by an actuary 
is no more than the value of the chance of those earnings reduced by the actuary for the 
chance of early death, and then further reduced by the court for general contingencies. The 
award of once-and-for-all lump-sum damages effects restitution, but only in the limited sense 
of topping up the present utility of the claimant's life plan to what it would have been had 
there been no injury or death. 
Administrative efficiency dictates that there is a limit to how much detailed evidence can be 
mustered to personalise the award to be made. Once the court is satisfied that a loss has 
been suffered it must make do with such concrete evidence as is available. It follows that 
a lump-sum award for damages has a generalised abstract component which varies from case 
to case. Instalment compensation can, in suitable circumstances, enable greater 
particularisation but in many instances the evidential difficulties will ensure that the regular 
payments are themselves but idealisations. 
Causation is an essential component of damage. A cause has no meaning without an 
expected alternative sequence of events free of the event giving rise to the claim for damages. 
Hypothesis is thus essential even when compensation is being paid by instalments. . The 
longer the period of time since the original event causing damage the more supervening 
events there will be to blur the causal connection. This problem is most evident with claims 
for damnum emergens. With claims for lucrum cessans the continuing loss remains 
hypothetically based on what was foreseeable at the time of the injury or death. Due to the 
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abstraction there will then be few supervening events that will upset the original assessment 
but, conversely, the regular payments continue to depend on the original assessment 
formulated many years previously. 
Ideal compensation will be based on a consideration of the universal effect of the wrongful 
act on the claimant's life plan, both advantageous and disadvantageous. This concept 
requires the deduction of many collateral benefits that, in terms of the substantive law, are 
non-deductible. In a utopian state where all citizens are protected by a centralised insurance 
scheme there would be full deduction of collateral benefits, a wholly macro-economic 
approach. South Africa is still a long way from becoming a utopia. 
The action for damages for personal injury comes closer than any other to the utopian ideal. 
There is by and large an interactive regard for most aspects of the damaged life plan. 
Compensating advantages provided by an employer are generally brought into account. Loss 
of pure utility is compensated by way of the award of general damages for pain and suffering 
and loss of the amenities of life. The further development of the action would be assisted 
by judicial recognition of objectivized utility as a form of patrimonial loss, coupled with 
suitable procedures for quantifying the damages for such losses. Compensation for loss of 
use of assets, particularly money, still leaves much to be desired. 
The modem dependants' action, by way of contrast with the action for personal injury, has 
become increasingly stylised, that is to say formalistic and divorced from the true financial 
circumstances of the family after the death of a breadwinner. The action has become 
directed at recovering 'loss of support' rather than financial loss having regard to the overall 
effect on the dependants' life plans. It seems fair to say that the substantive law reflects a 
number of instances of excessive focus on a 'right to support' at the expense of a broader, 
more realistic, view of financial loss. The ghosts of Grueber and Mommsen haunt us still. 
The indications are that the Roman-Dutch action at the time of Grotius was allowed to a far 
wider range of claimants than is permitted in modern South Africa. The stylised nature of 
the modern dependants' action emphasises the 'pricing', rather than the restitutory, nature 
of the awards made for damages for loss of support. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with damages for continuing loss, such as most commonly arise with 
personal injury, or the death of a breadwinner. The approach has been multidisciplinary 
rather than multinational. The thesis comprises 4 sections: General theory; Technical issues; 
Technique and law governing personal injury claims; Technique and law governing claims 
for loss of support. The thesis does not seek to be a compilation of all relevant legal 
sources. 
The initial inquiry focuses upon utility theory and the related concept of value. In its most 
general form utility is merely descriptive of a vital life force. Its application to the 
assessment of damages requires objectivization. Money and risk are both subject to 
utilitarian considerations. Techniques can be developed for the measurement of personal 
utilities. The statistical concept of an expectation describes the utility of uncertain, usually 
future events. In suitable circumstances market value provides an objective guide to utility. 
Abstraction promotes forensic efficiency. Concretization, attention to personal details, 
ensures for each claimant and defendant a proper hearing. Justice involves a blend of these 
conflicting goals. 
Perfect restitution is only possible in extremely rare instances. In _general the damages 
awarded by a court are compensation, a fair equivalent for what has been lost. When 
differencing utility regard must be had for the effect of the award for damages on the overall 
utility after the wrongful act. The assessment of lump-sum damages is assisted by the 
concept of a patrimonium which includes as assets the present values of future uncertain 
incomes and outlays. The assessment of damages requires a comparison between the 
hypothetical state had there been no wrongful act and the actual state having regard to that 
act. 
Fundamental to the assessment of damages for uncertain loss is the technique, known as 
'valuation of a chance', whereby the present value of an uncertain hypothetical event is 
calculated by taking the value of that event as a certainty and then reducing it by a 
percentage to allow for the contingency of non-occurrence. The technique is applicable 
equally to past and future losses. The technique is distinguished from proof in a civil court 
on the balance of probabilities. The determination of the percentage chance may have regard 
to historical statistics but will more often be based on subjective value judgments. The 
analysis of chances according to subjective considerations has been a major field of study for 
analysts of utility. 
The average expectation of life is a point estimate obtained by summing the survival chances 
for all possible years of life to age 99 and beyond. The chance of inheritance is similarly 
calculated but with the chance of death in each year substituted for one of the survival ratios. 
The standard actuarial calculation for ascertaining present value proceeds by taking the value 
of the chance in each year of the relevant income or expenditure and then summing the 
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resulting series of separate values. I~ is generally unsound to suggest that by consuming 
interest and capital a claimant may reproduce the income that has been lost. 
Despite the inadequacies of a compensation model based upon consuming interest and capital 
it is a useful concept provided its limitations are borne in mind. Conditions of high inflation 
dictate that there is a 'ballooning' of the original capital for many years before inroads into 
· accumulated funds begin to be made. To test the consumable income from investing an 
award a court should ignore high nominal rates of return and look to rates closer to the real 
rate of return. The prudent investor will save for a retirement that extends well beyond the 
expiry of the expectation of life. The impact of tax on interest receipts is aggravated by high 
rates of inflation and renders such investments unattractive compared to growth investments 
such as mutual funds and immovable property. 
Life annuities provide a medium for contractually transferring the risk of early and late death 
to a life insurer. The use of actuaries by the courts has its origin in the need for evidence 
as to the price at which to purchase a life annuity. This evidence has with time become 
corrupted into a fiction about consuming interest and capital over the expectation of life. In 
recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in life annuities in the form of 'settlement 
annuities' . There are a variety of different annuity contracts of which the 'annuity certain' 
and the 'life annuity' deserve special note. It was the practice in the classical Roman-Dutch 
law to ignore the price at which 'life annuities' were commercially available. That practice, 
with few exceptions, continues today. 
The 'discount rate of interest' is better described as the 'discount rate of return'. A nominal 
rate (I) comprises a real rate of return (R) and an offset to inflation (F). For compensation 
calculations R is the most important measure. · Historical analysis suggests that R has a value 
of about 2,5 % per year compound. The net capitalization rate will be different from R if 
the cash flow to be valued does not escalate in line with inflation. The allowance for the risk 
aspect of general contingencies is best achieved by an increase to the discount rate of return. 
The deduction for general contingencies reflects the court's subjective impression as to the 
adequacy, or otherwise, the comparative utility, of the primary actuarial calculations. 
Although collateral benefits are sometimes viewed as part of the general contingencies the 
risks attaching to what has been, or will be lost, are the major component of the deduction. 
Allowance for such risks can equally be achieved through an increase to the discount rate of 
return. 
Interest is the measure of loss for deprivation from the use of money. The loss of use of 
goods can generally be quantified by interest on the value of the goods subject to an 
adjustment for the rate at which the goods increase or decrease in value with the passage of 
time. A court is competent to award damages expressed in terms of a foreign currency. The 
rate of mora interest must then be adjusted to that appropriate to the relevant foreign 
economy. 
Before dealing with the explicit actions for loss of earning capacity and support one needs 
to examine the.impact of collateral benefit rules upon the distribution of the costs of damage 
within the community at large. A comprehensive approach to damages requires the 
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deduction of insurance and employment benefits. A court making an award of damages 
should specify that a claimant should reimburse certain welldoers including an employer. 
Benefits provided by the State are not gratuitous and are generally deducted. 
The expression 'loss of earning capacity' embraces both earnings and living expenses. 'Loss 
of earnings' and 'loss of earning capacity' should not be distinguished. Just as increased 
living expenses, damnum emergens, increase the compensation payable so too saved living 
expenses reduce damage suffered and thus the defendant's liability. General damages has 
a patrimonial aspect and awards must have some regard to the cost of goods and services in 
the community at large. Likely earnings and likely expenses are the criteria by which to 
measure earning capacity and spending needs. The earning capacity of business capital 
should be distinguished from the earning capacity of the victim. Compensation for 'loss of 
earning capacity' includes loss of support for the victim's family. Illegal earnings are best 
dealt with by basing compensation on what would have been earned had the victim acted 
legally. 
The loss of a right to support determines who may bring an action for loss of support. The 
financial loss suffered is, however, not the right to support but the value of the financial 
benefits expected from the breadwinner in consequence of this right. This financial value 
will be assessed according the value of the chance of receiving the support. The working 
wife who earns sufficient to support herself has no right, at that point in time, to claim 
support from her husband. The loss by the dependants will be assessed without regard for 
compensating advantages other than inheritance and remarriage. The focus is on the support 
which would have been provided had there been no death. The widow who takes up 
employment after the death will be compensated as though she were unemployed. 
Conversely a widow who ceases employment in consequence of the death has no claim under 
the dependants' action for this loss of earnings. Loss of inheritance prospects will be 
compensated to the extent that these would have provided ongoing support. Although 
dependants have in theory a claim for loss of support during the 'lost years' such claims will 
usually fail due to difficulties with ~vidence. 
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Hierdie proefskrif handel oor skade vir voortdurende verlies, soos die wat intree weens 
persoonlike besering of die dood van 'n broodwinner. Die benadering is metodologies 
multidissipliner eerder as multinasionaal. Die proefskrif bevat vier hoof afdelings: Algemene 
Teorie; Tegniese Aangeleenthede, Tegniek en Reg ten opsigte van eise vir persoonlike 
besering; Tegniek en Reg ten opsigte van eise vir verlies aan onderhoud. Die proefskrif is 
nie bedoel as 'n volledige uiteensetting van alle relevante regsbronne nie. 
Die aanvanklike ondersoek fokus op die utiliteitsteorie en die verwante begrip van waarde. 
In mees algemene vorm is utiliteit beskrywend van 'n kern lewensdrang. Toepassing van 
hierdie begrip op skadeberekening noodsaak die objektivering daarvan. Geld en risiko is 
albei onderworpe aan utiliteitsoorwegings. Tegnieke vir die meting of beraming van 
persoonlike utiliteit kan ontwikkel geword. Die statistiese begrip verwagting ('expectation'), 
beskryf die utiliteit van onsekere, gewoonlik . toekomstige, gebeurtenisse. In gepaste 
omstandighede verteenwoordig markwaarde 'n objektiewe riglyn vir die bepaling van utiliteit. 
Objektivering bevorder geregtelike koste-effektiwiteit. Konkretisering of verpersoonliking, 
dws aandag aan persoonlike besonderhede, verseker dat beide eiser en verweerder volledige 
geleentheid tot bewyslewering by verhoor verkry. Geregtigheid verg die versoening van 
hierdie teenstrydige doelstellings. 
Volkome restitusie is in weinige situasies moontlik. Oor die algemeen verteenwoordig die 
skadevergoeding wat deur 'n hof toegestaan word, 'n billike ekwivalent vir dit wat verloor 
is. Waar utiliteitsvergelykings gedoen word, moet die effek van die skadetoekenning op 
totale utiliteit na die onregmatige daad, in ag geneem word. Die bepaling van enkelbedrag-
skadevergoeding behels aanwending van die vermoensbegrip, dws die huidige waarde van 
'n onsekere, toekomstige stroom inkomstes en uitgawes, as 'n bate of las bereken. Die 
bepaling van skade verg 'n vergelyking tussen die hipotetiese toestand waar geen onregmatige 
daad plaasgevind het nie, en die werklike huidige toestand met volle inagneming van die 
gevolge van die daad. 
Wesenlik by die bepaling van skadevergoeding vir 'n onseker verlies is die tegniek van 
waardebepaling van 'n kans ('valuation of a chance'). Die tegniek behels die bepaling van 
die huidige waarde van 'n onseker, hipotetiese verlies deur eers die waarde daarvan as 'n 
sekerheid te bepaal, en daarna laasgenoemde met 'n persentasie te verminder om voorsiening 
te maak vir die gebeurlikheid dat dit nie sou plaasgevind het nie. Die tegniek is ewe 
toepaslik vir reeds gelede en toekomstige verliese. Die tegniek is onderskeibaar van die 
bewysstandaard van oorwig van waarskynlikhede wat in siviele sake toegepas word. By 
bepaling van 'n persentasie kans word historiese statistiese gegewens in ag geneem, maar dit 
sal meer dikwels op subjektiewe waardebepalings berus. Die ontleding van kanse wat 
volgens subjektiewe oorwegings beraam word, is 'n belangrike gebied van ondersoek vir 
navorsers op die gebied van utiliteitsleer. 
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Die gemiddelde lewensverwagting is 'n puntskatting, verkry deur die bymekaartel van die I 
oorlewingskanse vir alle moontlike lewensjare tot op ouderdom 99 of meer. Die kans om 
te erf word op soortgelyke wyse bereken, behalwe dat die kans van sterfte in die betrokke 
ouderdomsjaar gebruik word in plaas van die oorlewingskans. Die standaard aktuariele 
metode vir die berekening van die huidige waarde van 'n reeks toekomstige bedrae behels 
bepaling van die waarde van die kans van die inkomste of uitgawe in elke betrokke jaar, en 
dan die bymekaartel van die herleide reeks afsonderlike waardes. 
In die algemeen is dit misleidend om voor te gee dat die eiser deur stelselmatige vertering 
van inkomste en kapitaal die enkelbedrag vergoeding kan omskep in 'n reeks bedrae wat 
gelyk is aan die reeks verliese. Nieteenstaande die tekortkominge van 'n vergoedingsmodel 
wat op laasgenoemde fiksie berus, kan hierdie wyse van berekening nuttig wees, mits die 
beperkinge daarvan in ag geneem word. Omstandighede van hoe inflasie het die gevolg dat 
vir 'n groot aantal jare daar 'n sterk groei ('ballooning') van die oorspronklike kapitaal 
plaasvind, voordat die geakkumuleerde fondse begin daal. As 'n hof 'n aanduiding van die 
verteerbare gedeelte van die beleggings-opbrengste wil verkry, moet hoe, inflasie-aangejaagde 
nominale rentekoerse in die proses gelgnoreer word. 'n Opbrengskoers nader aan die reele 
rentekoers is meer van pas. 'n Versigtige belegger sal fondse spaar vir 'n aftreetydperk wat 
verder strek as die verstryking van sy lewensverwagting. Die effek van belasting op 
renteverdienstes word vererger deur toestande van hoe inflasie sodat rentebeleggings minder 
aantreklik word teenoor reele beleggings soos effektetrusts of vaste eiendom. 
Lyfrentes of annuiteite is beleggingsmetodes waardeur die risiko verbonde aan vroee of laat 
sterfte aan 'n lewensversekeraar oorgedra kan word. Die howe se gebruik van aktuariele 
getuienis het sy oorsprong in die behoefte aan getuienis oor die prys waarteen 'n lyfrente 
aangekoop kan word. Hierdie soort getuienis is mettertyd verkeerdelik aanvaar as grondslag 
vir die fiksie van vertering van kapitaal en inkomste oor lewensverwagting. Oor die afgelope 
paar jaar was daar hernude belangstelling in lyfrentes in die vorm van skikkingsannuiteite 
('settlement annuities'). Daar is 'n verskeidenheid annuiteitskontrakte, waarvan jaargeld en 
lyfrente die vernaamste is. In die klassieke Romeins-Hollandse reg was dit die praktyk om 
die prys waarteen 'n lyfrente kommersieel aangekoop kon word, te ignoreer. Hierdie 
praktyk, met min uitsonderings, duur vandag nog voort. 
Die begrip 'verdiskonterings-rentekoers' kan meer korrek beskryf word as die 
'verdiskonterings-opbrengskoers'. 'n Nominale koers (I) bevat 'n reele opbrengsgedeelte 
tesame met 'n vergoeding vir inflasie (F). Met vergoedingsberekeninge is R die beiangrikste 
gedeelte. Historiese analise toon dat, bereken oor lang periodes, R 'n waarde van om en by 
2,5 % pj saamgestel, het. Die netto kapitalisasiekoers sal verskil van R indien die 
kontantvloei nie saam met inflasie ge-eskaleer word nie. Die aanpassing vir die risiko-
element van algemene gebeurlikhede kan optimaal gedoen word deur die verdiskonterings-
koers te verhoog . 
Die aftrekking vir algemene gebeurlikhede weerspieel die hof se indruk van die 
toereikendheid, of anders gestel, die betreklike utiliteit van die primere aktuariele 
berekenings. Alhoewel kollaterale voordele soms as deel van die algemene gebeurlikhede 
behandel word, verteenwoordig die grootste gedeelte van die aftrekking die ander risikos 
verbonde aan · wat alreeds verloor is, of wat in die toekoms nog verloor sal word. 
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Voorsiening vir sulke risikos kan net so wel in ag geneem word deur 'n verhoging in die 
verd i skon teri ngskoers. 
Rente is die maatstaf vir die verlies wat veroorsaak word wanneer iemand van die gebruik 
van geld ontneem word. Die verlies van die gebruik van goedere kan in die algemeen 
gekwantifiseer word deur berekening van rente op die waarde van die goedere, onderhewig 
aan 'n aanpassing vir die koers waarteen sulke goedere se waarde oor die betrokke tydperk 
toe- of afgeneem het. 'n Hof is bevoeg om skade wat in 'n buitelandse geldeenheid 
uitgedruk is toe te staan. Die mora rentekoers moet in sulke gevalle aangepas word sodat 
dit geskik is vir toepassing in die betrokke buitelandse ekonomie. 
Voor bespreking van die aksies vir die verlies van verdienvermoe en onderhoud moet die 
uitwerking van die voordeeltoerekeningsreels op die verspreiding van die koste van 
skadevergoeding in die gemeenskap ondersoek word. 'n Omvattende benadering tot 
skadevergoeding vereis die aftrekking van versekering- en diensvoordele. 'n Hof wat 
skadevergoeding toeken, behoort te beveel dat eisers sekere weldoeners, insluitend 
werkgewers, moet terugbetaal. Voordele toegeken deur die Staat is gewoonlik nie ex gratia 
nie en behoort dus gewoonlik afgetrek te word . 
Die uitdrukking 'verlies aan verdienvermoe' het betrekking op verdienste en ook 
lewenskoste. 'Verlies aan verdienstes' en 'verlies aan verdienvermoe' moet nie onderskei 
word nie. Net soos verhoogde lewenskoste (damnum emergens) die vergoeding betaalbaar 
verhoog, so ook verminder uitgeblewe lewenskoste die skade en dus ook die verweerder se 
aanspreeklikheid. · Algemene- of nie-vermoenskade het tog betrekking op die vermoe en 
toekennings moet rekening hou met die koste van goedere en dienste. Waarskynlike 
verdienste en waarskynlike uitgawes is die kriteria waaraan verdienvermoe en 
uitgawebehoeftes gemeet behoort te word. Onderskeid moet getref word tussen die 
verdienvermoe van besigheidskapitaal en die verdienvermoe van die slagoffer. Vergoeding 
vir 'verlies aan verdienvermoe' sluit in vergoeding vir die verlies aan onderhoud van die 
slagoffer se afhanklikes. Ten opsigte van onregmatige verdienste behoort die vergoeding 
gebasseer te word op wat die slagoffer sou ver~ien het, het hy regmatig opgetree. 
Die verlies aan 'n reg op onderhoud bepaal wie 'n aksie mag bring vir vergoeding weens 
verlies aan onderhoud. Die finansiele verlies verteenwoordig nie soseer die reg op 
onderhoud nie, maar die waarde van die finansiele voordele wat van die broodwinner verwag 
kon word, dit wil se, wat hy sou betaal het ter vervulling van hierdie reg. Hierdie finansiele 
waarde word bepaal volgens die waarde van die kans dat die onderhoud ontvang sou word. 
Die werkende eggenote, wat genoeg verdien om haarself te onderhou, het geen reg op 
daardie tydstip, om onderhoud van haar man te eis nie. Die verlies van die afhanklikes word 
bepaal sender inagneming van vergoedende voordele, behalwe erflatings en hertroue. Die 
fokus word geplaas op die onderhoud wat ontvang sou word indien geen dood plaasgevind 
het nie. Die weduwee wat as gevolg van die dood begin werk word vergoed asof sy nie 
werkend is nie. Daarenteen het 'n weduwee wat ophou werk as gevolg van die dood, geen 
eis deur middel van die afhanklikes se aksie ten opsigte van haar eie verlies aan verdienste 
nie. Verlies aan erfvooruitsigte word vergoed in die mate dat dit voortgesette onderhoud sou 
voorsien het. Alhoewel afhanklikes teoreties 'n eis het vir verlies aan onderhoud gedurende 
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die 'verlore jare' (waar 'n beseerde slagoffer se lewensverwagting ingekort is), misluk sulke 
eise gewoonlik weens gebrek aan voldoende getuienis. 
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175, 188, 207, 208, 2 10, 224, 282, 288 , 302, 303 , 32 1, 326, 327, 329, 347 , 348 , 353 
Deterministic .......... . . .... . . . ...... .. . ...... . .. . .. .. .. ... . ... .. 70 
Duty of care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 273 
Egg-shell skull . . . ... ... . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. .... .. . .. . ..... . ... . ... 33 , 35 , 44 
Foreseeability . . ...... . .. .. . . . .... . .. ............ 20, 30, 33 , 44, 52, 190, 271 
Hypothetical causation .. . . ... .... . .......... . .... . . .. . ... .. .... . .. .. . 62 
Impecuniosity .... . . . . . . . .. . . . .. .... . . .... .... ... .. ... .. .. ... . 172, 223 
Li mi tat ion of damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 56 , 77, 194 
Occasions ...... . ...... . . . . .. ... . ....... . ...... . .... ... . ... .. 25 l , 326 
Ongoing states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Reasonable man .... .. ... . .... . .... . .. . . 20 , 31, 40, 51 , 61, 131 , 208 , 209, 236, 326 
Sine-qua-non test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 , 208 
Supervening events .. .. . . . . . . ... . 21, 22, 31, 54, 66 , _85 , 95, 203, 240, 334, 348, 353 , 354 
Von Kries . .. . . . . . . . .... . . . .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . ... .. . . . ... .. .. .... 20, 327 
Cerra spes . ... . ...... . . .. . .... . ...... . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. ....... . 57, 74, 76, 87 
Child 
Child . 5, 17, 61, 63 , 66 , 90, 91 , 111 , 143 , 153, 154, 199, 222-225, 229, 230, 234, 235 , 252, 266, 
275-278, 280, 281 , 282-286 , 289-291 , 293, 294, 297, 298, 300-322, 324, 325, 327, 328, 
337, 339-342, 344, 346, 349 
Collateral benefits .. 3, 27, 33, 35, 36, 47, 50, 53, 59, 126, 149, 172, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 190, 191, 
193 , 206 , 209-212, 318, 319, 354, 356 
Accident insurance . 21, 33, 34, 36, 43, 52, 69, 70, 75, 87 , 90, 126, 151, 153, 154, 163, 167, 170, 
171, 188, 191, 192, 196, 208 , 214 , 217-219, 221 , 222, 226, 229 , 230, 247 , 249, 278 , 283, 
284, 297 , 302, 332, 336, 345, 346 
Casual frolic . ....... . . . . .... .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . ............... . .... 188 
Charity ... ... . . ... ....... ...... ........ . ... . 60, 199, 222, 223 , 287, 301-303 
Compensating advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52, 179, 182, 201 , 250, 273 , 299 , 351 , 354, 357 
Death benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 94 
Discretionary . . . ..... . .... . . . .. 75, 197-199, 221, 227-229 , 245, 249, 256, 260, 302, 305 
Donation . .... . ....... . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35, 191, 287, 292, 294, 340 
Employment contract in equity .. . . .... . .. .. .. .. .......... . ............. 197 
Employment contract stricti iuris ..... . .. . . .. . . . . ... .. .. .. . . .. .. ......... 197 
Ex post rationalization .. . . .. . .. . . ....... . . ........................ . . 210 
Gratuitous benefits . . . .. ... . . .. . .. .......... 33 , 44, 47 , 51 , 151 , 179, 190, 191 , 197 
Gratuitous support . ....... .. . .. ......... .... . . .. ... . . ... ... . . . . .. . · . 301 
Insurance . 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-19, 21-24, 27 , 30, 32-37, 39-44, 47-49, 51 , 52, 54, 56 , 57 , 59-63 , 65, 
67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75-79, 81, 82, 85-87, 90, 91 , 94, 95, 98, 99 , 101-103, 109, 110, 114, 
121, 126, 127, 130-132, 136, 143 , 145, 146, 147, 150-158, 163-165, 167-172, 174, 176, 
179-211, 213-222, 224-232, 234-261, 265-271, 273-288, 291-303, 309-311, 315, 320-328, 
330-334, 336-341, 343, 345-347, 349-351, 354, 357 
Insurance benefits . . .. ....... . .. .. .. -33, 51 , 179, 186, 187, 190, 208 , 303, 334, 345, 346 
Insurance principle . . . . . .... . . ..... ....................... . ... . ... . 186 
Large financial institutions .... .... . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . .. ...... 181 
Leave pay .. . . ... . . . . .... ...... ... . .... . . ..... . .... . ... . ..... 65, 198 
Like from like . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 201 
Loss-spreading mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 
Medical aid . . ..... ... . .... .. . ... ... . ...... . . . .. . ... . ... . ... . . 196, 251 
Military pensions . . . . . . . .. ... ..... . . ............... .. .. . .. .. 33, 206, 207 
National serviceman ... ..... . ... .. .. ... .. . .. .. .. .. . . .. . ... . ........ 206 
Normal practice ...... . . . .... . .. . ..... . ...... . .... . .... . ... .. .. 171, 198 
Pension benefits .. . 40, 94 , 13 8, 150, 156 , 183-185, 184, 185, 187, 197, 237, 246 , 302, 318, 322, 
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333 , 344-346, 351 
Pension savings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 
Pigeonholing . .... . . . . ... .. ................. 3, 184, 200-203, 205, 206, 213, 232 
Primitiewe wraakgedagtes .. . ... .... . . . . ..... . ..... . . .. ... . ... .... . ... 209 
Public subscription ................... ... .... ........... .. . ..... ... 200 
Reimbursement .. . . . ..... . . ...... .............. 51, 191, 192, 194-197, 200, 212 
Res inter alios acta ............ . .... 35, 36, 179, 181, 191 , 197, 209, 247, 266, 309, 340 
Savings ... . 91, 127, 135, 137, 165, 184, 185, 184-186, 188, 189, 198, 214, 215, 222, 225-229 , 
246, 248, 260, 264, 294, 296, 302, 303, 305, 307, 323, 331 , 336, 339, 345, 198 
Sick pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155, 196-198, 213, 220 
State grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61, 199, 200 
State institution .......................... ... ..... . .......... .. 228, 229 
Subrogation .... .. ............. . ............... ....... .. 51, 187, 188, 193 
Substitute services ....................................... 222, 265, 266, 298 
Waiver of a right ........... . ...... ... . . .. . . . .... . ..... . .. .. .. .... 191 
Welldoers ............ . . . ............. .... 44, 179, 180, 183, 190-195, 200, 357 
Widow's earnings .............................................. 320, 321 
Workmen's compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51, 115, 139, 155, 183, 199, 201, 203, 206, 237 
Condictio indebiti ..................... . . ... ............... . ... . . . .. 341 , 343 
Customary law . .. . .. . . ................ 45, 48, 154, 287, 288, 301, 302, 307, 327, 328, 342 
Isondlo beast . . ...... . ....... .. ... . . .. .... .. . . .. .. ............... 307 
Lobola .......... . ......... .. ..... . , ................ . .. . .... 307, 327 
Ukungena .................... . ......... . ... .... .. .. .. . ...... 302, 327 
Damages . l, 5, xvii, 1-5, 7, 9-12, 14, 16-36, 39-79, 82, 85-87, 89-95 , 98, 99 , 101, 104, 107, 110, 111, 
114, 117, 118, 121, 125-127, 129-131, 133, 134, 136, 137, 139-147, 149-151, 154-159, 
162-173, 175-177, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 190-192, 194-196, 198-211 , 213-218, 
220-228, 230-232, 234-237, 239-241, 243, 244, 246, 247-249, 252-261, 265, 268-271 , 
273-279, 282-288, 290-292, 296-299, 301-304, 306, 309, 312-326, 328, 330, 332-334, 
336-351, 353-357 
Bucket of utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55, 255 
Buy off the spear or bear it ...... . . . ..... . . ..... ...................... 258 
Compensation l, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20, 23-26, 28-30, 32-37, 39-46, 48-54, 58-61, 70-78, 82, 
84, 85, 87, 89-92, 94, 97, 99, 109, 110, 114, 115, 118, 120, 125, 127, 130-132, 139, 142, 
145, 149, 152, 155, 156, 163-165, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 180-183 , 185, 187-197, 
199-201, 203, 204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220, 221-223, 227, 229, 
231, 232, 234-246, 248-250, 252, 254-259, 265-270, 273-280, 282, 284, 286-292, 296, 297, 
298, 300, 303, 312, 316, 317' 320, 322, 324-326, 328, 329, 331, 332, 337' 338, 342, 
345-347, 349, 353, 354-357 
Composition .......... . ...... . .................. . .. . . 29, 48, 49, 197, 207 
Consequential loss. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 36 , 45, 46, 49, 214 
Motor vehicle .... .... ....... xvii, 36, 42, 44, 54 , 115, 182, 187, 243, 248, 256, 268, 283 
Retribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 
Topping up ......................... . . . . . .......... 55, 70, 72, 78, 255, 353 
Damnum emergens 12, 20, 46, 47 , 68, 73, 169, 175, 204, 213, 214, 232, 239, 240, 243, 245, 254, 353, 
357' 361 
Deceased estate 
Breadwinner's estate .. ... .... _. . .. . ... . .. .... ....... .............. 285, 349 
Estate ... 30, 40, 46 , 47, 58, 64, 65, 67, 73, 81, 83 , 106-109, 204, 208, 216, 217, 221, 227, 228, 
230, 250, 251, 254, 256, 258-260, 266, 270, 274-276, 284-286, 295, 296, 303, 308, 327, 
330, 331, 333, 334, 336, 337, 339, 340, 341-343, 346, 347, 349 
Estate duty .. . ....... . ........................... . ..... . .. 83, 208, 346 
Executor's fees ........ . . . ........... . ... . . ... .. .... . ...... . . .... 346 
Prodigal son ........ . ... .. . .. ........ ... . ....................... 108 
Surrender value of life policies .... . . .. . ... . . . ..... . ................. 186, 346 
Survival of actions .... .. .. .. ... .... ........ . .. . .... . . . ......... 203, 221 
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Dependants' action . 27 , 43-46, 57, 195, 214, 273-276, 297, 322, 330, 331 , 345, 347, 349-351, 354, 357 
Accelerated benefits. . . . . . . . . 184, 185, 294, 296, 330, 331 , 333 , 334, 336 , 339, 340, 342-344 
Adoption .. . . . . . .. . .... . .... . . . ......... . . .... .. . . 198, 208, 302, 329, 349 
Apportionment of damages ... 42, 51, 76 , 180, 183, 187, 255, 275, 303 , 310, 311, 339, 342-344, 
mdi 
As a result of the death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208, 246, 322, 332, 333 , 345, 346 
Benefits in kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192, 251, 291, 306 
Board and lodging .................... . ................ 33, 194, 251, 306, 307 
Body of freeman has no value . . . . .. . . ......... . ... . .. . .. . ....... 45, 274, 350 
Breadwinner .. l, 3, 29, 35, 44-46 , 49, 52, 58, 61, 65, 67, 73, 74, 91-94, 107, 180, 190, 193-195, 
201, 213, 225, 241, 246, 266, 267, 271, 273-279, 283, 285, 288, 291, 292, 299 , 300, 302, 
303, 307, 308, 319, 321, 325, 328, 329, 333, 338, 341, 344, 345, 347-350, 354, 355, 357 
Bride .............. . .................. . ..... .. . . .. 58, 279, 280, 307, 327 
Bride price ............ . ................. . .... .. . .. . ... ...... 307, 327 
Bridegroom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 
Business assets .... . ..... . ....... . ......... .. . .. .. .. ..... 261-263, 295, 333 
Cause of death after many years .. . .... . ......... . ...... . .. .. ..... 81, 347, 348 
Charity ............ . .. . .... . .... . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . ...... 222, 287, 301-303 
Civil marriage ................... . ........ . ... . .. . ..... . ...... 275, 288 
Comforts, conveniences and advantages ............. .. ... .... .......... 291, 292 
Common household ................ 276, 280, 281, 283-285 , 290, 300, 301, 305, 306, 318 
Common-law wife .............................. . . . . .. .......... 293, 301 
Communal assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·. . . 294 
Contractual right to support .................. 107, 132, 196-198, 284, 286, 287, 300-302 
Council of Trent ... . .............. . .. . .. . ... . .................. 275, 350 
Customary union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 , 286-288, 300 
Death benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 94 
Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57, 64, 99, 169, 170, 172, 174-176, 216, 217, 276, 303, 341, 346 
Depreciating assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168, 295, 334 
Discretionary benefits .. 37-39, 52, 65, 75 , 137, 156, 157, 198-200, 203 , 205, 208-211, 291, 292, 
312, 349 
Divorce rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153, 289, 326, 327 
Divorced woman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286, 288, 340 
Domestic help ............................................ . ... 291, 320 
Donations between spouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 
Duty of support ... 57, 107, 180, 193-195, 256, 277 , 27S, 280-283, 285, 288-290, 292, 298, 307, 
310-312, 314, 318, 322, 323, 350 
Emotional distress .......................... . . . .... . ... . ........... 275 
Employment benefits not shared with family .. . . ............... . ... .. ...... . . 306 
Estate duty ......... . ... ... ............ . ............. . .... 83, 208, 346 
Executor's fees ...... . ....... .. ....... . ....... . . . .. . . .. .... . ..... 346 
Expensive hobbies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229, 293, 303 
Family business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 295 
Family home ............... 63, 67, 135, 290, 293, 294, 299, 302, 332, 333 , 336-339, 344 
Family income ....... . .. . ... 27, 31, 34, 281, 290, 300, 302, 304, 313, 317, 321, 336, 351 
Fideicommissum ...... . . .. ......... . ... . .. . .. . ......... . .......... 342 
Funeral expenses . . ..... . .......... . ...... . . . ..................... 339 
Furniture ................... .. .. . ....................... 295, 337, 344 
Further children ........... . . . .. . .. . .... . ............ 301, 307, 319, 325, 327 
Further wives ....... . . .. ........................ . ............... 301 
Germanic customary law ...... . .............. .. . 44, 45, 209, 258, 274, 275, 327, 350 
Gratuitous support ....... . .. . ........... . ... . ................... . .. 301 
Gratuitous transfer of inheritance .. . . .... . ..... . .......... . .. .. .. .. ..... 340 
Half share to child .... .. . . ....... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290, 323, 339 
Hindu marriage .. . . .. . . . .. . ... .. . .. . ... . . .. .. ... .. .. 277, 279 , 286-288 , 300 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
368 DAMAGES FOR REDUCED UTILITY 
Homemaking capacity . . . ..... . . . ...... . ........ . ...... . . . 213 , 222, 223 , 323 
Illegitimate children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 , 307, 320 
Indivisible household expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301, 337, 338 
Inheritance ...... 26, 52, 61, 66, 73, 76, 79, 92-94, 96, 184, 234, 235 , 258 , 273, 294-296, 303, 
325, 330-335, 334-343 , 355, 357 
Insolvent breadwinner ...... . .... . .......................... . ....... 303 
Insurance premiums . ........... . .................... . .. 95, 136, 248, 302, 345 
/sondlo beast .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 
Likely support . . . . ...... . . . ... . . . ................... . ............ 291 
Lobola . ............................. . .......... . . .. . ... .... 307, 327 
Loss of benefits of divorce ................... . ................... . .. . 340 
Loss of inheritance prospects . . .... . ..... . ...... . . . 52, 73 , 92, 273, 330-332, 336, 357 
Loss of support .. 1, 3, 4, 23, 27, 36, 40, 43-45, 48, 59-61, 68, 72, 91, 115, 126, 130, 153, 154, 
176, 179, 193, 194, 200, 201, 208 , 213, 214, 223-225, 246, 266, 271, 273-279, 283, 
285-288, 292, 296, 297, 299 , 301, 304, 307, 309, 312, 313-316, 318-326, 328, 330, 331, 
333, 334, 338-340, 346-351, 354, 355, 357 
Lower-income household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249, 289, 306 
Maintenance ............... . ... . ... . .... .. ... 89, 170, 229, 307, 308, 311, 316 
Maintenance payments .... . ... . .................. 89, 170, 229, 307, 308, 311, 316 
Massing .. . .. . ..... . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. ..... .. . ....... 342 
Medical care .. . .. ........................ 204, 226, 234, 241, 242, 246, 259, 306 
Method A . . ....... . ..... . . ..... . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. .. . . .. . 313-317, 319, 321 
Method B . .. .. . . . .... . ........ . ...... . . . . . ..... . ...... . .. 278 , 314-317 
Migrant labour .. . .... . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . ... .. .. . . .. ... . . . . ...... 306 
Moral obligation to support ....... . . .. .. . ........ . .. . ... . . . . 284, 285, 302, 307 
More than one widow . .... .... . . .. . ......... .. .... . ................ 288 
Moslem marriage .. . ..... . ... . ....... . ... . .... . ..... . ... .. .. 286-288, 300 
Notional marriage ....... . ...... . ... . ...... . . . ....... . .. . . . ..... 223, 306 
Nudum dominium .. . ........ . ... . .............................. 341, 342 
Pension benefits ...... 33, 40, 75, 83, 89, 91, 94, 115, 130, 132, 136, 138, 139, 150, 155, 156, 
182-185, 184, 185, 187, 197, 199, 200, 206, 207, 237, 246, 257, 302, 306, 318, 322, 333, 
344-346, 351 
Pension deductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 
Period of dependency . . . . . . . .... . ... . .. . .. . ... 73, 288, 290, 298 , 315, 325, 331, 342 
Period of Joss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 
Period of widowhood ............ . . . ... . .. . ..... . .. . ... ... ... .. .. .. . 325 
Permanent support . . . ...... .. . . ..... . ..... . .......... 189, 204, 281, 306, 351 
Political ordinance of 1580 .. . .................... . ....... . . . ......... 275 
Potentially polygamous marriage .. . .. . .. . ............... 270, 286, 288, 300, 301, 350 
Redistribution of assets on divorce ...... . ................................ 340 
Remarriage ... 12, 18, 34, 35, 60, 73 , 74, 151, 207, 208, 223, 224, 229, 230, 273, 284, 298, 301, 
305, 317, 324-329, 336, 339, 357 
Remarriage rates ......... . . .. ... . ....... . ....... . ........... 73, 325-329 
Remarriage statistics .................. . ... . ............. 18, 34, 35, 325, 327 
Remarried widow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 
Retirement assets .... . . . ... . .. ... ... . ............................. 295 
Retirement gratuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93, 337 
Reversionary trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 
Right of action . . 34, 36, 43-45, 48, 49, 56, 57, 170, 175, 180, 187, 191, 193-196, 212, 218, 220, 
227, 246, 254, 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 285-289, 292, 299, 301, 309, 310, 331, 344, 
345, 347' 349, 350 
Savings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 
Separate rights of action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283, 284, 296 
Services in· the home ... 63, 222, 223, 234, 265, 266, 296-299, 301, 304, 308, 320, 322, 323, 325 
Services of grandparents ..... . ... . ............ . .......... . ........... 298 
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Sib .................... . ...................... . ........ 45, 209, 258 
Simplicity of calculation .............................. . ............ .. 305 
Single black mothers ............... . . . ....................... . ..... 307 
Single-parent family ................. .. ..................... ... . 305, 306 
Social advantages ....... . . . .. . ............... .... ........... .. . 291, 292 
Support .. 57, 107, 180, 193-195, 256 , 277, 278, 280-283, 285, 288-290, 292, 298, 307, 310-312, 
314, 318, 322, 323, 350 
Surrender value of life policy ....................... . ..... . ......... 186, 346 
Temporary support .............. 33, 58, ll5, 140, 146, 155, 167, 188, 227, 267, 281, 282 
Testamentary support . . ...... . .... . .... . ......... . . .. ............... 340 
Three-parts share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 
Travel to and from work ............................... . ............. 226 
Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153, 226, 299 
Two-parts-one-part apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 300, 314 
Two-parts-one-part method .......... . ....... 276, 281, 297, 304-307, 316-318, 338, 351 
Ukungena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302, 327 
Wedding .......................................... .. ... . 58, 279, 280 
Widow's duty to mitigate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282, 320, 340 
Widow's earnings ......... . .................... . ............... 320, 321 
Widows who cease working . . ............................ . .. .. ........ 321 
Wife's assets . . . ......... . ....................................... 294 
Wife's income ............................................ 303, 314, 315 
Working wife ....... . ............ . .......... 273, 279, 298, 308, 314, 320, _357 
Differencing ................. . . 3, 39, 41, 50, 53, 57, 59, 61, 66, 80, 164, 184, 217, 218, 355 
Balance sheet of life ....................................... ......... 234 
Classical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59, 66 
Damage ... l, 3, 7, 17, 22, 24, 25, 32, 33 , 36, 41, 43, 44, 46-59, 62-64, 66-68, 70, 77, 150, 167, 
169, 179, 180, 183, 188, 194, 195, 201, 203, 207, 213, 214, 216, 218, 234, 247, 248, 253, 
261, 269, 271, 353, 356, 357 
Differential contingencies ..... . .......... . . . ..... . . ... ........ 218, 219, 218 
Differenztheorie ................................ . .. . ............. 57-59 
Living expenses . . 37, 102, 103, 157, 172, 204, 213, 221, 222, 224, 225, 227, 229-231, 239, 240, 
243, 260, 271, 276, 281, 299, 306, 307, 312, 319, 357 
Measurement ................... . 5, 7, 11-13, 31, 33, 34, 44, 54, 94, 98, 142, 260, 355 
Reverse contingencies .................. ....... ........ . ......... 153, 218 
Rights and duties .... ... . ........................... 49, 64, 65, 202, 255, 279 
Utility ...................... . ............................ 41, 59, 355 
Duty of support . 57, 107, 180, 193-195, 256, 277, 278, 280-283, 285, 288-290, 292, 298, 307, 310-312, 
314, 318, 322, 323, 350 
Breadwinner's estate . .. . ... . . ................................... 285, 349 
Communal assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 
Community of property . ..... 283, 284, 288, 294, 303, 310, 312, 314, 315, 320, 331, 338, 339 
Contractual ...... . ........ . ............ 107, 132, 196-198, 284, 286, 287, 300-302 
Depressed economy .......... . .. .. ................ ... .............. 282 
Economic depression ...... .. . . ..... . ............................ 220, 289 
Epileptics ....... . ...... . ............... . ........... . .. ... . 81, 82, 289 
Family divided .... . ............ . .............................. 299, 318 
In accordance with his or her means .............. . ................ .. .... 311 
lndigency .......... .. ... . ................................ 278, 281-285 
Magistrates' courts . ........... . .. . . .. .. . ... . ........ -.............. 283 
Military service .... . .. . ............. . ... . .... .. . ... ........... 281, 290 
Mongoloid child .. . .. .. ........... . . .. ...... . . . .......... .. ..... . . 289 
Moral duty ........ ...... . . ........ . .. · .. . ....... . .......... . . 284, 302 
Moral obligation ... ..... ....... .. .... . ............ . .. . .. .. ..... 284, 302 
Order of court . .......... . . .. .. . .. . ........... . ......... 78 , 286, 287, 310 
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Parents-in-law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 
Period of dependency ......................... 73, 288, 290, 298, 315, 325, 331, 342 
Right to support .. 36, 49, 52, 57, 107, 180, 193-195, 256, 273, 277-283, 285-290, 292, 294, 295, 
298-301, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312-314, 318, 322-325 , 329, 344, 347, 349-351, 354, 357 
Son-in-law ... ......... . . . . . ................. · ................... 284 
State disability grant .... ...... ...... .. ..... ...... ... . . .. . ........ .. 289 
Statutory right to support ................................. . ..... . .. . . 287 
Support by a child . ... ..... .. ... . ......... .. .............. . .. 279-281, 341 
Tertiary education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282, 289, 303 
Unemployment ... . ... ........ ... . . IO, 28, 145, 151, 152, 155, 156, 223, 257, 282, 319 
Wife's assets ............ ... .. .. .. . ...................... .... ... ; 294 
Working child .............................................. ..... 280 
Working wife ........ .................. 273, 279, 298, 303, 308, 314, 315, 320, 357 
Earnings 
Averages ........... ... ... .. .......................... 18, 145, 233, 262 
Benefits in kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192, 251, 291, 306 
Board and lodging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3, 194, 251, 306, 307 
Business capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168, 213, 261-263, 262-264, 266, 292, 295, 333, 334, 357 
Civil servant ·· ...... ... . . . . . ..... . ... .. ....... .. . . ...... . .. . 93 , 102, 337 
Commission .................. ... ..... 154, 155, 168, 172, 175 , 206, 261, 345, 349 
Contract of employment . . 36, 40, 65, 183, 186, 196-198, 200, 202, 208, 212, 239, 291, 322, 344 
Death benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 94 
Discretionary .................. 75, 197-199, 221, 227-229, 245, 249, 256, 260, 302, 305 
Domestic element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229, 245 
Electricity ............ ....... .... ... ...... . ..... . ............ 251, 291 
Employee . 12, 15, 60, 102, 150, 151, 154, 155, 165, 180, 183, 184, 196-198, 212, 220, 226, 239, 
332 
Employer ..... 12, 15-17, 21, 60, 65, 94, 102, 137, 151, 152, 154-157, 165, 179, 180, 183-186, 
195-200, 219, 220, 226, 236, 238, 239, 247, 291, 294, 307, 332, 333, 344, 348, 349, 354, 
357 
Employment benefits ...... . ..................... . ..... 179, 196, 197, 306, 357 
Entrepreneur .......................... . ...................... 130, 264 
Family business .... ...... ..... .... ... .. .......... 265, 266, 322-324, 330, 337 
Fluctuating ............. .... . ................................ 261, 262 
Gross national product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 
Illegal ..... . . ..................................... 53 , 213, 267, 269, 357 
Insurance benefits ...... ... . ... . .... 33, 51, 179, 186, 187, 190, 208, 303, 334, 345, 346 
Leave pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 198 
Meals ...... ........ . . ..... . . .. .................. . ............ 291 
Medical aid ........................ 196, 204, 226, 234, 241, 242, 246, 251, 259, 306 
Overtime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16, 65, 150, 154, 155, 261, 291 
Pension benefits ... 40, 94, 138, 150, 156, 183-185, 184, 185, 187, 197, 237, 246, 302, 318, 322, 
333, 344-346, 351 
Pension deductions ................................................ 302 
Ploughed-back profits ............................ .... .... 262, 264, 295, 336 
Promotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 28, 29, 35, 65, 73, 74, 90, 99, 145, 154, 197, 198, 291 
Real increases ..... .... . .. ....... . ...... ... ............ 117, 132, 145, 146 
Retirement .. . 47, 79, 83, 85, 86, 89, 91-93 , 96-99, 102, 111, 113, 114, 130, 134, 150, 153, 155, 
156, 158, 160-162, 184, 185, 199, 201, 237, 238, 246, 247, 252, 264, 279, 289, 295, 296 , 
302, 330, 337, 346, 356 
Retirement gratuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93, 337 
Salary/wages . . . . 18, 26-28, 34, 41, 60, 63, 65 , 104, 114, 130, 133 , 138-140, 143-145, 150-152, 
154-156, 165, 181, 183, 184, 186, 190, 195-198, 218, 220, 239, 256, 265, 278, 281, 282, 
290, 298, 302, 305-308, 322, 323 
Self-employed ..... ... ... ...... ..... 146, 150-152, 155, 184, 220, 251, 261, 295, 296 
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Servant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196, 240, 337 
Sick pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155, 196-198, 213, 220 
Standby ..................... . .. . .............................. 165 
State pension ..................... . ... . .. .... . .. . . .. . 91 , 237, 250, 251, 289 
Taxi driver . ...... .. .. . . .... ... .. . ........... ..... .............. 268 
Use of a car ........... ...... . . .. .... ....................... . ... 291 
Wage escalations ........ . ......... . ............. .. . ... ... . .... 138, 171 
Wage gap .............. . ... . ........... . . . . .... ...... .. ... . . 145, 282 
Equity 
Dutch law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 45, 48, 113, 172, 193, 209, 275, 287 , 288, 302, 356 
Equitable result ........................... . .. ... . .. .............. 201 
Even-handed justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 75, 109, 132, 181, 190, 224, 252, 316 
Fairness . 8, 14, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 26-28, 37, 38, 41, 69, 70, 72, 74, 80, 109, 119, 126, 132-137, 
139, 143, 156, 158, 164-166, 168, 172, 173, 179, 192, 199, 203, 207, 211 , 218, 219, 226 , 
238, 242, 257, 294, 302, 304, 312, 329, 332, 345, 348, 354, 355 
Gut feeling . . . . .... ... .. . . .... . .. . . . .. . . ...... ................... 37 
Inexorable actuarial calculations .... ... .. . . . .... . ...... . ........... .. . 37, 39 
Injustice . . ............... . ... .. . . ............. . .... 35, 37 , 139, 217, 254 
Justice .. 5, 13, 14, 16, 22, 32, 34, 35 , 38, 47, 48, 51, 71, 75, 109, 132, 144, 164, 168, 171, 180, 
181, 185, 190, 199, 201, 203, 209, 210, 224, 228 , 252, 259, 270, 274, 286, 316, 333, 340, 
355 
Morality ......................... . . .. ......... .. ... ... .. . . . . 31, 211 
Morality of logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 211 
Natural justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48, 199 
Wide discretion ..................... . ......... . 37-39, 203, 205, 210, 211, 312 
Evidence ... 12-14, 16, 17, 20-22, 24, 26, 27, 32-36, 39-42, 45, 54, 56, 62, 63, 71, 75, 81, 82, 85, 98, 
110, 113-115, 118, 121, 127, 131, 132, 138, 141, 142, 144-147, 149, 150, 154, 156, 157, 
165, 170-174, 176, 179, 181, 189 , 191, 210, 211, 220, 223-225, 232, 236, 238, 239, 241, 
242, 245, 250, 267, 273, 275, 276, 278, 289, 296, 303-308, 315, 320, 325, 328, 334, 338, 
344, 347, 349-351, 353, 356, 357 
Abstract damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 33, 34, 37, 126, 354, 355 
Averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Burden of proof . ... . . . ......... . .... . ........ 33, 35, 37, 51, 126, 163, 225, 239 
Compensation by instalments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l, 42, 48, 109, 114, 132, 326 
Concrete damage ....... 5, 27, 31-37, 51, 53, 54, 126, 131, 174, 180, 190, 225, 232, 353, 355 
Cross examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
. . 
Expert witness . . 11, 12, 17, 24, 26, 27, 77, 82, 143, 153 , 154, 157, 191, 238 , 241, 243-246, 248, 
264, 330 
Wide discretion ............................... . 37-39, 203, 205, 210, 211, 312 
Expenses 
Accommodation costs ... . .. .. 135, 140, 194, 199, 226, 229, 251 , 252, 275, 291, 298, 338, 339 
Airconditioning . .............. .. . .. ........ . ........ 234, 235, 248, 250, 251 
Attendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213, 225, 241 
Automatic car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 
Computers ................. . .... . ............. ............... 145, 147 
Cost of appliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213, 225, 241 
Costs awarded to parent .... . .. .... . .. . . ......................... . . .. 254 
Curator bonis .............. ........ ........ . ....... 127, 253, 254, 265, 276 
Domestic help ................ . .. . .......... . ... . ......... .... 291, 320 
Driver-attendant ..... ....... ...... . ...... .. ... .... . .. ..... ... ..... 252 
Entitlement ........... . ................................ 26, 125, 189, 237 
Expenses .. 26, 30, 35, 37, 46, 58, 68, 95, 102-104, 106, 109, 115, 118 , 125, 127, 136, 140, 146, 
148, 153, 154, 157, 169, 172, 184, 189, 195, 199, 201, 202, 204, 213, 221, 222, 224, 225, 
227, 229-232, 239-246 , 248, 251, 254, 255, 259, 260, 271, 273, 276, 281, 291, 293, 294, 
297, 299-301 , 303, 306, 307, 311-313 , 315, 319, 323 , 337, 338, 339, 342, 357 
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Extra insurance costs .. ................................ . ............ 160 
Heated swimming pool ..... . . ..... ....... . ....... ..... .. . .. . ..... .. . 250 
Holiday . . ... . ......... . ........ ... .... . . . . . ... . . . 226, 249, 252, 292, 336 
Home . 27, 63, 67, 90, 99-101, 123 , 135, 138, 167, 213, 220, 222, 223, 226, 234, 235, 243, 245, 
249-253, 265, 267, 281, 282, 289-291, 293-299, 301, 302, 304-308, 313-315, 317, 318, 320, 
322-325, 332, 333, 336-339, 344 
Investment advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127, 253, 265 
Licence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167, 243, 247 
Likely expenses .. ............. .. .. . .......... . .. .. . . ...... . 213, 241, 357 
Managing investments ............................. . .. .. . ... . .. . . . . . 265 
Medical expenses . 11, 22, 26, 46, 63, 73, 77, 81, 82, 109, 115, 146-148, 153, 154, 170, 181, 184, 
188, 195, 196, 200, 201, 204, 205, 207, 213, 221, 223, 226, 231, 232, 234, 238, 240-246, 
248, 251, 254, 255, 259, 273, 306, 307, 348 
Medical inflation .......... . . . ........................... . · . ....... 146 
Modifications to the victim's home . .. ... ................................ 250 
Motor vehicle xvii, 15, 32, 36, 42, 44, 54, 60, 66, 65, 67, 115, 135, 164-168, 182, 183, 187, 207, 
214, 226, 227, 234, 235, 241-243, 245, 247-249, 252, 256, 260, 268, 274, 281, 283, 291, 
292, 295-297, 302, 315, 334, 344 
Nurse ...... .. ................................. . .. . . 192, 193, 240, 251 
Power wheelchair ..... . . ..... . . ..... . . .. ............ . .. . .......... 252 
Private medical care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242, 246, 259 
Purchase of a home ........... . ..... . . . . ................ . .. .. .. .. . . 250 
Running costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166, 167, 235, 341 
Servant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196, 240, 337 
Social standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242, 243, 281 
Substitute services ....................... . .. . . . . . .. .. .. .. 222, 265, 266, 298 
Travel costs ...... .. . . . . . ....... ...... 150, 153, 204, 226, 252, 260, 292, 299, 303 
Wasted expenses . .......... . ....... . . . .................. . ... 58, 165, 199 
Wheelchair ........ ......... . ... .. .. ............... 147, 226, 247, 249, 252 
Expropriation .. .... ........ . ......... . . . ... . . ... ..... . .. .. ............ 29 
Family members 
Brother .. ............ . .......... . . . ..... 44, 120, 273, 283, 284, 302, 327, 331 
Child . 5, 7, 10, 12, 17, 27, 31, 34, 48, 56 , 57 , 61, 63-66, 90, 91, 96, 106-108, 111, 143 , 152-154, 
158, 191, 195, 199, 207, 208, 218, 220, 222-225, 229, 230, 234-236, 241, 245, 252, 254, 
255 , 266, 271, 273 , 275-281, 280-287, 289-291, 293 ; 294, 296-298, 300-322, 324, 325, 
327-329, 331 , 332, 337, 339-342, 344, 346, 349 
Daughter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 
Father .. 5, 32, 52, 91, 191 , 193, 194, 236, 254, 255, 277, 278, 280-284, 290, 297, 298, 305-308, 
310-320, 322, 329, 331 
Grandchildren ....... ... ...... ... ................................ 285 
Grandparents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285, 298, 306 
Husband . 17, 40, 91-93, 116, 130, 193, 194, 201, 214, 222-224, 230, 235, 240, 243, 258, 265-267, 
273, 274, 276, 277, 278-286, 288, 289, 292-295, 297-299, 302-304, 307-318, 320-329, 331, 
334, 336-340, 342, 345-347, 357 
- Mother ..... 48, 63, 91, 194, 225 , 236, 241, 277, 280, 281, 283, 284, 292, 297, 298, 300, 301, 
305-307, 311-313, 315, 316-320, 329, 339, 340, 342 
Nephews . . . ... ....... . ...... . ..... . ..... . . . . .. ... ... 273, 274, 278, 285 
Nieces . . ... ... ...... . . .. ..... . . ....... . . .. ......... .. . .... . 278, 285 
Parent .. 31, 33 , 57, 90, 93, 195, 208 , 235, 236 , 245, 254, 255 , 271, 277-285, 289, 290, 296-298, 
300, 303-307 ' 309, 310-320, 337 
Parents-in-law .. . ... . .. ... .. . . . ....... . ........... . ............ .. 284 
Sib ............................. . ............. ... . .. . .. 45 , 209, 258 
Siblings ................. . . . ..... _:... . ...... . . .. .... . ... 236, 281, 283, 290 
Sister .. · ..... . ... . ... . . . . . .... . ... . .. ... . .... ... . .... . ... ... .. 284 
Son . .... ...... . . . . . . . . . .... . . . 32, 91 , 108, 149, 278, 281, 284, 307 , 331, 342, 343 
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Son-in-law ............. .. . . .. . .......... . . . . . .......... .. .... . . 284 
Stepchild .............. .. . . ......... ". ..... . .......... 283, 284, 300, 310 
Stepfather .... . ............ . ....... . ............ . .. . ..... . ... 284, 317 
Stepmother . ............... . ....... . ............. . . .. .. ... ...... 284 
Stepparent ......................................... .. .. ... ...... 283 
Uncle .............. · .. .. . . . .. . . . . .. . ....................... 278, 285 
Widow .... 13, 17, 21, 40, 60, 73, 91, 94, 108, 130, 154, 189, 201, 207, 208, 214, 270, 273-275, 
278, 285-288, 291, 295, 296, 300-302, 305, 314, 316-318, 320-322, 324-326, 328, 329, 331, 
332, 334, 337-344, 346, 349, 351, 357 
Widower ...................... . ................. . ............. 329 
Wife .... 61, 63, 66, 67, 73, 91-94, 153, 193, 194, 222, 224, 229, 230, 234, 235, 240, 252, 258, 
265-267, 271, 273, 276-285, 287-289, 291-298, 300-318, 320-325, 327, 329, 331, 334, 336, 
338-340, 342, 346, 357 
Financial loss .... 22, 29, 32, 43-45, 53, 57, 59, 184, 193, 211, 221, 226, 232, 273, 278, 292, 354, 357 
Economics xvii, 1-3, 6, 14, 17, 19, 20, 32, 38, 42, 46-49, 53, 56, 63, 64, 77, 103, 120, 133, 137, 
143, 146, 159, 180, 187, 195, 199, 205, 207, 209, 212, 216, 220, 231, 238, 261, 279, 282, 
289, 290, 298, 344-346, 353, 354 
Foreign currencies 
Currency depreciation .. . ..... .. . . .. .. ............................ 146, 207 
Exchange rates ....... . ........................................ 168, 176 
Foreign economy ....... . ......... . ...... . .............. 16.3, 176, 177, 356 
Games of chance 
Casual frolic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 
Gambling ........................................... . 131, 228, 247, 303 
Lottery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10, 188, 258 
General contingencies ...... 3, 10, 14, 27, 66, 67, 73-75, 86, 90, 93, 97, 109, 110, 125, 126, 129, 138, 
144, 147, 149, 151-161, 160-162, 189, 202, 217-219, 225, 226, 229, 232, 241, 245, 247, 
248, 252, 258, 264, 270, 289, 301, 317, 325, 331, 336, 339, 344, 351, 353, 356 
Cataclysmic events ........ . ................................ . ... 155, 157 
Commission .......... . ............... 154, 155, 168, 172, 175, 206, 261, 345, 349 
Differential contingencies .......... . . . ........................ 218, 219, 218 
Divorce . 36, 67, 151, 153, 154, 216, 222, 224, 229, 230, 235, 239, 288, 289, 307, 308, 315, 318, 
319, 323, 326, 327, 339, 340 
Divorce rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153, 289, 326, 327 
Domestic element .............................................. 229, 245 
Early judgments .............. . ................................... 149 
Fluctuating earnings ............................................ 261, 262 
Fluctuating returns . . ... . . . ....... . ................ 107, 138, 139, 159, 168, 261 
Further children ................... . ................. 301, 307, 319, 325, 327 
Further wives ................................................... 301 
Increase to discount rate ..... . . . .............................. . ...... 160 
Layers of earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 
Period of risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
Risk attaching to pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 
Risk of fluctuation ................. . . .. ..... . ..................... 264 
Strike action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 
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